Brown v. Rayford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DELVON BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-00572-GCS

)

CHARLES RAYFORD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies by Defendants Curtis Dallas (“Dallas”), Charles

Rayford (“Rayford”), Brendan Garcia (“Garcia”), and Geddy McDonald (collectively,

“Defendants”). (Doc. 54). Plaintiff Delvon Brown (“Brown”) filed a Response and

Supplement on October 23, 2024. (Doc. 61, 62). Defendants filed a reply on November 27,

2024. (Doc. 65). A hearing was held on Defendants’ motion on April 22, 2025, wherein the

Court heard testimony and arguments. (Doc. 84). The Court took the matter under

advisement. Id. For the reasons delineated below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED. (Doc. 54).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Brown, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), brings this

civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights at

Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). (Doc. 1). Brown filed his Complaint on

February 28, 2024. (Doc. 1). Brown alleged that, after an encounter with several

correctional officers, he suffered serious injuries. Id. at 3.

The Court completed a preliminary review of Brown’s Initial Complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A on April 22, 2025. (Doc. 11, p. 1, 8). The Court allowed Brown to

proceed on the following counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force or failure to intervene/protect

claim against Defendants Rayford, Dallas, and Hughes.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Garcia for denying Plaintiff medical attention for his broken

teeth or dizziness.

(Doc. 11, p. 8).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In his response to the pending Motion, Plaintiff Brown discusses the exhaustion of

administrative remedies only in relation to Grievance No. K04-1023-0657. (Doc. 61, p 7).

Defendants, in their reply, did the same. (Doc. 65, p. 6-7). The Court will thus focus its

analysis of exhaustion of administrative remedies on this grievance.

1. Grievance No. K04-1023-0657 (Submitted on October 6, 2023)

On October 6, 2023, Brown submitted Grievance No. K04-1023-0657 related to the

incident on September 28, 2023. (Doc. 85, p. 6). Brown alleged that Correctional Officer

Rayford told Brown to turn around and stand up. Id. Brown recalls that Rayford was with

other prison officials, who he later alleges were Dallas, Garcia, and Geddy McDonald.1

1 Initially, Brown alleged that “Hughes” was a defendant. (Doc. 1, p. 2). However, Brown

later substituted McDonald for Hughes. (Doc. 39).

(Doc. 85, p. 6; Doc. 39). According to Brown, the men slammed Brown against a wall for

disobeying an order to turn around and stand. (Doc. 85-2, p. 6-7). The men allegedly

grabbed Brown’s hair and slammed him against a wall again. Id. at 7. During the

altercation, Brown claims that he spat out a tooth. Id. Brown reported dizziness,

headaches, swollen gums, and half a leftover tooth that perpetuates his gum problems.

Id. Brown also alleges that the prison provided no medical care. Id. Brown claims that he

was kept in a cell in the cold with no sheets, and the nurses did not treat his gums. Id.

Brown marked the grievance as an emergency, so it was expedited to the Grievance

Officer for a Second Level review on October 16, 2023. Id. at 6. No further action was

taken until the Grievance Officer requested an extension on December 27, 2023. Id. at 9.

The Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) granted the extension on February 2, 2024.

Eventually, after Brown had initiated this action, the Nursing Supervisor wrote a

memorandum stating that Brown’s grievance had been addressed. Id. at 8. Following that

report, on August 1, 2024, another Grievance Officer recommended denial of the

grievance, citing the memorandum. Id. at 4. The CAO concurred with the Grievance

Officer’s recommendation. Id.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper when a moving party cannot establish the presence

of a genuine dispute of material fact. See FED. R. CIV. Proc. 56(a). To survive a motion for

summary judgement, the non-moving party must provide admissible evidence which

would allow a reasonable jury to find in his or her favor. See Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520

F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008). Generally, the Court’s role is to determine whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists rather than evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge witness

credibility, or determine the truth of the matter when determining the outcome for a

motion for summary judgement. See National Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co.,

528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008).

However, in Pavey v. Conley, the Seventh Circuit held that, “debatable factual

issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are not

required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. 544 F.3d 739, 740-

741 (7th Cir. 2008). Therefore, it is left to the Court to determine whether an inmate has

exhausted his or her remedies when the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion is raised.

If the court finds that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies, then the

inmate is given the opportunity to exhaust should time still permit or if the failure to

exhaust was innocent. Id at 742. If the court determines that the failure to exhaust was the

inmate’s fault, then the case is over. Id.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which governs lawsuits filed

by inmates, “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal Law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This coincides with the PLRA’s statutory purpose of “afford[ing]

correction officials [the] time and opportunity to address complaints internally before

allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also

Begolli v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 701 F.3d 1158, 1161 (7th Cir. 2012). It affords prison

administrators an opportunity to fix the problem, reduce damages, and shed light on the

factual disputes that may arise in litigation. See Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023-

24 (7th Cir. 2002).

Inmates must follow their prison’s administrative rules when attempting to

exhaust their administrative remedies under the PLRA. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023. Plaintiff

is an inmate in the IDOC and is required to correctly follow the regulations contained in

the IDOC’s Grievance Procedures to properly exhaust his claims. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.800, et seq. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to a prison’s grievance

procedures to satisfy the requirements for exhaustion under the PLRA. See Dole v.

Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). The exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied

if an inmate files untimely or procedurally defective grievances. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at

83. Additionally, an inmate must correctly complete all the steps outlined in the grievance

procedures and is barred from filing suit prior to any step being completed. See Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If an inmate fails to

complete all the steps correctly to exhaust his claim, then “the prison administrative

authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely

unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. However, inmates are not required to exhaust

administrative remedies that are unavailable to them which can occur if, “prison

employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative

misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.

The IDOC Grievance Procedures require that an inmate first file a grievance with

a counselor at their correctional institution within 60 days of the discovery of an incident.

See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The Grievance must include, “factual details

regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint, including what happened, when,

where and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in

the complaint.” See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). If the inmate is unsatisfied with the

counselor’s response, then the inmate can submit a formal grievance to the prison’s

grievance officer. Id at (a)-(b). The grievance officer must then review the grievance and

provide a written response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). Within 60

days of the receipt of the grievance, the grievance officer must report their findings and

recommendations in writing to the CAO. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO

will then review the findings and recommendations and offer a written decision to the

inmate. Id. The inmate can appeal the CAO’s decision to the Administrative Review

Board (“ARB”) within thirty days. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). To do this

correctly, the inmate is required to attach copies of the grievance officers report and the

CAO’s decision to his appeal. Id. The ARB then submits its findings and

recommendations to the Director who will issue the IDOC’s final decision within six

months. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d)-(e).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Brown failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as

required by the PLRA. (Doc. 65, p. 6-9). Brown counters that the grievance procedure was

unavailable to him. (Doc. 61, p. 7). Specifically, Brown alleges that the grievance

procedure both took too long and that prison officials interfered with the grievance

process. Id. at 7-8.

A plaintiff cannot sue first and exhaust later. That is precisely what Brown did

here. As noted above, Brown submitted grievance #K04-1023-0657 on October 6, 2023.

On October 16, 2023, the Grievance Officer received Brown’s grievance for review, and

on March 7, 2024, the Nursing Supervisor wrote a memorandum recommending denial.

The Grievance Officer then also recommended the denial on August 1, 2024, and the CAO

concurred on the same day. Brown filed suit on February 28, 2024, less than five months

after he filed this grievance and just over a week before his grievance was addressed. This

five-month time frame does not appear to be adequate to allow a facility to

process/address any grievance thoroughly. Additionally, there is no evidence that at the

time of the filing of the lawsuit (February 28, 2024), the facility was ignoring Plaintiff’s claims

or grievances. In fact, the record shows that other grievances filed by Plaintiff were

answered accordingly. (Doc. 85, p. 12).

Next, Brown contends that Menard hindered the grievance process by failing to

respond to his grievance. (Doc. 61, p. 7, 8). The Court rejects this contention. See Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Matthews v. Pitzen, No. 24-1358, 2024 WL

4850498, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 2024) (noting that “processing delays do not relieve a

prisoner of the obligation to exhaust.”) (citing Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638-639 (2016)).

As noted above, Brown did not give the grievance process enough time to play out before

he filed this suit.

As to Brown’s argument that prison workers interfered with the grievance process,

the Court finds this argument unpersuasive. First, the record clearly indicates that Brown

was aware of the grievance procedures at Menard. The record also reflects that Brown

successfully and correctly used the grievance procedures multiple times in the past. (Doc.

85, p. 12). Brown likewise understood such steps when he filed his grievances with the

prison and when he filed his complaint. (Doc. 61, p. 4). And, crucially, the grievance at

issue here was processed and addressed by prison officials, albeit not as quickly as Brown

would have liked.

Accordingly, this case is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. See, e.g., Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2020)

(stating that “[a] premature lawsuit must be dismissed without prejudice, and the

prisoner must file a new suit after fully exhausting administrative remedies.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED. (Doc. 54). The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff’s complaint

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the

Court to enter judgment reflecting the same and to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 19, 2025. boner by

. Judge Sison

let ©. 23 Tate: 2025.09.19

10:22:23 -05'00'

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

Page 9 of 9