Jackson v. Robledo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

TRADARION JACKSON, §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:24-CV-2896-K-BW

§

AARON ROBLEDO; TRENTON §

FISCHER, CITY OF TERRELL, §

TEXAS; and SOUTHWESTERN §

CHRISTIAN COLLEGE, §

Defendants. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are multiple Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss Plaintiff

Jackson’s claims. On December 20, 2024, Defendant City of Terrell (the “City”)

filed its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 6 (“City Mot.”)), and supporting

brief, (Dkt. No. 7 (“City Br.”)). Jackson filed a response to the City’s motion on

January 24, 2025. (Dkt. No. 17 (“Resp. to City Mot.”).) The City filed a reply on

February 6, 2025. (Dkt. No. 20 (“City Reply”).) Defendant Aaron Robledo filed a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on January 29, 2025. (Dkt. No. 18 (“Robledo

Mot.”).) Jackson filed a response on February 14, 2025. (Dkt. No. 21 (“Resp. to

Robledo Mot.”).) Robledo did not file a reply. On March 4, 2025, Defendant

Trenton Fischer filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 22 (“Fischer

1 This case was referred to the United States magistrate judge for full case

management and for findings and recommendations on dispositive matters pursuant to

Special Order 3. (See Dkt. No. 3.) On August 23, 2024, it was transferred and reassigned to

the undersigned magistrate judge by Special Order 3-354. (See Dkt. No. 19.)

Mot.”)), and accompanying brief, (Dkt. No. 23 (“Fischer Br.”)). Jackson filed a

response on March 25, 2025. (Dkt. No. 24 (“Resp. to Fischer Mot.”).) Fischer did

not file a reply. Finally, Defendant Southwestern Christian University (“SWCC”)

filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 37 (“SWCC Mot.”)) and

supporting brief (Dkt. No. 38 (“SWCC Br.”) on May 24, 2025. Jackson filed a

response on June 16, 2025. (Dkt. No. 41 (“Resp. to SWCC Mot.”).) And SWCC

filed its reply on June 27, 2025. (Dkt. No. 42 (“SWCC Reply”).)

United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred this case to the undersigned

magistrate judge for case management. (Dkt. No. 26.) For reasons that follow, the

undersigned recommends that the District Judge GRANT the City’s and SWCC’s

Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, DENY Fischer’s and Robledo’s Rule 12(b)(6)

motions to dismiss, and allow Jackson to replead his claims against the City and

SWCC.

I. BACKGROUND

Jackson sues two police officers and their employing agencies for injuries he

allegedly suffered in connection with his arrest on November 19, 2022. According to

Jackson’s allegations in the complaint, he led officers in a high-speed chase in

connection with a suspected burglary. (See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 12.) Jackson

alleges that he parked in a residential driveway and got out of the car holding his

five-year-old daughter. (Id.) Jackson was in the backyard of the residence when

police arrived, among them Defendants Aarron Robledo (an officer with the SWCC

Police Department) and Trenton Fischer (with the Terrell Police Department). (Id.

¶ 13.) Jackson alleges that, manifesting an intent to surrender and cooperate with

officers’ commands, he raised his hands and handed his daughter over to an officer.

(Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) He further alleges that, while he was handing over his daughter,

Fischer began handcuffing Jackson, and officers threw him to the ground. (Id. ¶ 15.)

Jackson alleges that, although he was compliant with officer commands and

lying on the ground with his hands behind his back, Robledo released his K9 to

attack him, and Fischer and others hit and kicked him. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.) The K9

bit Jackson on his leg and his backside. (Id. ¶ 16.) Jackson alleges that he began

“convulsing in pain” from the dog bites and that any movement from that point was

not due to resisting police or attempting to flee. (Id.) Despite Jackson’s pleas to stop

the dog, the officers did not interfere. (Id.) According to Jackson, the officers also

placed their knees on his neck while continuing to punch and kick him. (Id. ¶ 18.)

At some point during the fray, Jackson was placed in handcuffs, and Jackson alleges

that the K9 “attack[]” and “brutality” from officers continued after he had been

handcuffed. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.)

Jackson alleges that he suffered serious physical injuries—including a torn

tendon in the back of his leg—as a result of “this violent and excessive force.” (Id.

¶ 20.) Jackson was transported to the hospital for treatment and required

approximately 20 stitches to his leg as a result of the K9 bites. (Id.) He also alleges

to have suffered “severe injuries to his wrists due to the officers excessively tightening

his handcuffs beyond what was necessary.” (Id.) After the hospital treated him, he

was transported and booked into the Terrell Jail. (Compl. ¶ 21.)

Jackson filed this lawsuit on November 18, 2024, against Fischer, Robledo,

SWCC, and the City asserting multiple causes of action. (See generally Compl.) He

maintains that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights and makes claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶ 1.) First, he contends that Fischer and Robledo

used excessive force against him. (Id. at 7.) Second, he avers that the City and

SWCC are liable for failure to train, supervise, or discipline. (Id. at 9.) Third, he

alleges that the City and SWCC are liable for maintaining unconstitutional customs,

policies, or practices of allowing excessive force and failing to intervene in the

application of excessive force that resulted in his injury. (Id. at 13-14.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court evaluates the

sufficiency of [the plaintiff’s] complaint by ‘accept[ing] all well-pleaded facts as true,

viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bramlett v. Med. Protective

Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 855 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (first alteration

added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,

495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). To state a claim upon which relief can be granted

and defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008). To

meet this “facial plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must

accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007).

However, the court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted

factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780

(5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that

all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations

omitted).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court limits its review to the face of

the pleadings. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). The

pleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins, 224 F.3d

at 498. The ultimate question is whether the complaint states a valid claim when

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan

Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). At the motion to

dismiss stage, the court does not evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success. It only

determines whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977).

III. ANALYSIS

Jackson asserts that all four Defendants violated his constitutional rights. He

alleges that both Fischer and Robledo used excessive force. Jackson also asserts that

SWCC and the City failed to train, supervise, or discipline their officers and

maintained unconstitutional customs, policies, and practices.

A. Municipal Liability

The general pleading standards apply to a claim against a municipality. See

Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., Tex., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021) (“There is no

heightened pleading standard for § 1983 claims against municipalities. To survive a

motion to dismiss, the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations but

still must state sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim on its face.” (citing Littell

v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. 2018))).

“A person may sue a municipality that violates his or her constitutional rights

[only] ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.’”

Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482 (quoting § 1983; citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 690 (1978)).

1. Unconstitutional customs, policies, and practices.

A municipality is a “person” subject to liability under § 1983 only if municipal

employees inflicted the deprivation of a constitutional right pursuant to an official

policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; see also Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237

F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, to state a claim for municipal liability, a

plaintiff must identify: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker

can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional

violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Valle v. City of Houston, 613

F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328

(5th Cir. 2002). Isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will

almost never trigger municipal liability. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. And a

municipality cannot be held liable simply on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell,

436 U.S. at 691.

“Official policy can arise in various forms. It usually exists in the form of

written policy statements, ordinances, or regulations, but may also arise in the form

of a widespread practice that is ‘so common and well-settled as to constitute a

custom that fairly represents municipal policy.’” James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612,

617 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579); see also Brown v. Tarrant

Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2021) (“An ‘official policy’ may take two

forms—either a ‘policy statement formally announced by an official policymaker’ or

a ‘persistent widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not

authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well

settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.’”

(quoting Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2010))).

“Under the second requirement, a plaintiff must show ‘[a]ctual or constructive

knowledge of [a] custom’ that is ‘attributable to the governing body of the

municipality or to an official to whom that body ha[s] delegated policy-making

authority.’” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 749 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Webster v. City of

Hous., 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)). And “a plaintiff must allege ‘moving

force’ causation by showing first, ‘that the municipal action was taken with the

requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the

municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.’” Id. (quoting Valle, 613 F.3d

at 542).

a. City of Terrell

The City argues that Jackson’s allegations under a Monell theory of liability fail

because “Plaintiff does not allege what official policy, practice or custom Terrell

implemented that affected Plaintiff, much less how such policy, practice, or custom

caused an alleged constitutional violation in the use of force that Plaintiff bases his

alleged claims on.” (City Br. at 6.) It further argues that Jackson’s allegations also

fail to meet the second and third elements because he failed to allege facts to show

action by a final policymaker and to establish deliberate indifference. (Id.) Jackson

counters that he “sufficiently identified the policies and customs being complained

of.” (Resp. to City Mot. at 15.) The undersigned agrees that Jackson failed to

plausibly allege that the City is liable under a Monell theory.

The Fifth Circuit has stated that “[t]o proceed beyond the pleading stage, a

complaint’s description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying

constitutional violation . . . cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.”

Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations

omitted). Here, Jackson’s allegations regarding the policy are vague and conclusory.

He does not point to a specific policy and instead vaguely asserts that the City

maintains policies such as “[u]sing excessive force[,]” “[p]roviding inadequate

training regarding use of force[,]” “[e]mploying and retaining officers who have been

know to be abusive[.]” (Compl. at 15.) But he provides no specific facts to supports

that the City does in fact have these policies.

Accordingly, because Jackson’s Monell claim fails on the first prong, the Court

should dismiss his claim against the City for unconstitutional policies, practices, and

customs. See Brown, 985 F.3d at 497 & n.11 (noting that where a plaintiff’s claim

fails as to one prong, a court “need not consider whether [his] claim also fails the

other two Monell prongs” (citing Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168-69)).

b. Southwestern Christian College

Jackson’s Monell claim for unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices

against SWCC fails for the same reason as his claim against the City.2 Jackson failed

to plausibly plead specific facts regarding such policy. Jackson’s policy allegations

are conclusory, as he avers that “SWCC maintained, or was deliberately indifferent

to, . . . [a] de facto policy of tolerating or ignoring the excessive force of use by its

officers, particularly in the deployment of K9s[,]” “[f]ailing to require meaningful

oversight or review of incidents involving the use of force or K9 deployment[.]”

2 SWCC noted that because Jackson asserted that SWCC operated under color of

state law SWCC would take such assertion as true and argue dismissal under the Monell

framework. (SWCC Br. at 4.)

(Compl. at 13.) As above, these allegations fail to allege specific facts, therefore,

Jackson’s claim against SWCC for unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice fails

and the Court should dismiss it.

2. Failure to train, supervise, or discipline.

“[T]he failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a

policy for which the [municipality] is responsible, and for which [it] may be held

liable if it actually causes injury.” Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 317 (5th

Cir. 2019) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). And, although

an alleged failure to train (or to supervise) “is a separate theory of municipal

liability,” “the same standard applies both to a failure to train [or to supervise] claim

and to a municipal liability claim.” Pinedo v. City of Dallas, Tex., No. 3:14-cv-958-D,

2015 WL 5021393, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2015) (citations omitted).

“To establish a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must ‘prove that (1) the city

failed to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there is a causal connection

between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the

plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate

indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.’” Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482

(quoting Pena, 879 F.3d at 623).

To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff normally must allege a “pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Pena, 879 F.3d at

623 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). But where a plaintiff does

not allege such a pattern, it is still possible to establish deliberate indifference through

the single-incident exception. Id. at 624.

The single-incident exception is “extremely narrow.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 549.

The “plaintiff must prove that the highly predictable consequence of a failure to train

would result in the specific injury suffered[.]” Id. (cleaned up). For a violation to be

“highly predictable,” the municipality “must have failed to train its employees

concerning a clear constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations that a

particular employee is certain to face.” Littell, 894 F.3d at 624–25 (cleaned up). The

single-incident exception “is generally reserved for those cases in which the

government actor was provided no training whatsoever.” Pena, 879 F.3d at 624.

a. City of Terrell

“Showing that a municipality’s training program is inadequate requires that

the plaintiff ‘allege with specificity how a particular training program is defective.’”

Bryan v. City of Dallas, 188 F. Supp. 3d 611, 620-21 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (quoting

Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 170). Jackson’s allegations against the City under this theory are

conclusory. Jackson does not plead any specific facts identifying a particular

program or any deficiencies within the program.

Additionally, Jackson fails to sufficiently plead deliberate indifference. He did

not plead facts plausibly alleging a pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees and instead pleaded conclusory allegations. (See Compl. at 13

(“The City’s failures to train, supervise, and discipline its officers amounted to

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of individuals[.]”).) Therefore

Jackson, also fails to plausibly allege the third prong.3

Accordingly, the Court should grant the City’s motion to dismiss Jackson’s for

failure to train, supervise, or discipline.

b. Southwestern Christian College

Jackson’s failure to train claim against SWCC suffers the same deficiencies.

Jackson failed to identify a particular training program and specific deficiencies of

that program. Instead, Jackson makes general assertions without particular facts.

For example, he asserts that “SWCC failed to adequately train its officers, including

Defendant Robledo, in areas critical to constitutional policing[.]” (Compl. ¶ 41.)

Jackson does not plausibly allege sufficient facts to meet the first element of a failure-

to-train § 1983 claim.

Jackson’s allegations regarding SWCC’s “deliberate indifference” are equally

conclusory. He does not provide facts and instead avers generally that “[t]he failures

of SWCC to train, supervise, and discipline its officers amounted to deliberate

indifference to the constitutional rights of individuals, including Plaintiff[.]” (Compl.

¶ 44.) He does not allege any facts addressing a pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained employees. As such, Jackson also failed to plausibly plead

that SWCC acted with deliberate indifference.

3 While it is possible for a plaintiff to allege plausible indifference through the single-

incident exception, Jackson’s complaint does not appear to plead such exception and thus

the undersigned does not address it.

Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Jackson’s claim against SWCC for

failure to train, supervise, and discipline.

B. Claims against officers.

Fischer and Robledo each seek dismissal of Jackson’s § 1983 claims based on

qualified immunity. (See generally Fischer Br.; see also Robledo Mot.) Robledo

additionally argues that Jackson failed to plausibly plead a § 1983 claim at all.

(Robledo Mot. at 5.)

“Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a

clearly established statutory or constitutional right.” Edmiston v. Borrego, 75 F.4th

551, 558 (5th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up), cert. denied sub nom. Crandel v. Hall, 144 S. Ct.

1002 (2024). When an official asserts qualified immunity, “[i]t is the plaintiff’s

burden to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Guerra v. Castillo,

82 F.4th 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The

plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to create the reasonable inference “(1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Edmiston, 75 F.4th at 558

(citation omitted). The Court addresses each prong of the qualified immunity

analysis in turn.

1. Constitutional violation.

Jackson alleges that Fischer and Robledo violated his Fourth Amendment

rights by applying excessive force. To prevail on an excessive force claim, he must

show “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was

clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.”

Elizondo v. Green, 671 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Collier v. Montgomery,

569 F.3d 214, 218 (5th Cir. 2009)). Jackson clearly alleges that he suffered an injury,

including a torn tendon and punctures, necessitating 20 stitches. (Compl. ¶ 20.) He

has plausibly pleaded the first element of an excessive force claim.

“Our precedents recognize that inquiries regarding whether a use of force was

‘clearly excessive’ or ‘clearly unreasonable . . . are often intertwined,’ and we

consider those questions together[.]” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 728

(5th Cir. 2018) (first alteration in original) (quoting Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738,

744 (5th Cir. 2017)). In excessive force claims, the reasonableness of an officer’s

conduct depends on the “facts and circumstances of each particular case, including

the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to

the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

We must adopt “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than

[judge] with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. Our inquiry is “whether the officers’

actions [we]re ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at

397. “In making this determination, a court should consider the totality of the

circumstances, ‘including [the Graham factors.]’” Darden, 880 F.3d at 728-

29 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

Applying these standards, the undersigned concludes on balance that Jackson

has alleged facts supporting an inference that both Robledo and Fischer used

excessive force against him. The severity of the crime at issue, weighs in favor of

Defendants. Jackson admittedly led officers on a high-speed chase in connection

with a suspected burglary. “Leading law enforcement on a vehicle pursuit is a severe

offense[.]” Tafolla v. Rodermund, No. 3:24-CV-0331-S, 2025 WL 875488, at *3 (N.D.

Tex. Mar. 19, 2025) (citing Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2022)).

Considering the next two Graham factors, the undersigned accepts Jackson’s

allegation that he had manifested surrender and cooperation when police first made

physical contact with him. (See Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) Likewise, Jackson alleges that

Robledo released the K9 to assault him and that Fischer continued punching and

kicking him after he was on the ground and had fully submitted to police custody.

(Id. at ¶¶ 16-18.) Although forcing Jackson to the ground might be reasonable, the

allegations that officers initiated or continued physical force against Jackson while he

was on the ground and had submitted to custody weigh in favor of finding that force

was excessive. See Tafolla, 2025 WL 875488, at *3-4. According to facts alleged in

the complaint, Jackson was at that later point subdued, see id. at *4, and posed no

threat of danger or escape. At that point, officers were required to reduce force, but,

according to the complaint, that is the point at which Robledo released the K9 onto

him and Fischer continued physically assaulting him. (See Compl. ¶¶ 15-17.) See

Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522-23 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding that the plaintiff was

no longer an immediate threat where he was not suspected of committing a violent

crime, had surrendered, and had no weapon on him).

These facts, taken as true, plausibly allege that the use force used was

objectively unreasonable. See Cooper, 844 F.3d at 524 (finding that defendant’s

continued allowance of a dog biting the plaintiff who was compliant and non-

threatening was objectively unreasonable); see also Tafolla, 2025 WL 875488, at *4

(finding that complaint alleged facts showing use of force was excessive and

unreasonable when they began punching an arrestee who was already on the ground

and subdued). Jackson has plausibly alleged that Robledo and Fischer applied

physical force that was excessive and unreasonable and, therefore, has pleaded a

claim for a constitutional violation.

2. Clearly established law.

Qualified immunity analysis considers whether clearly established law put

officials on notice that the constitutionality of the alleged conduct was beyond

debate. See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011). “When

considering whether a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity, [the Court

asks] whether the law so clearly and unambiguously prohibited his conduct that every

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the law.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “To answer that question in the

affirmative, [the Court] must be able to point to controlling authority—or a robust

consensus of persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in question

with a high degree of particularity.” Id. at 371-72 (internal quotation marks omitted).

But “this does not mean that ‘a case directly on point’ is required.” Id. at 372

(quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Rather, “existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. at 372

(quoting al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).

The central concept is “fair warning.” Id. at 372; Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d

757, 763 (5th Cir. 2012). “The law can be clearly established despite notable factual

distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so

long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue

violated constitutional rights.” Newman, 703 F.3d at 763 (quoting Kinney v. Weaver,

367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

“Furthermore, ‘in an obvious case,’ the Graham excessive-force factors themselves

‘can clearly establish the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.’” Id. at

764 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

At the time of the events alleged in the complaint, caselaw provided notice

that officers were prohibited from using excessive force by initiating, increasing, or

persisting in the use of serious physical force against a subject who had been subdued

and was not resisting arrest. “[The Fifth Circuit] caselaw makes certain that once an

arrestee stops resisting, the degree of force an officer can employ is reduced.” Cooper,

844 F.3d at 524. In Cooper, the plaintiff was pulled over by an officer on suspicion of

driving under the influence. 844 F.3d at 521. The plaintiff fled on foot, and a police

officer arrived with a K9. Id. The K9 found the plaintiff and bit him for one to two

minutes. Id. While the dog bit him, the plaintiff did not attempt to flee or strike the

dog, and he had his hands on the dog’s head. Id. The officer could see that plaintiff

had no weapons. Id. The officer defendant ordered plaintiff to roll onto his stomach,

and plaintiff complied. Id. But still, the officer did not release the dog, who

continued to bite. Id. The officer “did not order [the dog] to release the bite until

after he had finished handcuffing [the plaintiff].” Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed a

denial of qualified immunity for the officer and stated that the officer “had ‘fair

warning’ that subjecting a compliant and non-threatening arrestee to a lengthy dog

attack was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 525. This authority similarly gives fair

warning that releasing a K9 to bite a subdued subject—or allowing the K9 to persist

in biting a subdued subject—would be unreasonable and excessive force.

Similarly, Jackson’s allegations that Fischer punched and kicked him while he

was subdued on the ground state a violation of clearly established law. See Tafolla,

2025 WL 875488, at *6. In Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008), the Fifth

Circuit held that it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to slam an arrestee’s

face into a nearby vehicle when the arrestee was not resisting arrest or attempting to

flee. Id. at 502. By the time of the events alleged in the complaint, “it was clearly

established law that an officer cannot repeatedly punch a suspect once that suspect is

already subdued and no longer evading arrest.” Tafolla, 2025 WL 875488, at *7

(collecting cases).

Because Jackson’s complaint alleges facts that could establish that Robledo

and Fischer committed constitutional violations that violated clearly established law,

their motions to dismiss should be denied.

C. Leave to amend.

Although the undersigned concludes that Jackson has not pleaded claims

against the City and SWCC, it recommends that Jackson be given an opportunity to

replead those claims. Jackson has requested an opportunity to replead, and it is not

apparent that the pleading deficiencies are entirely incurable. See In re Am. Airlines

Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 567-68 (N.D. Tex. 2005); see also Great Plains Tr.

Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002).

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the

District Judge,

(1) GRANT Defendant City of Terrell’s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 6);

(2) GRANT Defendant SWCC’s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 40);

(3) DENY Defendant Robledo’s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 18);

(4) DENY Defendant Fischer’s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 22); and

(5) Allow Jackson to file an amended complaint within 28 days of the

District Judge’s resolution of these findings, conclusions, and

recommendations or by another deadline established by the District

Judge.

SO RECOMMENDED on August 13, 2025.

Ww

BRIAN McKAY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation will be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this

report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days of

being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be

specific, an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing

before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections

will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions

of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,

1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

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