BRYANT v. POTTSGROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHANICQUA BRYANT, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

v.

POTTSGROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT and No. 25-3140

ANN MARIE LUCAS in her personal and

official capacities,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Shanicqua Bryant, proceeding pro se, brings this case against Defendants

Pottsgrove School District (the “School District” or “District”) and Dr. Ann Marie Lucas in both

her personal and official capacities asserting:1 (1) constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violations of her Establishment Clause, equal protection, and due process rights; (2) a

claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); (3) statutory perjury

claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 and 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4902; and, (4) claims for the torts of

defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light under Pennsylvania law.2

1 Bryant does not specify which claims are brought against the School District, Lucas, or both. However, viewing

the allegations in a light most favorable to her, it could be concluded that she is bringing all of them against both

Defendants. Moreover, because Bryant sued Lucas in both her personal and official capacities, the official-capacity

claims will be treated as claims against Lucas’ municipal employer, the School District. See Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an

action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S.

658, 690 n.55 (1978))); see e.g., Byars v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 942 F. Supp.2d 552, 569-70 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (assessing

First Amendment claims brought against school district employees in their official capacity as claims against the

school district itself).

2 It is unclear whether Bryant seeks to raise these claims on her own behalf or on behalf of her minor child. To the

extent Bryant seeks to raise any claims on behalf of her minor child, she is prohibited from doing so. A pro se

litigant who is not an attorney may not pursue claims on behalf of anyone other than herself. Accordingly, because

Bryant is appearing pro se and is not an attorney, she may not bring claims on behalf of her minor child. See Osei-

Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991). Bryant, who has filed many

suits concerning the education of her son, has been told repeatedly that she cannot sue on her son’s behalf. See, e.g.,

Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss premised on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).3 For the following reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part

their motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following allegations are taken from Bryant’s Amended Complaint, well-pleaded

allegations from which are taken as true at this stage. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,

210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).

The Amended Complaint is about as bare bones as it can be, setting out a number of

incidents without any great detail:

• Bryant has a disabled son whom she enrolled in the District for the 2023-24 school year.

• On or about September 20, 2024, Lucas directed one of her subordinates to file a false

police report with the Lower Pottsgrove Police against Bryant. The District denied

responsibility for making the statements in the report and accused the police of false

Bryant v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 2025 WL 602160, at *1 n.1 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2025); Bryant v. Pottstown Sch. Dist.,

2022 WL 3722084, at *2 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2022); Bryant v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 2021 WL 4893368, at *3 n.3

(E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2021); Aponte v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 2019 WL 3080938, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2019).

3 Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2025. Bryant filed her response just two days later. To

respond so quickly would be a remarkable feat if done by a lawyer. When done by a pro se litigant, it strains

credulity.

The proliferation of artificial intelligence tools, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT product, will undoubtedly change the

legal profession. The technology is poised to facilitate legal research, drafting, and compliance with the law. But a

machine is no substitute for a lawyer, or even for a frequent pro se litigant such as Bryant. ChatGPT has a well-

documented tendency of generating fake cases in response to law-related prompts. See, e.g., Bunce v. Visual Tech.

Innovations, Inc., 2025 WL 662398, at *1, 4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2025) (sanctioning a lawyer who relied on ChatGPT

because two separate motions contained “hallucinat[ed]” and misrepresented cases). Moreover, even when

ChatGPT generates real cases, those cases may be inapplicable because the technology does not, for example,

automatically grasp common law principles, our system of authorities, or the nuances that divide distinguishable

from on-point cases.

Dangers lurk, and pro se litigants without legal training are especially vulnerable to being misled. Yet, like

attorneys, they still must comply with court rules and orders. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245

(3d Cir. 2013) (“At the end of the day, [pro se litigants] cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same

rules that apply to all other litigants.”); accord Ross-Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding

a pro se plaintiff was personally responsible for their failure to attend a pretrial conference or otherwise comply with

a court order); Campbell v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2022 WL 6172286, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2022) (“[P]ro se

litigants must generally comply with local rules.” (citations omitted)). That compliance includes ensuring that “the

claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for

extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).

reporting. Bryant, however, received assurance from the police department that the

accusations were documented as reported by the District.

• In November 2024, there was a “due process” hearing regarding Bryant’s son’s education

and the police report.4 Bryant alleges that Lucas and other individuals from the District

perjured themselves at that hearing by lying “under oath.” Bryant seems to allege that

their conduct was part of a broader conspiracy by Lucas and district staff to target her and

her son through lies and other unarticulated conduct.

• Bryant further alleges that the District allowed a teacher to proselytize Islam to her son.

While the District does not offer classes on Islamic studies, the teacher bought her son

Islamic clothing and items. Bryant says her son “brought those ideas and beliefs to my

home,” which led to distress and arguments with her son about religion.

DISCUSSION

A. 12(b)(1)

The gist of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) argument is that Bryant does not have standing to

pursue her Establishment Clause claim.5

4 The Amended Complaint states the hearing was in November 2025, but because that date has yet to occur, the

Court assumes Bryant meant November 2024. Moreover, given the paucity of the Amended Complaint’s

allegations, the Court can only make an educated guess that the “due process” hearing Bryant refers to is that

provided for by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (“IDEA”). See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(f).

5 Defendants also move to dismiss Bryant’s § 504 and perjury claims under Rule 12(b)(1). They contend that

Bryant lacks standing to pursue her § 504 claim because she fails to allege the elements for such a claim. Similarly,

they argue she lacks standing to pursue a perjury claim because there is no private cause of action for such a claim.

Although nominally attacks to jurisdiction, these arguments fundamentally challenge the sufficiency of Bryant’s

allegations; they are more appropriately raised under Rule 12(b)(6).

The choice of which rule to apply is significant because of the “myriad procedural differences” between 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6), such as when a motion can be raised and who bears the burden of persuasion. Potter v. Cozen &

O’Connor, 46 F.4th 148, 155 (3d Cir. 2022). More importantly, the question raised by a 12(b)(1) motion—whether

a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim—is “antecedent to [a court’s] power to reach the merits of

that claim” under a 12(b)(6) motion. Finkelman v. NFL, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2016). Accordingly, because

Defendants’ § 504 and perjury arguments are not challenges to the Court’s “very power to hear the case,” Mortensen

v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977), they are improperly raised under Rule 12(b)(1).

See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346-50 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the district court “erroneously

accepted” the argument that a plaintiff lacked standing because he had sued the wrong corporate entity, framing the

issue of whom the plaintiff could hold responsible as a “merits question” to be addressed under 12(b)(6)); cf. Off.

Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Whether a party has

standing to bring claims and whether a party’s claims are barred by an equitable defense are two separate questions,

to be addressed on their own terms.”). Nevertheless, because Defendants repeat their contentions under 12(b)(6),

they will be evaluated under that framework.

By contrast, Defendants properly move under 12(b)(1) to dismiss Bryant’s Establishment Clause claim. Their

i. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Want of Article III standing is properly brought

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because Article III provides “jurisdictional limitation[s]” that implicate

“the Court’s power to hear” claims. Potter, 46 F.4th at 154-57; Ballentine v. United States, 486

F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, Defendants launch a facial attack on Bryant’s standing to

pursue her Establishment Clause claim in that they “contest[] the sufficiency of the pleadings.”

In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir.

2012); see also In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632-33

(3d Cir. 2017). Such an attack focuses on the face of the complaint, asserting that “it is

insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court” because there is a

“jurisdictional defect.” Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). Here,

Defendants argue that Bryant’s Establishment Clause claim is jurisdictionally defective because

her alleged injuries do not give her a “concrete stake” in the litigation. Freedom from Religion

Found. Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 2016); see also

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423-24 (2021) (explaining that “federal courts do not

adjudicate hypothetical or abstract disputes,” only suits where the plaintiff demonstrates “their

personal stake” in the resolution of an issue).

In evaluating a facial attack, “the same standard of review” as a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim is applied. Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 194. In other words, the “well-pleaded

factual allegations” in the complaint are presumed to be true, “conclusory statements” are

argument, that Bryant fails to allege an Article III injury, concerns the heart of subject matter jurisdiction—“the

category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo,

Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).

ignored, and then a determination is made as to whether the allegations “plausibly” establish

standing. Id. (citing In re Schering, 678 F.3d at 243).

In the 12(b)(1) context, the burden of establishing the elements of standing is on the

plaintiff, and “each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the

plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the

successive stages of the litigation.” FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d

834, 838 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).

ii. Establishment Clause

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511

U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts

may only resolve “cases” and “controversies.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. “For there to be a

case or controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have a personal stake in the case—in

other words, standing.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish

standing, “a plaintiff must show (i) that [s]he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete,

particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant;

and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id. (citation omitted).

“[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross,” but rather “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each

claim [s]he seeks . . . .” Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017) (citations

omitted).

Defendants argue that, with respect to her Establishment Clause claim, Bryant fails to

meet the first element of standing, the injury-in-fact requirement. Citing Freedom from Religion

Foundation Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold School District, they contend that standing “in this

context” turns on whether a plaintiff alleges “direct and unwelcome personal contact with the

alleged establishment of religion.” 832 F.3d at 476-77 (citations omitted). Noting that Bryant

alleges only that she received secondhand information from her son about his engagement with

his teacher about Islam, Defendants argue she has not established the essential component of

“direct” contact with the establishment of religion.

Their argument might have merit if Freedom from Religion Foundation supplied the

controlling standard, but it does not. The Third Circuit made clear that Freedom from Religion

Foundation’s test applies in a different “context”—to challenges of religious displays under the

Establishment Clause. Id. at 476 (“We first address what a plaintiff must show to have standing

to challenge a religious display under the Establishment Clause and then examine whether

standing exists . . . .”). By contrast, Bryant’s allegations are about allegedly coercive religious

instruction given to her son.

Thus, the question really at issue here is whether Bryant suffered a cognizable injury

attributable to the religious teaching provided to her son. See Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dis.

200, 15 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1994) (observing that where “parents, not the students by their

parents,” have brought an Establishment Clause challenge to allegedly unconstitutional religious

instruction, a court “must be sure that the parents are raising rights personal to them and not the

rights of their children”).

The Supreme Court has long recognized that parents have an interest in their children’s

religious education and therefore have standing in their own right to challenge actions of their

children’s school that interfere with that interest. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.

Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 n.4 (1952);

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 206 (1948); see also Donovan ex rel.

Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 217 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We do note

that parents independently have standing to bring constitutional challenges to the conditions in

their children’s schools.”). In Schempp, the Supreme Court considered an Establishment Clause

challenge to a state statute requiring school prayer. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205. The Schempp

family—husband, wife, and two of their children—brought suit to enjoin the statute’s

enforcement. Id. Quite obviously, the Schempp parents were not themselves subjected to the

school prayer requirement. See id. at 206-08. While this might have suggested that they lacked

standing to sue in their own right, the Supreme Court wrote:

It goes without saying that the laws and practices involved here can be challenged only

by persons having standing to complain. . . . The parties here are school children and their

parents, who are directly affected by the laws and practices against which their

complaints are directed. These interests surely suffice to give the parties standing to

complain.

Id. at 224 n.9 (citation omitted). As later clarified in Valley Forge Christian College v.

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., the Schempp plaintiffs had standing

“because impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or

were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them.” 454 U.S. 464, 486 n.22 (1982).

In light of Schempp, courts have held that where parents are “directly affected” by

religious practices at their children’s school, the parents independently “have standing to raise

their claim alleging a violation of the Establishment Clause because the impermissible

establishment of religion might inhibit their right to direct the religious training of their

children.” Fleischfresser, 15 F.3d at 684; accord Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d

1528, 1532 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Dobrich v. Walls, 380 F. Supp.2d

366, 372-73 (D. Del. 2005).

Turning to this case, Bryant alleges that the unconsented religious instruction caused

disputes about religion between her and her son. She now seeks damages for this alleged

interference with her religious training of her son, whom she notes is particularly vulnerable

because of his disability. Accepting these allegations as true, they are sufficient for standing.

See, e.g., Dobrich, 380 F. Supp.2d at 370-73 (concluding that parents had standing to seek

damages after a dispute about school-sponsored prayer and religious “privileges” triggered

public harassment and forced some family members to relocate); Separation of Hinduism from

our Schs. v. Chi. Pub. Schs., 2021 WL 2036536, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2021) (determining that

parent had standing where he alleged he was “angered by the intrusion into his child’s religious

education and coercion toward a belief system that he believed was inconsistent with

Christianity” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Doe v. Heritage Acad., Inc., 2017 WL

6001481, at *5-6 (D. Az. June 9, 2017) (concluding that a father had standing to challenge

“unwanted religious instruction” at his son’s public charter school because he alleged it

undermined “his responsibility . . . to provide for his child or children’s religious education”).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion will be denied to the extent it is premised on lack of standing.

B. 12(b)(6)

Turning to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) contentions, they argue that the Amended

Complaint, with its dearth of facts, fails to state any claim. In addition, Lucas argues she is

entitled to qualified immunity with respect to any claims brought against her in her personal

capacity. Because the qualified immunity analysis turns in part on whether she adequately states

her claims, the sufficiency of Bryant’s allegations will be considered first.

i. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. When analyzing a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must be construed “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” with the question

being “whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to

relief.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). Legal conclusions are disregarded, well-

pleaded facts are taken as true, and a determination is made as to whether those facts state a

“plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 210-11 (citation omitted).

Because Bryant is proceeding pro se, her allegations must be construed liberally at this

stage. See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala, 704 F.3d at 244-45).

The “relevant legal principle” therefore will be applied “even when the complaint has failed to

name it.” Id. “[E]ven if it is vague, repetitious, or contains extraneous information, a pro se

complaint’s language will ordinarily be ‘plain’” in satisfaction of Rule 8 “if it presents

cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits.” Garrett v. Wexford

Health, 938 F.3d 69, 94 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

ii. Constitutional Claims Pursuant to § 1983

Bryant’s claims alleging violations of the Establishment Clause and her Fourteenth

Amendment rights are governed by § 1983, the statutory vehicle by which federal constitutional

claims may be heard in federal court. Section 1983 provides in part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988).

a. Establishment Clause

Bryant’s Establishment Clause claim is premised on her contention that the School

District violated her Establishment Clause rights by allowing a teacher to proselytize to her son.

The Establishment Clause, applied to the States and their political subdivisions through

the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1985).

To prevail on an Establishment Clause claim, a plaintiff must show that the challenged

government action “resemble[s] a traditional hallmark of religious establishment.” See

Hilsenrath ex rel. C.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Chathams, 136 F.4th 484, 486 (3d Cir. 2025), petition for

cert. filed, No. 25-256 (Sept. 4, 2025). The Third Circuit has identified six such hallmarks:

First, the government exerted control over the doctrine and personnel of the established

church. Second, the government mandated attendance in the established church and

punished people for failing to participate. Third, the government punished dissenting

churches and individuals for their religious exercise. Fourth, the government restricted

political participation by dissenters. Fifth, the government provided financial support for

the established church, often in a way that preferred the established denomination over

other churches. And sixth, the government used the established church to carry out

certain civil functions, often by giving the established church a monopoly over a specific

function.

Id. at 491 (citing Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243, 286 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in

the judgment)). Courts are to draw comparisons between these hallmarks and the challenged

government conduct. Id.6

6 Judge Phipps notes that there are two outstanding questions regarding Hilsenrath’s hallmarks test: “(i) whether

The second Hilsenrath hallmark—“the government mandat[ing] attendance in the

established church and punish[ing] people for failing to participate”—reflects that the

Establishment Clause prohibits the government, including public schools, from coercing

individuals into religious practice. Id. at 491-92. Indeed, “coercion was one of the one of the

‘foremost hallmarks of religious establishments’ at the founding . . . .” Id. at 492 (quoting

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 537 (2022)). The “government may not,

consistent with a historically sensitive understanding of the Establishment Clause, ‘make a

religious observance compulsory.’” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 537 (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at

314). “[N]or may it force citizens to engage in ‘a formal religious exercise.’” Id. (quoting Lee v.

Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992)). So, for instance, a public school violates the Establishment

Clause by permitting a student to deliver a prayer over a public address system before each

varsity football game because of the prayer’s coercive effect on spectators. See Santa Fe Indep.

Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (holding

unconstitutional a religious benediction given at a high school graduation ceremony because of

“heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the

elementary and secondary public schools”).

In assessing a motion to dismiss an Establishment Clause claim, a court’s role is to

identify a standard—adduced from factually similar Establishment Clause cases—and ask

whether a complaint’s well-pleaded allegations state a facially plausible claim. See, e.g.,

Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. New Kensington-Arnold Sch. Dist., 919 F. Supp.2d 648,

governmental action that offends only one of the hallmarks is sufficient for an Establishment Clause violation, or

whether the hallmarks should be considered in the aggregate; and (ii) if one or more of the hallmarks of an

established church are present, whether that is dispositive of an Establishment Clause violation, or whether the

government can justify its offending practice as comporting with history and tradition.” Id. at 494-95 (Phipps, J.,

concurring in the judgment). These questions need not be addressed here because, as discussed below, Bryant’s

allegations do not plausibly state a claim under any of the Hilsenrath hallmarks.

652-61 (W.D. Pa. 2013); Tearpock-Martini v. Borough, 98 F. Supp.3d 697, 700-02 (M.D. Pa.

2015); Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. House of Representatives, 251 F. Supp.3d 772, 789-91 (M.D.

Pa. 2017).

Here, Bryant alleges that her son’s public school coerced him into Islam. In Hilsenrath, a

case also involving allegations of Islamic proselytization at a public school, the Third Circuit

considered a parent’s Establishment Clause challenge to curriculum in her son’s mandatory

“Word Cultures and Geography” class. Hilsenrath, 136 F.4th at 486-87. The curriculum

assigned videos that, in addition to covering the five pillars of Islam, contained messages

describing Allah as “the one God” and Islam as “the true faith.” Id. at 487-88. The parent

alleged that the school board “did something like mandat[ing] attendance in the established

church” by requiring her to son to watch these videos. Id. at 491 (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Addressing her argument, the court distinguished “permissible curricular materials from

impermissible proselytization.” Id. at 493. On the unconstitutional side of the line are instances

where a public school opens its doors to clergy-led religious instruction during school hours, see

McCollum, 333 U.S. at 206-09, or organizes an orthodox devotional practice, such as student

readings from the Bible and recitations of the Lord’s Prayer at the start of the school day, see

Schempp, 374 U.S. at 207, 223. On the constitutional side of the line are instances where

students encounter religious material for legitimate “academic” purposes. Hilsenrath, 136 F.4th

at 492. The videos in Hilsenrath fell on this side of the line. They were instructional, not

coercive, because the school board had assigned them to help students “explore the 5 Pillars of

Faith and be able to explain the impact/significance of them in the Muslim culture,” as well as to

learn the benefits and consequences of generalizations. Id. at 493. Moreover, the unit on Islam

was part of the class’s larger exploration of world history and culture, which included

introductions to several other faiths, including Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism.

Id. The court therefore authorized public school curriculum incorporating ostensibly religious

doctrine into “an appropriate study of history, civilization, and comparative religion.” Id. at 493

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court affirmed that “[w]hile there may be

circumstances in which public schools violate the Establishment Clause by subjecting students to

proselytizing materials,” it also “cautioned against ‘[f]ocus[ing] exclusively on the religious

component of any activity.’” Id. at 492 (second and third alterations in original) (citing Lynch v.

Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)).

The facts that Bryant provides in support of her Establishment Clause claim are spare,

i.e., one of her son’s teachers gave him Islamic teaching and religious items, and the District

does not offer an Islamic studies class. Nothing is known beyond that. Indeed, there is not even

an allegation that the complained-of interaction occurred at school. Apart from the conclusory

accusation that the teachings were “forced” on her son, Bryant provides no plausible facts from

which it could be concluded that the District sanctioned the proselytization of her son.

Accordingly, her Establishment Clause claim against the District will be dismissed without

prejudice.

b. Equal Protection Clause

Bryant’s second constitutional claim, also brought pursuant to § 1983, arises under the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Equal Protection Clause commands: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A plaintiff can state an

equal protection claim under either a protected classification or “class of one” theory. See

Echevarria v. Cnty. of Bergen, 2025 WL 517955, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 18, 2025) (citing Vill. of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563 (2000)). Under a protected classification theory, a

plaintiff must allege “[s]he was treated differently than other similarly situated [individuals], and

that this different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on [her]

membership in a protected class.” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir.

2016) (citing Hassan v. City of N.Y., 804 F.3d 277, 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2015)). To state a claim

under a “class of one” theory, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant treated [her]

differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was

no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,

239 (3d Cir. 2006).

Common to both theories is the requirement that an individual be treated differently

relative to “similarly situated individuals.” At the pleadings stage, this is not a demanding

requirement. A plaintiff need not “name names” or identify “specific instances where others

have been treated differently.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 244-45 (3d Cir.

2008) (citing DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 2003)). Rather, “[she] must allege

facts sufficient to make plausible the existence of . . . similarly situated parties,” Perano v. Twp.

of Tilden, 423 Fed. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011), who are “alike ‘in all relevant aspects’” to

her, Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn,

505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). “[T]he failure to identify similarly situated persons dooms an equal-

protection claim.” Stradford v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022) (citing

Hill, 455 F.3d at 239).

Bryant has failed to meet this low burden. She alleges that Lucas “targeted” her and,

more broadly, engaged in a conspiracy with other staff members to defame her and suppress her

ability to be an active parent within the District. But “[s]he does not allege the existence of

similarly situated individuals,” and she does not allege they were treated differently than her.

Hill, 455 F.3d at 239 (citation omitted). For this reason alone, her claim must fail. See id.

(granting a motion to dismiss because the complaint did not allege that a mayor treated other

borough employees differently); Akil v. City of Phila., 2023 WL 8548743, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec.

11, 2023) (dismissing an equal protection claim where the complaint did not identify any

comparators).

Defendants also argue that her claim under a protected classification theory requires

dismissal for an additional reason. Alleging “intentional discrimination” under that theory

requires facts indicating a “state actor meant to single out a plaintiff because of the protected

characteristic itself.” Hassan, 804 F.3d at 297 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Bryant, however, does not allege a protected characteristic. A liberal reading of the Amended

Complaint suggests she believes that being the parent of a disabled child qualifies as a protected

characteristic. But the Equal Protection Clause does not provide heightened protections to

individuals with disabilities, let alone to parents of such individuals. See City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985) (holding that persons with disabilities are not

a suspect classification for the purposes of an equal protection challenge). The closest Bryant

gets to alleging a protected characteristic is her statement that she suffers “from anxiety of

known police brutality against people of color.” She, however, does not identify her race in the

Amended Complaint. Nor does she allege that any discrimination she faced from the District

was because of her race.7 Accordingly, her equal protection claim against the District will be

7 In her response in opposition, Bryant states the District “targeted Bryant due to her race.” Her contention,

however, cannot be considered because “courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint,

exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record” in deciding a motion to dismiss. Pension Benefit

dismissed without prejudice.

c. Due Process Clause

Bryant’s due process claim pursuant to § 1983 will, however, not be dismissed. The Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall . . . deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

As an initial matter, Defendants fault Bryant for not expressly invoking the Due Process

Clause in her complaint. She complains only of her “civil rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment.” While Rule 8 does require “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), it “do[es] not countenance dismissal of a

complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted,” Johnson v.

City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam) (citations omitted), particularly when the

plaintiff is representing herself. Indeed, in Johnson, where the lower court had dismissed a

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against a municipality because the complaint failed to

mention it was brought pursuant to § 1983, the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 11. Likewise, it

would be inappropriate to grant dismissal here just because Bryant, proceeding pro se, did not

invoke the magic words of “due process.”

Turning now to the allegations that underpin her due process claim, Bryant says that the

District, by way of one of Lucas’ subordinates, filed a false police report against her. Separately,

she says that Lucas and other district employees perjured themselves at an IDEA “due process”

hearing.

Defendants do not meaningfully engage with these allegations. Instead, they make

conclusory assertions that these “violations” are “speculative” and that Bryant “does not allege a

Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

deprivation of procedural rights, which would require an allegation that (1) she was deprived of

an individual interest ‘encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life,

liberty, or property; and (2) the procedures available to [her] did not provide due process of

law.’” Defs.’ Br. 8 (quoting Battle v. Marchese, 2025 WL 1710538, at * 18 (M.D. Pa. May 27,

2025)). Merely repeating keywords from Twombly and stating the due process standard, coupled

with a bare assertion that it is unmet, does not satisfy Defendants’ burden of showing the

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim. 8 Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.

2005) (“The defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.” (citing

Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991))); see, e.g., Doe v.

Wozniak, 2009 WL 10715510, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2009) (concluding defendants failed to

meet their burden when their argument was simply: “Plaintiff has failed to make any allegations

of a conspiracy or agreement to act to deprive her of her civil rights. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim

for conspiracy pursuant to § 1983 must be dismissed.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Bryant’s due process claim against the District will be denied.

iii. Perjury Claims

Turning now to Bryant’s perjury claims stemming from her allegations that Lucas and

other district employees lied “under oath” at her son’s IDEA hearing: she does not specify

whether they arise under federal or state law, so they will be analyzed under both the federal

criminal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1), and Pennsylvania criminal perjury statute, 18 Pa.

C.S.A. § 4902(a).

8 In a similar vein, Defendants state, without argument, that Bryant’s due process and equal protection claims should

be dismissed because Bryant “has failed to allege a state-created danger theory or a theory of municipality liability

supported by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and its progeny.” Absent

advocacy to support a position, the Court has not been provided with the tools to make a decision on this point and,

thus, Bryant’s due process and equal protection claims will not be dismissed on this argument.

Defendants argue that these statutes do not provide a civil cause of action. Indeed,

“[c]riminal statutes, which express prohibitions rather than personal entitlements and specify a

particular remedy other than civil litigation, are . . . poor candidates for the imputation of private

rights of action.” Chapa v. Adams, 168 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see

also Cent. Bank of Dover, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190

(1994) (“We have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal

prohibition alone . . . .”).

Accordingly, courts have declined to recognize a private right of action under the federal

perjury statute. See, e.g., Olexsak v. Jones, 2022 WL 2980985, at *4 n.9 (D.N.J. July 28, 2022)

(holding that § 1621 “do[es] not provide Plaintiff with a private cause of action”); Shawe v.

Fernandes, 2018 WL 547234, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2018) (concluding in a civil case alleging

a violation of § 1621 that “[c]riminal statutes . . . do not provide a basis for civil liability”

(citations omitted)); Howard v. Paye, 188 F. Supp.3d 496, 499 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“[The plaintiff]

cannot state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 because that federal criminal statute does not give

rise to civil liability.” (citation omitted)); Ivey v. Dep’t of Treasury, 285 Fed. App’x 763, 763-64

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“To the extent appellant attempted to raise additional causes of

action, there is no private cause of action for perjury and subornation of perjury.” (citations

omitted)); Oates v. City of Phila. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 1998 WL 107300, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18,

1998) (holding § 1621 does not provide a private cause of action).

Similarly, there is no civil cause of action under Pennsylvania’s perjury statute. See, e.g.,

Deyo v. Eck, 2023 WL 3821818, at *13 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2023) (dismissing pro se complaint

thar referenced § 4902, concluding there was no private cause of action); Page v. Doyle, 2018

WL 2976374, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 2018) (“But in Pennsylvania perjury is a criminal offense

with no civil remedy.” (citation omitted)); Simpson v. City of Coatesville, 2015 WL 7251546, at

*5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2015) (concluding § 4902 does not provide a civil remedy); Sarpolis v.

Tereshko, 26 F. Supp.3d 407, 418 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“Pennsylvania law, however, does not

recognize a private cause of action for perjury . . . .” (citations omitted)); Amos v. NMS Labs,

2013 WL 504181, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s perjury claim . . . also fails

because there is no private cause of action for perjury under Pennsylvania law.” ).

The lack of a private right of action is dispositive. Bryant’s federal and state perjury

claims against the School District and Lucas will be dismissed with prejudice.

iv. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

Bryant also seeks relief under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,9 which provides

“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his

disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29

U.S.C. § 794(a). The Rehabilitation Act guarantees that children with disabilities will not be

denied an education because of their disability, a protection enforced through discrimination

claims. Andrew M. v. Del. Cnty. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 350 (3d

Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). To safeguard this guarantee, a regulation implementing § 504 also

prohibits retaliation against those who enforce rights under the statute:

No recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any

individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section

601 of the Act or this part, or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or

9 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not contain an express private right of action. However, because the

Rehabilitation Act adopts the scheme of “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.),” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(2), and because the Supreme Court identified an implied

right of action under Title VI, “Congress, in essence, [has] provided a private right of action under Section 504 by

incorporating Title VI’s ‘remedies, procedures, and rights’ into the statute.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486

F.3d 791, 803-04 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Section 504, via Title VI, provides a standalone and “exclusive”

cause of action. Id. at 805-06.

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this part.

34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e).10

Bryant’s claim is premised on her allegations that the District retaliated against her for

enforcing her son’s § 504 rights: specifically, that the District retaliated by filing a false police

report. Defendants did not address Bryant’s retaliation claim in their brief and, accordingly, it

will not be dismissed against the District. See Hedges, 404 F.3d at 750 (“The defendant bears

the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.” (citing Kehr, 926 F.2d at 1409)).

v. Qualified Immunity

To the extent she is sued in her personal capacity, Lucas argues that she has qualified

immunity as a government official.11 Qualified immunity “balances two important interests—

the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the

need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). It “protects government officials

‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A two-part framework is used to evaluate

whether a defendant is protected by the qualified immunity doctrine: (1) whether the facts as

alleged constitute a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether the right at

issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. See id. at 231-32. A

government official bears both the burden of pleading the defense, Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463

10 34 C.F.R. § 1007(e) is the “anti-retaliation regulation implementing section 504.” Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.

DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 266 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007).

11 Although Lucas appears to raise the defense to all claims against her, qualified immunity is a defense to federal

claims only. See El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 334 n.3 (3d Cir. 2020).

F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2006), and the burden of persuasion, see Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 642

F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The burden of establishing qualified immunity falls to the official

claiming it as a defense.” (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819)); see also Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d

197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The burden of establishing entitlement to qualified immunity is on [the

defendant].” (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808)).

a. Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause Claims

With respect to Bryant’s § 1983 claims premised on the Establishment and Equal

Protection Clauses, Lucas has qualified immunity. Under prong one of the qualified immunity

framework, a well-pleaded complaint “necessarily alleges a constitutional violation for purposes

of qualified immunity, while a complaint that fails to plausibly plead the violation of a right does

not.” Stringer v. Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 85 (3d Cir. 2025). Accordingly, because the

Amended Complaint does not plead a plausible violation of Bryant’s Establishment Clause and

equal protection rights, Lucas is entitled to qualified immunity on those claims as currently

pleaded. See A.W., 486 F.3d at 806; George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 579 (3d Cir. 2013)

(granting qualified immunity after concluding the complaint did not establish a First Amendment

retaliation claim).

b. Due Process Clause and § 504 Retaliation Claims

Lucas also argues she has qualified immunity as to Bryant’s due process and § 504

retaliation claims. As a threshold issue, the Court notes that Third Circuit has recognized

qualified immunity applies to individual-capacity claims under federal statutes, including the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2023); see also Lue v.

Moore, 43 F.3d 1203, 1205 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Four other courts of appeals . . . have applied the

qualified immunity defense in lawsuits filed under the Rehabilitation Act. We think this result is

sensible. The broad language of Harlow v. Fitzgerald . . . suggests qualified immunity should

normally be available in civil damages lawsuits unless Congress has stated otherwise.” (citations

omitted)).

As explained above, Defendants have not shown that the Amended Complaint fails to

state a due process or § 504 retaliation claim. By that same logic, Lucas has not met her burden

of establishing she is entitled to qualified immunity on these claims, at least under prong one of

the analysis.

That means the success of Lucas’ defense turns on the second prong—whether the rights

were “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violations. Lucas, in essence, argues she is

entitled to immunity because “the complaint does not contain any factual allegations that would

negate [her] qualified immunity defense.” Thomas, 463 F.3d at 291. Specifically, she argues:

“On the face of Plaintiff’s complaint, it is not clear which constitutional or statutory right Lucas

is alleged to have violated, nor has Plaintiff made sufficient allegations that Lucas understood

that her actions violated that right such to remove the shield of qualified immunity.” Lucas’

argument is “legally unsound,” id., and squarely foreclosed by Third Circuit precedent.

To reiterate, “the ‘burden of pleading a qualified immunity defense,’ like any other

affirmative defense, ‘rests with the defendant.’” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 86 (quoting Thomas, 463

F.3d at 293). Lucas’ argument flips the qualified immunity burden. Qualified immunity is not,

as Lucas characterizes it, a “shield” that Bryant must “remove” by pleading a violation of clearly

law established law. Nor is “qualified immunity” a “a talismanic phrase that relieves Defendants

of their burden to show that their actions did not violate . . . clearly established constitutional [or

statutory] rights.” Jennings v. Borst, 2019 WL 4447593, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2019). As

recently reaffirmed by the Third Circuit, “a plaintiff ‘has no pleading burden to anticipate or

overcome a qualified immunity defense.’” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 86 (quoting Thomas, 463 F.3d

at 289).

Quite apart from Lucas’ incorrect understanding of the burden in a qualified immunity

defense, Lucas’ argument for qualified immunity as to Bryant’s due process and § 504 claims is

“conclusory and undeveloped.” Id. She neither defines the rights allegedly violated nor

demonstrates that they were clearly established. Accordingly, her request for qualified immunity

as to these claims will be denied.

If appropriate, Lucas may raise this defense again at summary judgment, when she will

still have the burden of establishing immunity. See Yost, 63 F.4th at 227 (“‘[T]he party asserting

the affirmative defense of qualified immunity’ bears the burden of persuasion on both prongs at

summary judgment.” (quoting Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014)).

vi. State Law Tort Claims

Finally, the School District moves to dismiss Bryant’s claims for defamation, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and false light—each of which are brought under Pennsylvania

law—on the grounds that they are barred by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims

Act (“PSTCA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8541 et seq.12 The PSTCA declares that “no local agency shall

be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of

the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” Id. Although there is an

exception for negligent acts involving nine enumerated categories,13 the PSTCA completely bars

12 Defendants moved to dismiss these claims against Lucas in her official capacity only. Thus, these claims remain

against her in a personal capacity.

13 The enumerated exceptions include: (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody, or control of personal property; (3) real

property; (4) trees, traffic controls, and street lighting; (5) utility service facilities; (6) dangerous conditions of

streets; (7) dangerous conditions of sidewalks; (8) care, custody, or control of animals; and, (9) sexual abuse. Id. §

8542(b).

liability for intentional torts. See id. § 8542(b); see also West ex rel. S.W. v. Pittsburgh Pub.

Schs., 327 A.3d 340, 346 (Pa. Commw. 2024) (“[The law is settled that . . . liability may be

imposed on a local agency only for negligent acts.”). A school district is a “local agency” for

purposes of the PSTCA. See West ex rel. S.W., 327 A.3d at 346. Accordingly, Bryant’s claims

against the District for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light

shall be dismissed with prejudice.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

__/s/ Wendy Beetlestone__________

WENDY BEETLESTONE, C.J.