The opinion
2025 IL 131039
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 131039)
CHRISTOPHER BITNER et al., Appellants, v. THE CITY OF PEKIN, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 18, 2025.
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Rochford,
and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 At issue in this appeal is whether section 1(b) of the Illinois Public Employee
Disability Act (Disability Act) (5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2018)) prohibits a public
employer from withholding employment taxes from payments made to an injured
employee under that provision. The appellate court concluded that it does not. 2024
IL App (4th) 230718. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The plaintiffs, Christopher Bitner and John Brooks, were injured in the line of
duty in separate incidents while working as police officers for the defendant, the
City of Pekin. Following their injuries, both Bitner and Brooks received payments
from the defendant pursuant to section 1(b) of the Disability Act (5 ILCS 345/1(b)
(West 2018)). That provision states:
“Whenever an eligible employee suffers any injury in the line of duty which
causes him to be unable to perform his duties, he shall continue to be paid by
the employing public entity on the same basis as he was paid before the injury,
with no deduction from his sick leave credits, compensatory time for overtime
accumulations or vacation, or service credits in a public employee pension fund
during the time he is unable to perform his duties due to the result of the injury,
but not longer than one year in relation to the same injury.” Id.
¶4 During the time the plaintiffs were injured and unable to perform their duties,
the defendant continued to pay the plaintiffs’ salaries in the same manner it did
before the injuries occurred. This meant that the defendant continued to withhold
the plaintiffs’ employment taxes, including federal and state income taxes, Social
Security taxes, and Medicare taxes.
¶5 On November 13, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a two-count, class-action complaint
against the defendant in the circuit court of Tazewell County on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated employees of the defendant. 1 Count I of the
complaint alleged that the defendant violated the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2018)) when it withheld
employment taxes from the payments made to the plaintiffs under section 1(b) of
1
Each of the complaints filed by the plaintiffs in the circuit court was styled as a class
action. However, the plaintiffs never sought to certify the class at any point, and the circuit
court never made any rulings with respect to the issue of class certification. We therefore
treat this case as a lawsuit brought solely by the individual plaintiffs, Bitner and Brooks.
-2-
the Disability Act. Count II alleged that the defendant improperly required the
plaintiffs to use previously accrued sick, vacation, or compensatory time while they
were injured and off duty and that this action also violated the Wage Act.
¶6 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, finding that relief was
unavailable under the Wage Act because the payments received by the plaintiffs
under section 1(b) of the Disability Act did not qualify as wages or compensation
within the meaning of the Wage Act. The plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended
complaint, which again alleged violations of the Wage Act. That complaint was
also dismissed.
¶7 On September 4, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. In that
complaint, which is the subject of this appeal, the plaintiffs removed all references
to the Wage Act. Instead, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment (see 735
ILCS 5/2-701 (West 2018)) that the defendant violated section 1(b) of the Disability
Act when it withheld employment taxes from the plaintiffs’ disability payments and
deducted from the plaintiffs’ accrued sick, vacation, or compensatory time.
¶8 The defendant filed an answer to the second amended complaint in which it
admitted that it withheld employment taxes from the plaintiffs’ Disability Act
payments but denied that it required the plaintiffs to use any of their accrued sick,
vacation, or compensatory time while they were injured and off duty. The defendant
also raised two affirmative defenses related specifically to Bitner. First, the
defendant argued that Bitner was subject to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement and that he had failed to exhaust his contractual remedies under the
agreement’s grievance procedure before filing his complaint. Second, the defendant
argued that claims brought under the Disability Act fall within the five-year statute
of limitations set forth in section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
13/205 (West 2018)), which applies to “all civil actions not otherwise provided
for.” The defendant noted that Bitner was injured in 2011 and had missed short
periods of work over the following several years. The defendant maintained that
any of Bitner’s claims that accrued before November 2013, or five years before his
initial complaint was filed, were untimely.
¶9 In April 2023, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in which they
maintained they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their claims that
the defendant violated section 1(b) of the Disability Act. Attached to the motion
-3-
were supporting affidavits from both Bitner and Brooks. In his affidavit, Bitner
stated that he was injured on the job in 2011 and that he was unable to work 112
hours in 2011, 40 hours in 2012, 40 hours in 2013, and 20.67 hours in 2017. Bitner
also stated that the defendant withheld $1,105.45 in employment taxes from the
payments made to him while he was injured and off work and that the defendant’s
“mandated use of vacation and compensatory time totaled $2,160.38.”
¶ 10 Brooks stated in his affidavit that he was injured on the job in 2016 and that he
was unable to work 80 hours. He also stated that the defendant withheld $767.20 in
employment taxes. Brooks did not state that the defendant deducted any of his sick,
vacation, or compensatory time. 2
¶ 11 In their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that section 1(b) of
the Disability Act prohibits the withholding of employment taxes and, in support,
pointed primarily to federal law. The plaintiffs noted that, under section 104(a)(1)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (2018)), amounts
received as compensation for personal injuries or sickness under workers’
compensation acts do not constitute gross income. The plaintiffs acknowledged that
the Disability Act is not a workers’ compensation act but noted that, under federal
regulations, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) excludes from gross income
payments received under statutes that are “in the nature of” workers’ compensation
acts. See 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(a)(2)-1(d)(1) (2017). According to the plaintiffs, the
Disability Act was “in the nature of” a workers’ compensation act and, therefore, it
followed that payments received under section 1(b) are not income subject to
federal withholding.
¶ 12 In their motion, the plaintiffs did not cite any IRS ruling that holds specifically
that payments received under section 1(b) of the Disability Act are excluded from
gross income. Nor did the plaintiffs identify any federal law or regulation that
prohibits public employers from withholding employment taxes from disability
payments made under section 1(b). Nevertheless, the plaintiffs maintained that, to
be consistent with federal law, section 1(b) had to be read as prohibiting the
withholding of employment taxes and that section 1(b)’s requirement that injured
Following the submission of Brooks’s affidavit, only Bitner pursued the claim that the
2
defendant improperly deducted sick, vacation, or compensatory time.
-4-
employees be paid “on the same basis” as they were before being injured had to
mean that the employees receive their pay without any withholding.
¶ 13 Bitner also asserted in the motion for summary judgment that it was undisputed
that the defendant deducted from his accrued sick, vacation, or compensatory time.
Further, according to Bitner, he was not obligated to follow the grievance procedure
in his collective bargaining agreement because the dispute in this case centered on
the meaning and application of section 1(b), not the agreement. Finally, Bitner
argued that the relevant statute of limitations was the 10-year statute of limitations
for claims on written contracts set forth in section 13-206 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-206 (West 2018)). Bitner maintained that this was so
because the defendant breached the collective bargaining agreement when it failed
to comply with section 1(b) of the Disability Act.
¶ 14 The defendant filed a response to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In these documents, the defendant
argued that there is nothing in the plain language of section 1(b) that prohibits the
withholding of employment taxes from disability payments. The defendant further
argued that the phrase “on the same basis” in section 1(b) simply means that the
injured employee continues to be paid and employment taxes continue to be
withheld, just as they were before the disabling injury occurred.
¶ 15 The defendant also raised an additional argument regarding the plaintiffs’
ability to recover any amounts withheld by the defendant. The defendant
maintained that, even if it wrongfully withheld employment taxes in violation of
section 1(b), the plaintiffs’ sole remedy was to seek a refund of the improperly
withheld taxes from the IRS. The defendant noted that, under section 7422(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (2018)), no suit or
proceeding can be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue
tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until a claim
for refund or credit has been duly filed. In this case, the plaintiffs never sought a
refund from the IRS, and thus, according to the defendant, the plaintiffs were barred
from seeking relief from the defendant.
¶ 16 The defendant also repeated the arguments that Bitner’s claims failed because
he did not file a grievance as required by the collective bargaining agreement and
that the applicable statute of limitations was 5 years, not 10. Finally, the defendant
-5-
submitted an affidavit from John V. Dossey, the defendant’s chief of police. In that
affidavit, Dossey averred that “[the defendant] has no record that any employee or
officer of the city notified or instructed Bitner that his time off for his duty related
injury would be deducted from his accrued vacation, sick, or compensatory time.”
¶ 17 On July 13, 2023, the circuit court held a brief hearing on the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
instructed the attorneys to draft orders and then stated that it would “enter the order
which I think is most appropriate.” Thereafter, the circuit court adopted the
plaintiffs’ proposed order, granting them summary judgment on July 20, 2023.
¶ 18 In its order, the circuit court concluded that section 1(b) of the Disability Act
prohibits a public employer from withholding employment taxes. The court found
that, under federal law, payments made under section 1(b) “are not income subject
to withholding.” The circuit court then concluded that section 1(b)’s requirement
that an injured employee be paid “on the same basis” as he was before the injury
meant that he must receive his “gross pay” because “[c]ommon sense so dictates.”
¶ 19 Without making any reference to Dossey’s affidavit, the circuit court also found
that the defendant had “concede[d]” it should not have deducted Bitner’s vacation
or compensatory time. The circuit court further concluded that Bitner was not
required to file a grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement because
“[t]he issue at hand is not a dispute involving the meaning, interpretation, or
application” of the collective bargaining agreement but “[i]t is a dispute as to the
meaning, interpretation and application of [the Disability Act]—a state statute.”
The circuit court then went on, however, to deem Bitner’s action a breach of
contract claim, subject to the 10-year statute of limitations, because the defendant
failed to comply with the collective bargaining agreement when it violated section
1(b) of the Disability Act. The court therefore concluded that none of Bitner’s
claims were untimely.
¶ 20 Finally, the circuit court found that any amounts withheld by the defendant were
not taxes, even if the defendant had treated them as such and had remitted those
amounts to the IRS. Thus, according to the court, the plaintiffs were not required to
seek a refund or recovery from the IRS. The circuit court entered judgment for
Bitner in the amount of $3,211.92 and for Brooks in the amount of $767.20. The
court also awarded the plaintiffs prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees.
-6-
¶ 21 On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit
court. 2024 IL App (4th) 230718, ¶ 2. The appellate court noted that section 1(b)
specifically prohibits public employers from deducting sick, vacation, and
compensatory time but that the statute says nothing about taxes and nothing about
prohibiting the withholding of employment taxes. Id. ¶ 18. The appellate court also
rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on various federal laws and regulations, stating that
it would be improper for the court to refer to those authorities, because doing so
would require the court to go outside the text of section 1(b) in order to interpret it.
Id. ¶ 19. The appellate court determined that, based on the plain language of the
statute, section 1(b) does not prohibit the withholding of employment taxes. Id.
Based on this reading of section 1(b), the appellate court concluded that the circuit
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim
that the defendant improperly withheld employment taxes. Id. ¶ 20. Because the
appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court on this basis, the appellate
court did not reach the defendant’s additional argument that, even if its withholding
of employment taxes violated section 1(b), the plaintiffs’ only remedy was to seek
a refund of the improperly withheld taxes from the IRS.
¶ 22 With respect to the applicable statute of limitations, the appellate court noted
the “dissonance” between, on the one hand, Bitner’s claim that he was not required
to file a grievance because the issue in this case concerned the meaning of a statute
and, on the other hand, his claim that the 10-year statute of limitations for breach
of contracts applied because the defendant violated the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. ¶ 24. The appellate court observed that these positions could not
both be true and held that, because this case centered on the meaning and
application of section 1(b), the five-year statute of limitations contained in section
13-205 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2018)) applied. 2024 IL App (4th)
230718, ¶ 25. Because this case did not involve a breach of contract claim under
the collective bargaining agreement, the appellate court also concluded that Bitner
was not required to file a grievance. Id.
¶ 23 Lastly, the appellate court found there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the defendant deducted any of Bitner’s sick, vacation, or compensatory
time because Bitner’s and Dossey’s affidavits gave conflicting accounts on the
question. Id. ¶ 28. Accordingly, the appellate court held that the circuit court erred
-7-
in granting summary judgment in favor of Bitner on his claim and remanded the
cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 29-31.
¶ 24 We granted the plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff.
Dec. 7, 2023). We allowed the Illinois Municipal League to file an amicus curiae
brief in support of the defendant’s position. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
¶ 25 ANALYSIS
¶ 26 Before this court, the plaintiffs do not challenge the appellate court’s conclusion
that the five-year statute of limitations applies to their claims. Nor does Bitner
contest the appellate court’s holding that there is a disputed question of material
fact as to whether the defendant deducted any of Bitner’s sick, vacation, or
compensatory time. Instead, in this appeal, the plaintiffs argue only that the
appellate court erred in its interpretation of section 1(b).
¶ 27 The plaintiffs point to a general statement, taken from Gibbs v. Madison County
Sheriff’s Department, 326 Ill. App. 3d 473, 477 (2001), that section 1(b) provides
for the “continuation of full pay.” The plaintiffs then contend that the phrase “full
pay”—which does not appear in section 1(b)—is ambiguous. According to the
plaintiffs, “full pay” could mean one of three different things: gross pay (the same
pay the employee received while working, but with no withholding or deductions
of any sort); net pay (the same pay the employee received while working, with the
same withholding and deductions); or what the plaintiffs refer to as “gross pay less
required deductions” (where “required deductions” refers to such things as union
dues, pension contributions, and insurance premiums, but not the withholding of
employment taxes). The plaintiffs maintain the phrase “full pay” means “gross pay
minus required deductions” and, therefore, that the defendant violated section 1(b)
when it withheld employment taxes. We disagree.
¶ 28 Determining the meaning of section 1(b) presents an issue of statutory
construction. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature. Mercado v. S&C Electric Co., 2025 IL 129526,
¶ 20. “When determining legislative intent, the starting point always is the language
of the statute, which is the most reliable indicator of the legislature’s objectives in
enacting the particular law.” In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 419 (2001). We therefore
-8-
begin our analysis not with the term “full pay,” which appears nowhere in section
1(b), but with the language of the statute itself.
¶ 29 Section 1(b) states, in relevant part, that an eligible employee who has suffered
an injury in the line of duty that renders him unable to perform his duties “shall
continue to be paid by the employing public entity on the same basis as he was paid
before the injury, with no deduction from his sick leave credits, compensatory time
for overtime accumulations or vacation.” 5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2018). The phrase
“on the same basis” clearly means that an injured employee is to be paid from the
regular payroll in the same manner as if the employee was on duty and in active
service. Thus, if a public employer withheld employment taxes from an employee’s
pay before an injury, it may continue to do so after the injury in order to maintain
payment “on the same basis” as before the injury.
¶ 30 Moreover, section 1(b) expressly prohibits public employers from deducting
sick leave credits, compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation, or
service credits in a public employee pension fund. Yet, the statute says nothing
about prohibiting the withholding of employment taxes. Under the maxim of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
any another), section 1(b)’s listing of particular prohibitions is an implied exclusion
of all others. See Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 17.
Accordingly, nothing in the plain language of the statute prohibits public employers
from withholding employment taxes from disability payments made under section
1(b).
¶ 31 The plaintiffs maintain, however, that the statute cannot be read as allowing the
withholding of employment taxes. Citing In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 230 (2003),
the plaintiffs note that a court is not bound by the literal language of a statute when
that language “yields absurd or unjust consequences not contemplated by the
legislature.” The plaintiffs contend that is the case here.
¶ 32 The plaintiffs again argue that any payments received under section 1(b) are not
subject to federal income tax. The plaintiffs maintain that, if withholding is allowed,
“the injured employee would lose out on an amount equivalent to the employment
tax withholdings,” even though section 1(b) payments are tax exempt. The plaintiffs
contend that the legislature’s purpose in enacting section 1(b) was “to create a
benefit that provides full pay” and that “the legislature could not have intended to
-9-
allow a public employer to withhold a portion of the benefits from an injured
employee without reason.” Thus, the plaintiffs argue that section 1(b) must be read
as prohibiting the withholding of employment taxes. Here, too, we disagree.
¶ 33 As in the circuit court, the plaintiffs in this court have not pointed to any IRS
ruling specifically establishing that payments under section 1(b) are exempt from
federal income tax. Nor have the plaintiffs identified any federal law or regulation
that prohibits public employers from withholding employment taxes from section
1(b) payments. Even assuming, however, that the plaintiffs are correct and that
section 1(b) payments are not subject to federal income tax, that does not mean that
an injured employee is wrongfully denied amounts owed to him when the employer
withholds employment taxes. Instead, it simply means that the employee must seek
a refund from the IRS or adjust his tax withholding by submitting a new W-4
withholding form to his employer.
¶ 34 At its root, then, the plaintiffs’ complaint is not about failing to receive amounts
owed but, rather, about how section 1(b)’s payments are administered. Requiring
public employers to determine when employment taxes should and should not be
withheld from section 1(b) payments can create an administrative burden on the
employer, particularly in cases where the employee is on repeated, short periods of
leave and switching back and forth between being on and off active duty. Section
1(b) eases that burden by allowing the public employer to simply continue the
payments made to the employee in the same way they were made before the injury
occurred. This makes the employee’s tax liability his own responsibility and leaves
the taxation question a matter to be determined between the employee and the IRS.
That may not be the plaintiffs’ preferred policy choice, but it is not an absurd result.
Notably, other states have similar payment schemes. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 41, § 111F (2018) (“All amounts payable under this section shall be paid at the
same times and in the same manner as, and for all purposes shall be deemed to be,
the regular compensation of such police officer or fire fighter.”); N.C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 143-166.15 (West 2018) (“All payments of salary shall be made at the same
time and in the same manner as other salaries are paid to other persons in the same
department.”).
¶ 35 Section 1(b) unambiguously does not prohibit a public employer from
withholding employment taxes from payments made to an injured employee under
- 10 -
that provision. Thus, the defendant did not violate section 1(b) when it continued
to withhold employment taxes from the plaintiffs’ disability payments on the same
basis as before the plaintiffs were injured. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate
court’s judgment reversing the circuit court’s judgment that the defendant
unlawfully withheld employment taxes.
¶ 36 CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court
reversing the judgment of the circuit court. We remand this matter to the circuit
court with directions to enter summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiffs’
claim that the defendant unlawfully withheld employment taxes and for further
proceedings on Bitner’s claim that the defendant improperly deducted sick,
vacation, or compensatory time.
¶ 38 Appellate court judgment affirmed.
¶ 39 Circuit court judgment reversed.
¶ 40 Cause remanded with directions.
- 11 -