Haselrig v. County of Los Angeles CA2/8

Filed 9/19/25 Haselrig v. County of Los Angeles CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

LAJUANA HASELRIG, B334774

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 22STCV29582)

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of

Los Angeles County. Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Affirmed in

part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

The Law Offices of Vincent Miller, Vincent Miller, Nick

Sage, and James Jirn for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Peterson, Bradford, Burkwitz, Gregorio, Burkwitz & Su,

Avi Burkwitz, and Gayane Muradyan for Defendants and

Respondents.

**********

Plaintiff and appellant LaJuana Haselrig contends she was

wrongfully terminated, after 34 years of service, from her

position as Chief of the Court Services Division of the

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). She filed this

action against defendants and respondents County of

Los Angeles, former sheriff Alex Villanueva, chief John

Satterfield, and deputy David Yoo alleging whistleblower

retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, retaliation under

the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code,

§ 12900 et seq.; FEHA), and six other related claims.

Defendants County, Villanueva, Satterfield, and Yoo

demurred to plaintiff’s first amended complaint, except for the

eighth cause of action for violation of the Public Safety Officers

Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.; POBR).

The trial court sustained the demurrer in its entirety without

leave to amend. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her POBR claim

and appealed from the judgment of dismissal entered in

defendants’ favor. She contends her claims are all adequately

pled. She argues that to the extent there are pleading defects,

the trial court erred in denying her the opportunity to amend her

pleading with additional facts.

We affirm the judgment of dismissal in favor of defendants

Villanueva, Satterfield and Yoo. We vacate the dismissal entered

in favor of defendant County and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The operative first amended complaint

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint contains seven causes of

action: (1) racial discrimination under FEHA against the County;

(2) failure to prevent discrimination under FEHA against the

2

County; (3) whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code

section 1102.5 against the County; (4) retaliation in violation of

FEHA against the County; (5) intentional infliction of emotional

distress against the County and Villanueva; (6) defamation

against the County, Villanueva, Satterfield, and Yoo; and

(7) false light against the County, Villanueva, Satterfield, and

Yoo. As stated above, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her eighth

cause of action under POBR. We assume the facts alleged in the

first amended complaint to be true to resolve whether plaintiff

has stated legally viable claims. (Centinela Freeman Emergency

Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016)

1 Cal.5th 994, 1010 (Centinela).)

In March 2021, plaintiff was the chief of the Court Services

Division at the LASD. Villanueva was the sheriff of the LASD,

Satterfield held the rank of commander, and Yoo was a deputy.

On March 10, 2021, an altercation, captured on video,

occurred at the San Fernando Courthouse involving an inmate

named Enzo Escalante and an LASD deputy, Douglas Johnson.

The video showed Escalante throwing punches at Johnson, and

Johnson eventually subduing Escalante for approximately three

minutes by placing his knee on Escalante’s neck and restricting

his breathing in a manner “reminiscent” of the excessive force

used against George Floyd in Minnesota. Escalante “struggled to

breathe but did not die.” We refer to the altercation as the

Escalante incident.

After being alerted to the Escalante incident, commander

Allen Castellano reported the matter to plaintiff—his supervisor.

Plaintiff in turn “immediately” reported the matter to her

supervisor, assistant sheriff Robin Limon who, according to

plaintiff, was “generally considered as number 3 in command

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after Villanueva and [undersheriff Timothy] Murakami.” Both

Castellano and plaintiff asked Limon to take a copy of the video

to Villanueva, and she agreed to do so. On March 15, 2021,

plaintiff gave a copy of the video to Limon “and watched her walk

toward [Villanueva’s] office.”

Later that same day, Limon told plaintiff that she and

several others watched the video in Villanueva’s office, that

Villanueva agreed the use of force “looked troubling” and he said

he would “handle it.”

Thereafter, with plaintiff “in the loop” and “guid[ing]”

Castellano’s efforts, Castellano moved forward according to

normal LASD procedures to have the Escalante incident

investigated through the LASD Internal Affairs Bureau (Internal

Affairs) and to obtain a consult with the LASD Internal Criminal

Investigations Bureau (Criminal Investigations).

However, shortly after the video was shown to Villanueva,

Villanueva began taking steps to thwart the investigation of the

Escalante incident. He replaced captain Robert Jones in the

West District with captain Jacqueline Sanchez. Sanchez, at

Villanueva’s direction, did not follow normal protocols, but rather

delayed Castellano’s efforts to have Deputy Johnson’s actions

reviewed. She also delayed a review of Escalante’s actions during

the altercation. Sanchez told Castellano the case against

Escalante had not been forwarded to the district attorney because

it would open a “pandora’s box.” Plaintiff reported this

information to Limon in June 2021.

By July 2021, plaintiff and Castellano were alarmed by the

continued delays in the investigation. Under plaintiff’s

supervision and with her “review and approval,” Castellano

continued to create a paper trail of the efforts to move the

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investigation forward. Castellano’s final report in July 2021

documented numerous irregularities and “possible crimes” that

had been committed by LASD personnel in handling the

Escalante incident. The report also stated unnamed LASD

executives “above the rank of chief” had directed the

investigation. Plaintiff and Castellano hoped the report would

“jump start” a proper investigation but Villanueva “continued to

quash the investigation.”

In the fall of 2021, captain Angela Walton replaced Captain

Sanchez in the West District, saw the video of the Escalante

incident, and spoke with Castellano about it. On November 21,

2021, with Captain Walton’s assistance, a review of the Escalante

incident by Criminal Investigations was finally approved.

Villanueva was “enraged” by the Criminal Investigations

review. Villanueva immediately opened “a fake [Internal Affairs]

investigation” of Castellano to deflect criticism. The

investigation of Castellano concluded on March 6, 2022, with a

finding that Castellano allegedly had made a procedural error

that caused delays in the investigation.

On March 25, 2022, the Los Angeles Times obtained the

Escalante video and published an article about “the Villanueva

cover up.” Villanueva reacted by publicly lying about the incident

and saying he first learned of the video in November of 2021.

Villanueva thereafter attempted to “falsify a timeline to fit his

cover up” of what actually occurred during the Escalante

incident. Villanueva had commander Joseph Williams, a member

of his staff, contact Captain Walton about the sequence of events.

When Captain Walton explained the true timeline “did not align”

with what Villanueva was saying, she was transferred from her

command position.

5

On March 29, 2022, three days after denying there had

been any intentional coverup of the Escalante incident in the

LASD, Villanueva “changed his story again” and admitted a

coverup had occurred, falsely pointing the finger at plaintiff and

Limon as the responsible parties. He “announced he was acting

against” plaintiff and Limon, “manipulated” the media with false

information, and published photographs of plaintiff and Limon as

“disgraced law enforcement officials” responsible for the LASD’s

mishandling of the Escalante incident.

Villanueva retaliated against plaintiff and Limon

demanding they agree to an immediate retirement or face a

demotion if they refused. Villanueva sent Undersheriff

Murakami to plaintiff’s home while she was on medical leave to

give her the ultimatum and insist she make an immediate

decision. Villanueva “constructively terminated” plaintiff.

Plaintiff filed a government claim on May 4, 2022, alleging

whistleblower retaliation and racial discrimination and received

a right to sue letter.

In May 2022, “defendants” leaked a memo to two media

outlets that had “purportedly” been written by Satterfield, at

Villanueva’s direction. The memo was “clearly written for

purposes of litigation” and was “full of glaring holes,

inconsistencies, and deficiencies” in an attempt to exonerate

Villanueva and implicate plaintiff and Limon in the mishandling

of the Escalante incident. The memo falsely stated plaintiff and

Limon committed “gross” failures in leadership and that plaintiff,

Limon, Castellano, and Jones attempted to cover up the

Escalante incident. The memo is a public document on the

LASD’s website “perpetually defaming” plaintiff and the other

whistleblowers.

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On August 8, 2022, Villanueva “posted an announcement”

that the Los Angeles district attorney had convened a grand jury

regarding the LASD’s handling of the Escalante incident.

Villanueva, at the same time, falsely suggested plaintiff, Limon

and Castellano were the targets of that investigation by making

references to the LASD’s investigation having shown that

personnel “falsely” portraying themselves as whistleblowers were

responsible for any misconduct.

Villanueva and Yoo defamed plaintiff on August 31, 2022,

when they lied about plaintiff and the other whistleblowers,

calling them criminals, and said their “frivolous lawsuits” were

efforts to “avoid accountability or prosecution” for their own

misdeeds regarding the Escalante incident.

The first amended complaint also alleges, in addition to the

above allegations concerning the Escalante incident, that

Villanueva “targeted [p]laintiff for being African American” and

retaliated against her on account of her race and because she

opposed his illegal conduct in violation of FEHA and against

whistleblowers generally. We discuss those allegations in more

detail in part 2 of the Discussion below.

2. Procedural summary

Plaintiff filed this action in September 2022. After a

demurrer to the original complaint was sustained with leave to

amend, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint. Defendants

County, Villanueva, Satterfield, and Yoo demurred to causes of

action one through seven, arguing various immunities and

asserting that plaintiff’s claims failed to state sufficient facts.

Defendants did not demur to the eighth cause of action under

POBR.

7

The court sustained defendants’ demurrer in its entirety

without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in

their favor. While the record does not contain a copy of the

dismissal, plaintiff apparently voluntarily dismissed her POBR

cause of action.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Where the lower court has entered a judgment of dismissal

after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, our review

is de novo. (Centinela, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1010; accord, Erlach

v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1291

(Erlach).) For the limited purpose of reviewing the legal

sufficiency of the challenged pleading, we “ ‘ “ ‘treat the demurrer

as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not

contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.]

We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ ” ’ ”

(Centinela, at p. 1010.) In determining whether the operative

complaint states a cause of action, “ ‘ “we give the complaint a

reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in

their context.” ’ ” (Ibid.) We are not concerned at the pleading

stage with evidentiary matters or the “plaintiff’s ability to prove

the allegations.” (Erlach, at p. 1291.)

In assessing whether the denial of leave to amend was an

abuse of discretion, “we decide whether there is a reasonable

possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can

be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not,

there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.]

The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on

the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318

(Blank).)

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1. Whistleblower retaliation

Plaintiff’s cause of action for whistleblower retaliation in

violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 is pled against the County.

The County contends plaintiff failed to plead the essential

elements of the claim. We disagree.

Labor Code section 1102.5 “ ‘reflects the broad public policy

interest in encouraging workplace whistle-blowers to report

unlawful acts without fearing retaliation.’ [Citation.] An

employee injured by prohibited retaliation may file a private suit

for damages.” (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022)

12 Cal.5th 703, 709 (Lawson); see also Lab. Code, § 1105.)

To plead a violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, plaintiff must

allege she engaged in whistleblowing activity protected by the

statute, and that the protected activity was a contributing factor

in her suffering an adverse employment action. (Lab. Code,

§ 1102.6; Lawson at p. 712.)

Plaintiff alleges the Escalante incident involved an

excessive use of force that likely violated state law, federal law,

and LASD protocols. Plaintiff adequately alleges, within the

meaning of Labor Code section 1102.5, that she reported a

violation of federal, state, or local law. Plaintiff also alleges she

reported the Escalante incident to Limon, her supervisor; asked

that the video be shown to Villanueva; and directed Castellano’s

efforts to follow LASD protocols to investigate the Escalante

incident. The complaint therefore adequately alleges plaintiff’s

report was made “to a government or law enforcement agency, to

a person with authority over the employee or another employee

who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the

violation or noncompliance.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)

9

Despite the County’s argument to the contrary, plaintiff need not

allege that she made her report directly to Villanueva.

Furthermore, the statute provides that a report by a public

employee to their employer, as occurred here, “is a disclosure of

information to a government or law enforcement agency” within

the meaning of the statute. (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (e).)

Finally, plaintiff alleges that because she was a whistleblower,

Villanueva and the County constructively terminated her.

While other factors, including the Los Angeles Times

article, may also have played a role in the County’s decision to

constructively terminate her, she adequately alleges that her

initial report of the Escalante incident in March 2021 and her

subsequent efforts to ensure it was investigated were

contributing factors. She was not required to allege they were

the sole motivating factors. (Lab. Code, § 1102.6; Lawson, supra,

12 Cal.5th at p. 712.) We conclude plaintiff’s allegations of

whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 are

sufficient for the pleading stage. The demurrer to the third cause

of action should have been overruled.

2. The FEHA claims

2.1 Retaliation

In her fourth cause of action, plaintiff alleges a retaliation

claim against the County under FEHA. “The elements of a claim

for retaliation in violation of Government Code section 12940,

subdivision (h), are: ‘(1) the employee’s engagement in a protected

activity . . . ; (2) retaliatory animus on the part of the employer;

(3) an adverse action by the employer; (4) a causal link between

the retaliatory animus and the adverse action; (5) damages; and

(6) causation.’ ” (Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.

(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 243.)

10

Plaintiff alleges she told Villanueva after he was elected

that she hoped “there would be fairness and opportunity” for

qualified African American candidates to be promoted at the

LASD, and that he responded by saying, “we have enough of you,

[black people].” Plaintiff alleges she continued to oppose

violations of FEHA and objected directly to Villanueva when he

failed to interview qualified African American candidates and

female candidates. After informing Villanueva the law required

him to interview qualified candidates for captain or other

promotions regardless of race, plaintiff “was no longer allowed to

attend [Villanueva’s] administration meetings.”

In addition, plaintiff alleges Villanueva made both internal

and public statements that there were “too many African

American” division chiefs in the LASD, including during one

media interview where he noted pictures of division chiefs on the

wall and pointed out that nine of them were African American

and only one was Latino. Villanueva referred to African

Americans as “knuckle dragger[s],” said they were responsible for

most crimes against Asian Americans, and refused to discipline

Undersheriff Murakami for using the Japanese slang version of

the “n” word.

Plaintiff also alleges she repeatedly objected directly to

Villanueva that he could not take revenge on whistleblowers,

sending him texts to “stand down,” and explaining that he was

exposing the LASD to liability. She says Villanueva eventually

retaliated against her, as an African American woman, choosing

to blame her as one of the individuals responsible for the

mishandling of the Escalante incident in order “to further his

goal of reducing the number of African Americans employed by

LASD.”

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Defendants argue that plaintiff alleges retaliation based on

her reporting of the Escalante incident which does not qualify as

protected activity under FEHA. Defendants’ argument

disregards plaintiff’s additional allegations regarding other

reporting activity that does qualify as protected activity under

FEHA. Read fairly and in context, plaintiff’s allegations

adequately state an alternative theory of retaliatory termination

based on workplace reporting of FEHA violations. “It is well

established that a retaliation claim may be brought by an

employee who has complained of or opposed conduct that the

employee reasonably believes to be discriminatory” even if that

conduct ultimately is determined not to violate FEHA. (Yanowitz

v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1043.)

At oral argument, the County urged us to find this cause of

action fails as a matter of law because plaintiff did not allege any

temporal connection between her alleged protected activity and

her constructive termination. Counsel for the County asserted

the incidents all occurred a significant period of time before

March 2022 when plaintiff alleged she was constructively

terminated and the case law requires allegations demonstrating

a close temporal connection, citing to Loggins v. Kaiser

Permanente International (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102.

Here, however, the precise timing of the protected activity

is not alleged in the first amended complaint. Moreover, Loggins,

an appeal from the grant of summary judgment, does not purport

to establish a bright-line rule fixing any particular length of time

as too long to qualify as close temporal proximity under FEHA.

We conclude the resolution of whether there was the

requisite degree of temporal proximity and causation between

12

plaintiff’s protected activity and her constructive termination is

better left to resolution on the factual merits.

The demurrer should have been overruled to the fourth

cause of action.

2.2 Racial discrimination and failure to prevent

Plaintiff alleges two additional claims against the County

arising under FEHA: the first cause of action for racial

discrimination (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a)), and the second

cause of action for failure to prevent racial discrimination

(Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k)).

In order to allege a prima facie claim of racial

discrimination under FEHA, plaintiff must allege she was a

member of a protected class, she was performing competently,

and she suffered an adverse employment action because of her

status in a protected class. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000)

24 Cal.4th 317, 355; see also Gov. Code, § 12993 [the provisions of

FEHA “shall be construed liberally” to accomplish its purposes].)

Plaintiff alleges she is an African American woman who

worked for over three decades at the LASD, receiving several

promotions and attaining the rank of chief of the Court Services

Division. She alleges numerous statements by Villanueva

reflecting racial animus, as well as animus directed at plaintiff

based on her efforts opposing conduct she believed violated the

rights of African American personnel at the LASD. She alleges

Villanueva’s racial animus was a contributing factor to her

termination.

Similar to their argument against her retaliation claim,

defendants argue that plaintiff failed to allege an adverse

employment action connected to race. We disagree. In order to

state a viable claim, plaintiff was not required to plead that racial

13

animus was the sole motivation behind the decision to terminate

her. (L.A. County Office of the Dist. Atty. v. Civil Serv. Com

(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 187, 201; Mixon v. Fair Employment &

Housing Com (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1319.) We conclude

plaintiff’s discrimination claim is sufficient for the pleading

stage.

The same allegations are adequate to support plaintiff’s

cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination. Plaintiff

alleges the County was aware of Villanueva’s behavior and failed

to address it. To the extent the County asserted its temporal

proximity argument also applied to these two FEHA claims, we

again conclude resolution of that issue is better left for the

factual merits. The demurrer to the first and second causes of

action should have been overruled.

3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of

emotional distress is pled against the County and Villanueva.

They contend they are immune from liability under Government

Code section 821.6 and that plaintiff failed to state sufficient

facts. We reject defendants’ immunity argument, but conclude

plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim.

Under the Government Claims Act (Act), public entities are

directly liable in tort only as “provided by statute.” (Gov. Code,

§ 815, subd. (b); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th

1112, 1127.) But public entities are vicariously liable for the acts

of their employees “under the principle of respondeat superior.”

(Zelig, at p. 1128; accord, Leon v. County of Riverside (2023)

14 Cal.5th 910, 918 (Leon); see also Gov. Code, § 815.2, subds. (a),

(b), § 820, subd. (a).)

14

For public employees, “ ‘ “the rule is liability, immunity is

the exception.” ’ ” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.

(1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 792.) The Act makes public employees

generally liable to the same extent as a private person for acts or

omissions taken in the course and scope of employment, except to

the extent a specific statute creates an immunity. (Leon, supra,

14 Cal.5th at p. 918.)

Government Code section 821.6 states that “[a] public

employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or

prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the

scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without

probable cause.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed

the narrow scope of section 821.6 immunity in Leon, supra,

14 Cal.5th 910, explaining that “[i]n enacting section 821.6, the

Legislature conferred absolute immunity against claims based on

injuries caused by wrongful prosecutions, but not other types of

injuries inflicted in the course of law enforcement investigations.”

(Leon, at p. 928, italics added.) Leon disapproved of numerous

decisions that expanded the scope of the immunity, to the extent

they were inconsistent with its holding, including three cases

cited by defendants here: Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007)

147 Cal.App.4th 1033, Ingram v. Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th

1280, and Amylou R. v. County of Riverside (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th

1205. (Leon, at pp. 930–931.)

There are no allegations that defendants initiated or

prosecuted an official proceeding against plaintiff. Defendants

appear to suggest the immunity of Government Code

section 821.6 applies to cloak actions taken by public employees

in responding to litigation initiated by others. That is not the

intent of the statute. Leon makes clear it is intended to protect

15

public employees from being sued for their own acts of alleged

malicious prosecution. (Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 928–931.)

Section 821.6 immunity does not apply here.

We must therefore assess whether plaintiff has stated the

essential elements of her claim. A cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress requires the pleading of facts

showing extreme and outrageous behavior specifically intended

to cause harm. “A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is

so ‘ “ ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in

a civilized community.’ ” ’ [Citation.] And the defendant’s

conduct must be ‘ “ ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with

the realization that injury will result.’ ” ’ ” (Hughes v. Pair (2009)

46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050–1051; see also CACI No. 1600.)

Plaintiff alleges that Villanueva intentionally “smeared”

her and Limon, falsely stating in public they were the individuals

who had “obstructed justice and committed the cover up” of the

Escalante incident. Villanueva “led the public” to believe she was

a “disgraced law enforcement official forced out of her job due to

her corruption.”

Villanueva’s disparaging statements about plaintiff made

during press conferences, or in other public forums, are barred by

the absolute privilege codified at Civil Code section 47,

subdivision (a), commonly referred to as the official act privilege.

Section 47, subdivision (a), provides that “[a] privileged

publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] (a) In the proper

discharge of an official duty.” (Ibid.)

The County and Villanueva did not argue the official act

privilege, and the trial court did not state the bases for its ruling

so we do not know whether the privilege played any part in the

court’s decision to sustain the demurrer. However, it is well-

16

established that “[w]e will affirm an order sustaining a demurrer

on any proper legal ground whether or not the trial court relied

on that theory or it was raised by the defendant.” (Summerfield

v. City of Inglewood (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 983, 992.)

In Kilgore v. Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770 (Kilgore), the

plaintiff sued the Attorney General for defamation, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy based on

statements made by the Attorney General at a press conference

in which he adopted statements in a report, and released copies

of the report to the press, suggesting the plaintiff was involved in

an illegal bookmaking operation. (Id. at pp. 774–778.) The

Supreme Court found the official act privilege applied and

affirmed the Attorney General’s judgment of dismissal following

a successful demurrer. (Ibid.)

Kilgore explained that the official act privilege of Civil Code

section 47, subdivision (a), (formerly section 47(1)), is absolute.

(Kilgore, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 778.) “Unlike qualified privileges,

it is not negated by malice or other personal motivation . . . .

Further, the privilege is equally applicable to defamation and

other actions, excepting only those for malicious prosecution.

[Citation.] For the absolute privilege to attach, the public official

need only be properly discharging an official duty.” (Ibid.)

Villanueva’s public statements about the LASD’s handling

and investigation of the Escalante incident were unquestionably

statements about matters of public interest that fell within the

scope of his duties as the head of the LASD. Those statements,

even if made with malicious intent, are protected by the absolute

privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a). (Maranatha

Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation

(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1089 [“ ‘Because a public official’s

17

duty includes the duty to keep the public informed of his or her

management of the public business, press releases, press

conferences and other public statements by such officials are

covered by the “official duty” privilege’ ”].)

The demurrer was properly sustained to the fifth cause of

action. Because the official act privilege is absolute and plaintiff

has not suggested any other material facts that can be pled to

state an alternative theory for defendants’ liability for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff cannot show the denial of

leave to amend was an abuse of discretion. (Blank, supra,

39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)

4. Defamation and false light

Plaintiff’s claims for defamation and false light, against all

four defendants, are alternate theories based on the same

allegations of wrongdoing. Plaintiff alleges defendants published

numerous false statements about her alleged mishandling of the

Escalante incident that tarnished her reputation and ruined her

lengthy career in law enforcement.

The County contends it cannot be held liable since no

authorizing statute provides that a public entity can be held

liable on the common law claims of defamation and false light.

The argument lacks merit. The County may not be held directly

liable, but as we already explained above, it may be held

vicariously liable for the acts of its employees taken in the course

and scope of the employment, assuming no statute provides an

immunity. (Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 918; see also Gov. Code,

§ 815.2, subds. (a), (b), § 820, subd. (a).)

The individual defendants argue that both claims fail on

the elements. We conclude the demurrer was properly sustained

as to both causes of action as to all four defendants.

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4.1 Defendants County and Villanueva

The defamatory statements attributed to Villanueva are

the same public statements that form the basis of plaintiff’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. They all

concern public statements by Villanueva about the Escalante

incident. For the same reasons explained in part 3 above, the

statements are absolutely privileged by the official act privilege

of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a). Furthermore, denial of

leave was not an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff has not argued any

facts showing a reasonable possibility of pleading any statements

not covered by the privilege.

4.2 Defendants Satterfield and Yoo

The defamatory statements attributed to Satterfield and

Yoo are minimal. Plaintiff alleges Satterfield “purportedly”

drafted the May 2022 memo at Villanueva’s direction that

disparages plaintiff and then they both leaked it to the media.

As for Yoo, plaintiff alleges that Villanueva and Yoo “released a

statement to the media” in August 2022 that included comments

about the frivolous nature of plaintiff’s lawsuit and otherwise

disparaged plaintiff. No further specificity is stated about any

independent statements attributable to either Satterfield or Yoo.

Plaintiff only alleges their minimal participation with

Villanueva, in largely conclusory terms, in those purportedly joint

publications.

To the extent plaintiff’s allegations are based on public

statements by Villanueva, the statements are covered by the

official act privilege discussed above. To the extent plaintiff’s

allegations can be read liberally to conclude that either

Satterfield or Yoo made their own defamatory statements not

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covered by the privilege, plaintiff has failed to comply with the

requirements for pleading defamation.

Defamation requires specific, nonconclusory allegations of

the intentional publication of a provably false, unprivileged

factual assertion. (Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931,

948.) “As Witkin distills the pleading rule, ‘It is sometimes said

to be a requirement, and it certainly is the common practice, to

plead the exact words or the picture or other defamatory matter.

The chief reason appears to be that the court must determine, as

a question of law, whether the defamatory matter is on its face or

capable of the defamatory meaning attributed to it by the

innuendo. Hence, the complaint should set the matter out

verbatim, either in the body or as an attached exhibit.’ ” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff has not done so. It cannot be determined from plaintiff’s

pleading what words, if any, are directly attributable to either

Satterfield or Yoo, whether they are actionable assertions of fact

or nonactionable opinion, or otherwise covered by privilege.

The demurrer was properly sustained and leave to amend

properly denied.

4.3 False light

The false light claim, based on the same conduct as the

defamation claim, is legally inadequate for the same reasons

discussed above.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal in favor of Alex Villanueva, John

Satterfield, and David Yoo is affirmed.

The judgment of dismissal entered in favor of the County of

Los Angeles is vacated. The order sustaining the demurrer to the

first amended complaint is affirmed in part, reversed in part and

the case remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.

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On remand, the superior court is ordered to vacate its order

and enter a new order on the demurrer as follows: the demurrer

of the County of Los Angeles is overruled to the first cause of

action for racial discrimination under Government Code

section 12940 (FEHA), the second cause of action for failure to

prevent racial discrimination under FEHA, the third cause of

action for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code

section 1102.5, and the fourth cause of action for retaliation

under FEHA. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend

to the fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, the sixth cause of action for defamation and the seventh

cause of action for false light.

The parties shall bear their own costs of appeal.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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