People v. Mangione

People v Mangione

2025 NY Slip Op 33323(U)

September 16, 2025

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Ind. No. 75657-24

Judge: Gregory Carro

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York

State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

NEWYORKCOLNTY: PART32

-------------------------.-\

THEPEOPLE OF THE STATE OFNEW YORK :

-against- DECISION AND ORDER

Ind. 75657-24

LUIGI MANGIONE.

Detbndant.

x

JUSTICE GREGORY CARRO:

On December 4,2024, Brian Thompson, the CEO of UnitedHealthcare, was shot to death

outside of the Hilton hotel in midtown Manhattan. Video surveillance captured a man wearing a

mask, dressed in black and carrying a backpack, drawing a gun and shooting Thompson in the

back and the leg. Video also established that belore the shooting, the man drank from a water

bottle and threw it in a nearby trash can, that he dropped a cellphone as he fled the scene, and that

he discarded the backpack in Central Park. Investigators recovered ballistics evidence from the

scene, including three shell casings, on which "depose," "delay," and "den"r had been written.

Investigators were able to trace the shooter's movements to a hostel in Upper Manhattan, where

he had registered using the name and identification of "Mark Rosario," and they also found

evidence that he took a train to Philadelphia following the murder.r

On December 9,2024, the defendant was arrested at a McDonald's in Altoona,

Pennsylvania, after he was recognized by employees who had seen media coverage. A nine-

millimeter gun was recovered irom the defendant's backpack. as well as ammunition. a silencer,

a fake New Jersey driver's license in the name of Mark Rosario. cash, a passport, and a notebook

in which the defendant had made joumal entries. There were also two letters in the backpack, one

addressed to his family and one to the FBI. Ballistics analysis demonstrated that the shell casings

recovered at the scene were fired by the gun found in the def'endant's backpack. DNA analysis

also established that defendant's DNA was on the water bottle found at the scene. and on the

I Likely intended to read

"deny."

'?Video surveillance footage showed the man without a mask, both at the hostel and at locations before the shooting

occurred. Photos ofthe suspect circulated on national media.

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cellphone and backpack discarded by the shooter. Det'endant's fingerprints were also found on

the water bottle and on a Kind bar wrapper found near the scene.

Defendant was indicted tbr Murder in the First Degree (PL $ 125.27 (i) (a) (xiii)) (victim

killed in ''furtherance ofan act of terrorism," as defined in PL $ 490.05), Murder in the Second

Degree as a Crime ofTerrorism (PL $$ 125.25 (1);490.25), Murder in the Second Degree (PL g

125.25 (1)) (intentional), two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree

(PL S$ 265.03 (l) (b), 265.03 (3)), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree (PL Q

265.02 (7)), two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree (PL $ 265.02

(8)), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree (PL $ 265.02 (2)), Criminal

Possession ofa Weapon in the Fourth Degree (PL $ 265.01 (9)), and Criminal Possession ofa

,l70.25).

Forged Instrument in the Second Degree (PL $

Defendant has filed an omnibus motion, seeking Huntley, Mapp. and Mosley hear\ngs.

The defendant also moves to dismiss the terrorism charges as legally insufficient, moves to

dismiss the entire indictment for alleged violations of the Double Jeopardy clause, and argues

that the state case should be stayed pending resolution of a concurrent federal case.3 The People

have filed a response. consenting to pre-trial hearings, and opposing the motions to dismiss and

to stay the proceedings. The defendant has additionally filed a reply to the People's response, and

the People have filed a sur-reply. The court has reviewed all submissions and decides as follows:

Suppression Hearings:

Huntley, Mapp and, Mosley hearings are ordered.

Motions to Dismiss:

Defendant's motion to inspect the grand jury minutes for legal sufficiency pursuant to

CPL S 210.30 (2) is granted. The standard ofreview for legal sufficiency is whether there is

"competent evidence which, ifaccepted as true, would establish every element ofan offense

charged and the defendant's commission thereof." CPL $ 70.10(l). Legally sufficient evidence

means a prima facie case, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Sv,amp,84 NY2d 725,

730 (1995). A court must consider "'whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to

rDefendant was

indicted in the Southem District ofNew York for murder, stalking, and firearms charges based upon

the same incident. The federal prosecutors have filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalt),.

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the People. ifunexplained and uncontradicted, would warant conviction by a petit jury."' People

v. Bello,92 NY2d 523,525-26 (1998) (quoting People v. Jennings,69 NY2d 103, 114 (1986).

Penal Law provisions are generally to be construed so as to give efl'ect to their natural and

obvious meaning, particularly where the definition of a crime is at issue, because courts must be

"scrupulous in insuring that penal responsibility is not 'extended beyond the fair scope of the

statutory mandate."' People v. Hedgemon, T0 NY2d 533,537 (1987) (quoting People v. Wood,8

NY2d48,sl (1960).

Here, defendant argues that there is legally insufficient evidence of first-degree murder

(atleging that the victim was killed in "furtherance ofan act of terrorism"), and of second-degree

murder as a crime of terrorism, and urges that the court dismiss those two counts of the

indictment. Defendant argues that both legislative intent and case law demonstrate that

defendant's actions do not fit within the statute and that the People did not present legally

sufficient evidence ofthose counts. The People argue that both counts are legally sufficient, and

that terroristic intent was established because the defendant was not engaged in a "personal

vendetta," but "violently broadcast a social and political message" that "inspired" threats to

employees oi UHC.

New York's terrorism statute, set forlh in article 490 of the Penal Law, was enacted on

September 17, 2001. just six days after the September I I attacks. The Legislature was able to act

so quickly because it "liberally bonowed" from already-existing federal legislation. See

Greenberg & Yurowitz, Analyzing New York's Anti-Terrorism Stdt te, NYLJ, May 13,2002; see

also People v. Morales,20 NY3d 240,248 (2012) (definitional provisions of statute drawn from

federal legislation; legislature was able to act quickly because ofthe "'model provided by

existing federal antiterrorism Iegislation"') (quoting Greenberg et al., Ne), York Criminal Lcrw $

39:1). The "legislative findings" state that the "devastating consequences ofthe recent barbaric

attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon" establish a "compelling need" for legislation

"designed to combat the evils of terrorism." PL $ 490.00. The examples of tenorism cited in the

legislative findings are l) the September 11, 2001 attacks, 2) the bombings olAmerican

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, 3) the destruction ofthe Oklahoma City federal office

buitding in 1995, 4) the mid-air bombing of Pan Am Flight number'103 in Lockerbie, Scotland in

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1988, 5) the 1997 shooting from atop the Empire State Building, 6) the 1994 murder of Ari

Halberstam on the Brooklyn Bridge, and 7) the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. PL

$ 490.00.

Under PL | 125.27 [1], a person commits first-degree murder when, "with intent to cause

the death ofanother person, he causes the death ofsuch person," and the victim was killed "in

furtherance ofan act of terrorism," as defined in PL $ 490.05[1][b]. Under Article 490.05[] [b],

a person is guilty offirst-degree murder when they engage in activities that "involve a violent act

or acts dangerous to human life." that are intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population,

influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion. or aflect the conduct of

a unit of govemment by murder, assassination or kidnapping.'' Simitarly, a person is guilty of

second-degree murder as an act ofterrorism when he commits a specified offense (including

second-degree murder under PL $ 125.25[1]) that is intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian

population, influence the policy ofa unit ofgovernment by intimidation or coercion, or affect the

conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination or kidnapping." PL g a90.05[1][a].

The People asseft that they have established all three "intents," although they focus on

"intimidat[ing] or coerc[ing] a civilian population."{ Yet they also briefly argue that defendant

intended to influence or aflect the policy of a unit of govemment by intimidation or coercion

through his actions. There was insufficient evidence presented in the grandjury to support this

claim. There was no evidence presented that defendant made any demands of govemment or

sought any particular governmental policy change, let alone that he did so by intimidation or

coercion. See People v. Parker,231 NYS3d 276,282-83 (3d Dep't 2025) (hat the defendant was

motivated by animus toward law enforcement did not establish an attempt to influence any

government policy through his actions; defendant's statement about need for "change"

insullicient to establish an attempt to influence a policy as opposed to expressing anger); c/

People v. Jenner.39 AD3d 1083, 1086 (3d Dep't 2007) (evidence established that defendant

specifically intended to influence Department of Social Services policy). Indeed, as the federal

authorities noted, the defendant's goal appeared to be to draw the public's attention to what he

l They also assert that the defendant's terroristic intent can be "inferred from the defendant's acts alone." Given the

specific language and requirements ofthe stalute, the coufi is unpersuaded that is the case.

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perceived to be problems with the healthcare industry.5 The People place great emphasis on one

snatched phrase ("revolutionary anarchism") in defendant's writings to suggest that this satisfies

the statutory element of an intent to "influence the policy of a unit of govemment by intimidation

or coercion, or affect the conduct ofa unit ofgovernment by murder, assassination or

kidnapping."6 Not only does this stretch the import of a two-word phrase beyond what it can

carry, but it ignores other, more explicit excerpts from defendant's writings in which he states

that his goal is to spread a "message" and "win public support" about "every4hing wrong with our

health system." Therefore, the court finds that the People failed to establish an intent to

"influence" or "affect" government. This court will tbcus on the intent element that both sides

appear to emphasize - the intimidation or coercion of a civilian population.

The court r-lill note that the term "terrorism" has been lamousll dilficult to define.7 Our

Court ofAppeals has cautioned against expanding the definition ofterrorism beyond what the

Legislature intended. The concept ofterrorism has a "unique meaning," and its implications "risk

being trivialized if the terminology is applied loosely in situations that do not match our

collective understanding ofwhat constitutes a terrorist act." Morales,2O NY3d at249.The

legislature incorporated a "general definition ofthe crime," and ret-erenced "seven notorious acts

of terrorism that serve as guideposts for determining whether a future incident qualifies for this

nefarious design ation." ld.

As noted above, those "notorious acts" include the massive death and destruction of

September 11, the 1998 bombings of American embassies, the 1995 destruction ofthe federal

5

See U.S. Attomey's Office, Southern District ofNew York, Press Release, Dec. 19,2024, Luigi Mqngione

Chargedwith the Stalking and Murder of UnitedHeolthcare CEO Brian Thompson and Use oJ a Silencer in a Crime

ofViolence.

6ln his notebook, defendant cornpared himself to Ted Kaczynski, the "Unabomber."

stating that Kaczl.nski had

"indiscriminately" mailbombed "innocents," thus crossing the line "from revolutionary anarchist to terrorist - the

worst thing a person can be." The People's suggestion that this single sentence established that the deferdant

intended to influence governmental policy or "affect the conduct ofa unit ofgoyemment" is not persuasive. Ses

Exhibit A, People's Affirnlation in Response.

' The search fbr a definition of terrorism has been compared to the quest for the Holy Grail.

^See Perry, The

Numerous Federal Legal Definitions ofTerrorism: The Problem ofToo Many Grails, 30 J. Legis. 249 (2OO4):

Levitt, Is "Terrorisnt" l(orth Defning?, l3 Ohio NU L. Rev. 97 (1986). Some resort to Justice Stewart's comment

on obscenity, "l know it when I see it." See Perry, 30 J. Legis. at 250 n.8.

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office building in Oklahoma, and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. PL g 490.00. See

Parker,23l NYS3d at 282 n.2 (the inclusion ofthese distinct acts ofterrorism underscore the

Legislature's understanding of the egregious nature of the conduct that constitutes terrorism).

In Morales, the defendant was a street gang member operating in a particular area ofthe

Bronx. At a christening party, the defendant fired five shots at one ofhis rivals, who was

parulyzed; the shots also killed a l0-year-old gir[. The prosecution argued that there was

sufficient evidence ofterrorism because the defendant intended to intimidate or coerce other

Mexican-American gangs, and by inference, all Mexican-Americans in the geographical area.

The Appellate Division dismissed the terrorism convictions, finding that there was no intent

shown to "intimidate or coerce" the Mexican-American population residing in that particular area

of the Bronx. People v. Morales, S6 AD3d 147 , 154 ( I st Dep't 201 1). The court also fbund that

members of other Mexican-American gangs in that area of the Bronx did not qualif! as a

"civilian population" under the statute, finding that the context of the statute weighed against

"stretching the meaning ofthe language to cover such a narrowly defined subcategory of

individuals." ld. at 156. Examining the legislative findings and the examples of terrorism listed,

it was "clear" that the Legislature "intended to address extraordinary criminal acts perpetrated for

the purpose of intimidating a broad range ofpeople, not a narrowly defined group ofparticular

individuals." 1d The court noted that it was not minimizing the "heinous nature of the criminal

conduct" or the "stark tragedy of its consequences," but the conduct did not fall within the

definition of terrorism. Id. at 16l.

The Court of Appeals afllrmed the Appellate Division's dismissal of the terrorism

convictions and ordered a new trial on the remaining counts. The Court noted that the statute did

not define the phrase "intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population," but stated that it

should be given its "most natural and obvious meaning," based on "common sense and

reasonableness" in the context ofthe "purpose and history ofthe terrorism statutes." Id. at247.

"Civilian population" could be read "broadly" to encompass a variety of communities depending

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on how "area" is defined and "who lives within that territory."8 The Court found it unnecessary

to "precisely define" the term "civilian population," but it concluded that "even if' all Mexican-

Americans living in a particular area could be considered a "civilian population," the evidence

did not demonstrate that the defendant committed his "discrete" act "with the conscious objective

of intimidating every Mexican-American in the territory identified al lrial." Id.

Moreover, the Court found that there was no indication that the legislature enacted article

490 r,r,ith the intent to ''elevat[e] gang-on-gang street violence to the status ofterrorism as that

concept is commonly understood." -[d at 248. "The statute cannot be interpreted so broadly so as

to cover individuals or groups who are not normally viewed as 'terrorists. "' 1d The Court further

stated that the legislature clearly did not intend to extend the reach ofthe statute to this type of

crime, and this was "apparent" by looking to the examples of terrorism cited in the statute. The

crimes committed by the defendant "obviously [were] not comparable" to those terroristic acts.

Id.

As in Morales, the question presented here is whether defendant's act, no matter how

heinous, fits within the definition ofterrorism as set forth in the statute and as illuminated by

legislative intent. This couft does not believe that the legislature intended the employees ofa

company, however large, to constitute a "civilian population" within the meaning ofthe statute.

Giving the phrase its "natural and obvious meaning," based on "common sense and

reasonableness," it is clear that the term encompasses inhabitants ofa particular area, or at least a

group ofinhabitants of a particular race or class living in a particular area. See Morales,20 NY3d

at 247 (term can encompass a variety of communities depending on how "area" is defined and

"who /ive.s within that tenitory") (emphasis added); see also Morales,86 AD3d at 156-57 (the

term and legislative history ofstatute implies an intention to create a "pervasively terrorizing

effect on people living in a given area"; cannot stretch meaning of statute to cover a "narrowly

defined subcategory of individuals"); Muhommad v. Commonwealth. 269 Y a. 451, 499 (2005)

("population at large" requires a "more pervasive intimidation of the community rather than a

3

The Court noted the dictionary definition of 'population" as the "total number of inhabitants constituting a

particular race, class, or group in a specified area." or a "particular section, group or type ofpeople. . . living in an

area or country, or "a body of persons having some quality or characteristic in common and usulally] thought of as

occupying a particular area." ld. at 24'7 n.l.

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narrowly defined group of people").'

Moreover, as in Moroles, even if this court were to find the employees of one company to

constitute a "civilian population," there was no evidence presented that defendant's conscious

objectite or intent was to intimidate or coerce the employees of United Healthcare. The People

point to defendant's joumal entries found in his backpack as evidence ofterroristic intent. But

those writings ultimately do not aid the People's argument. The defendant's apparent objective,

as stated in his writings, was not to threaten, intimidate, or coerce, but rather, to draw attention to

what he perceived as the greed ofthe insurance industry ("members ofthe public can focus on

greed"), and, as an additional possible consequence, to negatively affect the financials ofthe

company. The defendant emphasized that he wished to spread a "message" and "win public

support" about "every.thing wrong with our health system." The def'endant explicitly

contrasted himself with Ted Kaczynski, the "Unabomber," because he "indiscriminately mail

bomb[ed] innocents," and "cross[ed] the line ... to terrorist, the worst thing a person can be."

Exhibit A to People's Affirmation in Response to Defendant's Omnibus Motion. While

defendant's own characterization olhis conduct is olcourse not dispositive, where there is no

other evidence ofterroristic intent, the writings fail to supply that evidence, contrary to the

People's characterization. The People presented sufficient evidence that the defendant murdered

Brian Thompson in a premeditated and calculated execution. That does not mean, however, that

the delendant did so with terroristic intent.

Notably, the federal authorities, while recognizing that Brian Thompson was "gunned

down in cold blood," did not charge the defendant with crimes ofterror, but with using a firearm

to commit murder and related crimes, even though the federal terrorism statute served as a model

tbr the state statute. Regarding defendant's intent, the Acting United States Attomey for the

Southem District stated that defendant's goal was a "grossly misguided attempt to broadcast [his]

views across the country." The Assistant Director of the FBI stated that the det'endant committed

murder to "incite national debates" and that he deemed murder an "appropriate recourse to satiate

u

And see Hurubie Meko. In C.E.O. Murder Cue, o Test of New York's Antitarroisnr laws, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26,

2024, at Al (former appellate judge James M. Mccuire quoted as stating that it was difficult to conclude that the

Legislature intended "civilian population" to "encompass persons working for health insurers who make coverage

decisions").

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personal grievances." &e U.S. Attomey's Office, Southem District of New York, Press Release,

Dec. 19, 2024, Luigi Mangione Charged wilh the Stalking and Murder of UnitedHeolthcare

CEO Brian Thompson and Use of a Silencer in a Crime of Violence.

The People suggest that the element of intimidation and coercion can be met because

some UHC employees felt fearful after the murder, and some UHC employees received threats.

But putting aside that some employees received threats even before the murder (one so serious

that investigators traveled to another state to investigate), and every murder has the potential to

induce some degree of fear - for example, a random murder in the subway will cause riders to

feel fearful about riding the subway - that I'ails to establish that this was the deflendant's intent, or

that the conduct fits within the statutory definition of terrorism.

Using the "guideposts" ofthe seven examples, as directed by Morales,20 NY3d at 249,

defendant's crime. as in Morqles, is similarly not "comparable" to the examples listed in the

statute. There was no evidence presented of a desire to terrorize the public, inspire widespread

fear, engage in a broader campaign ofviolence, or to conspire with organized terrorist groups.

Here, the crime - the heinous, but targeted and discrete killing ofone person -- is very different

tiom the examples ofterrorism set forth in the statute. The examples cited in the statute share the

characteristic of indiscrintinate killing which produce 1'ear and terror - whether tkough bombing,

or through the indiscriminate shooting of multiple victims. The indiscriminate nature of the

shooting or bombing strikes "terror" into the population and induces a f'ear not to engage in daily

activities for fear ofviolence. As the legislative findings note, terrorism "disrupts public order

and threatens individual safety." PL $ 490.00. The concept ofterrorism has a "unique meaning"

that "risk[s] being trivialized if the terminology is apptied loosely in situations that do not match

our collective understanding ofwhat constitutes a terrorist act." Morales,20 NY3d at 249.

This court need not reach the issue ofwhether the statute encompasses an act that only

involves a single victim, but the court will note that the People's reliance on two ofthe examples

set forth in the statute, the Empire State shooting and the Ari Halberstam killing on the Brooklyn

Bridge, as incidents that encompassed only one victim, is misplaced. Those incidents were very

different than those presented here. In the 1997 shooting at the Empire State building, the

gunman, who expressed his desire for revenge for the treatment ofPalestinians, opened fire with

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a semi-automatic weapon on the observation deck, kitling one person and wounding six others.r0

In the 1994 Ari Halberstam shooting, the gunman, motivated by a desire to retaliate against Jews,

fired "shot after shot" into a van of Orthodox Jewish students, killing one and injuring three

others.rr The defendant's targeted killing ofone individual - although abhorrent and despicable -

is not "comparable."r2 See Morales,20 NY3d at 248.

While there is no doubt that the crime at issue here is not ordinary "street crime," it does

not follow that all non-street crimes were meant to be included within the reach ofthe tenorism

statute. While the People place great emphasis on defendant's "ideological" motive, there is no

indication in the statute that a murder committed for ideological reasons (in this case, the

defendant's apparent desire to draw attention to what he perceived as inequities or greed within

the American health care system), fits within the definition of terrorism. without establishing the

necessary element ofan intent to intimidate or coerce. The court agrees with the defendant that

the People appear to conflate an ideological belief with the intent to intimidate or coerce a

civilian population. While the defendant was clearly expressing an animus toward UHC, and the

health care industry generally, it does not lollow that his goal was to "intimidate and coerce a

civilian population," and indeed, there was no evidence presented ofsuch a goal. As the Third

Department recently held, "we look to the acts ofviolence in this case within the guideposts of

the specific acts ofterrorism referenced in the statute," and through lhat "lens," the court

declined to "loosely interpret" the defendant's conduct in that case as fitting within the statute.

Parker,23l NYS3d at 283. As in Parker, I do not sanction the defendant's heinous conduct, but

it does not "compo( with our current understanding of tenorism." ld.; see also Morales,20

NY3d at 249.Here, the evidence presented failed to establish that the defendant committed the

crime to coerce or intimidate a civilian population, or to influence or af'fect the policy of a unit of

govemment, and therefore, the first two counts of the indictment are dismissed. The remaining

r0

See Matthew Purdy, Enpire Slok Aunmdn's Note: Kill 'Zionists, ' N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1997. at A | .

rr

See Shaila Dewan, L/.5. Decides '91 Attqck on Hasidim Was Lone Act, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2000, at 89.

E Note

that the prosecutor for Grand Traverse County, Michigan, chose to indict a defendant who stabbed I I people

at a Walmart for terrorism, because his intent was to "bring fear and destruction to a community as a whole, rather

than to harm specific individuals." Man Fqces Terrorism Charge in Moss Stabhing ot a Michigdn llalmart,N.Y.

Times, July 27, 2025.

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counts of the indictment, including murder in the second degree, are legally sufficient.

Defendant's Claimed Double Jeopardl, Violation and Request for a Stay

Defendant argues that concurrent state and federal prosecutions violate the double

jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution and CPL $ 40.20, barring prosecution for two

offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction. However, as the United States Supreme

Court has held, "where there are two sovereigns, there are two laws, and two offenses." Gamble

v. United States,587 US 678,683 (2019). A crime "against two sovereigns constitutes two

offenses because each sovereign has an interest to vindicate." Id. at 687. Thus, there is no double

jeopardy violation.

While it is true that CPL $ 40.20 grants greater protection than that of the state or federal

constitution, that bar is triggered only when a prior prosecution ends in a conviction by guilty

plea, or once ajury has been swom. CPL S 40.30 (1). Therefore, because neither event has

occurred, defendant's motion is premature.

Defendant nonetheless argues that he is prejudiced by concurrent proceedings, because he

will be forced to litigate a federal case in which he faces the death penalty while the state case is

proceeding to trial, and that testifying in the state case may prejudice him during his federal trial,

thus implicating his rights to defend himself and against self-incrimination. Defendant suggests

that the federal case should proceed tirst, even though the federal and state authorities have

agreed that the state case should proceed to trial first.

This court is not persuaded that proceeding to trial in the state case lirst will cause the

defendant severe prejudice, and the defendant's claim that any state trial testimony will prejudice

his federal trial is merely speculative. See Curier y. Virginia,585 US 493, 503 (2018).

Moreover, defendant cites to no case law or authority that would permit such a protracted

adjoumment (as even delendant concedes that the federal case will take "several years" before

trial). The court is also confident that counsel will have the capability to manage an

approximately two-month state trial during the pendency of the "several years" before the federal

case proceeds to trial. Defendant's request to stay the state proceedings is denied.

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Summary

Counts 1 and 2, charging defendant with Murder in the First Degree (in furtherance ofan

act of terrorism) and Murder in the Second Degree as a Crime of Terrorism, are dismissed as

legally insufficient. The People presented legally sufficient evidence ofall other counts,

including Murder in the Second Degree (intentional). Thus, the motion to dismiss is denied in all

other respects, as is the motion to stay the proceedings.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: Septemb er 16,2025

Carro

.ludge ol the Court of Claims

Acting Justice, Suprerne Court

r$H.GnsmmtcAnao

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