Gibson v. Idleberg

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

COURTNEY GIBSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-683-JSS-NWH

CRYSTAL IDLEBURGH,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to state a

claim. (Dkt. 20.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Dkt. 27.) Without leave, Plaintiff

filed a second amended complaint, (Dkt. 33), which Defendant moves to strike, (Dkt.

34). As directed by the court, (see Dkt. 36), the parties submitted supplemental briefs

on the issue of qualified immunity, (see Dkts. 39, 40). Upon consideration, for the

reasons outlined below, the court grants Defendant’s motion to strike, and Defendant’s

motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff, a prisoner2 proceeding pro se, sues Defendant, an officer at the Brevard

1 These are taken from Plaintiff’s amended complaint, (Dkt. 8), the allegations of which this court

must take as true in ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 449

F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006).

2 Although Plaintiff alleges that she was a convicted prisoner at the time of filing her claims, the

amended complaint does not indicate whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a prisoner at the time

of the incident. (See Dkt. 8.) In any event, a court may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject

County Jail, in Defendant’s individual and official capacities for violations of

Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.3 (Dkt. 8 at 2–4.) Plaintiff alleges

that in July or August 2020, Defendant performed a routine inspection of Plaintiff’s

cell, and when Plaintiff “plac[ed] [her] hands in the slot to be placed in handcuffs,

[Defendant] went all the way up [Plaintiff’s] forearm[,] forcefully dragging the

handcuffs down [Plaintiff’s] arms with fecal matter on them.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also

alleges that she was accused of “attack[ing] [Defendant] with fecal matter” but that

“there were never any formal charges” made regarding this accusation. (Id.) Plaintiff

claims that she “received [a sexually transmitted disease] from the incident” and has a

related “diagnosis of lesions on [her] genitals.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that Defendant

“acted with culpable state of mind[,] maliciously, and sadistically for the purpose of

causing harm,” or “was deliberately indifferent to [Plaintiff’s] emotional well[-]being,

to reasonable dispute from sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned, Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2),

including state court records, Cunningham v. Dist. Att’y’s Off. for Escambia Cnty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1255

(11th Cir. 2010). The court takes judicial notice that between March 31 and December 29, 2020,

Plaintiff was charged by information in six cases in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court for Brevard

County, Florida, with several offenses, including second degree murder, battery on a law enforcement

officer, and battery by a person detained in prison or jail. See Brevard Cnty. Clerk of Cts., BECA-

Brevard Electronic Court Application (Nov. 7, 2024),

https://vmatrix1.brevardclerk.us/beca/CaseNumber_Search.cfm (input the following case numbers:

05-2020-CF-017733-AXXX-XX, 05-2020-CF-026784-AXXX-XX, 05-2020-CF-033332-AXXX-XX,

05-2020-CF-036679-AXXX-XX, 05-2020-CF-036875-AXXX-XX, and 05-2020-CF-054623-AXXX-

XX). Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced in those cases in 2023. See id. The court remanded

Plaintiff prior to her conviction. See id. (view Dkt. 34 in case number 05-2020-CF-017733-AXXX-XX

and Dkt. 3 in case number 05-2020-CF-026784-AXXX-XX). Thus, in 2020, at the time of the incident

at issue, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee.

3 Since Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident, her right to be free from deliberate

indifference “exist[s] under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the

Eighth Amendment.” De Veloz v. Miami-Dade County, 756 F. App’x 869, 876 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009)). That said, “the standards under the

Fourteenth Amendment are identical to those under the Eighth” in the context of deliberate

indifference. Id. (quoting Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007)); see Johnson v.

Bessemer, 741 F. App’x 694, 699 n.5 (11th Cir. 2018).

safety, and health.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seeks Defendant’s “remov[al] from all police

work,” along with compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on April 8, 2024,4 asserting various

individual and official capacity claims against Defendant, as well as ten John and Jane

Does and the Chief Executive Officer of the Brevard County Jail Complex, for

violations of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See Dkt. 1; Dkt. 1-2 at

4.) The court sua sponte dismissed all but the individual capacity claims against

Defendant and granted Plaintiff time to amend to “proceed with . . . dismissed official

capacity claims.” (Dkt. 6 at 6.) Plaintiff filed the operative amended complaint on

May 23, 2024, asserting individual and official capacity claims against Defendant for

violations of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Dkt. 8.) On September

10, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 20.) Plaintiff then

moved to amend her complaint, (Dkt. 22), which the court denied, (Dkt. 25).

Nevertheless, on January 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (Dkt.

33.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) authorizes a court to strike a pleading.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Striking a pleading under the rule is a matter committed to the

court’s sound discretion. See McCorstin v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 630 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir.

4 These dates are determined under the mailbox rule, by which a pro se prisoner’s legal mail is deemed

filed on the date the prisoner delivers it “to prison authorities for forwarding to the [d]istrict [c]ourt.”

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).

1980) (reviewing a Rule 12(f) decision for abuse of discretion). Courts “generally view

motions to strike with disfavor.” Gill-Samuel v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 298 F.R.D. 693,

699 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (quotation omitted). However, “striking an improper amended

pleading filed without leave of court is appropriate and necessary to enforce Rule

15(a)(2).” Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 12-0019-WS-B, 2012

WL 2395194, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala. June 22, 2012).

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court “accept[s]

the allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2019). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“[D]etailed factual allegations” are generally not required, but “[a] pleading that offers

‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Generally, when analyzing

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court considers only the four corners

of the complaint. See Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 583 n.27 (11th Cir. 2023).

However, a court may also consider judicially noticed facts. Lozman v. City of Riviera

Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1075 n.9 (11th Cir. 2013). Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8 permits a plaintiff to include inconsistent and alternative claims in a

complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)–(3).

The allegations of a pro se complaint are subject “to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,

1168 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Courts

therefore “give liberal construction” to pro se filings. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d

826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, the court may not serve as de facto counsel

for a pro se party or rewrite a deficient complaint to sustain a lawsuit. See Campbell,

760 F.3d at 1168–69.

ANALYSIS

The court first considers Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s second

amended complaint before turning to the motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

A. Motion to Strike

A plaintiff may amend a complaint once as a matter of course no later than

twenty-one days after it is served or the earlier of twenty-one days after service of an

answer or a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), 12(e), or 12(f). Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases,” the plaintiff may amend the complaint “only

with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2).

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint was not filed in compliance with either

of these rules. Plaintiff did not file her first amended complaint as a matter of course

under Rule 15(a)(1) but did so after the court dismissed her initial complaint and

granted leave to amend. (Dkts. 6, 8.) See M.G. v. St. Lucie Cnty. Sch. Bd., 741 F.3d

1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2014). Even if the court presumes that Plaintiff could have filed

a second amended complaint as a matter of course, cf. Beaulieu v. Powell, No. 22-13796,

2023 WL 3302874, at *5 (11th Cir. May 8, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 558 (2024),

Plaintiff did not file the second amended complaint in the time required by the rule.

The amended complaint was filed on May 23, 2024, (Dkt. 8), the motion to dismiss

was filed on September 10, 2024, (Dkt. 20), and the second amended complaint was

filed on January 30, 2025, (Dkt. 33)—more than twenty-one days later. Accordingly,

Plaintiff could amend only with the court’s or Defendant’s approval, which she did

not seek. See Iriele v. Griffin, 65 F.4th 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2023) (“If the requirements

of Rule 15(a)(1) are not met, a party may amend its pleading only with consent from

the opposing party or leave of court.”).

Defendant’s motion to strike is therefore granted. See Schebel v. Charlotte County,

833 F. Supp. 889, 890 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (striking a pro se plaintiff’s complaint for

failure to comply with Rule 15(a)). Thus, the amended complaint, (Dkt. 8), is the

operative complaint.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against her in either

her official or individual capacity for use of excessive force. (Dkt. 20 at 3–7, 9–10.)

Defendant contends that she is entitled to qualified immunity as to the individual

capacity claims because Plaintiff has not shown that she violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. (Id. at 7–9.) The court first discusses Plaintiff’s official capacity

claims before considering her individual capacity claims.

1. Official Capacity Claims

A suit against parties in their official capacities is equivalent to a suit against the

municipality for which they work. See Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1221 n.8 (11th

Cir. 2005) (citing McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997)). “When

suing local officials in their official capacities under [section] 1983, the plaintiff has the

burden to show that a deprivation of constitutional rights occurred as a result of an

official government policy or custom.” Id. at 1221 (footnote omitted).

As with Plaintiff’s initial complaint, her amended complaint does not allege any

facts establishing that the purported constitutional violations resulted from a policy,

custom, pattern, or practice. (See Dkt. 8; see also Dkt. 6.) Consequently, Plaintiff’s

official capacity claims against Defendant are dismissed. See Castellano v. N. Broward

Det. Facility, No. 18-60797-CIV-UNGARO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114450, at *9–10

(S.D. Fla. July 9, 2018) (dismissing official capacity claims where the “plaintiff [did]

not allege the existence of . . . a custom or policy, much less that it was the moving

force behind the alleged deprivation”).

2. Individual Capacity Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for the use of excessive

force, (Dkt. 20 at 3–7), and that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as to

Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims, (id. at 7–9). The court disagrees. Plaintiff has

stated claims for deliberate indifference and excessive force, and Defendant is not

entitled to qualified immunity as to either of these claims.

a) Deliberate Indifference

Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, she appears to raise a claim for deliberate

indifference to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. (See Dkt. 8 at 4–5.)

Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged incident, her claims

arise under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1257 n.3

(11th Cir. 2000) (stating that a pretrial detainee’s “Cruel and Unusual Punishment

claims sound properly in the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law rather

than in the Eighth Amendment”); accord Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe

Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that for deliberate indifference

claims “the minimum standard allowed by the due process clause is the same as that

allowed by the [E]ighth [A]mendment for convicted persons” (quotation omitted)); see

also Johnson, 741 F. App’x at 699 n.5. “A prison official violates the [Fourteenth]

Amendment when a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is

subjectively aware, exists and the official does not respond reasonably to the risk.”

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014) (emphasis and

quotation omitted). “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . .”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation omitted). However, “it does

not allow a prisoner to be exposed to an objectively unreasonable risk of serious

damage to his future health.” Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2015)

(quotation omitted).

“[D]eliberate[ ]indifference claims come in different varieties,” specifically

“inaction cases” that “challenge prison officials’ failure to do something” and “action

cases” that “target prison officials’ affirmative misconduct.” Wade v. McDade, 106

F.4th 1251, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted) (providing

hypotheticals of a guard who “fires his gun toward the ceiling, only to have the bullet

ricochet . . . and kill another prisoner,” a warden who “requires inmates to clean the

prison yard in subzero temperatures, resulting in an otherwise-healthy prisoner’s

sickness and eventual death,” and an official who “orders an inmate to clean . . . with

a mixture of bleach and ammonia, [causing] permanent respiratory damage”); see

Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 7–10 (2020); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002). In

action-based deliberate indifference cases, “the reviewing court must assess the

defendant’s knowledge by reference to the risk created by [her] own conduct.” Wade,

106 F.4th at 1260 (emphasis omitted).

To state a claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must satisfy three

elements: (1) “a substantial risk of serious harm,” (2) “the defendant[’s] deliberate

indifference to that risk,” and (3) “a causal connection between the defendant[’s]

conduct and the [Fourteenth] Amendment violation.” Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1303; see

Epps v. Hein, No. CV416-100, 2016 WL 3208950, at *7 (S.D. Ga. June 7, 2016).

Whether a plaintiff was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm—the first

element—is an objective inquiry, while the defendant’s deliberate indifference to that

risk—the second element—poses a subjective question. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–

37, 842, 846. For the second element, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

defendant (1) “had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm,” (2) “disregarded

that risk,” and (3) “engaged in conduct that amounts to subjective recklessness.”

Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024); see Wade, 106 F.4th at 1261–

62. Deliberate indifference “requires nothing more than an act (or omission) of

indifference to a serious risk that is voluntary, not accidental.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

840; see id. at 835 (holding that “deliberate indifference entails something more than

mere negligence” but “is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very

purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result”).

Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of deliberate indifference. (See Dkt. 8 at 4–

5.) When the court construes her pro se complaint liberally and in the light most

favorable to her, Plaintiff alleges that she submitted herself to be handcuffed for

Defendant to search her cell and that Defendant knowingly placed handcuffs on her

that were covered with fecal matter. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant “went all

the way up [Plaintiff’s] forearm[,] forcefully dragging the handcuffs down [Plaintiff’s]

arms with fecal matter on them.” (Id. at 5.) In relation to the first element, Plaintiff

adequately asserts that Defendant’s conduct not only created a substantial risk of

serious harm but also did cause harm: specifically, a sexually transmitted disease. (Id.)

Plaintiff also satisfies the third element by sufficiently alleging “a causal connection

between the defendant[’s] conduct and the [Fourteenth] Amendment violation.” See

Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1303–04 (holding that allegations that a plaintiff was “forced to

defecate into his jumpsuit and sit in his own feces for two days” stated a claim of

deliberate indifference).

As to the second element, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant was deliberately

indifferent to the risk caused by the feces. (Dkt. 8 at 5.) Though this issue is subjective,

“a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the

very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. “[T]he health risks of

prolonged exposure to human excrement are obvious.” Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1305;

accord Taylor, 592 U.S. at 7–10 (explaining that exposure to bodily waste posed an

obvious risk of serious harm); Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 909, 916 (11th Cir.

2020) (holding that refusing to provide a bathroom break and thus causing a prisoner

to sit in feces for three hundred miles violated the Fourteenth Amendment). As a

result, prisoners have “successfully stated [deliberate indifference] claims based on

being placed in contact and close proximity with excrement.” Brooks, 800 F.3d at

1304; accord Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that

“continued exposure to human excrement” can violate the Constitution (collecting

cases)). Moreover, Plaintiff is not alleging a latent preexisting risk caused by other

inmates; rather, Defendant’s action caused the fecal matter to cover Plaintiff’s arms.

See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1259. Thus, Plaintiff satisfies the subjective component of

deliberate indifference because exposure to human excrement creates an obvious and

substantial risk of serious harm. See Taylor, 592 U.S. at 7–10; Bilal, 981 F.3d at 909,

916; Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1305. In other words, Plaintiff plausibly pleads that Defendant

knew of a risk to Plaintiff’s health and disregarded the risk through subjectively

reckless conduct. Id.

Despite the obvious risks associated with feces, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

rubbed excrement on Plaintiff. (Dkt. 8 at 5.) Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges a plausible

claim of deliberate indifference. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 745; Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1305.

b) Excessive Force

To claim excessive force as a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff must show that “the

force purposely or knowingly used against [her] was objectively unreasonable.”

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015). Several factors are relevant in

this inquiry, including (1) “the relationship between the need for the use of force and

the amount of force used,” (2) “the extent of the plaintiff’s injury,” (3) the defendant’s

efforts “to temper or to limit the amount of force,” (4) “the severity of the security

problem at issue,” (5) “the threat reasonably perceived” by the defendant, and (6)

“whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. at 397. “These considerations should

be made without regard for the officer’s subjective intent or motivation.” Ireland v.

Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1297 (11th Cir. 2022).

Defendant asserts that Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2020),

provides the applicable standard. (Dkt. 20 at 4–5.) Because Plaintiff was a pretrial

detainee when the alleged misconduct occurred, the court applies Kingsley to the

excessive force claims.5 Had Plaintiff been convicted at the time of the incident, the

5 The Eleventh Circuit has held that “Kingsley does not undermine . . . deliberate indifference

precedents.” Johnson, 741 F. App’x at 699 n.5; accord Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., 871

F.3d 1272, 1279 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining that because “Kingsley involved an excessive[ ]force

claim, not . . . deliberate indifference,” it is not “squarely on point with and does not actually abrogate

or directly conflict with” prior precedents on deliberate indifference claims (quotation omitted)).

court would apply Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992), and Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559

U.S. 34, 37 (2010). See Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002). These

are two different tests as “[t]he language of the two [relevant constitutional c]lauses

differs, . . . the nature of the claims often differs[, a]nd, most importantly, pretrial

detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less maliciously

and sadistically.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400 (quotation omitted). Nonetheless, because

the post-conviction standard identified by Defendant is a higher standard than that of

Kingsley, cases decided under the post-conviction standard can still be informative.

Based on the amended complaint, Plaintiff was fully compliant and there is no

indication Plaintiff was resisting or presented a security problem or threat. (See Dkt.

8.) See Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that “spraying

inmates with chemical agents . . . when [they were] fully secured” and “not presenting

a threat of immediate harm” violates the Eighth Amendment); Council v. Sutton, 366

F. App’x 31, 36–37 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that allegations that “tasers and

beanbag rounds were used against [a jail inmate] after he was compliant and subdued”

plead a Fourteenth Amendment violation). Given these allegations, the force used by

Defendant—applying feces on a detainee submitting herself for handcuffing—was

neither proportionate nor necessary. See Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 322 (11th Cir.

1987) (noting that while prison officials are afforded due deference in maintaining the

safety and order of penal institutions, “this deference ‘does not insulate from review

actions taken . . . for no legitimate purpose’” (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

322 (1986))). Further, there seemingly was “[n]o reasonably perceived penological

need . . . for the application of such force.” Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 516 (2d Cir.

2013) (citation omitted); DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 978 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding

that a prison official’s indiscriminate spraying of cells with pepper spray served no

penological purpose under the higher post-conviction standard); Escobar v. Mora, 496

F. App’x 806, 812 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that “an absence of a legitimate

penological interest lends support to an asserted constitutional violation” where “[t]he

only purpose of spitting into [a] plaintiff’s meals would be to taunt and degrade him”).

As for the injury suffered, in addition to being smeared with feces, Plaintiff

alleges that she contracted a disease from the excrement and that the disease produced

lesions on her genitals. (Dkt. 8 at 5.) Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s allegation that the

feces caused Plaintiff’s injuries. (See Dkt. 20 at 6–7.) At this stage of the proceedings,

however, the court must accept the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations, and Plaintiff has

plausibly alleged that she was harmed by Defendant’s conduct. (See Dkt. 8 at 5.) See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, the amended complaint contains sufficient allegations

showing that the force used—rubbing feces on Plaintiff’s arms—was objectively

unreasonable and thus excessive. See Seweid v. County of Nassau, No.

21CV03712JMAAYS, 2024 WL 693981, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2024) (determining

that urinating on an inmate constituted excessive force under the higher post-

conviction standard).

Defendant states that “Plaintiff provides no context for these allegations

whatsoever, nor does she explain where the fecal matter originated or how it allegedly

came to be on the handcuffs.” (Dkt. 20 at 6.) Even so, under the higher post-

conviction standard, Defendant’s conduct in rubbing the feces on Plaintiff’s arms was

humiliating, degrading, and “undoubtedly repugnant to the conscience of mankind,”

thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Hogan, 738 F.3d at 516 (quotation

omitted); accord Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of

‘cruel and unusual’ punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition

de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” (quotation omitted)); Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d

312, 323–24 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The types of actions that have been classified as

‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind’ are torture, humiliation, or degradation.”);

Acevedo v. Warner, No. 7:03CV00526, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32332, at *11–12, 15–

*16 (W.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2005) (concluding that conduct including

smearing feces and urine on a prisoner’s face was repugnant to the conscience of

mankind).

Defendant primarily analyzes the excessive force claim in terms of handcuffing.

(Dkt. 20 at 6 (citing Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019)

(holding that an officer was not entitled to qualified immunity when he “intentionally

applie[d] unnecessarily tight handcuffs to an arrestee . . . neither resisting arrest nor

attempting to flee”), and Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1445–47 (11th Cir. 1997)

(determining that officers were entitled to qualified immunity when only “minimal

force was used to apply . . . handcuffs”))). It is undoubtedly true, but not relevant here,

that “only the most exceptional circumstances will permit an excessive force claim on

the basis of handcuffing alone.” Sebastian, 918 F.3d at 1312. Plaintiff’s excessive force

claim is not based on handcuffing alone; rather, it is based on Defendant’s alleged use

of handcuffs to cover Plaintiff in feces. (See Dkt. 8 at 4–5.) Accordingly, Defendant’s

caselaw on handcuffing is inapplicable. Defendant does not analyze Plaintiff’s claim

that Defendant’s use of excrement constituted excessive force. (See Dkt. 20.) The

alleged use of feces—even under Defendant’s cited standard—is “not a good faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline, but an attempt to maliciously and

sadistically cause harm.” Hogan, 738 F.3d at 515–16 (alteration adopted and quotation

omitted) (holding that “spraying an inmate with a mixture of feces, vinegar, and

machine oil . . . is unequivocally contrary to ‘contemporary standards of decency’”

under the higher post-conviction standard (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327)); Moody

v. Shoults, No. 5:15-cv-00325-MTT-CHW, 2016 WL 8465004, at *3 , *5 (M.D. Ga.

July 28, 2016) (determining that the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant

“intentionally poured a mixture of urine and feces . . . into [the p]laintiff’s cell” stated

a claim for excessive force under the higher post-conviction standard), report and

recommendation adopted in relevant part sub nom. Moody v. Shoultes, 2017 WL 626367, at

*2 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2017). Accordingly, Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for

excessive force.

c) Qualified Immunity

Defendant submits that “Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to meet her

pleading burden so as to overcome qualified immunity.” (Dkt. 20 at 9.) Qualified

immunity protects government officials “from suit in their individual capacities for

discretionary actions performed in the course of their duties.” Carter v. Butts County,

821 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2016); accord Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198

(2004) (“Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision

that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing

the circumstances she confronted.”). “To invoke the defense of qualified immunity, a

government official must have been acting within the scope of his discretionary

authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222,

1230 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). “After a government official establishes

that [s]he was acting within the scope of h[er] discretionary authority, the burden shifts

to the plaintiff to show that the official’s conduct (1) violated federal law (2) that was

clearly established at the relevant time.” Id.; see Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1054

(11th Cir. 2019). As for the second prong, “‘[c]learly established’ means that, at the

time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (cleaned up).

A plaintiff can satisfy the clearly established prong in three ways: (1) with

“case[]law with indistinguishable facts,” (2) with “a broad statement of principle

within the Constitution, statute, or case[]law,” or (3) with alleged “conduct so

egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of

case[]law.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).

The clearly established analysis generally limits courts to “binding decisions of the

Supreme Court of the United States, . . . the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of

the pertinent state, here the Florida Supreme Court.” Wate v. Kubler, 839 F.3d 1012,

1018 (11th Cir. 2016). However, in deciding whether the law was clearly established,

courts can consider “persuasive out-of-circuit authority to determine whether a

violation was of ‘obvious clarity.’” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1259

(11th Cir. 2025) (en banc). Obvious clarity—the third way described above—ensures

that qualified immunity does not permit flagrantly unconstitutional conduct to go

unremedied and unpunished. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)

(“[T]he easiest cases do[ no]t even arise. There has never been a section 1983 case

accusing welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow that

if such a case arose, the officials would be immune from damages or criminal liability.”

(quotation omitted and alterations adopted)).

Obvious clarity is reserved for “extreme circumstances” presenting “particularly

egregious facts” that would have put any reasonable officer on notice that his actions

“offended the Constitution.” Taylor, 592 U.S. 7 (reversing the grant of qualified

immunity to officers who violated the Eighth Amendment by leaving an inmate for

six days in one cell covered in feces and in another that was cold and had only a

clogged drain in the floor to dispose of bodily wastes); accord Hope, 536 U.S. at 734–

35, 745 (holding that prison guards were not entitled to qualified immunity with

respect to a claim that they handcuffed a prisoner to a post in the hot sun for hours

with little access to water and bathroom breaks—“obvious[ly] cruel[ ]” acts that

“should have provided” the guards with “some notice” that their behavior violated the

Eighth Amendment).

According to the amended complaint, Defendant was acting in the scope of her

discretionary authority when the incident occurred—she was a prison guard

performing a routine search of Plaintiff’s cell when she handcuffed Plaintiff. (See Dkt.

8 at 5.) See Balbin v. Johnson, No. 22-11182, 2025 WL 883064, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar.

19, 2025) (“[I]t is within a corrections officer’s discretionary authority to conduct

searches of inmate living areas to maintain prison security.”). Accordingly, the burden

falls to Plaintiff to demonstrate that Defendant violated clearly established law. See

Spencer, 5 F.4th at 1230; Carruth, 942 F.3d at 1054. In her briefing, Plaintiff advances

an obvious clarity argument and cites Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307. (Dkt. 39 at 4.)

The court has already determined that Plaintiff adequately alleges deliberate

indifference and excessive force, thereby satisfying the first prong of the qualified

immunity inquiry. Only the clearly established analysis remains. The court considers

deliberate indifference6 and excessive force in turn.

i) Deliberate Indifference

The Eleventh Circuit has “long recognized a well established . . . right not to be

confined in conditions lacking basic sanitation.” Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1303 (alteration

adopted and quotation omitted). “Indeed, every sister circuit (except the Federal

6 The Eleventh Circuit has previously held that “[a] finding of deliberate indifference necessarily

precludes a finding of qualified immunity; prison officials who deliberately ignore the serious medical

needs of inmates cannot claim that it was not apparent to a reasonable person that such actions

violated the law.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation

omitted). That said, the Eleventh Circuit subsequently stated that this pronouncement was dicta and

demurred on whether a finding of deliberate indifference necessarily satisfies the clearly established

prong. Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1426 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997). For this reason, the court

will conduct a full analysis. See Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326–31 (conducting separate analyses for

deliberate indifference and qualified immunity).

Circuit) has recognized that the deprivation of basic sanitary conditions can” violate

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1304 (collecting cases). Additionally,

Fourteenth “Amendment violations can arise from . . . proximity to human waste,”

and there is clearly established law “sufficient to put [officers] on notice.” Id. at 1306;

accord DeSpain, 264 F.3d at 974–75, 979 (stating that “[i]n viewing the great weight of

cases . . . condemning on constitutional grounds an inmate’s exposure to human

waste, a reasonable prison official would have known at the time that it was improper

to expose prisoners to such unsanitary, offensive conditions,” and collecting cases

with similar holdings from various circuits dating back to 1972). Even if there is not

an identical case to the one at hand, “[e]xact factual identity with a previously decided

case is not required.” Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011); see Hope,

536 U.S. at 741.

Obvious clarity applies to satisfy the second prong of the qualified immunity

inquiry. There are enough cases about exposure to feces to provide “fair and clear

warning” that Defendant’s alleged actions would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

Hope, 536 U.S. at 746 (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 271); see Taylor, 592 U.S. at 7–10;

Bilal, 981 F.3d at 909, 916; Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1305; Hogan, 738 F.3d at 515–16. It

bears repeating that Defendant allegedly rubbed feces along the length of Plaintiff’s

arms on purpose. (Dkt. 8 at 4–5.) Plaintiff plausibly pleads that Defendant covered

Plaintiff in excrement. (Id.) This conduct is “beyond any reasonable pale.” DeMarcus

v. Univ. of S. Ala., 133 F.4th 1305, 1319 (11th Cir. 2025). Defendant’s purported

misconduct thus constitutes one of those rare times that the Constitution itself put

Defendant on fair notice of the unconstitutionality of her actions. See Vinyard v.

Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he words of the pertinent . . . federal

constitutional provision in some cases will be specific enough to establish clearly the

law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances and to overcome qualified

immunity, even in the total absence of case[]law.” (emphasis omitted)).

No reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that it was

constitutionally permissible to use handcuffs to cover an inmate with feces. See Hope,

536 U.S. at 745 (holding that “[t]he obvious cruelty inherent” in putting inmates in

certain wantonly “degrading and dangerous” situations provides officers “with some

notice that their alleged conduct violate[s]” the Eighth Amendment). There is no

indication that the fecal contact was “compelled by necessity or exigency.” Taylor,

592 U.S. at 9. Courts have reached the same conclusion in similar cases prior to the

alleged conduct at issue. See Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307 (holding that obvious clarity

applied in a deliberate indifference case about exposure to feces); Moody, 2016 WL

8465004, at *4 (“Any reasonable officer should know ‘that [pouring feces and urine

into a prisoner’s cell] was at war with the command of the Eighth Amendment.’”

(quoting Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307)). “[A] reasonable official should not have needed”

caselaw to know that forcing feces on a prisoner violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307. When the court takes Plaintiff’s allegations as true,

Defendant’s actions satisfy the obvious clarity standard. See Taylor, 592 U.S. at 8–9;

Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.

Defendant maintains that the obvious clarity standard applies only “where the

plaintiffs were subject to prolonged and intentional exposure of feces,” (Dkt. 40 at 2

(emphasis omitted)), largely in reliance on an unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinion,

Hamlet v. Martin Corectional Institution, No. 21-11937, 2022 WL 16827438, at *4 (11th

Cir. Nov. 9, 2022), (see Dkt. 40 at 4–6). Defendant oversimplifies the analysis. In

Hamlet, the Eleventh Circuit held that “exposure to feces and urine in [a] shower” did

not violate clearly established law because it lasted only thirty to forty minutes, and

the contact was “intermittent rather than consistent.” Hamlet, 2022 WL 16827438, at

*4. At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the “feces [were not]

continuously pressed against the plaintiff’s body” and the plaintiff had access to both

“means to mitigate the severity of [the] exposure,” and the “possibility of avoiding

contact with feces,” which are “important considerations in assessing the objective

extremity of the conditions.” Id.

Hamlet is thus distinguishable. First, the amended complaint does not clarify

how long Plaintiff’s exposure lasted, so even if Defendant is correct that prolonged

exposure is dispositive, there are no facts presently indicating that the contact was

brief, nor does Defendant identify any such facts, other than conclusively asserting that

the exposure was brief. (See Dkt. 40 at 2.) Second, if intentionality is a relevant factor,

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that “[Defendant] went all the way up [Plaintiff’s]

forearm[,] forcefully dragging the handcuffs down [Plaintiff’s] arms with fecal matter

on them.” (Dkt. 8 at 5.) See Lewis v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 522 F. App’x 590, 592 (11th

Cir. 2013) (“[C]onsistently serving a prisoner food that has been intentionally

contaminated with . . . bodily fluids . . . would constitute a violation of the Eighth

Amendment.” (emphasis added)). To the extent that Defendant seeks to dispute this

allegation, the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and “constru[e]

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys.

of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007). Third, Defendant ignores other relevant

factors identified by the Eleventh Circuit, including continuous contact, means to

mitigate, and the possibility of avoiding contact, none of which favor Defendant. (See

Dkt. 40.) Finally, Hamlet was decided at the summary judgment phase, after the

factual record was more fully developed. See 2022 WL 16827438, at *1.

Ultimately, at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff adequately alleges that

Defendant acted in a manner that “[a]ny reasonable officer should have

known . . . was at war with the command of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” Brooks,

800 F.3d at 1307. As a result, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on the

deliberate indifference claim.

ii) Excessive Force

In the supplemental briefing, Defendant acknowledges that “Plaintiff has

asserted a claim of excessive use of force,” but Defendant limits her arguments to

“cases concerning conditions of confinement claims related to sanitation and/or

feces.” (Dkt. 40 at 9.) In any event, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity

as to the excessive force claim as “a defense of qualified immunity is not available in

cases alleging excessive force.” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he use of force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm is clearly

established to be a violation of the Constitution . . . . There is simply no room for a

qualified immunity defense when the plaintiff alleges such a violation.” (quotation

omitted)); see United States v. Hill, 99 F.4th 1289 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-

677, 2025 WL 1426661 (U.S. May 19, 2025).

Still, it was clearly established that Defendant’s conduct violated the Fourteenth

Amendment as “the alleged force was gratuitous and malicious, such that no

reasonable officer in [Defendant’s] shoes could have believed the force used was

constitutionally permissible,” Foy v. Sheriff of Jefferson Cnty., No. 23-11302, 2025 WL

671959, at *5 (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 2025), especially because Plaintiff alleges she was

complying and in the process of being handcuffed when the fecal matter was applied.

See Piazza v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947, 950, 954 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that

repeated taser use on a motionless and unresponsive pretrial detainee violated the

detainee’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force); Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d

1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[w]hen jailers continue to use substantial

force against a [pretrial detainee] who has clearly stopped resisting—whether because

he has decided to become compliant, he has been subdued, or he is otherwise

incapacitated—that use of force is excessive”); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th

Cir. 2002) (reversing the grant of qualified immunity for slamming an arrestee’s head

against the trunk of her car after she had been “arrested, handcuffed, and completely

secured”).

Further, “it is no answer to say that . . . none of [the] cases [discussed]

concerned the use of [feces] specifically.” Piazza, 923 F.3d at 956; accord Hope, 536

U.S. at 741 (“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established

law even in novel factual circumstances.”). In fact, “case[]law need not confront the

type of force at issue if it clearly establishes that no force would be objectively

reasonable under the circumstances . . . And here, precedent clearly established that

[an officer] could not use force against a compliant, nonresistant detainee.” Hill, 99

F.4th at 1303 (emphasis omitted); accord Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 237 (2d Cir.

2014) (“An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law is

not clearly established every time a novel method is used to inflict injury.” (quotation

omitted)).

Plaintiff’s allegations show no legitimate law enforcement or penological reason

for Defendant to rub feces on Plaintiff. (See Dkt. 8 at 4–5.) In any event, the “general

constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law”—that any added force used

against a compliant, nonresistant detainee is excessive—applies here “with obvious

clarity to the specific conduct in question.” See Taylor, 592 U.S. at 8–9 (quoting Hope,

536 U.S. at 741); see also Hill, 99 F.4th at 1303. It is also unlikely that any reasonable

officer would think that rubbing feces on a pretrial detainee is lawful. See Seweid, 2024

WL 693981, at *9 (holding that qualified immunity did not apply when it was

obviously clear that there was no legitimate law enforcement or penological reason to

urinate on an inmate). Defendant is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity on

the excessive force claim.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 20) is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part. Plaintiffs official capacity claims are dismissed. The motion is

otherwise denied.

2. Defendant’s motion to strike the second amended complaint (Dkt. 34) is

GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to strike Plaintiff's second amended

complaint (Dkt. 33).

3. On or before October 10, 2025, Defendant shall answer the amended complaint

(Dkt. 8).

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on September 18, 2025.

( fen of whee ake

JUFIE S. SNEED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Party

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