Ruth v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

SHIRLEY RUTH PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 25-4016

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Shirley Ruth, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial

review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)

denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the

provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must

determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the

Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. Procedural Background:

Plaintiff protectively filed her current application for DIB on February 22, 2021, alleging

an inability to work since January 27, 2021, due to fibromyalgia, hypothyroidism, osteoarthritis,

high blood pressure, carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative disc disease, gastritis, shoulder pain,

hip pain, and feet pain. (Tr. 98, 167). An administrative video hearing was held on December 19,

2023, at which Plaintiff, after being informed of her right to representation, testified without the

assistance of a representative. (Tr. 76-96)

By written decision dated April 5, 2024, the ALJ found that during the relevant time period,

Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 14). Specifically,

the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: obesity, fibromyalgia, hypertension,

bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, osteoarthritis of

the left hip, epicondylitis of the left elbow, and tendinosis of the right shoulder. However, after

reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not

meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in

Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 14). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (RFC) to:

[P]erform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that she has been

incapable of climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, as well as limited to stooping

and climbing ramps and stairs frequently and balancing, kneeling, crouching, and

crawling occasionally. She has been limited to reaching, fingering, feeling, and

handling frequently with her bilateral upper extremities. The claimant has needed

to avoid all exposure to workplace hazards, such as unprotected heights and moving

mechanical parts.

(Tr. 16). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work as

a cafeteria attendant, a housekeeping cleaner, and a blood unit donor assistant.

Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, who

denied that request on January 28, 2025. (Tr. 1-5). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (ECF

No. 2). Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is before the undersigned for report and

recommendation. (ECF Nos. 9, 16).

The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are

presented in the parties’ briefs and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.

II. Applicable Law:

The court reviews “the ALJ’s decision to deny disability insurance benefits de novo to

ensure that there was no legal error that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence

on the record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F. 3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016). Substantial

evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it

adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154

(2019). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support

it. Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 2015). As long as there is substantial evidence

in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse it simply

because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome,

or because the court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477

(8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent

positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the court

must affirm the ALJ’s decision. Id.

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one

year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari,

274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act defines “physical

or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that her disability,

not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation

process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial

gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Only if the final stage is

reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light

of her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir.

1982), abrogated on other grounds by Higgins v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 504, 505 (8th Cir. 2000); 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520.

III. Discussion:

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence in the record. (ECF No. 9). Specifically, Plaintiff raises the following arguments for

reversal: A) The ALJ ignored the clear directives of Polaski and discounted her subjective

allegations because there were not supported by her medical records; and B) The ALJ’s RFC

determination is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. Upon review, the Court

finds the ALJ did not fully consider Plaintiffs’ subjective allegations when evaluating her

disability. Accordingly, the Court will only address this issue on reversal.

In assessing the subjective allegations of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to

apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007). The factors to consider are as

follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;

(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of

medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.

The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective

allegations of pain. See Id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as

the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective

allegations. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly

applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the claimant’s subjective

allegations are not entirely valid, the ALJ’s determination is entitled to deference. See Id.; Cox v.

Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount a claimant’s

subjective allegations “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them

[the subjective allegations].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant’s allegation of pain, the ALJ must make a specific evaluation

of a claimant’s subjective allegations, articulating the reason for discrediting the testimony,

addressing inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140,

1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient

reason to find a claimant disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the

existence of pain, but whether the pain a claimant experiences precludes the performance of

substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

In the present action, the Court finds the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for

discounting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. In his opinion, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s

subjective allegations for the following reasons:

After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence

and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medial

evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.

(Tr. 17). While the ALJ referenced “other evidence,” with the exception of discussing Plaintiff’s

alleged occasional need to use a cane, he did not provide what that “other evidence” was and failed

to address Plaintiff’s reports of excessive fatigue and pain. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798,

802 (8th Cir. 2005) (in rejecting claimant’s complaints of pain as not credible, the court expects

the ALJ to detail reasons for discrediting testimony and set forth inconsistencies found).

Based upon this review, the Court finds the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiffs subjective

allegations was improper. Accordingly, because the ALJ provided an insufficient basis for

discounting Plaintiff's subjective allegations during the relevant time period, this case must be

reversed and remanded.

IV. Conclusion:

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends reversing the decision of the ALJ

and remanding this case to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties have fourteen days from receipt of our report and

recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.

The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo

review by the district court.

DATED this 20th day of August 2025.

/si( Anes Comateck

CHRISTYCCOMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE