The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
CIARA BRYANT CASE NO. 6:25-CV-00549
VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH
SCHOOL BOARD OF ST LANDRY MAGISTRATE JUDGE CAROL B.
PARISH ET AL WHITEHURST
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Penalty, Punitive, or
Exemplary Damages (Rec. Doc. 6) filed on behalf of the City of Opelousas and
Officer Ka’Leah Dorsey (individually and in her official capacity as a police officer
for the City of Opelousas). Moving Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims
against them for penalty, punitive, or exemplary damages. Plaintiff failed to file an
opposition. The motion was referred to this Court for report and recommendation
in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636 and the standing orders of this
Court. For the following reasons, it is recommended that Moving Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Penalty, Punitive, or Exemplary Damages (Id.) be GRANTED.
Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff filed the present action on behalf of her minor child, J.B., under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on April 25, 2025, against Opelousas High School, the City of
Opelousas, St. Landry Parish School Board, and Officer Ka’Leah Dorsey after
“Officer Ka’Leah Dorsey discharged a taser into the face of J.B.” during a multiple-
student altercation at Opelousas High School on January 27, 2025. (Rec. Doc. 1, ¶
11). Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-40). Plaintiff also asserts state law claims
for, inter alia, negligence, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-62). Plaintiff requests, in part,
compensatory, special, and punitive damages. (Id. at p. 19, ¶¶ D & E). On July 28,
2025, Moving Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss Penalty, Punitive, or
Exemplary Damages presently before the Court. (Rec. Doc. 6).
Law and Analysis
I. Law applicable to Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs must plead enough
facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 663, (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the
court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. A court must accept all well-pleaded
facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232–33 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). But the Court is not bound to accept as
true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
II. Availability of Punitive Damages
The United States Supreme Court held unequivocally that “[a] municipality is
immune from liability for punitive damages in a §1983 action.” City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270–71 (1981); see also Howell v. Town of Ball,
No. 12-951, 2012 WL 3962387, at *4 (W.D. La. Sept. 4, 2012) (citing Cook County,
Ill. V. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (2003); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); and Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.
1984)). Furthermore, “[i]t is equally well settled that a suit against a municipal
official in his or her official capacity is simply another way of alleging municipal
liability.” Howell v. Town of Ball, 2012 WL 3962387, at *4 (citing Monell v. New
York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). On the other hand,
punitive damages are recoverable against municipal employees who are sued in their
individual capacities pursuant to a §1983 claim. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35
(1983) and Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1015 (5th Cir. 2003).
In her Complaint (Rec. Doc. 1), Plaintiff requests punitive damages “in an
amount that would punish the Defendants for the willful, wanton, and reckless
misconduct and indifference alleged in this complaint and that would effectively
deter the Defendants from future harmful behavior.” (Id. at p. 19, ¶ D). The City of
Opelousas is, by definition, a municipality; therefore, Plaintiff is barred from
recovering punitive damages from the City of Opelousas. Because a suit against a
municipal official in his or her official capacity is simply another way of alleging
municipal liability, Plaintiff is also barred from recovering punitive damages from
Officer Dorsey in her official capacity. Thus, the Court recommends that Moving
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for punitive
damages against the City of Opelousas and Officer Dorsey in her official capacity
be granted.
Moving Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for punitive
damages under state law. Under Louisiana law, punitive damages are not
recoverable in civil cases absent a specific statutory provision authorizing recovery
of punitive damages. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So.2d 1039,
1041 (La.1988). Plaintiff cited no authority supporting her request for punitive
damages under Louisiana law in her Complaint or otherwise. Indeed, Plaintiff failed
to file an opposition to the present motion. Accordingly, the Court recommends
granting Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for punitive
damages under state law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, it is recommended that Moving Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Penalty, Punitive, or Exemplary Damages (Rec. Doc. 6) be
GRANTED.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b),
parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen days from service of this
report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of
Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen days after
being served with of a copy of any objections or responses to the district judge at the
time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the
proposed legal conclusions reflected in the report and recommendation within
fourteen days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual
findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except upon grounds
of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d
1415 (5 Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C.
$636(b)(1).
THUS DONE in Chambers, Lafayette, Louisiana on this 20" day of August,
CAROL B. WHITEHURST
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE