Sellers v. Monroe County Board of Prison Inspectors

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CATHERINE SELLERS

Plaintiff, : 3:23-CV-1373

: (JUDGE MARIANI)

V.

MONROE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants

Monroe County Correctional Facility and Monroe County Board of Prison Inspectors

(“Defendants”). (Doc. 21). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion will be granted.

I. INTRODUCTION & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 20, 2023, Plaintiff Catherine Sellers (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against the

Defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff

asserts five claims against the Defendants. (/d.). Plaintiff brings four claims under the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ef seg (“ADA”) alleging disability

discrimination, failure to accommodate, interference, and retaliation. (/d., at 6-14). Plaintiff

also brings a claim for racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (‘Title Vil’). (/d., at 14-15). Soon thereafter, the late Honorable

Judge Edward Smith transferred this action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)."

(Doc. 5).

On or about December 2, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,

along with a statement of material facts, exhibits, and brief in support. (Docs. 21, 21-1, 21-

2, 23). Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, did not respond to Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. After the time to respond had expired, the Court issued a Show Cause

Order on January 13, 2025. The Show Cause Order stated:

The background of this Order is as follows:

On December 2, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21)

and accompanying statement of material facts (Doc. 21-1) and exhibits (Doc. 21-2).

Defendant thereafter filed their brief in support of the motion for summary judgment on

December 16, 2023 (Doc. 23). As of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has failed to file a

brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion or otherwise respond to the motion.

Pursuant to Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rules, “[a] brief in opposition to a

motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any

transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one

(21) days after service of the movant’s brief.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.6. “Any party who fails

to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion.”

ACCORDINGLY, THIS 13th DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

THAT within 7 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall SHOW CAUSE why this

Court should not deem Defendants’ motion for summary judgment unopposed.

(Doc. 25).

In response to the Show Cause Order, Plaintiff submitted a memorandum of law and

made no attempt to explain her failure to file a response to Defendants’ motion or otherwise

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

respond to the Show Cause Order. (Doc. 26). Notably, Plaintiff did not and has not

submitted any response to Defendants’ Statement of Materials Facts.2 Nor has Plaintiff

submitted any evidence in opposition to Defendants’ motion. Rather, Plaintiff merely relies

on the allegations in the Complaint. Therefore, in the only document submitted by Plaintiff

in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff merely block quotes

from two cases and does not cite to any record facts or evidence in opposition to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 26), but instead, Plaintiff relies only on the

allegations in the Complaint.

Il. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

As discussed, Plaintiff did not file any response to DSOMF or file a timely brief in

opposition to Defendants’ motion. Pursuant to Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rules,

“[a] brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive

statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be

filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant’s brief.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.6.

“Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion.”

Id. Thus, under the Local Rules, Plaintiff is deemed not to oppose Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Although Plaintiff failed to respond to DSOMF, and therefore admitted

each of DSOMF, the Court will nevertheless proceed to set forth the undisputed factual

record:

2 The Court will refer to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, (Doc. 21-1), as “DSOMF.”

Plaintiff is African-American. (DSOMF, J 1). On June 25, 2012, Plaintiff was hired

as a Correction Officer by Defendants. (/d., ] 2). On or about November 29, 2021, Plaintiff

suffered an out-of-work injury when she injured her ankle falling off a beam at a trampoline

park while playing with her brother and nephew. (/d., 13). Monroe County has a Disability

Leave of Absence policy which provides: “The maximum duration that a disability leave of

absence can be approved is for six (6) months, which would include the maximum twelve

(12) weeks under F.M.L.A. If compelling reasons require an extension, it will be reviewed

by the County Commissioners to determine whether extension is warranted and whether it

should be granted.” (/d., 4).

While employed by Monroe County, Plaintiffs employment was also governed by a

Collective Bargaining Agreement with Teamsters Local 773 (“CBA”), which states: “The

maximum leave of absence shall be for ... six (6) months in the case of off-the-job illness or

injury ... provided that any such leaves may be extended beyond these limits if required as

a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act.” (/d., 95). Ina

medical note dated December 2, 2021, Plaintiffs treating physician, Dr. Hamad Saleemi,

noted that “[Plaintiff] is out of work until 12/20/2021. She will be reassessed on or just prior

to that date.” (/d., 96). Plaintiff interpreted Dr. Saleemi’s December 2, 2021, note to mean

that she would be out of work until December 20, 2021, but not that she would be returning

to work on December 20, 2021. (Id., Plaintiff did not return to work on December 20,

2021. (Id., J 8).

In a medical note dated December 22, 2021, Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Patrick

R. McDonald, noted that: “Catherine will be out of work until 2/10/22. She will be re-

evaluated at her next appointment.” (/d., J 9). Plaintiff interpreted Dr. McDonald's

December 22, 2021, note to mean that she would be out of work until February 10, 2021,

but not that she would be returning to work on that date. (/d., 10). Plaintiff did not return

to work on February 10, 2022. (/d., J 11).

Plaintiff required surgery on her ankle in April 2022 shortly prior to her April 28, 2022,

appointment. (/d., J 12). “On the medical note dated April 28, 2022, Dr. McDonald

indicated of Plaintiff that ‘She is expected to be out of work until 07/18/2022.” (Id., ¥ 13).

Plaintiff interpreted Dr. McDonald’s April 28, 2022, note to mean that she would be returning

to work on July 18, 2022. (/d., § 14). “When questioned why she interpreted Exh. ‘D’ to

mean she was out of work until December 20, 2021 but not returning on that date, and why

she interpreted Exh. ‘E’ to mean she was out of work until February 10, 2022 but not

returning on that date, but she interpreted Exh. ‘F’ to mean she was actually returning on

July 18, 2022, Plaintiff—after claiming to be confused—cryptically referenced her ‘recovery

time’ from the surgery.” (/d., 15).

Plaintiff's medical leaves of absence under Monroe County's Disability Leave of

Absence policy, which included her allotted FMLA leave and her CBA leave, expired on

June 2, 2022. (/d., 9 16). Prior to the expiration of said medical leaves, Monroe County

engaged in the interactive process with Plaintiff and, pursuant thereto, Plaintiff and her

treating physician completed a Reasonable Accommodation Medical Authorization Form

dated May 12, 2022, through which Plaintiff sought an ADA accommodation in the form of

additional medical leave until July 18, 2022. (/d., ] 17). The Reasonable Accommodation

Medical Authorization Form dated May 12, 2022, states in multiple places that Plaintiff “is

out of work until approximately 07/18/2022.” (/d., 18). Monroe County considered and

granted Plaintiffs request for a reasonable accommodation in the form of additional medical

leave until July 18, 2022. (/d., 9 19). Plaintiff did not return to work on July 18, 2022. (/d., J

20).

Plaintiff's treating physicians stated on December 2, 2021, December 22, 2021, April

28, 2022, and May 12, 2022, that Plaintiff was out of work until a date certain, and Plaintiff

did not return to work on or after any of those days. (/d., 21). On a medical note dated

July 5, 2022, Dr. McDonald indicated of Plaintiff that: “Catherine is to remain out of work

untik [sic] approx. 08/08/2022.” (Id., J 22). As memorialized in a letter dated July 19 2022,

Monroe County Assistant Director of HR Theresa Ratliff informed Plaintiff that, on July 11,

2022, pursuant to the interactive process and in response to Plaintiffs medical note dated

July 5, 2022, Plaintiff had been asked to complete a new Reasonable Accommodation

Medical Authorization Form, but as of the date Ms. Ratliff drafted and sent the July 19,

2022, letter Plaintiff had failed to provide it. (/d., 23). Ms. Ratliff further stated in the letter

dated July 19, 2022, that:

Based on an ADA request completed by you and your doctor, the County agreed to

extend your leave as an accommodation under the [ADA] an additional 6 % weeks

(through 7/17/22) based on your doctor's assertion that you had a FIRM return to work

date on July 18, 2022. You were not able to return to work on 7/18/22. You were not

able to return to work on 7/18/22 as previously indicated and have submitted a second

request for an extension with a TENTATIVE end date of 8/8/2022. On July 1 you were

asked by Deborah Thompson to have your physician complete a new ADA request

form, but to date we have not received one. Because this new end date on the doctor's

note you submitted is tentative and exceeds the length of time the Commissioners

have approved for extension of leave for other employees, we are denying your

request. If you have not returned to work with a doctor's release by 7/21/22, your

employment with Monroe County will be severed at the end of that day.

(Id., J 24).

The Monroe County Commissioners have never granted to any employee an ADA

accommodation in the form of a medical leave of absence beyond the 6 % weeks granted to

Plaintiff. (/d., ] 25). Plaintiff submitted a Reasonable Accommodation Medical

Authorization Form dated July 18, 2022, which states in multiple places that Plaintiff “will

remain out of work until 8/8/2022.” (/d., J 26). On page 3 of the Reasonable

Accommodation Medical Authorization Form dated July 18, 2022, it states that Plaintiff “will

remain out of work until 8/8/2022 and be re-evaluated as scheduled.” (/d., J 27). Plaintiff

expected Monroe County to accept that August 8, 2022, was a date certain for her return to

work. (/d., 28). When asked to explain why she believed the “approximately” August 8,

2022, date was a firm return to work date despite the same language being used on Exhibit

D, E, F, and H, Plaintiff responded “because of my healing process.” (/d., J 29). Plaintiff

could not provide any details or specifics regarding what her “healing process” meant, or

whether she had any discussions with her treating physicians regarding her “healing

process” and how, if at all, that meant August 8, 2022, was a firm return to work date. □□□□□

30).

While Plaintiff testified at her deposition that “approximately” August 8, 2022 equated

to a date certain for her return to work, in her response to Defendants’ Interrogatory No. 2,

which she verified as true and correct on February 26, 2024, she stated that: “Plaintiff

received medical clearance to return to work approximately August 8, 2022.” (/d., J] 31).

Warden Haidle interpreted the Reasonable Accommodation Medical Authorization Form

dated July 18, 2022, to mean that Plaintiff will be out of work until August 8, 2022, and

would be reevaluated at that time, but not that she would return to work on August 8, 2022.

(Id., | 32). Theresa Ratliff interpreted the Reasonable Accommodation Medical

Authorization Form dated July 18, 2022, to mean that Plaintiff will be out of work until

August 8, 2022, and would be evaluated at that time, but not that she would return to work

on August 8, 2022. (/d., J 33).

Despite being requested by defense counsel during her deposition, and on October

28, 2024 and November 6, 2024, to provide any documentation from her treating physician

showing that Plaintiff was medically cleared to return to work—on August 8, 2022 or any

time thereafter—Plaintiff failed to produce any such evidence and instead referred only to

the July 5, 2022 medical note, which states: “Catherine iis torernain out of work untik [sic]

approx. 08/08/2022.” (Id., § 34). Because Plaintiff could not produce to Monroe County a

firm return to work date, and because the new tentative end date of her extensive medical

leave of absence was August 8, 2022, which exceeded the iength of time that Monroe

County Commissioners had provided to any other County employee, the Commissioners

determined that it was necessary to terminate the employment of Plaintiff effective July 21,

2022. (Id., J 35).

Following her termination, Plaintiff did not obtain other employment until March

2024—approximately twenty (20) months after her termination from Monroe County. (/d., J

36). Following her termination in July 2022, Plaintiff has never sought medical treatment for

any alleged emotional or psychological harm. (Id., § 37). On one occasion (October 18,

2021), Plaintiff communicated a complaint to HR that Correction Officer Ogden had been

disrespectful and nasty toward her and had not been providing her with the necessary shift

change information, but she did not indicate in her complaint that race was an issue. (/d., J

38). Plaintiff never communicated any allegations of race discrimination to Warden Garry

Haidle. (/d., J 39). Plaintiff cannot identify any Correction Officer at Monroe County

Correctional Facility, including any Caucasian Correction Officer, who was granted an ADA

accommodation in the form of more leave of absence time than her. (/d., J 40).

The union that represented the Monroe County Correction Officers (Teamsters Local

773), which was the bargaining unit of which Plaintiff was a member, would routinely file

grievances in situations where they believed one or their unit neribers was treated unfairly.

(Id., ] 41). Around the time that Plaintiff received a letter from Theresa Ratliff dated July 19,

2022, seeking from her a definite return to work date, Plaintiff contacted her union

representative, Matt Weidman, but the union did not file a grievance on Plaintiff's behalf at

that time or at any time after her termination. (/d., | 42).

lll. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment “is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gonzalez v. AMR, 549

F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008). “An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary

basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute

is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v.

Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Thus, through summary

adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute

as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence

of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106

S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-

moving party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish

a genuine dispute of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110

S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose

summary judgment simply on the basis of the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a

factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or

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is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in

the record... . or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence

of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment

should be granted, “[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider

other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “Inferences should be drawn in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence

contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant's must be taken as true.” Big Apple BMW,

Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912,

113 S.Ct. 1262, 122 L.Ed.2d 659 (1993).

However, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). If a party has carried its burden under the summary

judgment rule,

its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine

issue for trial. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary

judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.

When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court

should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on.a motion for

summary judgment.

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Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). “In considering a motion for

summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in

any weighing of evidence.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Therefore, when evidentiary facts

are in dispute, when the credibility of witnesses may be in issue, or when conflicting

evidence must be weighed, a full trial is usually necessary.

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants seek summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs ADA claims and Title VII

claim. (Doc. 21). As discussed, Plaintiff has failed to file a response to Defendants’ motion

and did not and has not filed any response to DSOMF, despite the Court bringing this

matter to Plaintiff's attention by way of a Show Cause Order. (Doc. 25). Moreover, Plaintiff

does not cite to a single document, with the exception for the Complaint, in her untimely

opposition brief/reply to the Show Cause Order. (Doc. 26). This conduct violated Local

Rules 7.6 and 56.1.

A. Plaintiff Failed to Comply with Loca! Rules 7.6 and 56.4

It is well-settled that a failure to a file any response to a Defendants’ statement of

material facts deems those facts admitted, and the Third Circuit routinely upholds grants of

summary judgment on this basis. See, e.g., Romero v. Twp. of Tobyhanna, 2023 WL

27'28829, *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (“Here, the District Court was well within its discretion in

striking.Romero’s untimely responses to the defendants’ statement of material facts. The

responses failed to include required reference to the record. Also, Romero failed to file a

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brief in opposition to the defendants’ motions, as explicitly directed by both by Local Rule

7.6 and the court's own order.”); Gomez v. Cullen, 2022 WL 1183713, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 21,

2022) (“We have noted in the past that it is within the district court’s purview to mete out

appropriate penalties when a party has not complied with a local rule.”) (citing Weitzner v.

Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d Cir. 2018)); Rau v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins.

Co., 793 Fed. App’x 84, 87 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Because a failure to object to a statement of

facts is an admission under Local Rule 56.1, and the District Court has authority to impose

sanctions for noncompliance with the local rules, we find no abuse of discretion in the

decision to deem certain paragraphs of Allstate's SUF admitted.”); see also Manson v. Vogt,

2024 WL 4529562, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2024) (granting motion for summary

judgment, noting that “motion is deemed unopposed” under the Local Rule 7.6).

“Under Local Rule 56.1, a party must file a separate statement of material facts

along with any motion for summary judgment.” Weitzner, 909 F.3d at 613. “A party

opposing summary judgment must file a corresponding answer to the statement of material

facts, responding to the moving party’s filing.” /d. “Where an opposing party fails to object

in its answer, those facts in the moving party’s statement are considered admitted.” /d.

“Local Rule 56.1 was promulgated to bring greater efficiency to the work of the judges of the

Midaie District.” Id. However, a district court is “still recjuired to conduct a full analysis to

determine whether granting summary judgment was appropriate.” /d. 614. The Court

has reviewed the entire factual record and concludes that Plaintiff has failed to raise a

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genuine dispute of material fact as to any of her claims, and therefore, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on all claims. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’

motion for summary judgment in its entirety as more fully discussed below.

B. Plaintiff's ADA Claims Fail at Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff brings four separate claims under the ADA: disability discrimination (Count

|), failure to accommodate (Count II), interference (Count III), and retaliation (Count IV).

Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs ADA claims. As to the ADA

claim alleging discrimination in Count |, Defendants seek summary judgment, arguing that

there is no evidence that Plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability who could

perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation. (Doc.

23, at 17-22). Alternatively, Defendants claim that even if Plaintiff offered evidence that she

was qualified, her claim nevertheless fails because Defendants have proffered a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiffs employment and Plaintiff cannot show

pretext. (/d., at 22-24). In Count II and III Plaintiff brings claims under the ADA for failure to

provide a reasonable accommodation (Count II) and ADA interference (Count III).

Defendants seek summary judgment, claiming they engaged in the interactive process with

Plaintiff in good faith and provided her with a reasonable accommodation. (Doc. 23, at 24-

27). In Count IV, Plaintiff brings a claim under the ADA for retaliation. Defendants seek

summary judgment on Count IV, noting that there is no evidence that Defendants retaliated

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against Plaintiff due to any alleged disability. (Doc. 23, at 27-28). The Court agrees with

Defendants and will grant summary judgment on each of the four ADA claims.

‘The ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals who suffer a

disability.” Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharm., L.P., 401 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2005). “To

prove disability discrimination, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (i) they have a disability within

the meaning of the ADA; (ii) they are otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions

of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation by the employer; and (iii) they have

suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Morgan

v. Allison Crane & Rigging, LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2024) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted).

“A qualified individual with a disability is defined as person ‘with a disability who,

with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank,

N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). “In order to establish that a

plaintiff is ‘qualified’ under the ADA, the employee must show that he/she ‘satisfies the

requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment

position that such individual holds or desires.” /d. (quoting Skerski v. Time Warmer Cable

Co., 257 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2001)). “If the plaintiff is able to make that showing, ne/she

must then establish that with or without reasonable accommodation, he/she can perform the

essential functions of the position held or sought.” /d.

15

Here, Plaintiff's claim alleging disability discrimination under the ADA fails for at least

two separate reasons. First, there is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff was a

qualified individual with a disability who could perform the essential functions of her job with

or without reasonable accommodation. See Fowler v. AT & T, Inc., 19 F.4th 292, 303 (3d

Cir. 2021) (to maintain a disability discrimination claim, the plaintiff “must show that she was

qualified for her position... The ADA claim further requires [plaintiff] to show that, with or

without reasonable accommodation, she can perform the essential functions of that

position.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Plaintiff offers no facts or

evidence to support her ADA claims, and further failed to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact in opposition to the evidence offered by Defendants on summary judgment. Rather,

Plaintiff relies only on the allegations in the Complaint. It is Plaintiffs burden to prove her

claims, and, as the non-moving party at the summary judgment stage, she must identify and

raise a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Plaintiff failed to do so.

In addition, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff was a qualified individual with a

disability, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants have

proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiffs employment and

Plaintiff has not and cannot show pretext. Defendants have offered legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiffs termination—namely, Plaintiff's failure to provide

her employer with a firm return to work date, presented a request for an indefinite or open-

ended leave, her new tentative return date exceeded the length of time the Monroe County

16

Commissioners had provided to any other County employee under its policy, and was not a

reasonable accommodation request under the ADA as a matter of law. (DSOMF, 34-35).

Plaintiff offers nothing in response and does not claim or show a dispute of material fact that

Defendants’ reasons for her termination were a pretext for disability discrimination. Thus,

the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count |. See Moore v.

CVS Rx Servs., Inc., 142 F. Supp. 3d 321, 344 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (“The Court holds that there

is no genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiff failed to adequately establish the

elements of her prima facie case. Equally relevant, the Court also holds that Defendant has

proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification, which Plaintiff has failed to show was

merely pretextual.”).

In Count Il, Plaintiff alleges a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA. “A

plaintiff bringing an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim must establish: ‘(1) he was disabled

and his employer knew it; (2) he requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) his

employer did not make an a good faith effort to assist; and (4) he could have been

reasonably accommodated.” Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir.

2017) (quoting Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’! Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir.

2006)). “Reasonable accommodations are modifications or adjustments to the work

environment, or the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is

customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the

essential functions of that position.” Walton v. Mental Health Assoc. of Southeastern

17

Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661, 741 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted).

Here, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendants

failed to make a good faith effort in meeting Plaintiffs request for accommodation in the

form of additional leave. See Conneen, 334 F.3d at 333 (“both the employer and the

employee have a duty to act in good faith once the interactive process begins.”).3 “All the

interactive process requires is that employers make a good faith effort to seek

accommodation.” /d. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Itis undisputed that Defendants did in fact accommodate Plaintiff on several

occasions. (DSOMF, ff] 4-5, 16-17, 19, 23- 24). Moreover, the fact that Defendants did not

accommodate Plaintiff in the form of additional leave after she had exhausted the leave she

had been granted, does not mean Defendants failed to accommodate Plaintiff, especially

where, as here, the undisputed material record shows that the leave requested by Plaintiff

“exceeded the length of time that Monroe County Commissioners had provided to any other

County employee” and presented a request for an indefinite and open-ended leave.

(DSOMF, Ff] 25, 35); see also Walton v. Mental Health Assoc. of Southeastern

3 “The ADA itself does not refer to an interactive process.” Conneen, 334 F.3d at 329 (internal citation

and quotation marks omitted). “Rather, the text of the ADA requires only that employer make a reasonable

accommodation to the known physical or mental disability of a qualified person with a disability unless the

employer can show that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.” /d.

“However, applicable regulations provide that in order to determine the appropriate reasonable

accommodations it may be necessary for the employer to initiate an informal, interactive process with the

employee in need of accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the

disability and the potential reasonable accommodations that could over those limitations.” /d.

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Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Although unpaid leave supplementing

regular sick and personal days might, under other facts, represent a reasonable

accommodation, an employer does not have to allow leave of this type to the extent that

[defendant] had already granted it to Walton. A blanket requirement that an employer allow

such leave is beyond the scope of the ADA when the absent employee simply will not be

performing the essential functions of her position.”); Brangman v. AstraZeneca, L.P., 952 F.

Supp. 2d 710, 723 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“The ADA does not require employers to grant indefinite

or open ended disability leave.”).

The Defendants also met the county's policies and complied with Plaintiffs CBA. 4

Plaintiffs accommodation requests were granted, until they were properly denied.

Moreover, as stated by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment/reply to the Order to Show Cause, “[o]n summary judgment, a plaintiff need only

identify an accommodation that on its face does not cost more than its benefits.” (Doc. 26,

at 4). Yet Plaintiff failed to identify any accommodation, let alone one that “on its face does

not cost more than its benefits.” (/d.). Moreover, the Third Circuit has held that similar

accommodation requests, in the form of “continued leave,” “would have created an undue

4 Monroe County has a Disability Leave of Absence policy which provides: “The maximum duration

that a disability leave of absence can be approved is for six (6) months, which would include the maximum

twelve (12) weeks under F.M.L.A. If compelling reasons require an extension, it will be reviewed by the

County Commissioners to determine whether extension is warranted and whether it should be granted.”

(DSOMF, J 4). Similarly, Plaintiffs employment was also governed by a CBA with Teamsters Local 773,

which states: “The maximum leave of absence shall be for ... six (6) months in the case of off-the-job illness

or injury ... provided that any such leaves may be extended beyond these limits if required as a reasonable

accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act.” (/d., ] 5)

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burden on the” employer. Walton, 168 F.3d at 671. And Plaintiff argues nothing to the

contrary. Viewing all the facts and the inferences from those facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on Count II alleging failure-to-

accommodate under the ADA. See Capps, 847 F.3d at 157 ("Thus, Mondelez provided and

Capps received the accommodation he asked for. There is clearly a lack of evidence to

show that Mondelez did not make a good faith effort in accommodating Capps’ request... .

Since the record here does not support any failure to accommodate Capps, we affirm the

District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Capps’ failure-to-accommodate claim under

the ADA.”).

Similarly, Count III alleging interference under the ADA also fails for many of the

same reasons why Counts | and II fail. That is, there are no facts or evidence before the

Court from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendants interfered with any of

Plaintiff's rights under the ADA. “Section 503 of the ADA makes it ‘unlawful to . . . interfere

with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of rights under the ADA.” Piotrowski v.

Signature Collison Ctrs., LLC, 2021 WL 4709721, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2011) (citing 42

U.S.C. § 12203(b)). Plaintiff fails to identify any facts to support her ADA interference claim

alleged in Count Ill. To the contrary, the only evidence before the Court demonstrates that

Defendants made a good faith effort to accommodate Plaintiff's disabilities, did in fact

accommodate Plaintiffs disability, engaged in the ADA interactive process in good faith, and

did not interfere with any of Plaintiffs rights under the ADA. (DSOMF, fff 15-19, 23-30).

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And Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. Thus, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as

to Count II and III will be granted because there is no genuine dispute of material fact and

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Moore, 142 F. Supp. 3d 321

(M.D. Pa. 2015) (granting summary judgment to defendant on plaintiffs ADA failure to

accommodate claim, ADA failure to engage in interactive process claim, ADA retaliation

claim, and concluding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that employer's reason for

terminating her was pretextual).

Next, Defendants seek summary judgment on Count IV, where Plaintiff alleges

retaliation in violation of the ADA. “To establish a claim for unlawful retaliation pursuant to

the ADA, ‘a plaintiff must show (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the

employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; and (3) a

causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse

action.” Allen v. Lackawanna Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 2022 WL 1110323, at *6 (M.D.

Pa. Apr. 13, 2022) (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Because Plaintiff does not offer any direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, Plaintiff's

ADA retaliation claim is “controlled by the three-step burden shifting framework established

in McDonnell Douglas.” Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, (3d Cir.

2022).

Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff has made a prima facie case of ADA

retaliation (a doubtful proposition given the evidentiary record before the Court), her claim

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nevertheless fails because there is no evidence that Defendants’ legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiffs employment—based on her failure to

report to work after several extensions to do, were a pretext for disability discrimination.

Stated differently, there is simply no evidence that the decision to terminate Plaintiff was

casually connected, and in retaliation for, her exercise of any rights under the ADA. See

Allen v. Lackawanna Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 2022 WL 1110323 (granting defendant's

motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim alleging retaliation under the ADA).

Viewing the facts and the inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants discriminated, failed to

accommodate, interfered with, or retaliated against Plaintiff due to her disability or because

of her exercise of her rights under the ADA. To the contrary, Plaintiffs request for indefinite,

open-ended leave, does not state a claim under the ADA as a matter of law. See Walton,

168 F.3d at 671. Put simply, there are no facts from which a reasonable jury could find that

Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff or engaged in any impermissible conduct under

the ADA. Summary judgment will be granted to Defendants and Counts |, Il, III, and IV will

be dismissed.

C. Plaintiff's Title VIl Claim Fails

Plaintiff also brings a clam for racial discrimination under Title VII. “A Title VII

plaintiff may state a claim for discrimination under either the pretext theory set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973), or

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the mixed motive theory set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct.

1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), under which a plaintiff may show that an employment

decision was made based on both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.” Makky v. Chertoff,

541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008).

To establish her racial discrimination claims under the pretext theory, Plaintiff must

show that “(1) s/he is a member of a protected class; (2) s/he was qualified for the position

s/he sought to attain or retain; (3) s/he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the

action occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional

discrimination.” Makky, 541 F.3d at 214 (citations omitted). “If a plaintiff establishes a

prima facie case of discrimination, then an inference of discriminatory motive arises and the

burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

adverse employment action.” /d. “If the defendant does so, the inference of discrimination

drops and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered

reason is merely pretext for intentional discrimination.” Id.

According to Defendants, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has satisfied the

first three elements of her claim, the claim nevertheless fails because Plaintiff fails at the

fourth element—i.e., her termination arose under circumstances that could give rise to an

irferenice of intentional discrimination. (Doc. 3 at 28-32). More specifically, Deferijants

claim summary judgment is warranted because Plaintiff failed to identify a Caucasian

comparator who was treated more favorably than her, and that there is no evidence that the

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decision to terminate Plaintiffs employment was based on race. (/d.). Plaintiff does not

respond to Defendants’ arguments seeking summary judgment or direct the Court to any

facts or evidence supporting her claim. Because Plaintiff did not respond to DSOMF in

support of its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff has conceded those facts, and they

are deemed admitted under Local Rule 56.1.

Viewing all the facts and the inference from those facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, as the non-moving party, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

race played a role in Defendants’ termination of Plaintiffs employment. The undisputed

material factual record shows that race played no role in the termination of the Plaintiff.

(DSOMF □□ 39-40).5 And Plaintiff offers neither evidence nor augments to the contrary.

Because Plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination, the

burden never shifted to Defendants to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for

Plaintiffs termination. Even if the burden shifted, however, Defendants have offered a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiffs termination—namely, Plaintiff's failure to

provide her employer with a firm return to work date, presented a request for indefinite and

open-ended leave, and because her new tentative return date exceeded the length of time

5 “The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does not apply in a mixed-motive case in the

way it does in a pretext case because the issue in a mixed-motive case is not whether discrimination played

the dispositive role but merely whether it played ‘a motivating part’ in an employment decision.” Makky, 541

F.3d at 214. Plaintiff does not purport to set forth a cause of action for mixed-motive racial discrimination.

And, in any event, such claim would similarly fail because there is no evidence before the Court that race

played any role in Plaintiff's termination. Moreover, although the discrimination charge appears to have been

filed with both the EEOC and the PHRC, (Doc. 1, 8), Plaintiff does not purport to bring any state law claims

under the PHRA.

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the Monroe County Commissioners had provided to any other County employee under its

leave policy. (DSOMF, {J 34-35). Plaintiff does not offer a scintilla of evidence raising the

inference that her employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her termination was

merely a pretext for racial discrimination. See Vaughn v. Boeing Co., 733 Fed. App’x 617,

624 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Because Vaughn has not provided reason to disbelieve Boeing or find

racially discriminatory animus in his termination, he has failed to meet his burden to show

pretext under McDonnell Douglas.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on Count V will be granted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted in

its entirety. A separate Order follows. Cc □ 2

obert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

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