The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM TIERNO, :
Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-790
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
PA PAROLE BOARD, et al., :
Respondents :
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 to challenge a denial of parole. The petition
will be dismissed and a certificate of appealability will not issue.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, William Tierno, is incarcerated in Pine Grove State
Correctional Institution (“SCI-Pine Grove”) pursuant to a criminal conviction
in the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas. He brings the instant case
under 28 U.S.C. §2254 to challenge the denial of his parole in 2024 by the
Pennsylvania Parole Board. (Doc. 1). Tierno asserts that the denial of parole
violated his constitutional right to due process and violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United States Constitution. (Id.)
Respondents responded to the petition on July 3, 2024. (Doc. 11).
Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed both because
Tierno failed to exhaust state court remedies and because he has not alleged
any nonconclusory facts showing that he is entitled to relief and therefore
fails to state a prima facie claim for habeas corpus relief. (Id.) Tierno filed a
reply brief on August 26, 2024, making the petition ripe for review. (Doc. 14).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A challenge to the denial of parole is cognizable under Section 2254.
Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001). However, a federal
district court may not grant parole or determine parole eligibility. Billiteri v.
U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976). “The only remedy which
the court can give is to order the Board to correct the abuses or wrongful
conduct within a fixed period of time, after which, in the case of non-
compliance, the court can grant the writ of habeas corpus and order the
prisoner discharged from custody.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
“[T]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to
be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” nor has
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created such a right. Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Thus, because
the denial of parole “does not implicate any constitutionally [or state]
protected liberty interest,” the scope of federal judicial review of state parole
denials is limited. Diehl-Armstrong v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 13-CV-
2302, 2014 WL 1871509, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2014). The federal court is
confined to reviewing the substance of the state parole decision to determine
whether the Parole Board exercised its authority in an arbitrary and
capricious, or constitutionally impermissible manner. Block v. Potter, 631
F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980).
To show a violation of substantive due process, a habeas petitioner
must demonstrate that: (1) he was arbitrarily denied parole due to
impermissible reasons such as race, religion, or political beliefs, and/or (2)
the Parole Board failed to apply appropriate, rational criteria in reaching its
determination to deny parole. Id. “However, federal courts are not authorized
by the due process clause to second-guess parole boards and the
requirements of substantive due process are met if there is some basis for
the challenged decision.” Coady, 251 F.3d at 487. The “relevant level of
arbitrariness required to find a substantive due process violation involves not
merely action that is unreasonable, but, rather, something more egregious,
which we have termed at times ‘conscience shocking’ or ‘deliberately
indifferent.’” Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this case, Tierno asserts that the denial of his application for parole
violated his right to due process and constituted a violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause. (Doc. 1). Respondents contend the petition should be
dismissed for failure to exhaust and failure to state a prima facie claim for
habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 11).
At the outset, the court finds respondents’ exhaustion argument
unavailing. This court recently rejected an essentially identical argument for
failure to exhaust state court remedies in Mathis v. Rivello, No. 3:23-CV-225,
2025 WL 524301, at *7-8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2025) (Mannion, J.). In Mathis,
the court held that Defoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 2005),
remains good law and compels the conclusion that habeas petitioners
challenging the denial of parole are not required to exhaust remedies through
Pennsylvania state courts before they may file in federal court. Mathis, 2025
WL 524301, at *8. The court does not see any sound basis to reach a
contrary conclusion in this case and accordingly holds that dismissal of
Tierno’s petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies is not warranted.
Turning to the merits, respondents argue the petition should be
dismissed because it does not assert any nonconclusory factual allegations
to show that Tierno’s continued detention violates federal law. (Doc. 11).
The court agrees. A petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 must “state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(c)(2),
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Following 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A petition
is subject to dismissal without an evidentiary hearing if it offers nothing more
than “bald assertions” and “conclusory allegations.” Palmer v. Hendricks,
592 F.3d 386, 395 (3d. Cir. 2010) (quoting Campbell v. Burris, 515 F.3d 172,
184 (3d Cir. 2008)). The petition must present a prima facie claim for habeas
corpus relief by making “sufficient ‘factual allegations, which, if true, would
entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.’” Id. at 392 (quoting Schiro v.
Landigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). “[C]ourts are not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. at 395 (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
In his petition and supporting brief, Tierno makes several conclusory
assertions of violations of his constitutional rights. (See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 5
(“The Pa. Parole Board rendered a parole decision denying Petitioner parole
that is arbitrary, capricious, and violative of due process guarantees due to
Parole Board did not consider Petitioner’s parole application in accordance
with articulated statutory standards.”); id. at 6 (“The Pa Parole Board
retroactively applied sentence and parole statutes & guidelines that were not
in effect at the time of Petitioner’s crimes & sentencing.”)); see also, e.g.,
Doc. 2 at 6-17 (advancing numerous additional conclusory statements of
constitutional violations). But Tierno simply fails to allege any facts in support
of his claims. Although Tierno argues in his reply brief that he has stated
sufficient facts in his petition, (see Doc. 14 at 9-10), he fails to state what
those facts are or cite where in the petition they may be found. Instead,
Tierno argues he should be granted relief because respondents have not
“rebutted” or “refuted” his claims. (Id. at 13). But because Tierno has not
presented a prima facie claim for relief, there is no claim for respondents to
rebut. Thus, the petition will be dismissed because it does not state a prima
facie claim for habeas corpus relief. See Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393-95.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss the petition for writ of
habeas corpus. A certificate of appealability will not issue because no
reasonable jurist would disagree with this ruling or conclude that the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Buck
v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
336 (2003)). An appropriate order shall issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
Malachy E. Mannion
United States District Judge
Dated: September 17, 2025
24-790-01