The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JENNIFER VRABEL, ) CASE NO. 1:24 CV 1193
)
) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
) AND ORDER
PROGRESSIVE NORTH )
RIDGEVILLE, LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
This matter is before the Court on the Motion of Defendant Progressive North Ridgeville,
LLC (“Progressive”) for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the alternative, motion in limine to
prohibit Plaintiff from introducing evidence of an ADA violation, or a violation of R.C.
4112.02(A) (alleged claims of disability discrimination.)(ECF #24).! Plaintiff has filed a brief in
opposition and Defendant has filed a reply brief in support. For the reasons that follow
Defendant’s Motion for partial judgment on the pleadings is granted.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Jennifer Vrabel filed this action on July 15, 2024 asserting that her former
While denoted as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, in fact Defendant seeks partial
judgment on the pleadings as to Counts II and III of Plaintiff's Complaint. There is no
motion with respect to Plaintiffs claim under the Family Medical Leave Act in Count I of
the Complaint.
employer, Defendant Progressive, denied her benefits and rights under the Family Medical Leave
Act (““FMLA”)(Count I), violated the Americans with Disability Act (““ADA”)(Count II’, and
violated the Ohio Disability law, Ohio Revised Code §§ 4112.02 and 4112.99 (Count IID.
The Complaint sets forth Plaintiffs claims under the ADA and Ohio Disability law and
the factual support for those claims in relevant part as follows:
9. Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as a licensed practical nurse
beginning December 3, 2021 until on or about December 2, 2023.
12. Plaintiff lives with and cares for her father, Robert Vrabel, who at all
relevant times has had a serious health condition within the meaning of the
FMLA, to wit, cancer.
13. Defendant approved Plaintiff's request for FMLA intermittent leave to
care for her father, which Defendant allowed her to use until on or about
December 2, 2023, when Defendant told her she could no longer take
intermittent leave but would have to use the remaining FMLA leave in one
block of time rather than intermittently.
16. Defendant laid Plaintiff off, forcing her to find other employment as
she needed an income.
20. Defendant is an employer as defined under the ADA.
21. At all times relevant Plaintiffs father has had cancer, a recognized
disability under the ADA, and was undergoing treatment which required
Plaintiff to provide care and comfort on an intermittent basis and for
which she previously sought time off.
22. Defendant knew about Plaintiff's father’s disability.
Plaintiff appears to have misnumbered her claims for relief in that her claim under the
ADA is also designated as Count I. Accordingly, the Court will treat Plaintiff's claim
under the ADA as Count II.
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23. Plaintiff was qualified for and could perform the essential functions of
her job with or without a reasonable accommodation.
24. Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiffs need to care for her father
on an intermittent basis on or after December 2, 2023 but instead required
her to take all her unused leave at one time when she only needed to be off
on an intermittent basis after he was given his therapy and then only for a
short period of time.
25. Plaintiff was fully capable of doing her job with the appropriate
accommodation. Instead, Defendant laid Plaintiff off and she was forced to
find other employment as she needed an income.
26. As result of Defendant's actions, Plaintiff suffered significant
emotional distress, lost income, promotional opportunities, and other
compensatory damages.
27. Defendant acted with malice and/or with reckless indifference to
Plaintiff's federally protected rights, in that it discriminated against
Plaintiff in the face of a perceived risk that its actions would violate
federal law, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an award of punitive damages.
28. Plaintiff timely filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on or about January 30,
2024, EEOC Charge No. 532-2024- 01522 alleging discrimination based
on disability as required by law A copy of her charge marked as Exhibit A,
is attached hereto.
29. Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue on or after April 30, 2024
from the EEOC giving her ninety (90) days to file suit. A copy of the
notice is attached as Exhibit B.
31. By it actions and inactions as set forth in Count Two, Defendant
violated Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A), which makes it unlawful for
any employer to discriminate against an employee because of disability
with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.
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32. Defendant acted with malice, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an award of
punitive damages.
Standard of Review
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to
delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The standard of review for a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). E.E.0.C. v. LH. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851
(6™ Cir. Ohio 2001) (citing Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6 Cir. Tenn. 1998)). □□□□□□
well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true,
and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to
judgment.” Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 240 (6"
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
The complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Solo v. UPS Co., 819 F.3d 788, 793 (6" Cir. Mich. 2016)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In construing the pleadings, the Court
accepts the factual allegations of the non-movant as true, but not unwarranted inferences or legal
conclusions. Holland v. FCA US LLC, 656 F. App'x 232, 236-37 (6" Cir. Mich. 2016) (citing
Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6" Cir. Tenn. 2000)).
Discussion
Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff's claims under the ADA
and §4112.02(A) (Counts II and because Plaintiff failed to allege that she has a disability
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recognized by the statutes.’ Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to extend the ADA and Ohio law to
require an employer to provide an employee without a disability a reasonable accommodation to
enable the employee to care for a disabled family member. As such, Plaintiff seeks to extend the
bounds of associational discrimination.
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating “against a qualified individual on
the basis of disability” in regard to the “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42
U.S.C. 3 12112(a). Under the ADA, “discrimination includes a failure to make ‘reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability ... unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
covered entity.’ ” Brumley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 F.3d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 2018)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). To establish a prima facie case for failure to
accommodate, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is disabled under the ADA; (2) she is otherwise
qualified for the position, with or without a reasonable accommodation; (3) her employer knew
or had reason to know of her disability; (4) she requested a reasonable accommodation; and (5)
The state law claims in Count III involve the identical subject matter and issues
as in Count JI. Federal and state disability discrimination claims, whether brought under
the ADA, 42. U.S.C. §12112 et seq., or Ohio's anti-discrimination statute, R.C. 4112.02,
are subject to the same evidentiary standards and may be evaluated concurrently.
Cortalillo v. eTech Ohio Comm'n Res., 2015 Ohio Misc. Lexis 183, *14 (Court of
Claims, Oct. 13, 2015), citing Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp. Inc., 627 f£.3d 193, 201 (6 th
Cir., 2010). Ohio courts look to the ADA, its regulations, and its interpretation of federal
courts for guidance in interpreting the Ohio statute. Smith v. Bd. Of Cuyahoga County
Comm'rs, 2006-Ohio-1073, 420 (8 th Dist.); Thomas v. PNC Bank, N.A., 2018-
Ohio-4000, 915. See Also Columbus Ci. Serv. Comm. v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St. 3d 569,
573 (1998). Accordingly, the claims in Counts II and II will be analyzed together.
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the employer failed to provide the reasonable accommodation. Aldini v. Kroger Co. of Mich.,
628 F. App'x 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff has not alleged that she is disabled under the
ADA and thus fails to establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate.
Instead, Plaintiff asserts, without further analysis, that “a non-disabled person has
standing for relief if they can show they suffered an adverse employment action because of their
association with a disabled person. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).” (ECF #29 at 1) Section
12112(b)(4) of the ADA, prohibits “excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a
qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified
individual is known to have a relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2006).
Citing the legislative history of this section, the Sixth Circuit explained that this section prohibits
employers from declining to hire a qualified applicant because it assumed that the applicant will
have to miss work or leave early in order to care for a disabled spouse. However, if the employer
hires the applicant, if the person violates a neutral policy concerning attendance or tardiness, the
employee may be dismissed even if the reason for the tardiness or absence is to care for the
disabled spouse. “Importantly, employers are not required to provide reasonable
accommodations to non-disabled workers under this section of the Act. See 29 C.F.R. §
1630.8 App. at 379 (2007); Larimer v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 370 F.3d 698, 700 (7th
Cir.2004); *487 Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1084 (10th Cir.1997).”
Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486-87 (6th Cir. 2011).(Emphasis
added.)
The crux of Plaintiff's claims under the ADA and Ohio law is that Defendant failed to
accommodate Plaintiff's need to care for her father on an intermittent basis and that she was
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fully capable of doing her job with the appropriate accommodation. (See ECF #1, §§ 24, 25)
However, since the right to reasonable accommodation is limited to disabled employees under
the ADA and does not extend to a non-disabled associate of a disabled family member,
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim under the ADA or §4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (ECF #24) is granted and judgment in favor of
Defendant is granted as to Counts II and III of the Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONALD C. NUGENT
United States District Judge
DATED: Li [wht 5, 1p
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