The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
AARON SAMSON RILEY #620219 )
and )
JOSE BONELGES GUILLEN ALONSO )
# 599903, ) No. 3:24-cv-00860
)
Plaintiffs, ) Judge Trauger
v. ) Magistrate Judge Holmes
)
CPT. COREY SLUSHER, et al., )
)
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Aaron Samson Riley and Jose Bonelges Guillen Alonso, both in the custody1 of the
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office in Nashville, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their civil rights. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiffs
submitted an Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 10).
I. PLRA SCREENING OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Amended Complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
1 Plaintiff Riley identifies himself as a pretrial detainee in the initial complaint. (Doc. No. 1 at 1).
Plaintiff Alonso’s initial submission (Doc. No. 8) was in Spanish, and the court has no access to a
Spanish translator. The Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 10) does not provide the status of either
Plaintiff.
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
A. Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiffs bring their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which creates a cause of action against
any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state
law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of
Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint
The allegations of the Amended Complaint are assumed true for purposes of the required
PLRA screening.
On October 5, 2023, Plaintiffs were assaulted by other inmates while in the custody of the
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office. Defendants Corporal Justyn Rhodes and Captain Corey Slusher
were assigned to Plaintiff’s pod, Charlie #1, on that date. Defendant Rhodes failed to complete
security checks every half hour as required by the Davidson County Sheriff’s Correctional
Officers’ handbook guidelines. Defendant Rhodes failed to account for and remove all cleaning
supplies that were used in the assault. Defendant Slusher failed to monitor his subordinate,
Defendant Rhodes.
The assault occurred in the restroom area of housing unit C-1. Plaintiff Riley was
attempting to exit the crowded restroom area when he was struck from behind and slammed against
the wall, causing him to lose consciousness. When he regained consciousness, he tried to get to
his feet “while a flurry of kicks and punches struck [him] in the face, head, and back area.” (Doc.
No. 10 at 3). Plaintiff Riley was then hit “with the handle of an unscrewed push-broom stick left
in the unit well after cell clean-up.” (Id.) Plaintiff Alonso also was hit with the same broomstick
handle during the incident.
Both Plaintiffs were taken to the hospital to receive treatment for their injuries. Plaintiff
Riley sustained lacerations to the face, a concussion, and a bruised ribcage. Plaintiff Alonso’s eye
socket was ruptured.
The Amended Complaint does not state what relief is sought by Plaintiffs.
C. Analysis
As the court reads the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to impose constitutional liability
against two jail employees because they allegedly failed to protect Plaintiffs from an attack by
other inmates and/or failed to intervene in an ongoing attack. Although Alonso does not identify
his custodial status, Riley identifies himself as a pretrial detainee. For purposes of the required
PLRA screening, the Court assumes that both Plaintiffs were pretrial detainees, rather than
convicted prisoners, at the time of the alleged attack. This distinction is relevant because the Eighth
Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment applies to convicted prisoners,
while the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees the rights of pretrial detainees
to be free from punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence by other inmates and to take
reasonable measures to protect their safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994).
Liability attaches to an officer’s failure to protect an inmate only where the inmate demonstrates
that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” and that the
prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s safety. Id. at 834. Historically,
detainee and prisoner claims analyzed the deliberate indifference standard “under the same rubric.”
Villegas v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013). In Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), however, the Supreme Court eliminated the subjective intent
element of a detainee’s claim of deliberate indifference in the context of excessive force, holding
that the relevant inquiry is whether the force purposely used was objectively unreasonable. Id. at
576 U.S. at 397-98. Considering Kingsley, the Sixth Circuit later modified “the subjective prong
of the deliberate-indifference test for pretrial detainees” to hold that a pretrial detainee can establish
deliberate indifference by proving “more than negligence but less than subjective intent —
something akin to reckless disregard.” Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2021)
(citing Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016)).
More recently, the Sixth Circuit took “the position that a failure-to-protect claim by a
pretrial detainee requires only an objective showing that an individual defendant acted (or failed
to act) deliberately and recklessly.” Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., 29 F.4th 721, 728 (6th Cir.
2022) (citing Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596). Specifically, liability attaches where the defendant officer
“[1] act[ed] intentionally in a manner that [2] put[ ] the plaintiff at a substantial risk of harm, [3]
without taking reasonable steps to abate that risk, and [4] by failing to do so actually cause[d] the
plaintiff’s injuries.” Stein v. Gunkel, 43 F.4th 633 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Westmoreland, 29 F.4th
at 729).
With these standards in mind, the court finds that the allegations of the Amended
Complaint are insufficient to allow the inference that either Defendant demonstrated reckless
disregard to “an unjustifiably high risk of harm” to Plaintiffs by failing to prevent the attack. See
Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). While Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendant Rhodes failed to complete security checks every half hour as required by jail policy2
and failed to account for and remove all cleaning supplies that were used in the assault, Plaintiffs
have not alleged any facts to indicate that Defendant Rhodes should have appreciated any
particularized risk to Plaintiffs by failing to do so. Plaintiffs do not provide any facts that would
indicate that either Defendant knew or should have known that the alleged inmate perpetrators had
any ill intent toward Plaintiffs prior to this incident or had a history of attacking other inmates in
the bathroom or in other locations within the facility. Further, Plaintiffs do not provide any facts
that would indicate that either Defendant knew or should have known that the alleged inmate
perpetrators, or any inmates, previously had used cleaning supplies to effectuate an attack on other
inmates prior to this incident. In sum, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts from which “a reasonable
officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved and the
2 “It is well settled that alleged violations of state prison policies are not actionable under Section 1983.” Boyd v.
Staggs, No. 1:19-cv-00007, 2019 WL 295087, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2019) (citing Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d
789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995)). Further, “no liberty interest subject to due process is created by TDOC policies and
regulations.” Taylor v. Dukes, 25 F. App’x 423, 424 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Rimmer-Bey). Thus, a prisoner-plaintiff
cannot proceed under Section 1983 based on a defendant’s failure to follow TDOC policies. This same reasoning
applies to a prisoner-plaintiff’s claims based on a defendant’s failure to follow jail policies, such as those raised by
Plaintiffs here.
obvious consequences” of Defendants’ conduct. Westmoreland, 29 F.4th at 730. See Morgan by
next friend Morgan v. Wayne Cnty., Mich., 33 F.4th 320, 327 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[a]n official who
was unaware of a substantial risk may not be held liable under the Eighth Amendment.”); Davis v.
Chorak, No. 22-1839, 2023 WL 2487339, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2023) (assuming arguendo that
plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, holding that attack “without warning” indicates lack of substantial
risk and defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s failure to protect
claims); Young v. Phillips, No. 3:22-CV-295-TAV-JEM, 2022 WL 4360848, at *3 (E.D. Tenn.
Sept. 20, 2022) (finding no viable failure to protect claim under Section 1983 where plaintiff failed
to allege that defendant “knew or should have known . . . that [assailant] had any ill intent toward
[plaintiff]”). Therefore, the court finds Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable failure-to-protect
claim under Section 1983 against Defendants.
With regard to Plaintiffs’ claim based on Defendants’ failure to stop an ongoing attack,
the Sixth Circuit in Patmon v. Parker, 3 F. App’x 337, 338 (6th Cir. 2001), and this Court, in
Hamby v. Parker, No. 3:17-cv-01596, 2018 WL 2264418, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 15, 2018), have
noted that there is no duty under the Eighth Amendment to stop every assault in progress before
injuries are inflicted. And prison guards have no constitutional duty to intervene in an armed
assault by an inmate when the intervention would place the guard in danger of physical harm.
Patmon, 3 F. App’x 337, 338. Thus, constitutional liability does not arise merely because an
officer fails to act immediately or does not engage in every possible option in response to an
inmate assault. See Bowers v. Power, No. 3:17-cv-01599, 2018 WL 1794730 at *7 (M.D.
Tenn. April 16, 2018) (Crenshaw, J.) (finding that prison inmate did not state a failure to protect
claim based upon mere allegation that prison guard failed to intervene to prevent attack on
inmate by an unidentified assailant); Brittain v. Clemons, No. 4:09CV-P123-M, 2011 WL
2471587 (W.D. Ky., June 21,
2011) (defendant entitled to summary judgment based on failure to show subjective intent to cause
harm, even assuming that defendant officer delayed for a few minutes prior to radioing for
assistance to break up active prison fight).
Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that the inmates who attacked Plaintiffs used a
broomstick handle as a weapon. As noted above, Defendants have no constitutional duty to
intervene in an armed assault by an inmate when the intervention would place the guard in danger
of physical harm. However, even if the Court did not consider the attack on Plaintiffs by multiple
inmates using a broomstick handle to be an “armed assault,” the Amended Complaint fails to allege
the state of mind of Defendants. Even more importantly, the Amended Complaint does not even
allege that Defendants were present at the scene when other inmates attacked Plaintiffs. There are
no allegations, for example, that Defendants failed to respond to a call for assistance, took too long
in calling for backup, or did not attempt to stop the attack. Without more, the Amended Complaint
fails to state a Section 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted based on Defendants’ failure
to intervene in the inmate attack of Plaintiffs.
II. CONCLUSION
Having conducted the screening required by the PRLA, the Court finds that the Amended
Complaint fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted via Section 1983. Accordingly,
this action is therefore DISMISSED.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
It is so ORDERED. bhi □□□ —
Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge