Sisson v. SOI Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ALNANDO SISSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-01249-GCS

)

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTIONS, )

)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 112,

113, 123). Specifically, Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as

Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence establishing that it discriminated against him

because of Plaintiff’s race. This is because Defendant had a legitimate reason for placing

Plaintiff on administrative leave and suspending his employment, and Plaintiff has not

offered evidence establishing the proffered reasons were pretextual. Plaintiff opposes the

motion arguing that he has made a prima facie case of rase discrimination and that he

has provided evidence Defendant’s reasons were pretextual and motivated by racial

discrimination. (Doc. 115).1 For the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS the

motion.

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff did not follow the Local Rules in responding to Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s statement of facts as

required by the Local Rules. See Local Rule 56.1(b). Further, Plaintiff, in his “Statement of Facts”

On November 29, 2021, Plaintiff Alnando Sisson (“Sisson”) filed an amended

complaint against the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) alleging violations of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). (Doc. 48). Sisson, who at the time of

the events was a Correctional Officer at Southwestern Correctional Center

(“Southwestern”), alleges that he was discriminated against because of his race following

a physical altercation at work on December 12, 2017, with fellow Correctional Officer

Joseph Kinsey. He alleges that he was placed on administrative leave and suspended

from his employment following this altercation.

FACTS2

Sisson, an African American male, began working for the IDOC in 1998. He served

as a Correctional Officer at Southwestern for approximately 19 years prior to the

altercation. During his tenure at IDOC, Sisson was promoted several times. Currently, he

is employed as a Correctional Lieutenant at Centralia Correctional Center (“Centralia”).

On December 12, 2017, near the beginning of the midnight shift around 10:00 p.m.,

a physical altercation occurred between Sisson and Correctional Officer Kinsey at

Southwestern.3 Correctional Officer Joseph Kinsey is a white male. Prior to the

and “Adverse Employment Actions Against Plaintiff” did not cite to the record, except for citing

to his own deposition, as required by the Local Rules. See Local Rule 56.1(c).

2 In accordance with Local Rule 56.1(f) and (g), the Court disregards facts not supported

with a citation to the record, and the Court deems admitted material facts that have not been

specifically disputed.

3 Sisson testified to the following about the incident:

Q. Okay. Why did you approach Mr. Kinsey?

A. There was a report from a female correctional officer to me as union steward at the time that

she was being verbally harassed by Correctional Officer Kinsey.

. . .

A. I went to him, said, hey, I’m a union steward. It’s reported to me by female staff that he was

harassing and bullying her. . . . I identified myself, told him who I was, and told him only that a

female staff reported something to me. At that particular time the first words out of his mouth

was: Fuck you, as in me. Get the fuck out of my face.

. . .

Q. So when he said that to you, did he touch you in any manner?

A. No, not at that time.

Q. What happened after he said that to you?

A. After he said that, I told him who I was again and told him I’m coming at him in a professional

manner and that I’m not speaking to him in an incorrect manner. I did not use any curse words

or anything. Then that’s when he said it again.

Q. Okay. And then what happened after he said it again?

A. At that moment I broke down to him what I had knew about the situation that was brought to

me. I told him it was inappropriate, it was unprofessional, and we both should be professional as

staff members.

Q. Okay. Then what happened?

A. At that particular moment we just kind of going back and forth, which I was doing the majority

of the talking, and which I think he began to get agitated, and that’s when he took his radio and

took a swing at me.

Q. Okay. Did he take a swing at you with his radio or something else?

A. Yes, his radio was in his – his radio was in his right hand.

Q. Did it strike you? Did the radio strike you?

A. Luckily – luckily, no, sir, it did not.

Q. Okay. What happened after that?

A. After I ducked out of the way of the radio, I remember I punched him a couple of times. He

grabbed me. I grabbed him. He tried to use the van as momentum to kick me, and that’s when I

slammed him out of the van because he was – he was holding onto the door and the van to try to

kick me, and he – and I grabbed him off the van and slammed him to the ground.

Q. Were either you or Kinsey carrying a weapon at that time?

A. At that time as an outer patrol assignment, CO Kinsey should have had a weapon somewhere

on him maybe.

Q. Did you see of that weapon ever dislodged during this confrontation?

A. No, I did not.

. . .

Q. At any time were you on top of Kinsey?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. How so?

A. After I slammed him to the ground, I was on top of him, and instead of me hitting him, I think

I grabbed him and told him don’t ever try to swing at me, threaten me again.

Q. And did you every physically strike him with your fist or your feet or legs?

altercation, Sisson worked a different shift than Correctional Officer Kinsey, and the two

had little interaction with each other.

Correctional Sergeant Eddie Rumph, an African American male, and Correctional

Sergeant Ronald Swanson, an African American male, witnessed the altercation and

prepared incident reports.4 Sisson’s Correctional Sergeant, Claude Heimburger, a white

male, responded to the incident but did not witness the incident. Major Gary MacQuarrie,

a white male, also responded to the incident. After observing Correctional Officer Kinsey

with a bloody lip and swelling to his left cheek area, Major MacQuarrie instructed

Correctional Officer Kinsey to visit healthcare. Correctional Officer Kinsey indicated that

he wanted to press charges against Sisson.

At no point during the altercation was Sisson’s race mentioned.5

As a result of the altercation, Sisson was placed on paid administrative leave from

December 14, 2017, through June 29, 2018.

A. I struck him with my fist at the beginning of the confrontation after he swung the radio at me.

Q. What part of – did you actually strike any part of his body with your fist?

A. Yes, I struck the left side of his face with my right fist.

(Doc. 113-1, p. 29, 37-40).

4 During the altercation, Rumph witnessed Sisson on top of Kinsey, but did not see him

throwing punches. (Doc. 115-1, p. 14, 17). Also, during the altercation, Swanson witnessed Sisson

walking to Kinsey’s outer patrol van, saw Sisson standing in between the van door and Kinsey,

saw the van rocking side to side, and saw Sisson’s body and arms moving as if throwing “blows.”

Id at p. 19, 21.

5 Plaintiff further testified to the following in his deposition:

Q. And so during this confrontation at any point did Ken make any reference to your race?

A. No, not that I heard.

(Doc. 113-1, p. 40).

Eventually, the Illinois State Police (“ISP”) was contacted, and the ISP initiated a

criminal investigation, 18CF767.

On May 22, 2018, Sisson was arrested for felony aggravated battery. That same

day, the Employee Review Board (“ERB”) held a hearing to determine whether Sisson

should be suspended for violating multiple employee rules.

On June 30, 2018, Sisson was suspended without pay pending the outcome of the

criminal charges. This determination was signed by Major C. Davis, an African American

female, and Warden Ron Vitale, a white male.

On November 26, 2018, a bench trial was held on Sisson’s criminal charges. Sisson

was acquitted, and the criminal charges were dismissed. Sisson returned to work for the

IDOC on December 2, 2018, after the dismissal of the criminal charges. Sisson was

transferred to Centralia. At Centralia, Sisson applied for and was promoted to

Correctional Sergeant. Thereafter, he applied for and was promoted to Correctional

Lieutenant.

Correctional Officer Kinsey was not arrested, and the ERB did not hold a hearing

as to him.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and affidavits “show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c); Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d

1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The

movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material

fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Santaella v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). This Court must

consider the entire record, drawing reasonable inferences and resolving factual disputes

in favor of the non-movant. See Regensburger v. China Adoption Consultants, Ltd., 138 F.3d

1201, 1205 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

See also Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that “we are not

required to draw every conceivable inference from the record . . . we draw only

reasonable inferences”) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is also

appropriate if a plaintiff cannot make a showing of an essential element of his claim. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. While the Court may not “weigh evidence or engage in fact-

finding [,]” it must determine if a genuine issue remains for trial. Lewis v. City of Chicago,

496 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007).

In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not simply

rest on the allegations in his pleadings; rather, he must show through specific evidence

that an issue of fact remains on matters for which he bears the burden of proof at trial.

See Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 670–671 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

No issue remains for trial “unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving

party for a jury to return a verdict for that party . . . if the evidence is merely colorable, or

is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249–250 (citations omitted). Accord Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir.

1996); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1994). In other words,

“inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Trade Finance

Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). See

also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (finding that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence

in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on

which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]”). Instead, the non-moving

party must present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the [summary judgment]

motion.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citation

omitted).

Finally, at the summary judgment stage it is not the Court’s role to “sift through

the evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe.”

D.Z. v. Buell, 796 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp.,

24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2016)

(noting that courts are not required to scour the record looking for factual disputes or

piece together appropriate arguments). Instead, the Court “is only tasked with deciding

whether, based on the evidence of the record, there is any material dispute of fact that

requires a trial.” Buell, 796 F.3d at 756.

Additionally, as outlined in Local Rule 56.1(g), “[a]ll material facts set forth in a

Statement of Material Facts or a Statement of Additional Material Facts shall be deemed

admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.”

Consequently, when a party fails to respond as outlined in Local Rule 56.1, “we depart

from our usual deference towards the non-moving party” and accept all of the moving

parties' “unopposed material facts as true.” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735

F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013). “Nevertheless, the Court is cognizant that ‘a nonmovant's

failure to respond to a summary judgment motion, or failure to comply with Local Rule

56.1, does not, of course, automatically result in judgment for the movant. [The movant]

must still demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Pratt v. Bebout,

Case No. 3:21-CV-1262-MAB, 2024 WL 1013920, at *3 (S.D. Ill. March 8,

2024) (quoting Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2012)).

DISCUSSION

At summary judgment, the “singular question” for the district court is whether the

plaintiff has introduced evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude

that the employer took an adverse action against him because of a statutorily proscribed

factor – in this case, race. Purtue v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 963 F.3d 598, 602

(7th Cir. 2020) (citing Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corporation, 892 F.3d 887, 894

(7th Cir. 2018)). See also Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 2018) (stating that

“[t]o succeed on a Title VII claim, the plaintiff-employee must prove three elements: [1]

he is a member of a class protected by the statute, [2] that he has been the subject of some

form of adverse employment action . . . and [3] that the employer took this adverse action

on account of the plaintiff's membership in the protected class.”). To answer that

question, the court must evaluate all the relevant, admissible evidence. See, e.g., Ortiz v.

Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that “all evidence belongs

in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole.”). See also Chatman v. Board of Education

of City of Chicago, 5 F.4th 738, 746 (7th Cir. 2021) (the court must “look at the evidence

holistically.”); David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508, 846 F.3d 216,

224 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “Ortiz explicitly instructed district courts to stop

separating ‘direct’ from ‘indirect’ evidence and proceeding as if they were subject to

different legal standards.”).

A discrimination claim can be analyzed using the burden-shifting framework

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Chatman, 5 F.4th

at 746; Purtue, 963 F.3d at 601–602; Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018); David,

846 F.3d at 224. The McDonnell Douglas approach requires the plaintiff to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination without proving a direct causal link by showing that: (1) he

is a member of a protected class; (2) he met the employer’s legitimate job expectations; (3)

he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside

of the protected class were treated more favorably. See Lauderdale v. Illinois Department of

Human Services, 876 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted); Lewis, 909 F.3d at 866;

David, 846 F.3d at 225 (citation omitted). If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the

burden shifts to the employer to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for

the actions taken against the plaintiff. David, 846 F.3d at 225. The plaintiff must then

“submit evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.” David, 846 F.3d at 225.

However, the plaintiff need not rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework to

establish a case of race discrimination. See Purtue, 963 F.3d at 601–602; Joll v. Valparaiso

Community Schools, 953 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2020); David, 846 F.3d at 224. Instead, the

plaintiff can proffer direct or circumstantial evidence that satisfies the elements of the

discrimination claim and “point[s] directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s

action.” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2016). See also Joll, 953 F.3d at 929; Lewis

v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018) (staring that “[t]he direct method requires the

plaintiff to simply present evidence satisfying the elements of the [discrimination] claim

. . . .”). There are three broad types of circumstantial evidence that will support an

inference of intentional discrimination: “ambiguous or suggestive comments or conduct;

better treatment of people similarly situated but for the protected characteristic; and

dishonest employer justifications for disparate treatment.” Purtue, 963 F.3d at 602

(quoting Joll, 953 F.3d at 929).

The McDonnell Douglas framework is relevant as Sisson contests the reasons for

him being placed on paid administrative leave and placed on suspension and asserts that

those reasons were pretextual.6

Defendant argues that Sisson failed to show that his race was a motivating factor

as to either him being placed on paid administrative leave on December 13, 2017, or him

being suspended from employment on June 20, 2018. Specifically, Defendant argues that

it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for placing Sisson on paid administrative

leave on December 13, 2017, i.e., the physical altercation with Officer Kinsey, who had

visible injuries from that altercation. It also had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for

suspending Sisson’s employment on June 30, 2018, i.e., his May 22, 2018 arrest for felony

aggravated battery, and the ERB, after holding a hearing on May 22, 2018, finding that

6 For the purposes of this motion, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff has

established a prima facie case of race discrimination. The Court instead focuses on the issue of

pretext. See, e.g., Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[i]t

is not always necessary to march through this entire process [analysis of a prima facie case] if a

single issue proves to be dispositive. Here, as is often true, that issue is pretext or the lack

thereof.”).

Sisson violated employee rules during the December 12, 2017, incident.7 Sisson avers that

the explanations are pretextual as Officer Kinsey was not disciplined, investigated, or

placed on paid administrative leave or suspended for his actions in the altercation and

that Defendant has not explained why Officer Kinsey was treated differently. The Court

agrees with Defendant.

“Pretext is a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” Fischer v. Avanade,

Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 403 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Thus, “to show pretext, a plaintiff must show that (1) the employer's nondiscriminatory

reason was dishonest; and (2) the employer's true reason was based on

a discriminatory intent.” Id. “Pretext does not exist if the decisionmaker honestly

believed the nondiscriminatory reason given by an employer for an adverse employment

action.” Downing v. Abbott Laboratories, 48 F.4th 793, 804 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “So, in evaluating pretext, the focus is on what the

decisionmakers knew, and their perceptions are ‘controlling.’” Id. (quoting Stockwell v.

City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 2010)). “[T]he pretext inquiry turns on honesty,

not correctness, and even if we assume a less severe punishment might have been more

7 Defendant also argues that being placed on paid administrative leave is not an adverse

employment decision. The Court agrees with Defendant that in this case Sisson being placed on

paid administrative leave is not an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Nichols v. Southern Illinois

University-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 722, 786-787 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that placing an officer on

paid administrative leave pending the conclusion of an investigation is not a materially adverse

action). However, assuming arguendo that it is an adverse employment action, the Court will

address Plaintiff being placed on paid administrative leave.

appropriate, that fact does not, without more, provide evidence of pretext.” Liu v. Cook

County, 817 F.3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2016).

Pretext is not established simply because the plaintiff denies the proffered reasons.

The Seventh Circuit recently reiterated this notion when it stated:

Shures contends on appeal that, because he denies all of the employer’s

findings concerning poor performance, a jury trial is required to resolve the

dispute. This misunderstands what is necessary to establish pretext. Most

fired employees believe that they have unrecognized or underappreciated

talents. But it does not matter what the employee believes; the question is

what the employer believes. To establish pretext, the plaintiff must show

that the employer does not believe its own explanation – that it is lying

rather than just making an error. See, e.g., Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC,

534 F.3d 715, 726 (7th Cir. 2008); Bragg v. Munster Medical Research

Foundation Inc., 58 F.4th 265, 271 (7th Cir. 2023).

Shures v. Ameren Illinois Company, No. 23-2761, 2024 WL 1756338, at *1 (7th Cir. April 24,

2024).

In the case at bar, Defendant placed Sisson on paid administrative leave the day

after the altercation. As a result of this altercation, Officer Kinsey suffered visible injuries

to his face, went to the health care unit immediately afterwards, and expressed his wishes

to press charges against Sisson. There is no indication in the record that Officer Kinsey’s

desire to press charges against Sisson was because he is African American. Rather, it was

due to the physical altercation. Further, as to Defendant placing Sisson on paid

administrative leave, there is no evidence that Defendant did so based on Sisson’s race.

There is also no evidence to suggest that Defendant’s reasons for doing so were not based

on anything other than Officer Kinsey’s physical injuries. In short, Sisson has not shown

Defendant’s decision was based on a lie or dishonesty. Thus, as to Sisson’s claim that he

was placed on paid administrative leave because of his race, the Court finds that

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

Similarly, there is no evidence that Defendant’s decision to suspend Sisson on June

30, 2018, was based on a lie or dishonesty held by the Defendant. Defendant contends

that it suspended Sisson after the criminal charges were filed against him on May 22,

2018, and after the ERB’s finding that Sisson’s conduct on December 12, 2017, violated

several employee rules. The Court also notes that the ERB’s recommendation for

suspension was signed by Major Davis, an African American female, which weighs

against Sisson’s claim. See, e.g., Menefee v. Dynamic Educational Systems, Inc., No. 07 C 6396,

2008 WL 4866016, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2008) (stating that “there can be no

compelling inference of discrimination when the decision-maker is in the same protected

category as the plaintiff.”).

Further, Sisson, without citing to the record, contends that Defendant’s

investigation relied on inaccurate, false, or incomplete evidence, which thus undermines

Defendant’s reasons for suspending him. Specifically, Sisson maintains that Sgt. Melvin

made statements to the Grand Jury that were later contradicted by other witness

testimony and physical evidence.8 Sisson also maintains that witnesses, Correctional

Sergeant Rumph and Correctional Sergeant Swanson, demonstrated that he acted in self-

8 The record reflects that Sergeant Melvin is an Illinois State Police Investigator involved in

Sisson’s criminal investigation. Sergeant Melvin is not employed by the IDOC.

defense and that Kinsey initiated the physical confrontation by attempting to strike him

with the radio.9

Sisson’s argument misses the mark. The reason Defendant suspended Sisson was

because of the pending criminal charges against him. Once those pending criminal

charges were dismissed, Defendant promptly retuned Sisson to work. Further, Sisson has

not established that the investigation was unreliable. The Court has read Correctional

Sergeant Swanson’s and Correctional Sergeant Rumph’s statements, and they do not

establish definitively that Sisson acted in self-defense or that Kinsey was the aggressor as

argued by Sisson. As stated previously, both men stated that they did not see how the

altercation started. Simply put, Sisson failed to present evidence that his suspension was

based on his race.

Sisson’s case also falls short under the holistic evidence framework. This

framework requires a court to determine whether all the relevant evidence “would

permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race . . . caused the discharge

or other adverse employment action.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. A court must ask “whether

the totality of the evidence shows discrimination, eschewing any framework of formula.”

Igasaki v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, 988 F.3d 948, 958 (7th

Cir. 2021). Relevant evidence includes smoking-gun evidence such as a defendant's

“actual admission of discriminatory intent.” See Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Management

Services, Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 879 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Mullin v. Temco Machinery, Inc., 732

F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2013)). Circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the

employer's stated reasons for suspending the plaintiff were pretextual, is also

relevant. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 852 (7 Cir. 2012). As the Seventh Circuit

made clear in Ortiz, all the “evidence belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a

whole” to determine discriminatory intent. 834 F.3d at 766.

The only evidence of race discrimination that Sisson identifies is that Officer

Kinsey, a white male, was not investigated, charged with a crime, or suspended as he

was. However, immediately after the incident, Officer Kinsey stated that he wanted to

press charges against Sisson, and the police were called to investigate. The record does

not reflect that Sisson pursued charges against Officer Kinsey. In the final analysis, when

the evidence is considered “in a single pile,” which consists only of the fact that Sisson is

a member of a protected class, no reasonable juror could find that he was suspended

because of his race. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. 112). The Court FINDS in favor of Defendant Illinois Department of Corrections

and against Plaintiff Alnando Sisson. Lastly, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court

to enter judgment reflecting the same and close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Digitally signed by

DATED: September 19, 2025. Attar 2. BS Forse 9

09:59:53 -05'00'

GILBERTC.SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

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