Wachter v. Jeffries

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MARC WACHTER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

VIPIN SHAH, TISH BRASHEAR- ) Case No. 3:21-cv-1536-DWD

FINNEY, PERCY MYERS, and DANIEL )

MONTI, Warden of Centralia )

Correctional Center, in his Official )

Capacity only, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Before the Court are the parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment, which are fully

briefed with their respective Responses. (Docs. 114, 115, 116, 121, 128, 130, 133). For the

reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 114) is DENIED

and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 115, 116, 121) are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an inmate at Centralia Correctional Center, filed this action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). He claims,

under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his concerns of rectal bleeding and vomiting of blood. (Doc. 1, generally).

More specifically, as to Defendant Shah, who is a physician, Plaintiff alleges a deliberate

indifference claim related to medical treatment provided in April and May 2021. (Docs.

1, generally; 63; 88, pgs. 2, 4; 116, pg. 2; 133, pg. 1). Defendant Shah allegedly ordered a

blood draw, which occurred six days later, but failed to perform a rectal or throat

examination or to heed concerns about Plaintiff’s Mobic prescription. (Docs. 1, generally;

88, pgs. 2, 4). As to Defendants Myers and Brashear-Finney, who are a physician and a

nurse, respectively, Plaintiff alleges a deliberate indifference claim related to follow-up

medical treatment provided in July 2021. (Docs. 63; 88, pgs. 2-3, 5-6; 116, pg. 2; 133, pg.

1); Wachter v. Myers, Brashear-Finney, and Monti, No. 22-cv-577-SMY, Docs. 1, generally;

71, pg. 3 (S.D. Ill.).1 Defendant Brashear-Finney allegedly made comments to Defendant

Myers about the appropriateness of Plaintiff’s care, and Defendant Myers allegedly failed

to hear Plaintiff’s concerns about continued bleeding, offer treatment for that continued

bleeding, or hear Plaintiff’s concerns about the side-effects of his Mobic prescription.

(Docs. 63; 88, pgs. 3, 5-6); Wachter, No. 22-cv-577-SMY, Docs. 1, generally; 71, pg. 3.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff and Defendants move for summary judgment. The Court will grant that

relief if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, such that the movant is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Driveline Sys., LLC v. Arctic

Cat, Inc., 936 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc., 807

F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2015); citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

Assertions that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must be supported by citations

to the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Alternatively, the assertions must be supported

1Case No. 22-cv-577-SMY was consolidated with the instant case, Case No. 21-cv-1536-DWD, on

October 31, 2022. (Doc. 54); Wachter, No. 22-cv-577-SMY, Doc. 71.

by a showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine

dispute or that an adverse party cannot support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).

If the movant presents evidence to show the absence of a genuine dispute of

material fact, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to provide evidence of specific

facts that create a genuine dispute of material fact. Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th

Cir. 2012) (citing Hudson Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago Heights, 48 F.3d 234, 237 (7th Cir. 1995)).

A genuine dispute of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for the nonmovant

to receive a verdict. Driveline Sys., 936 F.3d at 579 (quoting Aregood v. Givaudan Flavors

Corp., 904 F.3d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 30, 2018)). Speculation that is

unsupported by the evidence cannot defeat summary judgment. Moje v. Fed. Hockey

League, LLC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 907, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing Sbika v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884

F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir. 2018); Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 1994)).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court will not determine

credibility, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts, as

those tasks are reserved for the finder of fact. Runkel v. City of Springfield, 51 F.4th 736, 741

(7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosp. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir.

2018)). Instead, based on the evidence of record, the Court will decide whether a genuine

dispute of material fact requires a trial. Id. (quoting Johnson, 892 F.3d at 893). When doing

so, the Court construes the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant while

also avoiding the temptation of deciding one side’s version of the facts is more likely true

than the other side’s version of the facts. Id. (quoting Johnson, 892 F.3d at 893).

If the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court applies the

ordinary summary judgment standards, articulated above, during its review. See Tokio

Marine Specialty Ins. Co. v. Altom Transp., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 3d 791, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2022)

(quoting Blow v. Bijora, Inc., 855 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2017)). The Court simultaneously

reviews the cross-motions for summary judgment, but neither may be granted unless the

evidence, as a whole, reveals there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Id. (quoting

Bloodworth, 475 F.App’x at 95). That is, each party must still bear their burden of proof.

Wilson v. Baptiste, No. 13-cv-7845, 2016 3878125, *2 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2016) (quoting

McKinney v. Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 504 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2008)). Finally, courts

cannot assume cross-motions for summary judgment are suggestive of no undisputed

material facts, and the denial of one cross-motion for summary judgment does not require

the grant of the other cross-motion for summary judgment. Wilson, 2016 3878125 at *2

(quoting Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997)).

As a substantive matter, it is well settled that prison medical professionals violate

the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment when their

conduct shows a deliberate indifference toward serious medical needs. Jones v. Mathews,

2 F.4th 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir.

1997)); Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The plaintiff must prove (1) an objectively serious medical condition,

and (2) deliberate indifference toward the inmate’s health or safety. Jones, 2 F.4th at 612

(citing Orlowski v. Milwaukee Cnty., 872 F.3d 417, 423 (7th Cir. 2017)); accord Eagan v.

Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 693-95 (7th Cir. 2021); Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 544-45 (7th

Cir. 2019); Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 716 (7th Cir. 2019). When reviewing this claim,

the Court considers the totality of the inmate’s medical care. Lisle, 933 F.3d at 716.

Notably, there is an objective and a subjective component to the above claim. Jones,

2 F.4th at 612 (quoting Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002));

accord Lewis, 864 F.3d at 562. To satisfy the objective component to the claim, a plaintiff

may provide evidence that a physician diagnosed a medical condition as requiring

treatment, a layperson would find the need for treatment to be obvious, or the failure to

treat the condition resulted in a more serious injury or the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain. Jones, 2 F.4th at 612 (quoting Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1022-23

(7th Cir. 2019)); Eagan, 987 F.3d at 695 (quoting Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1373); Orlowski, 872

F.3d at 423 (quoting Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010)). A condition may

be obvious to a layperson even if he or she cannot diagnose or properly identify the cause

of the observed ailment. Jones, 2 F.4th at 612 (quoting Orlowski, 872 F.3d at 423). Also, a

medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious. Orlowski, 872 F.3d at 423.

To satisfy the subjective component to the claim, a plaintiff must prove the prison

medical professionals were aware of facts from which to infer a substantial risk of serious

harm, drew such an inference, and responded with a reckless or intentional disregard for

the serious medical condition through inaction or woefully inadequate action. Jones, 2

F.4th at 612; Eagan, 987 F.3d at 695; McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010).

That is, a plaintiff must prove “a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., that the prison

medical professionals were “aware of a substantial risk of serious harm[] and effectively

condone[d] th[at] harm by allowing it to happen.” Jones, 2 F.4th at 612-13 (quoting Estate

of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up); Eagan, 987 F.3d at 693).

The Court stresses that deliberate indifference requires a state of mind more

blameworthy than even gross negligence. Jones, 2 F.4th at 612-13 (quoting Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)); McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640; see also Eagan, 987 F.3d at 688

(“A physician’s ‘negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state

a valid claim…under the Eighth Amendment.’ ”). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has found

“an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Eagan, 987 F.3d at 688 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06) (cleaned up).

Likewise, a mistake in professional judgment is not deliberate indifference. Id. (citing

Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016)). As such,

treatment decisions are entitled to deference unless no minimally competent professional

would respond in the same way. Campbell, 936 F.3d at 545 (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d

886, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2008)); accord Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011);

see also Orlowski, 872 F.3d at 424 (“Even if a defendant recognizes the substantial risk, he

is free from liability if he “responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately

was not averted.”) (cleaned up). The treatment must be “such a substantial departure

from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards[] as to demonstrate that the

person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Campbell, 936

F.3d at 545 (quoting Sain, 512 F.3d at 895) (cleaned up); see also Roe, 631 F.3d at 857 (“The

burden is high on a plaintiff making such a claim: Deliberate indifference is not medical

malpractice; the Eighth Amendment does not codify common law torts.’ ”) (cleaned up).

Relevantly, a “[r]efusal to treat chronic pain, delay in providing medical treatment,

refusal to provide prescribed pain medication, or erroneous treatment based on a

substantial departure from accepted medical judgment may evidence deliberate

indifference.” Spencer v. Sheahan, 158 F. Supp. 2d 837, 848 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Jones v.

Simek, 193 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1999); Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir.

1996); Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1999); Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d

605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)); but see Campbell, 936 F.3d at 549 (“Deciding whether to provide

additional medical interventions—especially when the inmate’s preferred course of

treatment poses considerable challenges to prison administration—is not the same as

deciding to provide no treatment at all.”). Whether delay is tolerable depends upon the

seriousness of the condition, the prison official’s awareness, and the ease of treatment.

Jones, 2 F.4th at 615 (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 778 (7th Cir. 2015));

see also Lewis, 864 F.3d at 563 (“A delay in treatment may show deliberate indifference if

it exacerbated the inmate’s injury or unnecessarily prolonged his pain, and even brief,

unexplained delays in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference.”) (cleaned up).

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 114)

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment contains no legal argument; instead, it

is limited to a statement of material facts. (Doc. 114, generally). Further, the statement of

material facts violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1. See L.R.

56.1(j) (eff. Oct. 30, 2023) (“This Local Rule applies equally to represented and pro se

parties.”). Plaintiff failed to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record” and to

provide “specific citation(s) to the record, including page number(s).” See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1); L.R. 56.1(a) (eff. Oct. 30, 2023); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“The Court need

consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”); L.R.

56.1(f) (eff. Oct. 30, 2023) (“The Court will disregard any asserted fact that is not

supported with a citation to the record, unless the factual basis for the assertion is clearly

identifiable from the parties’ related citations or permissible inference.”). He also failed

to “set[] forth each relevant, material fact in a separately numbered paragraph.” L.R.

56.1(a) (eff. Oct. 30, 2023). Defendants Shah, Myers, and Brashear-Finney note these

deficiencies but still answer the statement of material facts. (Doc. 130, pgs. 1-10).

Regardless, the Court is left to speculate about how the material facts, even if proper and

procedurally sufficient under Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1, fit within a deliberate

indifference claim against Defendants under the Eighth Amendment. Thus, whether due

to procedural violations of Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1(a), or to the substantive failure to

carry his burden with argument on summary judgment, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment must be DENIED. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1); L.R. 56.1 (eff. Oct. 30, 2023).

B. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 115, 116, 121)2

Defendants Shah, Myers, and Brashear-Finney argue neither their action nor

inaction caused an injury to Plaintiff. (Doc. 116, pg. 1). More specifically, Defendants

state: “[T]he facts developed during discovery demonstrate that Plaintiff received

2The Court notes, in response to the filing of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment,

Defendants Shah, Myers, and Brashear-Finney, as well as the Court itself, provided Plaintiff the requisite

notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1. (Docs. 117 & 123).

appropriate treatment for rectal bleeding and self-reported side effects of Mobic, and [he]

did not suffer any harm because of the Defendants’ actions.” (Doc. 116, pgs. 11-12).

As to Defendant Shah, in particular, Defendants argue “[t]he record does not

indicate that [his] treatment decisions deviated so significantly from accepted medical

practices that his medical judgment could be said to be compromised.” (Doc. 116, pg. 12).

They also state: “Courts within the Seventh Circuit have determined on several occasions

that prison doctors are not deliberately indifferent for choosing to treat complaints of

rectal bleeding conservatively during initial evaluations, and that the decision of whether

or when to use diagnostic tests such as colonoscopies appropriately falls within the

proper exercise of a physician’s independent medical judgment.” (Doc. 116, pg. 12).

Finally, Defendants describe Defendant Shah’s encounters with Plaintiff as follows:

In this case, Plaintiff complained of rectal bleeding as the primary side effect

he experienced while on Mobic following Dr. Shah’s treatment of pain in

his lower back, elbow, shoulder, and neck in March 2021. As a threshold

matter, it must be noted that Dr. Shah was not the regular doctor assigned

to CCC and served intermittently there as a substitute doctor, continued

Plaintiff’s treatment from a prior encounter with another physician, Dr.

Pelegrin, and did not control scheduling of doctor appointments at CCC.

Thus, Dr. Shah had limited involvement and lasting control over Plaintiff’s

medical care. Dr. Shah’s care of Plaintiff followed in the wake of Plaintiff

undergoing an MRI of the lumbar back on March 2, 2021, for which Dr.

Pelegrin had previously placed a referral on February 1, 2021. Dr. Shah

discussed the MRI report with Plaintiff approximately two weeks later on

March 13, 2021, advised Plaintiff the MRI showed advanced degenerative

disc disease (DDD) with mild narrowing, and continued his existing

treatment plan that included Robaxin and Ibuprofen for back pain. He

discussed the MRI results with Plaintiff again five days later on March 18,

2021, observed that Plaintiff’s pain did not significantly affect his activities

of daily living, and added a low-bunk permit and planned a referral to

physical therapy.

Dr. Shah ordered Mobic for Plaintiff on April 26, 2021. Plaintiff self-

reported to Dr. Shah about a month later on May 25, 2021 that he could not

take Mobic because it caused him indigestion, and Dr. Shah responded by

discontinuing Mobic that very day. He began complaining of rectal

bleeding later in the day on May 25, claiming symptoms started

approximately 3-5 days prior. In response, Dr. Shah saw him the very next

day on May 26 and ordered CBC labs, a hemorrhoid suppository, request

for prior medical records, and follow up in doctor sick call in one month.

Following this appointment, Dr. Shah had no further notable encounters

with Plaintiff concerning Mobic or its side effects and other doctors took

over Plaintiff’s care for those conditions.

(Docs. 116, pgs. 13-14; 122) (Emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).

Since Defendant Shah addressed Plaintiff’s concerns by “immediately

discontinuing Mobic” on May 26, 2021, Defendants argue “[i]t is unclear what Plaintiff

alleges Dr. Shah should have done in March 2021 or on May 26, 2021, but the law is clear

that Dr. Shah’s treatment decisions fell well within the proper scope of his independent

medical judgment because the decision to use diagnostic testing are subject to that

judgment.” (Doc. 116, pg. 14). In any event, they state there is no evidence that any delay

actually harmed Plaintiff, as “a subsequent colonoscopy on February 17, 2022[,] revealed

only mild irritation of the stomach with no evidence of lesions or ulcers that would have

caused any gastrointestinal bleeding.” (Doc. 116, pg. 14). A medical expert also found no

evidence of negligence or deliberate indifference by Defendant Shah. (Doc. 116, pg. 15).

Next, as to Defendants Myers and Brashear-Finney, Defendants argue Plaintiff

was “off Mobic for approximately two months by the time he saw Dr. Myers and Nurse

Brashear-Finney on July 27, and…any side effects from its use would have dissipated

within two weeks.” (Doc. 116, pg. 15). Nevertheless, during the July 27, 2021, medical

appointment, Defendants note Defendant Myers “responded to Plaintiff’s complaints of

rectal bleeding by advising him [that] his recent blood tests were normal and indicated

no significant bleeding.” (Doc. 116, pg. 15). Plaintiff was allegedly “encouraged…to use

medications for hemorrhoids to prevent suspected bleeding from hemorrhoids.” (Doc.

116, pg. 15). Defendants also note Plaintiff did not report rectal bleeding again until

October 15, 2021, Defendant Myers responded to that report on November 30, 2021, with

orders for medication and a colonoscopy, and the colonoscopy and

esophagogastroduodenoscopy that occurred on February 17, 2022, “revealed no

significant medical condition in the stomach or throat that would have caused Plaintiff’s

rectal bleeding.” (Doc. 116, pg. 15). There was purportedly no need for a follow-up with

the gastroenterologist. (Doc. 116, pgs. 15-16). As such, Defendants argue Plaintiff

“suffered no worsened prognosis or unnecessary pain as a result of [any] perceived delay

in treatment.” (Doc. 116, pg. 16). Defendants maintain Plaintiff may have disagreed with

Defendant Myers’ treatment plan, but it is undisputed that he acted in a medically

appropriate fashion without ignoring Plaintiff’s concerns. (Doc. 116, pgs. 15-16).

As to Defendant Brashear-Finney, Defendants note she “had the least involvement

in Plaintiff’s care.” (Doc. 116, pg. 16). In fact, Defendants note “Plaintiff admits the sole

basis for his allegations against her was that he observed her speak with Dr. Myers

immediately before the July 27 appointment.” (Doc. 116, pg. 16). However, it is

undisputed that Plaintiff “did not hear what they discussed.” (Doc. 116, pg. 16).

Therefore, in the absence of such evidence, or of evidence that she was otherwise

involved in the constitutional deprivation alleged by Plaintiff, Defendants argue

Defendant Brashear-Finney is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 116, pg. 6).

Defendant Monti, for his part, notes that he remains a party to the case for

purposes of carrying out any injunctive relief. (Doc. 121, pg. 1). However, since there is

no continuing violation of federal law that warrants injunctive relief, and he is otherwise

entitled to sovereign immunity, Defendant Monti requests that the Court grant summary

judgment in his favor. (Doc. 121, pgs. 2-7). In doing so, Defendant Monti stresses that

there is no “ongoing emergent health issue” because the medication that allegedly caused

Plaintiff to suffer adverse side effects, Mobic, has been discontinued. (Doc. 121, pg. 6).

In his Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants

Shah, Myers, and Brashear-Finney, Plaintiff answers the statement of material facts. (Doc.

133, pgs. 1-5). Plaintiff also includes argument in those answers. (Doc. 133, pgs. 1-5).

However, the Response in Opposition to that Motion for Summary Judgment does not

cite any legal authority. (Doc. 133, generally). Despite this circumstance, and the

circumstances surrounding the deficiencies in his own Motion for Summary Judgment,

Plaintiff states he “is allowing his statements previous to stand as the argument section

of this objection so as not to be repetitive but this was not intentional.” (Doc. 133, pg. 5).

Here, Plaintiff indicates “the entire context of the issues starts on 4-26-21.” (Doc.

128, pg. 1). On that date, Plaintiff had a medical appointment with Defendant Shah, at

which time an x-ray of Plaintiff’s right shoulder and elbow was ordered. (Docs. 116-1, pg.

12; 122, pg. 2). Defendant Shah also discontinued Plaintiff’s Motrin prescription in favor

of a 12-month prescription for the drug at issue, Mobic. (Docs. 116-1, pg. 12; 122, pg. 2).

On May 25, 2021, Defendant Shah discussed the x-ray results with Plaintiff. (Docs.

116-1, pgs. 13-15; 122, pg. 2). Defendant Shah also discontinued the prescription for Mobic

because Plaintiff reported experiencing indigestion. (Docs. 116-1, pgs. 13-18; 122, pg. 2).

In a visit with a nurse later that same day, Plaintiff reported regular bowel habits.

(Doc. 116-1, pg. 16). However, he noted a history of hemorrhoids or constipation,

bleeding/blood in his stool over the past 3 to 5 days, and rectal pain. (Docs. 116-1, pg. 16;

122, pg. 2). The nurse noted: “reports has [sic] lessened since stopping mobic.” (Doc. 116-

1, pg. 16). He was referred to a doctor. (Docs. 116-1, pg. 16; 122, pg. 2).

Plaintiff was again seen by Defendant Shah, at the latest, on May 28, 2021, for “eval

of blood in stool w/ mobic.” (Docs. 116-1, pg. 16; 122, pg. 2). Plaintiff reported a prior

colonoscopy that revealed two polyps. (Docs. 116-1, pg. 17; 122, pg. 2). The polyps caused

pain, leakage, increased bathroom use, and bleeding. (Docs. 116-1, pg. 17; 122, pg. 2).

Plaintiff also reported that his neurological medication and Mobic caused him to “gain

30 lbs.” (Docs. 116-1, pg. 17; 122, pg. 2). Defendant Shah rushed a request for Plaintiff’s

prior medical records and ordered a CBC panel, hemorrhoid suppository, and follow-up

medical appointment in one month. (Docs. 116-1, pg. 17; 122, pg. 2). This was Defendant

Shah’s last notable encounter with Plaintiff. (Docs. 116-1, pgs. 18-25; 122, pg. 2).

Thereafter, Plaintiff’s follow-up medical appointment had to be rescheduled due

to a quarantine, lockdowns, and limited movement orders. (Doc. 116-1, pgs. 20-21).

Eventually, the follow-up medical appointment occurred with Defendant Myers on July

27, 2021. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 22). On that date, which was over 2 months after Defendant

Shah discontinued Plaintiff’s prescription for Mobic, Defendant Myers noted Plaintiff did

not continue to have “the large volume of blood” in his stool. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 22). Plaintiff

reported that, on occasion, he would still see blood in his stool. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 22).

Plaintiff attributed his problems to the prior prescription for Mobic. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 22).

However, Defendant Myers reviewed Plaintiff’s CBC panel, which was previously

ordered by Defendant Shah, and informed him that the results were normal. (Doc. 116-1,

pg. 22). Plaintiff was advised to use his medications for hemorrhoids. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 22).

On October 15, 2021, Plaintiff was referred to a doctor after reporting to a nurse,

inter alia, that he had “fecal matter” drainage and pain during bowel movements. (Doc.

116-1, pg. 24). Defendant Myers encountered Plaintiff on November 30, 2021, in response

to those reports. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 25). Plaintiff’s blood pressure was elevated, and he

reported feeling stressed. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 25). Ultimately, Defendant Myers submitted a

collegial review for a colonoscopy and ordered Plaintiff fiber tablets. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 25).

On January 5, 2022, Plaintiff had an off-site evaluation for his complaints of “rectal

drainage.” (Doc. 116-1, pg. 27). On February 17, 2022, Plaintiff underwent a colonoscopy

and esophagogastroduodenoscopy that revealed the following findings:

Findings: -minimal inflammation in the antrum, biopsies taken here.

Biopsies also taken [of] the squamocolumnar junction. No strictures, no

mass lesions, no ulcers. Vocal cords were briefly visualized.

Normal colonoscopy to the terminal ileum. No diverticulosis noted.

Mucosa normal. No polyps. No hemorrhoids. Sphincter tone normal. No

fissures.

(Doc. 116-1, pgs. 30-31).

In terms of a recommendation or plan, Plaintiff merely needed to “repeat

colorectal cancer screening in 10 years.” (Doc. 116-1, pg. 31). Otherwise, there was “[n]o

need to follow up in the office” of the nonparty medical doctor. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 31).

Finally, Dr. Kenneth Breger, a medical doctor, reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, the

Court’s Memorandum & Order granting a consolidation of Plaintiff’s two cases,

Plaintiff’s Answers to Defendants’ Interrogatories, and Plaintiff’s medical and mental

health records from Centralia Correctional Center in order to offer an expert opinion for

Defendants. (Doc. 116-4, generally). He is the only medical doctor to offer such an opinion

in this case. He opined: “While Mobic can cause bleeding in the digestive tract, there was

no evidence the medication did so in [Plaintiff]’s case. [Plaintiff] underwent several

diagnostic tests, including an endoscopic procedure, and none of the evaluations

indicated he was suffering from bleeding in his digestive tract.” (Doc. 116-4, pgs. 1-2).

Further, while Plaintiff allegedly suffered from a wide range of side effects after taking

Mobic, most of those side effects “were conditions or effects not commonly reported or

associated with taking Mobic.” (Doc. 116-4, pg. 2). Dr. Breger indicated “[t]here was no

support in [Plaintiff’s] medical records that any of the[] additional symptoms, including,

but not limited to coughing up blood, were related to taking Mobic.” (Doc. 116-4, pg. 2).

In any event, Dr. Breger believed, “[i]f [Plaintiff] did have an intolerance to Mobic, once

the medication was stopped[,] within a week or two[,] any side effects should have been

resolved.” (Doc. 116-4, pg. 2). On the standard of care, Dr. Breger opined as follows:

When a patient presents with a complaint of blood in the stool it is not

customary practice or standard of care to perform a rectal examination. The

standard of care regarding a report of blood in stool would be to check

vitals and then preform [sic] an abdominal exam. The first diagnostic test

would be a blood count. If the results came back normal one would proceed

to treat the blood as hemorrhoidal. If the results showed the patient was

anemic, upper and lower endoscopic evaluations would be appropriate. A

CT scan would be appropriate if the patient had abdominal tenderness

upon examination.

A rectal examination would not be an effective method of determining the

source of blood even if some blood was detected during the examination.

The routine diagnostic tool is to run a blood panel, as was done here. A

blood panel would test for a drop in red blood cells or anemia, indicating

internal bleeding was present. Here, [Plaintiff]’s test results were normal,

which indicated he had no signs of internal bleeding or any indication that

Mobic had irritated his stomach or digestive tract.

(Doc. 116-4, pg. 2).

Now, it is undisputed Plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical

condition. Nevertheless, nothing about the above-discussed medical care is indicative of

Defendants’ personal involvement in causing Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional

deprivation or deliberate indifference toward his health or safety, especially in light of

Dr. Breger’s opinions. See Gonzalez v. McHenry County, Illinois, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir.

2022) (noting, for personal involvement, which is required against an individual, “the

plaintiff must show that the relevant official ‘caused the constitutional deprivation at

issue’ or ‘acquiesced in some demonstrable way in the alleged constitutional

violation.’ ”). Plaintiff obviously disagrees with the medical treatment that was provided

by Defendants; however, as discussed below, neither that disagreement nor Plaintiff’s

perceived breaches of care by Defendants rise to the level of deliberate indifference.

As to Defendant Shah, it is clear he used reasonable medical judgment to address

Plaintiff’s ailments. (Docs. 116-1, pgs. 12-15; 122, pg. 2). The prescription for Mobic, which

was prescribed on April 26, 2021, was discontinued following complaints from Plaintiff

at their next encounter on May 25, 2021. (Docs. 116-1, pg. 12-18; 122, pg. 2). Also, one to

three days later, he saw Plaintiff for an “eval of blood in stool w/ mobic,” resulting in a

rushed request for Plaintiff’s medical records and orders for a CBC panel, a hemorrhoid

suppository, and a follow-up medical appointment. (Docs. 116-1, pgs. 16-17; 122, pg. 2).

Likewise, over two months after the discontinuance of Mobic by Defendant Shah,

on July 27, 2021, Defendant Myers exercised reasonable medical judgment to address

Plaintiff’s ailments by reviewing his CBC panel, which were normal, and advising him

of the need to use hemorrhoid medication. (Doc. 116-1, pg. 22). When Defendant Myers

saw Plaintiff on November 30, 2021, after the October 15, 2021, referral by a nurse, he

submitted a collegial review for a colonoscopy and ordered fiber tablets. See Lloyd v.

Moats, 721 Fed. App’x 490, 494 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[A] delay in ordering tests must be

evaluated in light of the entire record to determine if it evinces deliberate indifference:

‘[T]he question whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic techniques or forms of

treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment. A medical

decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual

punishment.”); (Doc. 116-1, pgs. 24-25). The esophagogastroduodenoscopy and

colonoscopy occurred on February 17, 2022, after a consultation, and the results did not

require a “follow up in the office” of the nonparty doctor. (Doc. 116-1, pgs. 30-31).

Finally, there is scant evidence in the record relating to Defendant Brashear-

Finney. At his deposition, however, Plaintiff confirmed that his claim against Defendant

Brashear-Finney is based on a conversation that she had with Defendant Myers before

Plaintiff’s appointment on July 27, 2021. (Doc. 116-3, pgs. 41-46, 71-73). Plaintiff testified:

As far as this particular suit goes, I haven’t done any kind of useful

amendments, but I may depending on what—how this goes. [Defendant

Brashear-Finney] went into [Defendant] Myers’ office and was looking

straight at me when she went in the room. Okay. That may be unconscious,

it may be a security issue where she wanted to make sure I wasn’t going to

continue walking. I did not. But when she came out, she was awfully

apologetic, which is odd for her. And Myers had a stern grip on not treating

me. And I can use any kind of logic you’d like. It all comes back to the fact

that it’s most likely that she said something. I don’t know if I have enough

to file an amendment for conspiracy, but I'm going give it a try and see what

happens.

(Doc. 116-3, pg. 72).

Plaintiff admitted he could not hear the conversation between Defendants Myers

and Brashear-Finney, so “[t]hey could have been talking about anything.” (Doc. 116-3,

pg. 73). And, as noted above, the Court already found nothing amiss about the treatment

provided by Defendant Myers on July 27, 2021, after he spoke to Defendant Brashear-

Finney. On this record, Plaintiff resorts to rank speculation, which does not suffice.

By virtue of these conclusions, the Court also finds there is no injunctive relief that

can be granted by Defendant Monti. See Kress v. CCA of Tennessee, LLC, 694 F.3d 890, 894

(7th Cir. 2012) (noting, when there is no continuing violation of federal law, injunctive

relief is not part of a federal court’s remedial powers); LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC

v. Huston, 131 F.4th 566, 580 (7th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he difference between a preliminary

injunction and a permanent injunction is meaningful: in granting or denying a

preliminary injunction, the court decides only the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the

merits, whereas in granting or denying a permanent injunction, it decides their actual

success on the merits.”) (cleaned up). For these reasons, each Defendant is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference. See Davis v.

Wahl, No. 10-cv-971, 2013 WL 6097108, *4 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2013) (finding, in a case

presenting circumstances similar to those in this case, the defendant was entitled to

summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to rectal bleeding

and pain, where “not only was [the defendant] attentive to [the plaintiff]’s medical needs,

but [the] defendant also gave [the plaintiff] effective treatment,” including an

examination “the very next day” after the plaintiff noticed rectal bleeding, prescriptions

for suppositories, orders for blood and stool tests, and various medications and an

antibiotic); Mack v. Nwaobasi, No. 12-cv-986, 2015 WL 264708, *5 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2015)

(finding, in a case presenting circumstances similar to those in this case, the defendants

were entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to

rectal bleeding, where “they regularly monitored [the] [p]laintiff, seeing him on various

occasions from March to November 2011, provided him with different medications to

treat the bleeding, performed several different tests to identify the source of his bleeding,

and ultimately directed him to change his diet in order to alleviate the problem”).

III. CONCLUSION

As stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 114) is DENIED

and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 115, 116, 121) are GRANTED.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 19, 2025

Dur * 2 J

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

20