Knox v. Miller

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

STEPHEN L. KNOX, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-01323-JEH

)

)

KYLE MILLER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

I

A

This cause is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. During the relevant time, Plaintiff, Stephen L. Knox, was an inmate with

the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) who was incarcerated at the IDOC’s

Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac). Plaintiff is currently being held at the

IDOC’s Joliet Treatment Center.

On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

that correctional officers at Pontiac violated his Constitutional rights. Specifically,

Plaintiff alleged that that, on September 3, 2021, Defendants Lt. Kyle Miller, Lt.

Kyle Devine, Sgt. Curtis Bailey, Correctional Officer Andrew Lawrence, and

Correctional Officer William Davis opened his cell door, jumped on top of him,

and began to hit, punch, and choke him. Thereafter, Plaintiff averred that these

officers placed him in handcuffs and sprayed him in his eyes with a chemical

agent. These officers, then, forced Plaintiff to walk down the galley to a holding

cell without the use of his walker. Plaintiff asserted that Defendants’ actions

caused him to experience physical pain.

On October 30, 2023, the Court conducted a merit review of Plaintiff’s

Complaint that is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and found that Plaintiff’s

Complaint stated a claim against Lt. Miller, Lt. Devine, Sgt. Bailey, C/O Lawrence,

and C/O Davis for exerting excessive force against him in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights. Defendant have now moved for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s claim against them.

B

Despite being provided with a notice from the Court advising him of the

consequences for failing to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

and despite the Court giving him additional time to respond to Defendants’

motion for summary judgments, Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants’

motion for summary judgment, and the deadline for him to do so under the Local

Rule has now passed. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence with

which to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat Defendants’

motion for summary judgment.

Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6) provides that “[a] failure to respond to any

numbered fact [contained within a motion for summary judgment] will be deemed

an admission of the fact.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff has admitted all of the relevant

facts that show that Defendants’ are entitled to summary judgment, and the Court

incorporates those facts herein. Parra v. Neal, 614 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010), as

revised (July 19, 2010) (internal citations omitted) (“At summary judgment, the

plaintiffs filed an opposition to the defendants’ motion but did not bother to

respond to their statement of material facts. The district court thus accepted the

defendants’ statement of material facts as true. We do as well.”).

Despite Plaintiff’s failure to respond, the Court is cognizant that

“[s]ummary judgment cannot be granted by default even if there is a complete

failure to respond to the motion.” Boyd v. Habeck, 2013 WL 518966, * 1 (E.D. Wis.

Feb. 12, 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e) advisory committee note to 2010

amendments). Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the evidence submitted by

Defendants in order to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists

that would preclude summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. The Court finds

that no such disputed fact exists and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Abbot v. Gale, 896 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that where

a defendant denies the allegations of the complaint and a plaintiff then fails “to

respond with evidence in support of [her] claim,” the court is justified in granting

summary judgment).

C

With that in mind, the undisputed facts demonstrate the following. On

September 3, 2021, Plaintiff was housed in Pontiac’s Mental Health Unit and was

classified as an “A-grade inmate,” which allowed him limited telephone usage.

However, Pontiac’s policies prohibited an inmate from making telephone calls on

behalf of another inmate

At approximately 3:50 p.m. on September 3, 2021, Sgt. Bailey observed

Plaintiff using a telephone to make an unauthorized call on behalf of another

inmate. Accordingly, Sgt. Bailey ordered Plaintiff to stop using the phone, and he

ordered Plaintiff to surrender the phone to him. Plaintiff refused and responded:

“I ain’t giving you’ll [anything].”

After Plaintiff’s continued refusal, Sgt. Bailey notified Lt. Devine and Lt.

Miller that Plaintiff had and was refusing to comply with a direct order.

Thereafter, the correctional officers went to Plaintiff’s cell. After Lt. Devine and Lt.

Miller arrived at Plaintiff’s cell, the correctional officers, again, ordered Plaintiff to

relinquish the phone. Once again, Plaintiff yelled: “y’all ain’t taking my stuff.”

Thereafter, Plaintiff continued to ignore further orders from the correctional

officers, and so, Sgt. Bailey unlocked Plaintiff’s cell door in order to retrieve the

phone. Sgt. Bailey was accompanied by Lt. Devine and Lt. Miller in entering

Plaintiff’s cell.

Upon entry by the correctional officers, Plaintiff assumed a fighting stance.

Sgt. Bailey, then, moved toward Plaintiff and again ordered him to release the

phone that has in Plaintiff’s hand. Instead of complying, Plaintiff swung his closed

fist at Sgt. Bailey, but he did not strike Sgt. Bailey. In response, the correctional

officers attempted to restrain Plaintiff, but Plaintiff resisted. At one point, Plaintiff

attempted to bite Lt. Devine.

Due to Plaintiff’s continued aggression and resistance, Lt. Miller deployed

two brief bursts of OC spray to subdue Plaintiff. Lt. Miller applied the OC spray

in a controlled manner to prevent further escalation and to ensure safety. Despite

being hit with the OC spray, Plaintiff continued to resist the officers.

As a result, Correctional Officers Davis and Lawrence entered Plaintiff’s cell

so that they could assist the other correctional officer in placing leg restraints on

Plaintiff. Although he continued to resist the officers’ efforts to restrain him, the

officers were, eventually, able to shackle Plaintiff. Once he was fully restrained,

Sgt. Bailey, Lt. Devine, and Lt. Miller escorted Plaintiff to a holding tank.

Throughout the escort, Plaintiff remained verbally confrontational, and he told the

officers that was “feeling homicidal.”

Following the incident, Plaintiff had a minor laceration on his lip. Therefore,

medical personnel evaluated Plaintiff at (approximately) 6:10 p.m., and Plaintiff

received three stitches for the minor laceration on his lip. Plaintiff refused

treatment for OC spray decontamination despite being offered eyewash.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall

be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a);

Ruiz-Rivera v. Moyer, 70 F.3d 498, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1995). The moving party has the

burden of providing proper documentary evidence to show the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must come forward

with specific evidence, not mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, which

demonstrates that there is a genuine issue for trial. Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck,

N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). “[A] party moving for summary judgment

can prevail just by showing that the other party has no evidence on an issue on

which that party has the burden of proof.” Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives

Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, the non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must

designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or

admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue; he must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 261 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1986)

(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986));

Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally, a scintilla

of evidence in support of the non-movant’s position is not sufficient to oppose

successfully a summary judgment motion; “there must be evidence on which the

jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

III

A

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain” on prisoners. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). In order to survive

summary judgment, a plaintiff must put forth evidence that “support[s] a reliable

inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Id. at 322. The core requirement

for an excessive force claim is that the defendant “used force not in a good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009).

In determining whether the intent was malicious, relevant factors include

how much force was needed versus how much was actually used; the extent of

injury inflicted; whether the force was needed because of a risk to someone’s

safety; and whether the officers made efforts to limit the severity of the force.

McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 663 (7th Cir. 2019). Deference is given to prison

officials when the use of force involves security measures taken to quell a

disturbance because “significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff” can

be involved. Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). Prisons are dangerous places,

and security officials are tasked with the difficult job of preserving order and

discipline among inmates. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 476 (7th Cir. 2009).

B

As is oft-time repeated by courts in this Circuit, summary judgment is the

put-up or shut-up stage of the litigation. Brown v. CACH, LLC, 94 F.4th 665, 667 (7th

Cir. 2024). Plaintiff has offered no evidence with which to support his excessive

force claim against Defendants. Instead, the undisputed facts show that

Defendants did not exert unconstitutional force against Plaintiff on September 3,

2021.

Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Defendants exerted force against him

maliciously or sadistically. On the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that

Defendants used minimal force against Plaintiff because he repeatedly refused

their lawful orders that were given pursuant to Pontiac’s policies and that were

intended, in good faith, to maintain order and discipline at Pontiac. Hendrickson,

589 F.3d at 890. Defendants were required to use force because Plaintiff refused

their repeated orders and took a fighting stance towards them. Moreover, Plaintiff

suffered a minor injury to his lip, which further shows that the amount of force

used was de minimis. McCottrell, 933 F.3d at 663.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [26] is GRANTED.

2. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in

all Defendants’ favor and against Plaintiff.

3. All other pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is

terminated. All deadlines and settings on the Court’s calendar are vacated.

4. If he wishes to appeal this judgment, Plaintiff must file a notice of

appeal with this Court within thirty (30) days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(4).

5. If he wishes to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must identify the issues that he will

present on appeal to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken

in good faith. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th

Cir. 1999) (an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement

of his grounds for appealing so that the district judge “can make a responsible

assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th

Cir. 2000) (providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable

person could suppose . . . has some merit” from a legal perspective).

6. If he chooses to appeal, Plaintiff will be liable for the $605.00

appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

It is so ordered.

Entered: September 19, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge