The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AJANI POSEY, :
Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-615
v. :
(JUDGE MANNION)
KATHY BRITTAIN, et al., :
Respondents :
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 to challenge a denial of parole. The petition
will be dismissed and a certificate of appealability will not issue.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Ajani Posey, is incarcerated in Camp Hill State Correctional
Institution (“SCI-Camp Hill”) pursuant to a Pennsylvania criminal conviction.
He brings the instant case under 28 U.S.C. §2254 to challenge the denial of
his parole in March 2025 by the Pennsylvania Parole Board. (Doc. 1). Posey
asserts that the denial of parole violated his constitutional right to due
process because the Parole Board based the denial on a disciplinary charge
for which he was acquitted and acted in retaliation for civil rights actions he
filed against prison officials. (Docs. 1-2).
Respondents responded to the petition on May 30, 2025. (Docs. 14-
15). Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed both because
Posey failed to exhaust state court remedies and because he has not alleged
any nonconclusory facts showing that he is entitled to relief and therefore
fails to state a prima facie claim for habeas corpus relief. (Id.) Posey filed a
reply brief on June 18, 2025, making the petition ripe for review. (Doc. 17).
Posey has additionally filed a motion for sanctions and a motion for “judicial
notice.” (Docs. 18-19).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A challenge to the denial of parole is cognizable under Section 2254.
Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001). However, a federal
district court may not grant parole or determine parole eligibility. Billiteri v.
U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976). “The only remedy which
the court can give is to order the Board to correct the abuses or wrongful
conduct within a fixed period of time, after which, in the case of non-
compliance, the court can grant the writ of habeas corpus and order the
prisoner discharged from custody.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
“[T]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to
be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” nor has
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created such a right. Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Thus, because
the denial of parole “does not implicate any constitutionally [or state]
protected liberty interest,” the scope of federal judicial review of state parole
denials is limited. Diehl-Armstrong v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 13-CV-
2302, 2014 WL 1871509, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2014). The federal court is
confined to reviewing the substance of the state parole decision to determine
whether the Parole Board exercised its authority in an arbitrary and
capricious, or constitutionally impermissible manner. Block v. Potter, 631
F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980).
To show a violation of substantive due process, a habeas petitioner
must demonstrate that: (1) he was arbitrarily denied parole due to
impermissible reasons such as race, religion, or political beliefs, and/or (2)
the Parole Board failed to apply appropriate, rational criteria in reaching its
determination to deny parole. Id. “However, federal courts are not authorized
by the due process clause to second-guess parole boards and the
requirements of substantive due process are met if there is some basis for
the challenged decision.” Coady, 251 F.3d at 487. The “relevant level of
arbitrariness required to find a substantive due process violation involves not
merely action that is unreasonable, but, rather, something more egregious,
which we have termed at times ‘conscience shocking’ or ‘deliberately
indifferent.’” Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this case, Posey seeks a writ of habeas corpus because the Parole
Board purportedly denied parole based on a disciplinary charge for which he
was acquitted and acted in retaliation for civil rights actions he filed against
prison officials. (Docs. 1-2). Respondents contend the petition should be
dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies and failure to state a
prima facie claim for habeas corpus relief. (Docs. 14-15).
At the outset, the court finds respondents’ exhaustion argument
unavailing. This court recently rejected an essentially identical argument for
failure to exhaust state court remedies in Mathis v. Rivello, No. 3:23-CV-225,
2025 WL 524301, at *7-8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2025) (Mannion, J.). In Mathis,
the court held that Defoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 2005),
remains good law and compels the conclusion that habeas petitioners
challenging the denial of parole are not required to exhaust remedies through
Pennsylvania state courts before they may file in federal court. Mathis, 2025
WL 524301, at *8. The court does not see any sound basis to reach a
contrary conclusion in this case and accordingly holds that dismissal of
Posey’s petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies is not warranted.
Turning to the merits, the court first finds no merit to petitioner’s
contention that he was denied parole based on disciplinary charges for which
he had been acquitted. The Parole Board’s written rationale for the denial of
parole states that it denied parole based on the level of risk Posey posed to
the community, his minimization of the seriousness of his criminal offenses
and the nature of the offenses, his refusal to accept responsibility for the
offenses, and the negative recommendation made by the prosecuting
attorney. (Doc. 15-6). The only mention of Posey’s disciplinary history states
that at petitioner’s next parole hearing—which is scheduled to occur in March
2026—“the board will review [his] file and consider . . . whether [he has]
maintained a clear conduct record.” (Id. at 2-3). There is simply no basis to
conclude that the board denied parole based on a disciplinary charge for
which Posey was acquitted, and he has offered nothing other than
speculation to the contrary.
The court similarly finds Posey’s argument that he was denied parole
in retaliation for filing civil suits unavailing. A petition for writ of habeas corpus
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 must “state the facts supporting each
ground.” Rule 2(c)(2), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Following 28
U.S.C. §2254. A petition is subject to dismissal without an evidentiary
hearing if it offers nothing more than “bald assertions” and “conclusory
allegations.” Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 395 (3d. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Campbell v. Burris, 515 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2008)). The petition must
present a prima facie claim for habeas corpus relief by making “sufficient
‘factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal
habeas relief.’” Id. at 392 (quoting Schiro v. Landigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474
(2007). “[C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Id. at 395 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
In his petition and supporting brief, Posey asserts that the Parole Board
denied him parole in retaliation for various civil rights suits he filed against
prison officials, but he offers nothing other than speculation to establish that
there is a causal connection between his civil suits and the denial of his
parole. (See Doc. 2 at 3 (“With all of these matters pled it raises questions
as to if this parole denial was retaliation fo[r] filing civil rights suits.”). There
is no allegation in the complaint or the supporting brief that members of the
Parole Board were even aware of Posey’s civil suits. (See Docs. 1-2).
Posey appears to acknowledge the absence of factual allegations to
support his claim of retaliation, noting that “the record has to be developed
to see if the claims of retaliation have a factual basis.” (Id.) A petition for writ
of habeas corpus, however, must offer more than mere speculation in the
hopes of conducting a fishing expedition to determine whether there is a
“factual basis” for the petition’s claims. See Palmer, 592 F.3d at 395 (noting
that petition must make “sufficient ‘factual allegations, which, if true, would
entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.’” (quoting Schiro, 550 U.S. at
474). Posey has not made any factual allegations to support his retaliation
claim. The proper course in this situation is not development of the record. It
is dismissal of the petition.1
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss the petition for writ of
habeas corpus. A certificate of appealability will not issue because no
reasonable jurist would disagree with this ruling or conclude that the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Buck
v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
336 (2003)). An appropriate order shall issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
Malachy E. Mannion
United States District Judge
Dated: September 18, 2025
25-615-01
1 Petitioner’s motion for sanctions and motion for judicial notice are
deemed withdrawn because petitioner did not file a brief in support of either
motion. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.5.