“Whether an officer exerts excessive force is determined under an objective reasonableness standard.” (citation modified)
How later courts described this case
- “Whether an officer exerts excessive force is determined under an objective reasonableness standard.” (citation modified)
- reasoning that another officer’s failure to use deadly force when he similarly perceived the events undercut the defendant officer’s assertion that the plaintiff created an imminent threat of harm
- “Where the weapon was, what type of weapon it was, and what was happening with the weapon are all inquiries crucial to the reasonableness determination.” (quoting Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0255p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐
MICHAEL CHRESTMAN, as Next Friend to Melissa
│
Wooden,
│
Plaintiff-Appellant, │
> No. 24-6018
│
v. │
│
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND │
DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE; BENJAMIN WILLIAMS; │
BRANDON LOPEZ, │
Defendants-Appellees. │
┘
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:22-cv-00173—William Lynn Campbell, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: June 11, 2025
Decided and Filed: September 16, 2025
Before: GILMAN, DAVIS, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Kyle Mothershead, RELENTLESS ADVOCACY, PLLC, Brentwood, Tennessee,
for Appellant. Allison L. Bussell, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND
DAVIDSON COUNTY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Kyle Mothershead,
Brian Daniel Mounce, RELENTLESS ADVOCACY, PLLC, Brentwood, Tennessee, for
Appellant. Allison L. Bussell, Melissa Roberge, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 2
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
MATHIS, Circuit Judge. This case arises out of an unfortunate incident in which Melissa
Wooden, in the throes of a mental-health crisis, called 911 and asked for police to kill her. Three
police officers responded and saw Wooden holding a bat and a pickaxe. One of the officers told
Wooden that she would not be harmed. Less than ten minutes after arriving at the scene, that
officer tased Wooden and another officer shot her.
Michael Chrestman, on Wooden’s behalf, sued the two officers who harmed her and the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro Nashville”) under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers
moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted the
officers’ motion to dismiss and Metro Nashville’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Because the complaint plausibly alleges that the officers violated Wooden’s clearly established
rights when they tased and shot her, and because the district court erred in granting Metro
Nashville’s motion, we reverse in part and vacate in part.
I.
The district court ruled in the defendants’ favor at the motion-to-dismiss stage. So we
recite the facts as Chrestman alleged them in the complaint. See Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96
F.4th 932, 937 (6th Cir. 2024).
On March 12, 2021, Wooden called 911 and asked for police to come to her address to
shoot her. At the time, she was experiencing a mental-health crisis. Metro Nashville Police
Department dispatched Officers Benjamin Williams, Brandon Lopez, and Thomas Denenea.
Williams was informed over dispatch that Wooden had a pickaxe and a baseball bat.
The three officers arrived at the scene. Wooden, as Williams had been told, was carrying
a pickaxe and a bat. Williams, Lopez, and Denenea began talking to Wooden, maintaining a
distance of about fifteen feet from her. Lopez drew his firearm. Denenea pulled out his taser.
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 3
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
Williams did not initially draw a weapon. The officers told Wooden to back away from them,
and she did.
Williams kept talking to Wooden for several minutes. Williams told Wooden repeatedly
that none of the officers would hurt her and that he had no reason to draw his weapon because
there was distance between them.
Five minutes into the encounter, Wooden’s mother drove an electric cart down the
driveway and informed Williams that Wooden was not a bad person, but that she was “mentally
ill.” R. 1, PageID 11. Echoing his earlier words, Williams told Wooden’s mother that “the
officers would resolve the situation . . . peacefully.” Id. at 12.
Wooden continued backing away from the officers. The officers kept moving toward
Wooden so that they stayed about fifteen feet from her. After Wooden’s mother drove her cart
close to Wooden, Williams ordered the mother to stop and back away, which she did. Williams
then pulled out his taser, motioned to the other officers, and shouted, “Tase her tase her tase
her!” Id. Williams fired his taser at Wooden. Williams would say later that he “gave up” and
“popped” Wooden because the situation “wasn’t going anywhere.” Id. at 13, 15 (citation
modified).
At least one of the taser probes struck Wooden, shocking her. Wooden remained
standing and began moving in Williams’s direction. Lopez responded by shooting at Wooden
multiple times, striking her twice. When confronted by Wooden’s mother, Williams described
Wooden’s movements as “charging” the officers and running toward him with the pickaxe. Id.
at 13. Williams reported over the radio that Wooden was shot and requested medical assistance.
Wooden survived but sustained severe injuries that required several surgeries and a two-month
hospital stay. Body-cam and dashcam video captured the incident.
Chrestman, as next friend to Wooden, sued Williams, Lopez, and Metro Nashville under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Chrestman also
sued Metro Nashville for negligence arising out of the shooting. Defendants sought dismissal or
summary judgment on all claims against them. The district court granted the motion to dismiss
as to the excessive-force claims against Williams and Lopez and the negligence claim against
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 4
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
Metro Nashville but denied the motion as to the § 1983 claim against Metro Nashville. Metro
Nashville later moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted.
Chrestman appeals the dismissal of the § 1983 claims.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on qualified-immunity grounds. Linden v. City of Southfield, 75 F.4th
597, 601 (6th Cir. 2023). A party bringing a claim must provide “a short and plain statement”
showing that he “is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under this pleading standard, a
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
When reviewing a district court’s dismissal of a complaint based on qualified immunity,
we must determine “whether the complaint alleges violation of a clearly established
constitutional right.” Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quotation omitted). The plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that a defendant is not entitled to
qualified immunity.” MacIntosh v. Clous, 69 F.4th 309, 315 (6th Cir. 2023). But that burden is
“not high” at the motion-to-dismiss stage—the plaintiff need show only that it is “plausible that
an official’s acts violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. (citation modified). To
that end, we have cautioned that “it is generally inappropriate for a district court to grant a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Although an officer’s entitlement
to qualified immunity is a threshold question to be resolved at the earliest possible point, that
point is usually summary judgment and not dismissal under Rule 12.” Anders v. Cuevas, 984
F.3d 1166, 1175 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation modified).
III.
Chrestman asserts Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims against Williams and
Lopez. The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits unreasonable seizures by police officers. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Maryland v. Pringle,
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 5
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
540 U.S. 366, 369 (2003). An unreasonable seizure includes an officer’s use of excessive force
against a person. Godawa v. Byrd, 798 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2015). The use of force becomes
excessive when the officer’s actions are not “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting” him, without considering the officer’s “underlying intent or
motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (citation modified); see also Barton
v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 952 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Whether an officer exerts excessive force is
determined under an objective reasonableness standard.” (citation modified)). We judge
objective reasonableness “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. And we consider “only the facts
that were knowable” to the officer at the time. White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 77 (2017) (per
curiam) (citation omitted).
Determining the “reasonableness of police force requires analyzing the totality of the
circumstances.” Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1358 (2025) (citation modified). The Supreme
Court directed courts to consider a nonexhaustive list of factors for this inquiry: (1) “the severity
of the crime at issue”; (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others”; and (3) “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
But as courts encountered scenarios that did not track neatly the above factors, more
tailored factors emerged. In the mental-health-emergency context, these factors include:
(1) whether the person was “experiencing a medical emergency that rendered him incapable of
making a rational decision under circumstances that posed an immediate threat of serious harm
to himself or others”; (2) whether “some degree of force [was] reasonably necessary to
ameliorate the immediate threat”; and (3) whether “the force used [was] more than reasonably
necessary under the circumstances (i.e., was it excessive).” Est. of Hill ex rel. Hill v. Miracle,
853 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2017).
Williams and Lopez assert qualified-immunity defenses. In reviewing the dismissal of a
claim on qualified-immunity grounds, “the first step is to determine if the facts alleged make out
a violation of a constitutional right,” and “the second is to ask if the right at issue was clearly
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 6
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
established when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would have known that his
conduct violated it.” Courtright, 839 F.3d at 518 (citation modified). We “consider each
officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity separately.” Hodges v. City of Grand Rapids, 139
F.4th 495, 517 (6th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted). But we no longer apply the segmented
approach, where we “carve up the incident into segments and judge each on its own terms to see
if the officer was reasonable at each stage.” Id. (quotation omitted). Instead, “to assess whether
an officer acted reasonably in using force,” we “consider all the relevant circumstances,
including facts and events leading up to the climactic moment.” Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1356
(citation modified).
A.
The Tasing. Chrestman argues that Williams used excessive force against Wooden by
tasing her. Officers may use nonlethal force, including tasing, if they have an “objective
justification” for doing so. See Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Township, 364 F.3d 763, 774
(6th Cir. 2004). “We have found tasing reasonable where individuals were particularly violent or
physically resistant, so as to endanger responders.” Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384, 391
(6th Cir. 2016) (citation modified). An officer can tase someone who “actively resists arrest.”
Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2015). We have determined that a person
engaged in active resistance “where some outward manifestation—either verbal or physical—on
the part of the suspect had suggested volitional and conscious defiance.” Jackson-Gibson v.
Beasley, 118 F.4th 848, 856 (6th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). “Noncompliance alone does not
indicate active resistance; there must be something more.” Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781
F.3d 314, 326 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). An officer cannot tase someone who does not
actively resist arrest or has stopped resisting arrest. Rudlaff, 791 F.3d at 642.
Chrestman plausibly alleges that Williams violated Wooden’s constitutional rights when
he tased her. Wooden, who was experiencing a mental-health crisis, called 911 and asked that
police come and shoot her. Williams was one of the officers who arrived on the scene. When
Williams arrived, Wooden held a bat and a pickaxe. Williams did not draw a weapon on
Wooden initially, as Wooden maintained a distance of about fifteen feet from the officers.
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 7
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
Wooden’s mother came to the scene in an electric cart and began communicating with Wooden
and Williams. Williams tased Wooden shortly after Wooden’s mother drove her cart near
Wooden, though by that time Wooden’s mother had backed away from her daughter.
We turn first to the Graham factors. Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true,
the factors weigh in Chrestman’s favor. The first factor—the severity of the crime at issue—
favors Chrestman because Wooden was not committing a crime when she was tased. So does
the second factor, as nothing in the complaint suggests that Wooden posed a threat to the officers
or others on the scene. The third Graham factor also supports Chrestman—Wooden was not
under arrest, so she could not have resisted arrest or attempted to flee arrest.
Because the complaint indicates that Wooden was suffering a mental-health crisis and
because Wooden had not committed a crime, we also consider the Hill factors. But we must
exercise caution in applying those factors at the motion-to-dismiss stage, where we consider only
the factual allegations in the complaint. As to the first Hill factor, the complaint indicates that
Wooden was experiencing a medical emergency, but the complaint does not indicate that
Wooden posed a danger to anyone except herself. As to the second factor, the well-pleaded facts
do not indicate that some degree of force was necessary to ameliorate an immediate threat.
Specifically, the complaint does not describe an immediate threat. Wooden, although she held
weapons, maintained her distance from the officers. And Williams had not drawn a weapon for
most of the time that he was on the scene. As to the third factor, Chrestman has alleged facts
indicating that Williams’s tasing of Wooden was excessive. No other officer on the scene used
force against Wooden at that time. Williams would later explain that he tased Wooden after he
“gave up.” R. 1, PageID 15 (citation modified). Ultimately, the test is an objective one, not a
subjective evaluation. But absent an officer’s reasonable fear for his safety, simple disobedience
by an individual not under arrest does not justify tasing. Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852,
868–69 (6th Cir. 2020).
Williams argues that the body-cam and dashcam footage of the encounter with Wooden
blatantly contradicts the complaint and shows that Chrestman has not pleaded a plausible
excessive-force claim against him. Specifically, Williams argues that the video evidence shows
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 8
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
that, despite Williams’s efforts to de-escalate the situation, Wooden maintained an aggressive
posture while holding the bat and pickaxe and made statements to try to provoke the officers to
shoot her, demonstrating that she was a danger to herself. Williams further argues that the
videos show that Wooden moved the bat and pickaxe over her shoulder as if planning to swing
them just before Williams tased her, which Lopez reasonably perceived as an imminent danger
to Williams.
We can consider the videos only on a limited basis when reviewing a district court’s
decision on a motion to dismiss in the qualified-immunity context. Bell v. City of Southfield, 37
F.4th 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2022). If an officer disputes the complaint’s version of the facts, “we
can only rely on the videos over the complaint to the degree the videos are clear and blatantly
contradict or utterly discredit the plaintiff’s version of events.” Id. (citation modified). This
limitation applies “even if available video evidence would save time and effort or would easily
resolve a case.” Hodges, 139 F.4th at 510 (citation modified).
As to the arguments raised by Williams, the videos do not blatantly contradict or utterly
discredit the complaint’s allegations. The complaint indicates that Wooden held a bat and a
pickaxe during the standoff with the officers and that Williams tried to defuse the standoff by
stating that “none of the officers would hurt [Wooden]” and that “he had no reason to pull a
weapon on her.” R. 1, PageID 10–11. True, the complaint does not mention that Wooden placed
the bat and pickaxe on her shoulder shortly before she was tased. But that omission does not
contradict or discredit the complaint because Wooden was backing away from the officers when
she lifted the bat and pickaxe, and she had lowered the weapons from her shoulder when
Williams tased her.
More to the point, the video evidence does not change our analysis of the application of
the Graham and Hill factors. Chrestman has plausibly alleged that Williams violated Wooden’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force when Williams tased Wooden. Further
factual development could eventually show that Williams’s actions were objectively reasonable,
but at the motion-to-dismiss stage, Chrestman has pleaded sufficiently that Williams violated
Wooden’s constitutional rights.
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 9
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
B.
The Shooting. We turn next to Chrestman’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim
against Lopez. Chrestman claims that Lopez violated Wooden’s constitutional rights by
shooting Wooden seconds after Williams tased her. “A police officer’s use of deadly force
violates the Fourth Amendment when it is not objectively reasonable.” Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at
1356 (citation omitted). An officer may use deadly force when he “has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.”
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Assessing reasonableness when deadly force is
involved requires considering the totality of the circumstances. Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1356;
Palma v. Johns, 27 F.4th 419, 432 (6th Cir. 2022). We consider the following nonexhaustive list
of factors in conducting the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in deadly force cases:
(1) why the officer was called to the scene; (2) whether the officer knew or
reasonably believed that the person was armed; (3) whether the person verbally or
physically threatened the officer or disobeyed the officer; (4) how far the officer
was from the person; (5) the duration of the entire encounter; (6) whether the
officer knew of any ongoing mental or physical health conditions that may have
affected the person’s response to the officer; and (7) whether the officer could
have [defused] the situation with less forceful tactics.
Palma, 27 F.4th at 432 (citation modified).
The complaint alleges that Lopez had drawn his service firearm during the standoff with
Wooden before Williams tased her. It also alleges that after Williams tased Wooden, Lopez
reacted by shooting at Wooden, striking her twice. But the complaint omits what took place
immediately after Williams tased Wooden—Wooden moved in Williams’s direction. The video
evidence shows this. Because Wooden’s movement in Williams’s direction blatantly contradicts
the complaint’s omission on this point, we can consider this part of the video evidence in
assessing the sufficiency of the complaint. See Bell, 37 F.4th at 366. That said, the video
evidence is unclear about how close Wooden moved toward Williams. It is also unclear about
whether Wooden’s movement was intentional, or whether it was involuntary movement caused
by the shock from the taser. With this background, we consider each applicable Palma factor in
turn.
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Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
We discuss the first and sixth factors together. Those factors ask us to consider why
Lopez was called to the scene and whether he knew about mental-health conditions impacting
Wooden’s response to the officers. Lopez and the other officers were called to the scene in
response to Wooden calling 911 because she wanted officers to shoot her. On the scene,
Wooden’s mother disclosed to the officers that Wooden was “mentally ill.” R. 1, PageID 11.
When an officer responds to “wellness checks or other non-criminal calls,” we consider “what
the officer learned and observed about the situation before the officer even engaged with anyone
on the scene.” Palma, 27 F.4th at 432. The officers here were not responding to a past or
ongoing crime. And the complaint indicates that Lopez knew Wooden was experiencing a
“mental health crisis” at the time of the shooting. Id. at 10.
We also discuss factors two and four together: whether the officers knew that Wooden
was armed and the distance between the officers and Wooden. The officers knew that Wooden
was armed with a baseball bat and pickaxe, and she maintained a distance of around fifteen feet
from the officers during the standoff, moving back from the officers multiple times. An officer
may not shoot a person just because she has a weapon, even a gun, in hand. Hicks v. Scott, 958
F.3d 421, 435 (6th Cir. 2020). Whether a suspect has a weapon is just one consideration in
assessing the totality of the circumstances. Thomas v. City of Columbus, 854 F.3d 361, 366 (6th
Cir. 2017) (“Where the weapon was, what type of weapon it was, and what was happening with
the weapon are all inquiries crucial to the reasonableness determination.” (quoting Perez v.
Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016))).
Factor three asks whether Wooden verbally or physically threatened the officers. Lopez
argues that Wooden physically threatened Williams when she charged at him after Williams
tased her. Chrestman says that Wooden took just two steps in Williams’s direction after the
tasing. The video evidence does not definitively resolve this ambiguity. So at this stage,
viewing the complaint and the pertinent video footage in Chrestman’s favor, we acknowledge
simply that Wooden moved toward Williams after he tased her. Cf. LaPlante v. City of Battle
Creek, 30 F.4th 572, 578 (6th Cir. 2022).
As for factor five, the duration of the entire encounter lasted approximately six minutes.
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Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
The seventh Palma factor asks whether the officers could have defused the situation with
Wooden before employing deadly force. Without factual development, it is difficult to assess
this factor. Lopez shot Wooden seconds after Williams tased her. But, notably, neither
Williams—who Wooden allegedly “charged” at—nor Denenea used deadly force. We consider
the reaction of other officers to a perceived threat. See Heeter v. Bowers, 99 F.4th 900, 914 (6th
Cir. 2024) (reasoning that another officer’s failure to use deadly force when he similarly
perceived the events undercut the defendant officer’s assertion that the plaintiff created an
imminent threat of harm). According to the complaint, Williams said that the fact that he did not
draw his gun spoke to “his state of mind as to whether or not he was in fear that Wooden would
kill him.” R. 1, PageID 15. When Wooden’s mother asked Williams why Lopez opened fire,
Williams said that “[he] saw it the way [he] saw it, [Lopez] saw it the way [Lopez] saw it.” Id. at
14. “That neither [Williams nor Denenea] thought it appropriate to fire at [Wooden] cuts against
[Lopez’s] assertion that he reasonably perceived an imminent threat.” Heeter, 99 F.4th at 914.
All in all, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true—except where we have
determined that the video evidence contradicts the complaint—and considering the Palma
factors on this sparse record, we conclude that Chrestman has plausibly alleged a Fourth
Amendment excessive-force claim against Lopez. Wooden, while suffering a mental-health
crisis, called officers to the scene to shoot her. Although Wooden carried a bat and a pickaxe,
Lopez was the only responding officer to draw a deadly weapon. Wooden maintained distance
from the officers, only moving toward Williams after he tased her. The reason for Wooden’s
movement might emanate from discovery. Discovery might also reveal whether a reasonable
officer would have perceived an imminent threat of deadly force under the circumstances.
C.
Although Chrestman has plausibly alleged that Williams and Lopez violated Wooden’s
constitutional rights, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless Wooden’s
constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident. For a right to be clearly
established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 12
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
(1987). This means that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” White, 580 U.S. at 79 (quotation omitted). That said, we need not
identify a perfect match to the facts and circumstances of this case. Id.; Palma, 27 F.4th at 442.
But we must be confident in saying that “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [was]
apparent,” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, such that a reasonable officer would have known that his
alleged conduct was unlawful, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 152 (2017). In other words,
qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” White, 580 U.S. at 79 (quotation omitted). “The specific acts or conduct at issue need not
previously have been found unconstitutional for a right to be clearly established law.” Baynes v.
Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 614 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation modified).
That this case comes to us at the motion-to-dismiss stage complicates our analysis of the
clearly established prong of the officers’ qualified-immunity defense. “Development of the
factual record is frequently necessary to decide whether the official’s actions violated clearly
established law.” MacIntosh, 69 F.4th at 315 (citation modified). Absent such development, “a
court cannot fairly tell whether a case is obvious or squarely governed by precedent,” hindering
our ability to determine “whether a right is clearly established.” Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d
907, 917 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).
1.
We consider first whether Williams’s taser use violated law that was clearly established
at the time of the subject incident in 2021. As of that time, there was “a clearly established right
not to be tased when” a person “is not actively resisting arrest.” Wright, 962 F.3d at 870
(collecting cases). We have also held that “the gratuitous or excessive use of a taser violates a
clearly established constitutional right.” Goodwin, 781 F.3d at 327 (citation modified). This is
particularly so “when the claimant was never told he was under arrest and posed little safety
threat to officers.” Kent, 810 F.3d at 396 (citing Goodwin, 781 F.3d at 326). Also bear in mind
that an officer must account for a person’s “apparent mental state” when using nonlethal force.
Gaddis, 364 F.3d at 775.
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Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, Wooden was: (1) not under arrest, (2) not
resisting arrest, (3) suffering a mental-health crisis, and (4) nonviolent. Chrestman has therefore
“ma[de] out a plausible claim” that Williams tasing Wooden “violated a constitutional right that
was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 641 (6th Cir.
2016) (citation omitted).
2.
We reach a similar conclusion on Lopez’s use of deadly force against Wooden. Officers
may not use lethal force simply because someone disobeys their orders. See Wright, 962 F.3d at
868–69. “It is axiomatic that individuals have a clearly established right not to be shot absent
probable cause to believe that they pose a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or
to others.” Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). By 2018,
it was clearly established “that, even if [a suicidal individual] was armed and had disobeyed the
officers’ commands, these facts do not alone amount to a threat of serious or deadly harm.”
Heeter, 99 F.4th at 915.
As stated above, accepting the facts in the light most favorable to Chrestman, Wooden,
while experiencing a mental-health crisis: (1) asked police officers to shoot her, (2) wielded a bat
and a pickaxe at a distance from the officers, and (3) moved toward Williams while still holding
her weapons after Williams tased her. The degree of aggression she showed in that movement is
ambiguous from the video and could benefit from further factual development. But based on the
complaint’s allegations, Wooden’s actions do not “amount to a threat of serious or deadly harm.”
Id. Thus, the complaint plausibly alleges that Lopez violated Wooden’s clearly established right
to be free from excessive force.
3.
Williams and Lopez make several arguments in response. We reject each argument.
First, Williams and Lopez argue that Palma v. Johns cannot clearly establish rights as to
the tasing or the shooting because we decided Palma after the events of this case. But we rely on
Palma only to show that Chrestman has pleaded sufficiently that the shooting violated Wooden’s
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Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
constitutional rights. We do not rely on Palma for our analysis of the clearly established prong
for the tasing or the shooting.
Second, Lopez seems to argue that our decision in Caie v. West Bloomfield Township
shows that Chrestman has not plausibly alleged the violation of a clearly established right for the
tasing. 485 F. App’x 92 (6th Cir. 2012). In Caie, we held that an officer’s use of a taser did not
violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights when the officer deployed his taser after the plaintiff:
(1) “repeatedly told the officers that he wanted to die and asked what he would have to do to get
them to shoot him”; (2) threatened to “fight the officers so that they would have a reason to kill
him”; (3) experienced “dramatic mood swings, ranging from sad and crying and upset . . . to
hostile and violent and threatening”; (4) began running from officers until they took him to the
ground; and (5) refused to move his arms behind his back so the officers could handcuff him. Id.
at 94 (citation modified).
Caie is easily distinguishable. We decided Caie at the summary-judgment stage, not the
motion-to-dismiss stage. Id. at 95. We also did not reach the clearly established analysis; we
instead held that the plaintiff’s evidence failed to establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 97
& n.3. So Caie does not affect our analysis of whether Wooden’s rights were clearly established.
Third, Williams and Lopez, relying on Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752 (6th Cir. 2021),
argue that although we have repeatedly cautioned district courts against granting qualified
immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage, there is no presumption against courts doing so.
Crawford actually cuts against the officers. There, we explained that “dismissing for qualified
immunity” on the clearly established prong “is sometimes difficult because the clearly
established inquiry may turn on case-specific details that must be fleshed out in discovery.” Id.
at 765. And Crawford specifically mentions tasing cases as an example of the type of case that
can benefit from factual development. Id. Of course, the officers argue that further factual
development is unnecessary because video evidence captures the tasing and the shooting. But, as
we have explained, we are limited in our ability to rely on the video evidence when reviewing
the sufficiency of the complaint.
No. 24-6018 Chrestman v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Page 15
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., et al.
IV.
We turn finally to Chrestman’s § 1983 Monell1 liability claim against Metro Nashville.
The complaint alleges that Metro Nashville is liable for Williams’s and Lopez’s actions by
engendering a “culture of fear, violence, and impunity”; failing to reform use-of-force policies
for mental-health emergencies; failing to investigate/discipline; and failing to train. R. 1, PageID
17. When, as here, “a municipality’s alleged responsibility for a constitutional violation stems
from an employee’s unconstitutional act,” a claimant must show that the municipality’s failure to
prevent harm was “deliberate under ‘rigorous requirements of culpability and causation.’”
Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)). “The violated right . . .
must be clearly established because a municipality cannot deliberately shirk a constitutional duty
unless that duty is clear.” Id. (citation omitted). And so “a municipal policymaker cannot
exhibit fault rising to the level of deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right
has not yet been clearly established.” Id. at 994 (quotation omitted).
The district court dismissed Chrestman’s municipal-liability claim for the same reason it
concluded that Williams and Lopez were entitled to qualified immunity—the constitutional
rights at issue were not clearly established. But because we hold that Chrestman has plausibly
alleged that Williams and Lopez violated Wooden’s clearly established rights, we revive
Chrestman’s municipal-liability claim against Metro Nashville.
V.
We REVERSE the district court’s order dismissing Chrestman’s claims against Williams
and Lopez. We VACATE the district court’s order granting Metro Nashville judgment on the
pleadings. We REMAND to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).