Richards v. City of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------x

ALROY RICHARDS,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

- against - 24-CV-7074 (PKC) (RML)

CITY OF NEW YORK AND MR. ROSARIO,

Defendants.

-------------------------------------------------------x

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Alroy Richards (“Plaintiff” or “Richards”), proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis (“IFP”), (Dkt. 4), brings this suit against the City of New York (the “City”) and Police

Officer Joseph Rosario (“Defendant Rosario”) (together, “Defendants”), alleging violations of

various constitutional amendments and other state law claims, all stemming from a traffic stop on

July 8, 2023. (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF1 9–10; Dkt. 19 (providing Defendant Rosario’s full

name).) Since filing the complaint, Plaintiff has also alleged various common law causes of action

as well as violations of the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). (Order to Show

Cause (“OTSC”) Resp., Dkt. 21-1.) On March 25, 2025, Defendants filed a letter motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).2 (Mot.,

Dkt. 22.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss and

dismisses Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety.

1 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing

system and not the document’s internal pagination.

2 The Court ordered Defendants to brief their motion to dismiss via letter-motion.

(2/12/2025 OTSC (ordering Defendants to file a letter brief in support of its motion to dismiss));

see Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(e) (generally prohibiting dispositive matters to be brought by letter-motion

“unless authorized by . . . order issued in a particular case”).

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Allegations3

Plaintiff is a “[B]lack, immigrant” man who alleges that he has made “numerous

complaints [and] filed related lawsuits” against the City and the New York City Police Department

(“NYPD”). (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF 9 (emphasis removed4).) Plaintiff alleges that, in part

because of these complaints, he has been subject to “careful targeting,” profiling, and retaliation.

(Id. at ECF 10.) Plaintiff alleges that he “was . . . followed by the police[] in unmarked vehicles.”5

(Id. at ECF 8.)

On July 8, 2023, at 7:42 pm,6 and allegedly as part of this “intimidat[ion]” campaign,

several members of the NYPD, including Defendant Rosario, conducted a traffic stop of Plaintiff

in Brooklyn, New York. (Id. at ECF 8–9.) Plaintiff alleges that he was driving when “all of a

sudden . . . the police teams pulled up[] and . . . accused the Plaintiff of traffic violations.” (Id. at

ECF 8.) The NYPD “questioned [Plaintiff] as to his driving [past] a garbage truck as well as a

black SUV,” (id. at ECF 35), which had caused Plaintiff to drive “into oncoming traffic,” (id. at

3 “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion” a court may properly consider, inter alia, “the facts

alleged in the pleadings, [as well as] documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference

in the pleadings.” Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Samuels v. Air

Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1993)). In addition, because of the liberal construction

afforded to pro se papers, “[a] district court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider factual

allegations made by a pro se party in [their] papers opposing the motion.” Moss v. Bd. of Educ.,

No. 23-CV-6571 (JS) (SIL), 2025 WL 1548945, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2025) (quoting Walker

v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013)).

4 Where applicable, the Court has removed emphasis from, and made capitalization

alterations to, the remaining citations to Plaintiff’s filings.

5 The Court notes that Plaintiff elsewhere alleges that the vehicles were “marked.” (Am.

Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF 35.)

6 Plaintiff states that his traffic stop occurred at 7:42 pm rather than 7:35 pm, as stated on

the relevant traffic summons. (Id. at ECF 8.)

ECF 18). Plaintiff confirmed he had passed a garbage truck that was moving slowly. (Id.) Plaintiff

then provided the paperwork requested by the NYPD and was told to remain in his vehicle, which

he did for nearly ten minutes. (Id. at ECF 9.) The NYPD then handed him a traffic court summons

for reckless driving. (Id.; see also id. at ECF 18 (showing reckless driving charge).) Plaintiff

responded to state court pursuant to his summons on July 27, 2023, where his traffic violation was

dismissed pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“NYCPL”) § 170.55. (Id. at

ECF 9, 14.)

Plaintiff subsequently filed a personal injury claim (the “Claim”) with the New York

Controller’s Office (“Controller’s Office”) on October 5, 2023, for claims including the “illegal

traffic stop,” “unlawful detention/imprisonment,” and “illicit profiling.” (Id. at ECF 33, 35, 38.)

Plaintiff sought “garden variety” emotional damages. (Id. at ECF 36.) The Controller’s Office

confirmed receipt of Plaintiff’s Claim on October 10, 2023. (Id. at ECF 31.) On

December 10, 2023, and March 22, 2024, Plaintiff reached out to the Controller’s Office to follow

up on his Claim. (Id. at ECF 40–42.) On April 11, 2024, the City’s counsel contacted Plaintiff to

schedule a 50-h hearing7 for May 22, 2024, regarding the incident underlying Plaintiff’s Claim.

(Id. at 43–46.) On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff reached out to the Controller’s Office to discuss

settlement.8 (Id. at 47.)

7 A 50-h hearing is one pursuant to Section 50-h of the New York General Municipal Laws,

which outlines the process for examining claims against municipal entities. N.Y. Gen. Mun.

L. § 50-h.

8 The record does not indicate whether the City responded to Plaintiff’s settlement

invitation. (See generally Am. Compl., Dkt. 19.)

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in this case on October 4, 2024. (Compl., Dkt. 1.)

On January 21, 2025, the City filed a letter requesting a pre-motion conference ahead of its

anticipated motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 14.) On February 3, 2025, Defendant Rosario filed his answer

to the Complaint. (Dkt. 16.) On February 12, 2025, the Court denied the pre-motion conference

request as unnecessary and instead set an expedited briefing schedule “for the City’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claims.” (2/12/2025 Dkt. Order); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court also noted “that there does not

appear to be any plausible basis for any of Plaintiff’s claims, including what appear to [be] claims

against Defendant Rosario under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for violations of the 4th and

14th Amendments,” and ordered Plaintiff to show cause by March 11, 2025, “why his claims

against Defendant Rosario should not be dismissed under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state claims

on which relief may be granted.” (Id.) On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Amended

Complaint, which is identical in substance to the original Complaint but redacts certain

information as directed by the Court. (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19; 2/12/2025 Dkt. Order (directing

redactions).) On March 11, 2025, Plaintiff responded to the Order to Show Cause. (OTSC Resp.,

Dkt. 21-1.) On March 25, 2025, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint

for failure to state a claim. (Mot., Dkt. 22.) On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed his response. (Pl.

Resp., Dkt. 23.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss” pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)); Tyler v. City of Kingston, 74 F.4th 57, 61 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting id.). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Olson v.

Major League Baseball, 29 F.4th 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting id.). “The plausibility standard is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Pleadings submitted by pro se plaintiffs are held to “less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The Court is required to read a pro se plaintiff’s

complaint liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. McLeod v. Jewish

Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Bertin v. United States, 478

F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007)). But even under this liberal standard, a court “cannot invent factual

allegations that [the pro se plaintiff] has not pled.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d

Cir. 2010). Finally, a district court must dismiss an IFP action if the Court determines that the

action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION

Reading Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and his responsive pleadings most liberally,

Plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and First Amendment rights; common

law and NYCHRL claims; and a Monell claim against the City.9 (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF

9–10; OTSC, Dkt. 21, at 5.) As Defendants are a city government entity and one of its employees,

9 While Plaintiff generally does not distinguish his claims between the Defendants, Plaintiff

does bring a Monell claim specifically against the City.

Plaintiff must plausibly allege his constitutional claims under Section 1983, which requires a

showing “(1) that the [D]efendants deprived him of a right ‘secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States’; and (2) that they did so ‘under color of state law.’” Giordano v. City of New

York, 274 F.3d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,

49–50 (1999)).10

I. Claims against Defendant Rosario

Plaintiff brings his constitutional claims against Defendant Rosario, all stemming from the

traffic stop on July 8, 2025. (See Am. Compl., Dkt. 19.) All fail.

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the July 8, 2025 traffic stop was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

(Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF 9.) “The Fourth Amendment guarantees ‘[t]he right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures.’” United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting U.S. Const.

amend. IV). “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police,

even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within

the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].” Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,

809–10 (1996)). In order for this temporary detention to comport with the Fourth Amendment,

“an officer making a traffic stop must have probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the person

10 In his show-cause response, Plaintiff repeatedly references Defendants’ “burden of

proof.” (See, e.g., OTSC Resp., Dkt. 21-1, at 7.) However, for Plaintiff’s claims to survive

dismissal, the “complaint must contain ‘enough factual matter (taken as true)’ that is suggestive

of, ‘not merely consistent with,’ the alleged wrongdoing.” 7 West 57th St. Realty. Co. v. Citigroup,

Inc., 771 F. App’x 498, 501 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57). The Court

notes that Plaintiff’s show-cause response includes a significant number of legal citations, some

of which are undeniably relevant. (OTSC Resp., Dkt. 21-1.) Still, at this stage, and as directed by

the Court in its show-cause order, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to establish a cause of action.

(See 2/12/2025 Dkt. Order.)

stopped has committed a traffic violation or is otherwise engaged in or about to be engaged in

criminal activity.” Id. at 86 (quoting United States v. Stewart, 551 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 2009)).

Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant Rosario lacked probable cause or reasonable

suspicion to stop him on July 8, 2025. Defendant Rosario’s sworn statement from the traffic stop,

which Plaintiff attached to his Amended Complaint and is thus incorporated by reference into the

Complaint, Hu, 927 F.3d at 88, describes Plaintiff as “creat[ing] serious risk of [personal injury]

or death by driving into oncoming traffic and overtaking multiple vehicles,” (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19,

at ECF 18); Jimenez v. City of Cohoes Police Dep’t, No. 23-CV-0955, 2024 WL 1551149, at *1

(2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2024) (finding an officer had reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop because

it was “apparent ‘on the face of the complaint’— to which [plaintiff] attached the sworn statement

of the police officer who stopped him — that the officer observed [plaintiff] commit a traffic

violation” (quoting Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998))).

Plaintiff does not contest that he had passed two vehicles, which caused him to drive “into

oncoming traffic” at the time he was stopped by Defendant Rosario.11 (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at

ECF 18; see id. at ECF 35 (Plaintiff explaining that NYPD “questioned [him] as to his driving

[past] a garbage truck as well as a black SUV”); Johnson El v. Bird, No. 19-CV-5102 (CS), 2020

WL 5124920, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2020) (dismissing false arrest claim where plaintiff failed

to allege that he had not engaged in the conduct he was stopped for), aff’d sub nom. Johnson El v.

Chambers, No. 20-CV-3377, 2021 WL 4484929 (2d Cir. Oct. 1, 2021). Given these alleged facts,

11 Plaintiff does argue that he was “exonerated” and therefore this makes the stop itself

illegal. (OTSC Resp., Dkt. 21-1, at 8.) While the concept of exoneration is more relevant for

Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims than his Fourth Amendment claims, the Court notes that

Plaintiff was not, in fact, exonerated by the traffic court but rather accepted adjournment in

contemplation of dismissal pursuant to NYCPL § 170.55, (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF 14), which

is neither a conviction nor a finding of innocence, Cabello-Setlle v. Scott, No. 21-CV-7477 (NSR),

2024 WL 308212, at *2 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2024).

Defendant Rosario’s decision to stop Plaintiff was supported by probable cause that Plaintiff had

committed a traffic violation and was thus reasonable.

Plaintiff has also failed to allege that the duration of the traffic stop “exceed[ed] the time

needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made” and therefore “violates the Constitution's

shield against unreasonable seizures.” Gomez, 877 F.3d at 88 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States,

575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015)). Plaintiff alleges that the traffic stop lasted approximately ten minutes,

(Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF 9), which is a reasonable amount of time to issue a summons, cf.

United States v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 336 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding a ten-minute stop constitutional

during an investigatory traffic stop).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Rosario fails.

B. Fifth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff also alleges “deprivation of property interests” and “deprivation of property

rights,” which the Court construes as due process claims under the Fifth Amendment. See Jones

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 11-CV-4733 (KAM) (MDG), 2013 WL 5300721, at *12 (E.D.N.Y.

Sep. 19, 2013) (construing pro se plaintiff’s deprivation of property claim under the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment). In evaluating such claims, the Court must determine “whether

the plaintiff has a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution,” and if so, “whether

the government deprived the plaintiff of that interest without due process.” Perry v. McDonald,

280 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trs., 850 F.2d 70, 72 (2d

Cir. 1988)). Here, it is entirely unclear from Plaintiff’s pleadings exactly what property interest or

right Plaintiff bases his due process claims on. To the extent this interest is his driver’s license,

which the NYPD took for the duration of the traffic stop, this license was neither revoked nor taken

by the NYPD, and so Plaintiff was not deprived of this interest. (See Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at

ECF 10 (alleging only that plaintiff has a right to be able to drive without harassment).) To the

extent Plaintiff bases his due process claims on “cost[s] . . . now and into the future” because the

traffic-stop “information will be unfairly on the Plaintiff’s records,” (id.), Defendants state that

because Plaintiff’s reckless driving charge was dismissed pursuant to NYCPL § 170.55, it was

sealed pursuant to NYCPL § 160.50, (Mot., Dkt. 22, at 6).12 Plaintiff does not contest this in his

response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (See Pl. Resp., Dkt. 23, at 6–7 (responding to the

relevant pages of Defendants’ motion).)

Thus, even reading Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, the Court can find no cognizable

property interest of which Plaintiff was deprived, and so his Fifth Amendment claim against

Defendant Rosario fails.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff also brings a claim pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF 9.)

To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on selective

enforcement, a plaintiff must ordinarily show the following: “(1) [that] the person,

compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such

selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race,

religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious

or bad faith intent to injure a person.”

Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Lisa’s Party City,

Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff states that he is Black and an

immigrant, which he alleges are the bases for his harassment by the NYPD. (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19,

at ECF 9.) However, as with his other constitutional claims, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts to

12 Butts v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 22-CV-4418 (OEM) (CLP), 2024

WL 4350430, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2024), recon. denied sub nom. Butts v. Kelch, 2025

WL 388856 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2025) (quoting Norton v. Town of Islip, 97 F. Supp. 3d 241, 254

(E.D.N.Y. 2015).

support his claim of selective treatment or that any such selective treatment was based on his race

or immigration status. Plaintiff’s “wholly conclusory and unsupported” Equal Protection claim

therefore also fails. See Gordon v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-5148 (CBA) (LB), 2012

WL 1068023, at *28–29 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s “wholly conclusory and

unsupported” Equal Protection claim because he had not “alleged any disparity in treatment

between himself and another person”).

D. First Amendment

As part of his generalized allegation that the NYPD has been “careful[ly] targeting and

profiling” him, Plaintiff alleges that the July 8, 2023 traffic stop was in retaliation for his prior

lawsuits against the NYPD. (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF 9–10.) Construing this claim most

liberally, Plaintiff appears to be bringing a First Amendment claim. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 587

U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (explaining that the First Amendment generally “‘prohibits government

officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions’ for engaging in protected speech”

(quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006))). But to successfully plead a retaliatory

arrest, Plaintiff must “plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the [retaliatory] arrest.”

Id. at 400. As the Court has found probable cause for Plaintiff’s traffic stop, see supra, this claim

fails.

E. Other Claims

Plaintiff also alleges excessive force, (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at 9–10)), false arrest,

malicious prosecution, and negligence, (OTSC Resp., Dkt. 21-1, at 3, 6).13 Given the paucity of

factual allegations to support these claims, and given that many of these claims are subsumed in

13 Although Plaintiff also claims that Defendants subjected him to “harassment,” the Court

construed that allegation as being part of his Fourteenth Amendment unequal treatment claim,

which is dismissed.

the constitutional claims discussed supra, the Court analyzes them only briefly below and

dismisses them all, as well.

1. Excessive Force

Plaintiff brings an “excessive force” claim based on NYPD agents “exceeding their lawful

authority.” (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at ECF 10.) Plaintiff’s allegations center on whether or not the

NYPD agents misused their power and authority and never alleges any use of physical force by

Defendant Rosario or other NYPD agents. See Davis v. Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 424, 431 (2d

Cir. 2004) (“To establish a claim of excessive force, ‘a plaintiff must show that the force used by

the officer was, in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [them], objectively

unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards.’” (quoting Finnegan v. Fountain, 915

F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1990))). This claim must therefore also fail.

2. False Arrest

Plaintiff alleges what the Court liberally construes as a common law false arrest claim

primarily in his show-cause response. (OTSC Resp., Dkt. 21-1, at 3.) While Plaintiff provides a

number of legal cites to support this claim, he provides no supporting factual allegations. There

is nothing in the Complaint or Plaintiff’s show-cause response indicating that Plaintiff was arrested

on July 8, 2023. See Guadagni v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 08-CV-3163 (CPS) (SMG),

2009 WL 1910953, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2009) (explaining that, to state a claim for false arrest,

a plaintiff must show, inter alia, intentional confinement (citing Savino v. City of New York, 331

F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2003)), aff’d, 387 F. App’x 124 (2d Cir. 2010)). And as previously discussed,

the stop conducted by Defendant Rosario of Plaintiff in his car that day was reasonable and

supported by probable cause. Plaintiff’s false arrest claim thus fails.

3. Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiff further alleges malicious prosecution in his show-cause response (although not in

his Complaint). (OTSC Resp., Dkt. 21-1, at 6.) “In New York, probable cause is an absolute

defense to . . . malicious prosecution.” Jones v. City of New York, 988 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311

(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (first citing Maron v. Cnty of Albany, 166 F. App’x 540, 541 (2d Cir. 2006); and

then citing Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006)). “This is true whether that action

is brought under state law or under [Section] 1983.” Maron, 166 F. App’x at 541. As the Court

has found that Defendant Rosario had probable cause to stop Plaintiff, see supra, the Court declines

to further analyze this claim, which fails.

4. Negligence Claim under NYCHRL

Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages under NYCHRL for alleged negligence. (OTSC,

Dkt. 21-1, at 5.) “[T]he standard for determining punitive damages under the NYCHRL is whether

the wrongdoer has engaged in discrimination with willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness,

or a conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such

disregard.” Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28, 43 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting

Chauca v. Abraham, 30 N.Y.3d 325, 334 (2017)). The New York Court of Appeals has required

“an appropriate showing of heightened culpability for [an award of] punitive damages.” Id.

(quoting Chauca v. Abraham, 30 N.Y.3d 325, 334 (2017)). Plaintiff has provided no evidence of

discrimination, let alone evidence of heightened culpability, and thus his negligence claim fails.

* * *

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Rosario are dismissed.

II. Claims against the City

In order to sustain constitutional claims against the City, Plaintiff must show the existence

of a policy or custom adopted by the City that caused injury to Plaintiff, and a direct causal

connection between that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional right. Monell,

436 U.S. at 694; see also Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Because

Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead any of his constitutional claims, his Monell claim against

the City necessarily fails. However, even if he had sufficiently pled a constitutional claim, his

Monell claim still fails because he does not show any official policy or custom directly tied to his

constitutional complaints.

A plaintiff seeking to sufficiently allege that an affirmative municipal policy exists “must

make factual allegations that support a plausible inference that the constitutional violation took

place pursuant either to a formal course of action officially promulgated by the municipality’s

governing authority or the act of a person with policymaking authority for the municipality.”

Missel v. Cnty of Monroe, 351 F. App’x 543, 545 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Vives v. City of New York,

524 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 2008)). Single incidents are insufficient to impose Monell liability

“unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional

municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” Oklahoma City v.

Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985). A collection of such incidents, even with similar facts, is

still insufficient absent proof of municipal policy. Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 85

(2d Cir. 2012) (finding that three related incidents “fell far short of showing a policy, custom, or

usage of officers”); Giaccio v. City of New York, 308 F. App’x 470, 471–72 (2d Cir. 2009)

(dismissing Monell claim when plaintiff could identify only four incidents); Price v. City of New

York, No. 15-CV-5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018) (“[A]llegations

of three similar constitutional violations do not allow the Court plausibly to infer the existence of

a widespread custom or practice that can be attributed to the City.” (collecting cases)); Calicchio

v. Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist., 185 F. Supp. 3d 303, 316–17 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (observing, in

dismissing Monell claim, that “courts in [the Second] Circuit have rejected the notion that two,

three[,] or even four incidents will support such an inference” (collecting cases)). “[A] plaintiff

must allege ‘sufficient factual detail[]’ and not mere ‘boilerplate allegations’” for their Monell

claim to survive a motion to dismiss. Broomes v. City of New York, No. 22-CV-2807 (PKC)

(MMH), 2024 WL 3823031, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2024) (quoting Plair v. City of New York,

789 F. Supp. 2d 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).

To support his Monell claim, Plaintiff alleges a pattern of “illegal” traffic stops and tickets

issued to him by the NYPD over the course of approximately seven years. (Pl. Resp., Dkt. 23,

at 2–3.)14 Plaintiff appears to have filed at least two other cases against the City in this district and

in the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”).15 According to Plaintiff’s filings in this matter,

these other cases include “a plethora of examples” that show a “practice, norm, and pattern of some

City of New York agents against/towards the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 2.) Indeed, Plaintiff’s SDNY

lawsuit similarly alleged “violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution” by NYPD officers. Richards, 2024 WL 4263004,

at *1. But the vast majority of Plaintiff’s claims in those cases were dismissed; only one claim

14 While Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and show-cause response only cursorily reference

a “practice, norm, and pattern of the NYPD . . . profiling the Plaintiff,” (Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at

ECF 9; see also OTSC Resp., Dkt. 21-1, at 3 (describing the purported “profiling[,] patterns,

practice, [and] custom[]” of Defendants “in . . . targeting the Plaintiff”)), Plaintiff’s response to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss provides the clearest view of his Monell allegations, (Pl. Resp.,

Dkt. 23, at 2–3).

15 These are Richards v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-3348 (RA), 2024 WL 4263004

(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 23, 2024) (dismissing Plaintiff’s claims), (see Pl. Resp., Dkt. 23, at 2); and likely

Richards v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 21-CV-6027 (PKC) (MMH), 2023 WL 7611560

(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2023) (same), (see id. at 3). The cite provided by Plaintiff for the second case,

“21CV621,” (id.), does not correspond to any cases relevant to Plaintiff, and so the Court assumes

Plaintiff refers to 21-CV-6027, which was filed on October 20, 2021, the same date Plaintiff

identifies in his filings, (id.).

against a single NYPD officer in the SDNY case moved past the motion to dismiss stage, though

it was ultimately dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute pursuant to Rules 37(b)

and 41(b). See id. Therefore, these other lawsuits fail to provide a sufficient factual basis for

Plaintiff’s Monell claim. And as Plaintiff provides very few additional factual allegations in his

briefings in the instant matter, the Court simply cannot plausibly infer any policy, pattern, or

practice by the City to retaliate against or harass Plaintiff, even if Plaintiff had adequately pled his

constitutional claims in this case, which he has not.

* * *

Plaintiff’s claims against the City are therefore dismissed.

III. Leave to Amend

Ordinarily, because of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court might allow Plaintiff to

seek leave to file a second amended complaint. Saunders v. Queensborough Cmty. Coll.,

No. 13-CV-5617 (PKC) (RML), 2015 WL 5655719, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2015) (“When a

motion to dismiss is granted, the usual practice is to grant leave to amend the complaint.” (quoting

Hayden v. Cnty of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d Cir. 1999))). But the Court declines to do so here.

Plaintiff has already amended his Complaint once; the Court gave him the additional opportunity—

if not, directed him—to supplement his Amended Complaint with additional facts, in response to

Defendants’ motion to amend, accompanied by a warning that his Complaint was so devoid of

facts that it risked being dismissed sua sponte. (See 2/12/2025 Dkt. Order.) The Court therefore

finds that yet another amendment of the Complaint would be futile. See Smith v. NYS OMH S.

Beach Psychiatric Ctr., No. 23-CV-4401 (PKC) (LB), 2024 WL 730492, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22,

2024) (denying pro se party leave to amend when “it would be futile” (citations omitted)), appeal

dismissed, No. 24-CV-0743, 2024 WL 4336995 (2d Cir. Sep. 11, 2024).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed in

its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). As Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court certifies pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and

therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369

U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close

this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: September 18, 2025

Brooklyn, New York