The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOE BILLIPS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-04003-GCS
)
PERCY MYERS, )
CHRISTINE BROWN, )
and BOB BLUM, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
Pending before the Court are Defendant Percy Myers’s (“Myers”) and Defendant
Bob Blum’s (“Blum”) motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, (Doc. 43, 44), and Defendant Christine Brown’s (“Brown”)
motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(Doc. 46, 50).1 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s grievance dated August 16, 2022, does not
identify by name, describe, or otherwise attribute any conduct to them. Plaintiff opposes
the motions. (Doc. 49). The Court held a hearing on the motions on April 24, 2025, heard
testimony from John Barwick, Warden of Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”), Margaret Madole, with the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”),
and Plaintiff, and took the matter under advisement. (Doc. 60). For the reasons delineated
below, the Court DENIES the motions.
1 Defendants filed the required Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 notice informing Plaintiff
of the failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment. See (Doc. 45, 47).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Joe Billips (“Billips”) is an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”), currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). On
December 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of his constitutional rights that occurred while at Pinckneyville. (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff alleges that on June 17, 2022, he was taken to the hospital and diagnosed with
appendicitis. When he returned to Pinckneyville, he continued to experience severe
symptoms, including vomiting feces and blood and constant pain. Plaintiff wrote several
medical requests to Dr. Myers, Nurse Practitioner Blum, and Christine Brown, from June
19, 2022, through August 13, 2022. He also wrote a grievance that was deemed emergent
by Warden Mitchell, and staff still did not treat his ongoing medical issues. At some point,
Plaintiff was told that his colon was infected, he would have to wait for a CT scan, and
then he would be sent to see a gastroenterologist.
On May 6, 2024, the Court completed its preliminary review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and construed Plaintiff’s allegations into the
following count:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Myers, Blum and
Brown for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs
(Doc. 16).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties agree the relevant grievance related to the issues in this case is
Plaintiff’s emergency grievance dated August 16, 2022, # 2271-08-22. Thus, the Court will
consider only this grievance in determining whether Plaintiff has exhausted his
administrative remedies.
In this August 16, 2022, emergency grievance, Plaintiff states:
I’ve been having sever stomach pains for the past 2 in a half months. I was sent
to the emergency room 6-17-22 and they told me I had appendicitis. Problem
never resolved. It’s gotten worse, I’ve spoken to health care and they believe
it’s something to do with my colon being infected or something along those
lines. I’m waiting for a Cat scan to be approved and once I get that I suppose
to go to a GI which is a stomach doctor. I’ve threw up shit and I haven’t eaten
for days at a time. I’m in constant pain and I feel sick all the time. I’ve been
talking to the PA Mrs. Ashaini and she’s been the only one who has the power
to do anything actually helping me. The reason why I’m writing this is because
I feel like something can get done because I know this is a serious matter.
(Doc. 44-1, p. 18). In the “Relief Requested,” Plaintiff states: “I’m requesting that
something happen, like the doctor appointment that was put in gets approved in a more
appropriate time frame to see what’s the matter and nothing had happen to me that’s
going to result in long-term medical problems.” Id. at p. 18, 19. On August 23, 2022, the
Grievance Officer recommended that Plaintiff’s grievance be denied. The grievance
officer, after discussing the issue with the Health Care Unit Administrator (“HCUA”),
found that the PA had ordered Plaintiff a CT and once the prison was off quarantine,
Plaintiff would be sent out accordingly. On September 14, 2022, the Chief Administrative
Officer (“CAO”) concurred. Id. at p. 17. On November 2, 2022, the ARB denied Plaintiff’s
grievance finding that it was appropriately addressed by the facility and that it was
unqualified to dispute medical review. Id. at p. 16.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper when a moving party cannot establish the presence
of a genuine dispute of material fact. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(a). To survive a motion for
summary judgement, the non-moving party must provide admissible evidence which
would allow a reasonable jury to find in his or her favor. See Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520
F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008). Generally, the Court’s role is to determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists rather than evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge witness
credibility, or determine the truth of the matter when determining the outcome for a
motion for summary judgment. See National Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co.,
528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008).
However, in Pavey v. Conley, the Seventh Circuit held that, “debatable factual
issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are not
required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. 544 F.3d 739, 740-
741 (7th Cir. 2008). Therefore, it is left to the Court to determine whether an inmate has
exhausted his or her remedies when the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion is raised.
If the court finds that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies, then the
inmate is given the opportunity to exhaust should time still permit or if the failure to
exhaust was innocent. Id. at 742. If the court determines that the failure to exhaust was
the inmate’s fault, then the case is over. Id.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which governs lawsuits filed
by inmates, “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal Law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This coincides with the PLRA’s statutory purpose of “afford[ing]
correction officials [the] time and opportunity to address complaints internally before
allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also
Begolli v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 701 F.3d 1158, 1161 (7th Cir. 2012). It affords prison
administrators an opportunity to fix the problem, reduce damages, and shed light on the
factual disputes that may arise in litigation. See Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023-
24 (7th Cir. 2002).
Inmates must follow their prison’s administrative rules when attempting to
exhaust their administrative remedies under the PLRA. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023. Plaintiff
is an inmate in the IDOC and is required to correctly follow the regulations contained in
the IDOC’s Grievance Procedures to properly exhaust his claims. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.800, et seq. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to a prison’s grievance
procedures to satisfy the requirements for exhaustion under the PLRA. See Dole v.
Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). The exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied
if an inmate files untimely or procedurally defective grievances. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at
83. Additionally, an inmate must correctly complete all the steps outlined in the grievance
procedures and is barred from filing suit prior to any step being completed. See Ford v.
Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If an inmate fails to complete
all the steps correctly to exhaust his claim, then “the prison administrative authority can
refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole,
438 F.3d at 809. However, inmates are not required to exhaust administrative remedies
that are unavailable to them which can occur if, “prison employees do not respond to a
properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner
from exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
The IDOC Grievance Procedures require that an inmate first file a grievance with
a counselor at their correctional institution within 60 days of the discovery of an incident.
See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The Grievance must include, “factual details
regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint, including what happened, when,
where and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in
the complaint.” See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). If the inmate is unsatisfied with the
counselor’s response, then the inmate can submit a formal grievance to the prison’s
grievance officer. Id at (a)-(b). The grievance officer must then review the grievance and
provide a written response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). Within 60
days of the receipt of the grievance the grievance officer must report their findings and
recommendations in writing to the CAO. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO
will then review the findings and recommendations and offer a written decision to the
inmate. Id. The inmate can appeal the CAO’s decision to the ARB within thirty days. See
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). To do this correctly, the inmate is required to attach
copies of the grievance officer’s report and the CAO’s decision to his appeal. Id. The ARB
then submits its findings and recommendations to the Director who will issue the IDOC’s
final decision within six months. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d)-(e).
DISCUSSION
Defendants asserts that this grievance does not sufficiently implicate their actions
in relation to Plaintiff’s medical care. Plaintiff counters that he did exhaust administrative
remedies through this grievance as it was against all medical staff. Ultimately, the Court
believes the grievance sufficiently exhausts Plaintiff’s administrative remedies as to
Defendants because the grievance contains a reference to Plaintiff’s complaints about his
medical care on June 17, 2022, a date certain and a period of two months after that time.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense in an action
against prison officials, and the burden of proof is on the officials. Here, the undersigned
finds that Defendants have not met that burden, and that Plaintiff did exhaust his
administrative remedies. “While grievances must contain factual details regarding each
aspect of the inmate’s complaint, including the name of each person who is the subject or
is otherwise implicated in the complaint, this condition is tempered in that an offender
who does not know the name of each person who is involved in the complaint may
simply describe the individual with as much detail as possible.” Williams v. Spiller, Case
No. 22-cv-756-RJD, 2024 WL 3673152, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2024) (citing ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 504.810(c)). The Seventh Circuit has interpreted this as requiring an inmate to name
individuals only to the extent practicable to serve a grievance’s function of giving “prison
officials a fair opportunity to address [an inmate’s complaints.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d
709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Glick v. Walker, No. 09-2472, 385 Fed. Appx. 579, 582 (7th
Cir. July 13, 2010). Thus, not naming the defendants in the grievance itself amounts to “’a
mere technical defect’ where the inmate sufficiently describes the alleged wrongdoing to
allow prison officials a fair opportunity to respond.” Saffold v. Illinois Department of
Corrections, Case No. 18 C 3301, 2021 WL 4477930, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2021) (quoting
Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722). So long as the “prison officials have been afforded an
opportunity to address an inmate’s claims internally prior to federal litigation, the
purpose of exhaustion has been met, and the prisoner has properly exhausted his
available remedies.” Bandala-Martinez v. Bebout, 188 F. Supp.3d 836, 842-843 (S.D. Ill. 2016)
(citing Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, an inmate is not
required to provide personal notice of suit to an individual defendant through his
grievance. See Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722 (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)).
In this case, the Court believes that the grievance provided enough information to
put the prison on notice as to the nature of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants. In this
grievance, Plaintiff complains that he has had stomach issues for the past two months,
and prior to that he was sent to the emergency room on June 17, 2022, and that he has
spoken to health care. Thus, it is not a stretch that Plaintiff believes that medical staff and
the health care unit – which includes Defendants – ignored or did not properly and timely
address his medical issues. The information in the grievance should have made the
facility aware of Plaintiff’s claims. Moreover, the HCUA was mentioned in the grievance
officer’s report, thus, indicating Defendant Brown’s potential responsibility and
involvement for the lack of medical treatment. Furthermore, a review of the medical
records could have revealed the relevant providers. See, e.g., Williams v. Luking, Case No.
3:21-cv-00448-GCS, 2023 WL 317663, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2023) (noting that grievance
provided sufficient notice to alert the prison that Plaintiff’s quality of care was at issue
and that prison officials were capable of identifying which providers were involved
through review of Plaintiff’s medical file); Gordon v. Rogers, Case No. 3:17-cv-1302-DRH-
DGW, 2018 WL 6977338, at *1-2 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2018) (noting that after grievance officer
contacted the HCU, the court found “grievance served its function of notifying the prison
there was a problem with the medical care” because it prompted a review of medical
records); Cox v. Lashbrook, Case No. 3:16-cv-1096-NJR-DGW, 2018 WL 5904399, at *5 (S.D.
Ill. April 26, 2018) (highlighting that “it could be no mystery to the prison who Plaintiff’s
treatment providers were[]” once the grievance officer reviewed medical records and
contacted the health care unit); Harper v. Henton, No. 11-cv-406-MJR-SCW, 2012 WL
6595159, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2012) (asserting that prison administrators “could have
easily viewed the medical records to determine which doctors and nurses treated Plaintiff
or were responsible for his treatment[]” given that he provided enough details regarding
his medical care); Brown v. Pfister, Case No. 18-cv-6042, 2021 WL 1722771, at *10 (N.D. Ill.
April 30, 2021) (noting it was not necessary for the plaintiff to name the prison’s medical
director because he clearly complained about the lack of medical care, which “naturally
called into question the provider of the medical care, including the person running the
department.”).2 Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative
remedies as to these Defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons delineated above, the Court DENIES Defendant Percy Myers’s
and Defendant Bob Blum’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, (Doc. 43), and Defendant Christine Brown’s motion for
summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 46).
2 Defendants attempt to distinguish the case at bar from the cases cited supra arguing that
the grievance here did not give prison officials enough information and that Plaintiff did not
claim that he had been denied treatment for his stomach complaints. The Court disagrees and
finds Defendants’ interpretation to be a narrow reading of the Plaintiff’s grievance.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 16, 2025. Digitally signed by Judge
= ..Sison
Alkling 0. Sey: Date: 2025.09.16
11:22:39 -05'00'
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
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