Lazy S Ranch Properties, LLC v. Valero Terminaling and Distribution

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

LAZY S RANCH PROPERTIES, LLC, an

OKLAHOMA LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 19-CV-425-JWB

VALERO TERMINALING AND

DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on two motions by Defendants, one to exclude the report of

Philip J. Isaacs and one to exclude the testimony of Matthew Trimble, who was substituted for

Philip J. Isaacs in March 2025 and adopted his report and opinions. (Doc. 388, 428.) The motions

are fully briefed and ripe for decision. (Docs. 388, 400, 407, 428, 442, 446.) The motions are

denied for the reasons stated herein.

I. Facts

The facts in this case have previously been presented several times by the court. (Doc.

316, 335, 357, 375, 427.) Briefly repeated here, Plaintiff owns and runs cattle operations on 6,150

acres of real property in Carter County, Oklahoma (the “Lazy S Ranch” or “property”). The Roos

family bought the property for approximately $8.6 million in December 2017. The Lazy S Ranch

lies above a portion of the Arbuckle-Simpson Aquifer, which covers an area of over 500 square

miles in south central Oklahoma. The aquifer feeds numerous freshwater springs and clear running

streams in the region.

Several pipelines cross the property. Central to this case is a 12-inch refined products

pipeline operated by Valero (the “Wynnewood Pipeline”). The Wynnewood Pipeline carries

gasoline and diesel from Valero's refinery at Ardmore to a refined products terminal at

Wynnewood, some 30 miles to the north. Approximately three miles of the Wynnewood Pipeline

is located beneath the property. This section of the pipeline runs essentially in a north-south

direction about 0.5 miles east of Highway 77. The pipeline also runs about 0.5 miles east of a

spring called Tulip Springs in the northwest corner of the property near Highway 77. In July 2018,

Robert Charles “Cinco” Roos, a representative of Lazy S Ranch, claims to have smelled a diesel

fuel odor emanating from Tulip Springs. Plaintiff then retained multiple experts to begin

investigating hydrocarbon contamination of the property. One of the experts that Plaintiff retained

was Philip J. Isaacs, who determined the effect of the alleged contamination on the value of the

property. (Doc. 127, 198, 199.)

In December 2019, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, who are all related entities

operating the pipeline, alleging eleven claims under Oklahoma state law. Currently, only three

claims remain, and Defendants filed motions to exclude all of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses under

the Daubert standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. This included moving to exclude the

testimony of Mr. Isaacs. (Doc. 388, 400, 407.) However, prior to the scheduled hearing on

Defendants’ Daubert motions in February 2025, Plaintiff notified the court on January 30 that Mr.

Isaacs was no longer able to testify due to his personal health situation and moved to substitute

Matthew Trimble instead. (Doc. 413.) The court granted the motion to substitute on March 26,

2025, and Mr. Trimble filed his Rule 26 expert report on April 1, 2025. (Docs. 422, 423.)

Nevertheless, before a new round of briefing could be completed regarding Mr. Trimble’s

opinions, the court issued an order on Defendants’ Daubert motions regarding Plaintiff’s other

experts on May 5, 2025. (Doc. 427.) This order excluded the opinions of Dr. Kevin Boyle and

limited the topics on which Plaintiffs other experts, Trae Miller, Dr. J. Burton Fisher, Dr. Kenneth

Ede, and Dr. Tamzen Macbeth, could opine. The next day, Defendants filed their present motion

to exclude Mr. Trimble, and a full round of briefing has ensued on Mr. Trimble’s testimony in

light of the undersigned’s other Daubert rulings. (Docs. 428, 442, 446.)

II. Standard

Generally, district courts have broad discretion to determine whether a proposed expert

may testify. United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Cir. 1999). Federal Rule of

Evidence 702, which controls the admission of expert witness testimony, provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the

case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of showing the expert

testimony is admissible. Hampton v. Utah Dep't of Corr., 87 F.4th 1183, 1201 (10th Cir. 2023).

“First, the Court determines whether the expert is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience,

training or education to render the opinion.” Lippe v. Howard, 287 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1277–78

(W.D. Okla. 2018). After determining an expert is qualified, “the district court must satisfy itself

that the testimony is both reliable and relevant, in that it will assist the trier of fact, before

permitting a jury to assess such testimony.” Schulenberg v. BNSF Ry. Co., 911 F.3d 1276, 1282

(10th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009) (en

banc)). “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo,

non-helpful.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (citation omitted).

Generally, a district court should focus on a proffered expert’s methodology and “not on the

conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 595. However, an expert's conclusions are not immune

from scrutiny: “A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the

data and the opinion proffered.” General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). See also

Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1222–23 (10th Cir. 2003).

III. Analysis

As with all experts, the court must initially determine if Mr. Trimble is qualified to offer

his opinions. Given his experience, the court is convinced that Mr. Trimble has sufficient technical

knowledge to opine on property appraisal. He has numerous years of experience in the field of

real estate appraisal, is a Certified General Appraiser in Oklahoma, and is a member of the

Appraisal Institute. He also has published articles in The Appraisal Journal and currently teaches

real estate appraising at the University of Central Oklahoma. His credentials satisfy the court that

he has sufficient technical and specialized knowledge that would aid the jury in their factual

determinations regarding the valuation of the property.

Moving to the arguments in the Daubert motion, Defendants move to exclude the Land &

Building Improvements Value Damages calculation of $13,050,000 from both the Isaacs report

(Doc. 388) and Mr. Trimble’s testimony on the Isaacs report. (Doc. 428.) Although these two

motions are separate on the docket, Defendants largely make the same arguments in their briefs

since Mr. Trimble adopted the opinions of Mr. Isaacs. Thus, the court will rely on the arguments

and briefing regarding Mr. Trimble since those briefs constitute the most recent filings on the

issues presented by Defendants. Defendants contend that Mr. Trimble’s conclusions are

improperly drawn under Oklahoma law, his conclusions improperly rely on other expert testimony,

and his conclusions employ improper valuation methodology. (Doc. 428.) The court will address

each of these in order.

First, relating to whether Mr. Trimble failed to follow the proper procedure for measuring

alleged damages under Oklahoma law, Defendants contend that Mr. Trimble failed to properly

calculate the exact time when the Wynnewood Pipeline began to leak and contaminate the

property. (Doc. 428 at 6–8.) The substance of Defendants’ argument is that without a definitive

date determining when an alleged leak started, Mr. Trimble cannot identify the reasonable market

value of the land immediately before and immediately after the injury to the land as required by

Oklahoma law. See Houck v. Hold Oil Corp., 867 P.2d 451, 461 (Okla. 1993). The court is not

convinced that Oklahoma law requires such a strict temporal determination. Given the

subterranean nature of the pipeline, it is quite possible that a leak could exist undetected for some

time before being discovered. The fact that damage to property is undiscovered for a time should

not preclude the property owner from being able to receive compensation for that damage.

Defendants argue from the case Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 143 Okla. 290, 288 P. 981

(Okla. 1930), that Plaintiff needs to have a specific time when the contamination occurred.

Defendants argue that Mr. Trimble’s model is insufficient to establish damages if he cannot show

the value of the property “immediately before the pollution.” Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 288 P. at

983. However, the question of whether the property is contaminated is the very core of the dispute

in this case. Thus, this case is factually distinct from the issues in Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., because

the stream that the defendant companies polluted with discharge from their oil and gas lease was

open and notorious. The property owner lost cattle and mature trees due to the pollution of a

stream, and there was a clear time when the contamination of the property’s water started and from

whom the contamination originated. Given these facts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that

Plaintiff’s failure to present the value of the property prior to the contamination was an error.

Compare those facts with the alleged contamination in this case. Although there was some prior

notice that the property might be contaminated before the Roos family bought the property in

2017,1 the underground contamination was not allegedly confirmed until Plaintiff’s experts Dr.

Fisher and Dr. Ede conducted their tests on the property. This court has already allowed Dr. Fisher

and Dr. Ede to opine on contamination of the property. (Doc. 427.) The undersigned’s prior order

only excluded their opinions on whether the Arbuckle-Simpson Aquifer has been contaminated

based on insufficient facts and data. (Id. at 16, 18.) These experts will opine that starting in 2018

they began conducting tests that allegedly confirmed the Wynnewood Pipeline is the source of

contamination on the property. (Docs. 130, 131.) The court rules that these reports represent the

time at which injury to the property was officially recognized (or at least recognized in a way that

affects the value of the property), and thus 2018 is the date around which the reasonable market

value of the land should be calculated. See Nichols v. Burk Royalty Co., 576 P.2d 317, 321 (Okla.

Civ. App. 1977) (affirming a property damage calculation where “witnesses based their before

calculations upon the date permanent injury was first recognized”).

The Isaacs Report includes comparable sales from both sides of this 2018 date (the report

has comparable land sales ranging from 2016–2021) and proffers the difference in land values

between unimpaired land and impaired land. (Doc. 127.) Although Defendants disagree on the

methodology and conclusions of the Isaacs report, these topics are best left for development in

cross examination. The court is sufficiently satisfied with the data and methodologies Mr. Trimble

intends to proffer such as to satisfy a Rule 702 threshold Daubert determination.

Second, Defendants contend that Mr. Trimble and the Isaacs Report “uncritically adopt[s]

1 Defendant cites to reports of potential contamination on the property “much earlier than July 2018, perhaps as early

as 2011.” (Doc. 442 at 9.) If true, this fact could become relevant for purposes of discerning the true amount of

damages inflicted on the property. Although this fact is certainly something which can be developed in cross

examination, it is not necessarily fatal to Mr. Trimble’s damages calculations because the property value does not

appear to have been affected by this contamination until later dates. Thus, this earlier report of contamination is not

the same sort of open and notorious contamination with which the Oklahoma Supreme Court was concerned in Sinclair

Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen.

opinions of other experts” (Doc. 428 at 8) such that Mr. Trimble lacks an adequate foundation for

his conclusions. It is true that an expert cannot offer an opinion based on the opinion of another

expert “simply because the other is an expert.” Mooring Cap. Fund, LLC v. Knight, 388 F. App’x

814, 820 (10th Cir. 2010). However, this decision largely relates to an expert being a vehicle for

other opinions which are not otherwise available to be admitted. “[A]s a general matter, there is

nothing objectionable about an expert relying upon the work a colleague.” Gopalratnam v.

Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 789 (7th Cir. 2017). Indeed, an “expert may rely upon another

expert’s opinion if ‘the facts or data relied upon [are of] the kind that experts in the particular field

would reasonably rely on ... in forming an opinion on the subject.’” Vox Mktg. Grp., LLC v.

Prodigy Promos L.C., 521 F. Supp. 3d 1135, 1144–45 (D. Utah 2021) (quoting Gopalratnam, 877

F.3d at 789).

As noted above, the court has already ruled on the admissibility of Plaintiff’s other experts

and allowed some of them to testify as to at least some of their opinions on the alleged

contamination of the property. Therefore, Mr. Trimble would not be a vehicle for otherwise

inadmissible expert opinion. Moreover, as argued extensively by Defendants in their briefing, Mr.

Trimble and Mr. Isaacs are not environmental experts. Thus, they must reasonably rely on other

experts to provide a basis for their own work. Indeed, as noted by Plaintiff in its response to the

motion, “the experts upon which Trimble relies for contamination on the Lazy S Ranch will be

testifying in the very same trial as Trimble.” (Doc. 442 at 19 (emphasis in original).) Thus, Mr.

Trimble will not be offering his opinions on contamination to argue in the first instance that the

property is contaminated, but rather to show how this alleged contamination could shape the

property value. Thus, Mr. Trimble and the Isaacs report’s reliance on the opinions of Mr. Miller,

Dr. Fisher, and Dr. Ede regarding contamination of the property is well within the facts and data

upon which experts in the field of appraisal would normally rely to satisfy Rule 702 and Rule 703

concerns.

Third and finally, Defendants contend that Mr. Trimble’s “use of comparable sales and

calculation of building improvement damages is based on a flawed methodology” which leaves

his opinions no more than ipse dixit. (Doc 428 at 12.) Defendants point to numerous alleged flaws

in Mr. Trimble and the Isaac Report’s methodology, such as his failure to include the amount the

Roos family paid for the ranch in 2017, his exclusion of benefits from the land from the value of

the land itself, his choice of comparable “impaired” land sale sites, his “subject impaired” valuation

of $1200 per acre, and his conclusion that $750,000 of the $1,569,000 in capital improvements on

the property are a total market loss. While these are certainly concerns which can and should be

developed on cross examination, they do not rise to the level of exclusion under Rule 702.

Although the damages may be overstated due to the methodology employed, Mr. Trimble (and by

extension the Isaacs Report) still includes sufficient facts and data on which to base his opinion

along with reliable and accepted methods which were applied to this data. The fact that Defendants

disagree with the conclusions does not mean that they are insufficient to survive Rule 702 or that

they are unhelpful to a jury. Therefore, Defendants’ motions to exclude testimony from Mr.

Trimble and the Isaacs report are denied.

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motions to exclude Matthew Trimble who will be offering the conclusions of

Philip Isaacs (Doc. 388, 428) are DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 12th day of

September, 2025.

__s/ John W. Broomes__________

JOHN W. BROOMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE