Brown v. Borough of Harveys Lake

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JERRY D. BROWN,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-01379

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

BOROUGH OF HARVEYS LAKE,

et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

This is a federal civil rights action, brought by the plaintiff, Jerry

D. Brown, against several defendants: the Borough of Harveys Lake:

Michael Rush, the Borough’s mayor; Charles P. Musial, the Borough’s

chief of police; Greg Johnson, Jr., a Borough police officer; and Manuel

Santayana, a private citizen and principal member of a limited liability

company that owned property within the Borough.

The plaintiff’s claims arise out of a business dispute between Brown

and Santayana. Brown is a contractor, and in February 2021, he entered

into an agreement with Santayana and his company, Speed Hound

Landing, LLC, to build a home and dock on a parcel Speed Hound owned

in Harveys Lake. Dissatisfied with a retaining wall Brown had

constructed, Santayana terminated Brown’s services in December 2021

and replaced him with another contractor. Several months later, in April

2022, Santayana filed a police report alleging that Brown had stolen

materials from the worksite. After filing that report in April 2022,

Santayana began visiting the Borough police station regularly, meeting

with the chief of police, Musial, on a weekly basis.

On August 15, 2022, Brown was arrested for felony theft. The arrest

warrant was based on an affidavit of probable cause prepared and signed

by the chief of police, Musial. Brown alleges that there were several

material omissions and fabrications in the affidavit of probable cause

Musial had prepared. At bottom, Brown contends that he could not have

stolen the materials as charged because those materials did not belong to

Santayana, but to Brown. On or about November 30, 2022, the charges

against Brown were withdrawn by the county district attorney, and on

December 2, 2022, Brown's criminal case was dismissed by the county

court of common pleas.

In his five-count second amended complaint, Brown asserts the

following claims: (a) in Count I, Brown asserts a Fourth Amendment

unreasonable seizure claim against Musial and Johnson; (b) in Count II,

Brown asserts a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against

Musial and Johnson; (c) in Count ITI, Brown asserts a § 1983 civil rights

conspiracy claim against all of the individual defendants; (d) in Count IV,

Brown asserts a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim

against the Borough only; and (e) in Count V,! Brown asserts a

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against the

Borough and Musial.

The Harveys Lake Defendants? have moved to dismiss Counts II],

IV, and V of the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.’ Doc. 28. They do not seek dismissal of

Counts I or II. The Harveys Lake Defendants’ motion is fully briefed and

ripe for decision. Doc. 29; Doc. 33; Doc. 34.

1 The second amended complaint contains a clear scrivener’s error,

labeling this fifth count as a second “Count IV.” We will refer to the

plaintiff’s procedural due process claim as Count IV and his substantive

due process claim as Count V herein.

2 The “Harveys Lake Defendants” are: the Borough; Mayor Rush:

Chief Musial; and Officer Johnson.

3 The Harveys Lake Defendants also seek dismissal of any claims

for punitive damages against the Borough. Finding other grounds for

dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against the Borough, we do not reach

this issue. But we do note that the second amended complaint’s prayer

for relief clearly states that its request for punitive damages is limited to

“the individual Defendants in their individual capacities.”

3

Santayana has similarly moved to dismiss Count III of the second

amended complaint—the only count in which he is a named defendant—

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 30.

Santayana’s motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision. Doc. 31; Doc. 35.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a

defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a

motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded

allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial

plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir.

2011) (citing Bel] Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56

(2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged

on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial

notice.” TJellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322

(2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the

complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions

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and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (8d Cir. 2013) (quoting

Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Nor is it required

to credit factual allegations contradicted by indisputably authentic

documents on which the complaint relies or matters of public record of

which we may take judicial notice. In re Washington Mut. Inc., 741 Fed.

App’x 88, 91 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018); Sourovelis v. City of Phila., 246 F. Supp.

3d 1058, 1075 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Banks v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp.

2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).

II. DISCUSSION

A. § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

In Count IV, the plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process claim against the Borough alone, claiming that

his unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution by Borough officials

deprived him of his right to be free from unlawful arrest and his right to

fair and unbiased legal processes. In particular, he claims that he was

subjected to unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution without adequate

procedural protections—i.e., due to the fabrication of evidence,

withholding of exculpatory evidence, and failure to present key

documents to the district attorney or the magistrate who issued the

criminal complaint and arrest warrant against him.

In Count V, the plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process claim against the Borough and Musial, claiming

that, in preparing a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause

against Brown, Musial concealed favorable evidence and fabricated

inculpatory evidence in an effort to manufacture probable cause to secure

an arrest warrant from a neutral magistrate, which would not have been

granted with full candor and full disclosure. The plaintiff contends that

this conduct constituted a clear abuse of official power so egregious that

it shocks the conscience, and thus violated his substantive due process

rights.

But it is well established that “it is the Fourth Amendment, not the

Fourteenth Amendment, which is the proper vehicle for addressing any

unlawful pretrial deprivations of liberty incidental to criminal

proceedings. Meketa v. Kamoie, 955 F. Supp. 2d 345, 365 (M.D. Pa. 2013)

(citing Crouse v. S. Lebanon Twp., 668 F. Supp. 2d 664, 674 (M.D. Pa.

2009)). This is the “more specific provision” or “explicit source rule,”

derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

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266 (1994). See Meketa, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 365. “This rule has been

extended to preclude both procedural and substantive due process claims

where the rights underlying the same are derived from and otherwise

protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Jd.

Accordingly, the plaintiff's §1983 Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process claims, set forth in Count IV of the second

amended complaint, and his § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment substantive

due process claims, set forth in Count V* of the second amended

complaint, will be dismissed.

B. § 1983 Civil Rights Conspiracy Claim

In Count III, the plaintiff asserts a § 1983 civil rights conspiracy

claim against all of the individual defendants: Rush, Musial, Johnson,

and Santayana. In conclusory fashion, the second amended complaint

alleges that “the Borough, through the Mayor [Rush] and Chief Musial

and in concert and agreement with Mr. Santayana” sought to punish

Brown for the “perceived bad acts” of Brown and his girlfriend, who was

a Borough code enforcement officer. It further alleges that these

defendants “conspired and agreed to deprive [Brown] of his constitutional

4 See supra note 1.

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rights,” and that “Mr. Santayana did conspire with Mayor Rush and Chief

Musial for the purpose of depriving... [Brown] the equal protection of

the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” The

second amended complaint alleges that Musial commenced the criminal

proceedings against Brown in furtherance of this conspiracy.

“A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is ‘a combination of two or more

persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful

act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement

between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and

an overt act that results in damage.” Jones v, Dalton, 867 F. Supp. 2d

572, 585 (D.N.J. 2012) (quoting Adams v. Teamsters, 214 Fed. App’x 167,

172 (3d Cir. 2007)). A § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate federally-

protected rights must be pleaded with particularity. See Damiano v.

Scranton Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 255, 281-82 (M.D. Pa. 2015). A

plaintiff must plead an actual agreement between the parties. Watson v.

Sec’'y Pa. Dept of Corr, 436 Fed. App’x 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2011) (per

curiam). “Mere conclusory allegations that a conspiracy existed will not

survive a motion to dismiss.” Rogers v. Mount Union Borough ex rel.

Zook, 816 F. Supp. 308, 314 (M.D. Pa. 1993). “[T]he rule is clear that the

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plaintiff must provide some factual basis to support the existence of the

elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.” Jutrowski v.

Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

“As ‘the linchpin for conspiracy is agreement, concerted action,

without more, cannot suffice to state a conspiracy claim.” Watson, 436

Fed. App'x at 137. “[O]nly allegations which are particularized, such as

those addressing the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy,

and actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, will be deemed

sufficient.” Grigsby v. Kane, 250 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458 (M.D. Pa. 2003).

Here, the second amended complaint simply alleges no facts from

which any type of conspiratorial agreement can be inferred. “Stating that

the defendants ‘conspired’ and ‘acted in concert’ is not equivalent to

pleading a conspiracy with sufficient factual matter to state a plausible

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Schneller v. Phila. Newspapers

Inc., 577 F. App'x 139, 143 (8d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); see also Bell Atl

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (“Without more, parallel

conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of

agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to

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show illegality.”).5

Accordingly, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, viewed in

the light most favorable to the non-moving plaintiff, we find that the

plaintiff has failed to state a plausible civil rights conspiracy claim under

§ 1983, and thus the plaintiff’s § 1983 civil rights conspiracy claim, set

forth in Count III of the second amended complaint, will be dismissed.

C. Leave to Amend

The Third Circuit has instructed that, if a civil rights complaint is

vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must

permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be

inequitable or futile, Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108

(3d Cir. 2002). This instruction applies equally to pro se plaintiffs and

5 The most robust factual allegations in support of this claim are

that Santayana was witnessed entering the police station on a weekly

basis, where he attempted to pressure Chief Musial to bring charges

against Brown, and that Mayor Rush met with Chief Musial on a weekly

basis as well, usually on Monday mornings. But the fact that two

defendants met or spoke routinely—particularly where they are mayor

and police chief of a small municipality—is simply insufficient to support

a reasonable inference that their meetings resulted in an actual

agreement to violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. See

Lankford v. City of Clifton Police Dept, 546 F. Supp. 3d 296, 318 (D.NwJ.

2021) (‘The mere occurrence of several meetings between defendants

does not establish a meeting of the minds for purposes of a conspiracy

claim.”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

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those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir.

2004). It is not clear, however, that amendment would be futile, nor is

there any basis to believe that it would be inequitable. Therefore, the

partial dismissal of the complaint will be with leave to amend.

III. _ CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, both motions to dismiss will be granted.

Counts III, IV, and V of the second amended complaint will be dismissed

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but the

plaintiff will be granted leave to file a third amended complaint within a

specified time period. If a third amended complaint is not timely filed,

defendants Santayana, Rush, and the Borough will be terminated as

parties to this case, and defendants Musial and Johnson will be directed

to answer the complaint.

Dated: September _/f __, 2025 age heeerail

SEPH F. SAPORITY, JR.

United States District Judge

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