holding that “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong”
- concluding that “proper exhaustion” means complying with the specific prison grievance requirements, not judicially imposed requirements
- concluding “that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and” inmates do not have “to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
MARIO M. THOMAS,
DOC # M68634,
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
JAMES W. MILLER,
Defendant.
__________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a prisoner civil rights action filed by a pro se Plaintiff. ECF No.
1. The operative pleading is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, ECF No.
19, alleging that the Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights
on November 6, 2023, by failing to protect him from another inmate.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF
No. 37. Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust all available
administrative remedies and failed to disclose his litigation history. Id.
Plaintiff was directed to file a response to that motion by May 2, 2025. ECF
No. 38. Plaintiff has responded, ECF Nos. 44 and 49, and the motion is
ready for a ruling.
Page 2 of 11
Standard of Review
“Before a prisoner may bring a prison-conditions suit under § 1983,
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 [PLRA] requires that he exhaust
all available administrative remedies.” Whatley v. Warden, Ware State
Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
and Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1822, 149 L.
Ed. 2d 958 (2001)). The issue of exhaustion under the PLRA is “treated as
a matter in abatement.” Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir.
2008) (cited in Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008)).
That means, it is a preliminary consideration or “a precondition to an
adjudication on the merits,” and is not jurisdictional. Bryant, 530 F.3d at
1374.
Ruling on a “motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is a two-step process.” Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082 (citation
omitted). “First, the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant’s
motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff’s response, and if they conflict,
takes the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true.” Id. “If, in that light, the
defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, it must be dismissed.” Id. (citing to Bryant, 530
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
Page 3 of 11
F.3d at 1373-74). “If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first
step, where the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true, the court then
proceeds to make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual
issues related to exhaustion.” Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082 (citing Bryant, 530
F.3d at 1373-74, 1376). The burden of proof for evaluating an exhaustion
defense rests with the Defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S. Ct.
910, 921, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007) (concluding “that failure to exhaust is
an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and” inmates do not have “to
specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints”).
Factual disputes concerning exhaustion may be decided by the court
sitting as fact-finder, “so long as the factual disputes do not decide the
merits and the parties have sufficient opportunity to develop a record.”
Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1373-74, 1376. When motions to dismiss are based on
issues not enumerated under Rule 12(b), then Rule 43(c) governs, and that
Rule “permits courts to hear evidence outside of the record on affidavits
submitted by the parties.” Id. at 1377, n.16. Further, a credibility finding
may be made after review of the relevant documentary evidence. Id.
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
Page 4 of 11
Exhaustion
In enacting the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Congress mandated that
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies
as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion
requirement of § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d
1321, 1324-26 (11th Cir. 1998); Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374 n.10. Courts lack
discretion to waive this requirement or provide continuances of prisoner
litigation in the event that a claim has not been exhausted prior to filing.
Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1325; see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122
S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (holding that “the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
allege excessive force or some other wrong”); Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d
1205, 1207-08 (11th Cir. 2000).
A prisoner must comply with the process set forth and established by
the State’s grievance procedures. See Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190,
1193 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, § 1997e(a) of the PLRA requires “proper
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
Page 5 of 11
exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2387
(2006) (concluding that “proper exhaustion” means complying with the
specific prison grievance requirements, not judicially imposed
requirements). “Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore,
is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Jones, 549 U.S.
at 218, 127 S. Ct. 910 (quoted in Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 627
F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2010)).
The Department of Corrections has a grievance procedure. FLA.
ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103. Inmates are required to first submit an informal
grievance at the institutional level. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.005. If the
informal grievance is denied, inmates must submit a formal grievance to
the warden’s office. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.006. If that is denied, or
the inmate is not satisfied with the response, he may submit a grievance
appeal to the Office of the Secretary. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.007.
Inmates must generally comply with all three steps of the grievance
process to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Rules do, however, provide a few exceptions.
Emergency grievances and grievances of reprisals, protective
management, admissible reading material, grievances
concerning sentence structure (release date calculations),
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
Page 6 of 11
inmate banking issues or sexual abuse grievances when the
abuse is alleged to have been committed by the Warden of the
institution where the inmate is currently housed may be filed
directly with the Office of the Secretary using the Request for
Administrative Remedy or Appeal, Form DC1-303.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.007(3)(a). Such a grievance must be
reviewed, but “if it is determined that the grievance is not an emergency
grievance, a grievance of reprisal, protective management, admissible
reading material, sentence structure (release date calculations), inmate
banking issues, or a grievance alleging a violation of HIPAA, the grievance
shall be returned to the inmate with the reasons for return specified
advising the inmate to resubmit his or her grievance at the appropriate
level.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-103.0073(d).
Defendant’s evidence showed that “the only relevant grievance that
Plaintiff submitted was a direct grievance appeal,1 log # 24-6-10761, and it
was returned without action.” ECF No. 37 at 6; see also ECF No. 37-2 at
14. Defendant acknowledges that the response to that grievance informed
1 It does not appear that Plaintiff filed a “direct” grievance. See ECF No. 37-2 at 14.
Plaintiff did not state at the beginning of his grievance that he was skipping steps of the
grievance process as required by Rule 33-103.007(3)(a)1. Moreover, Plaintiff claimed
within the grievance that he had submitted an informal grievance and a grievance to the
warden, but did not get a response. ECF No. 37-2 at 14. It would appear that Plaintiff’s
statement was accepted as true as his grievance was not rejected for having failed to
take the necessary preliminary steps. Id. at 13.
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
Page 7 of 11
Plaintiff that the matter would be “referred to the Inspector General’s Office
for appropriate action.” See ECF No. 37-2 at 13. However, Defendant
points out that “the response did not give Plaintiff a final determination on
the merits.” Id. at 6-7; see also ECF No. 37-2 at 13. Rather, Plaintiff was
advised that he could resubmit his grievance at his current location if he
was “within the allowable time frames for” doing so. ECF No. 37-2 at 13.
Grievance 24-6-10761 concluded2 by stating that Plaintiff’s “appeal [was]
returned without action.” A grievance that is “returned without action” is
insufficient to show proper exhaustion.
Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss asserted that he had
“exhausted ‘available’ administrative remedies” and Plaintiff said that
inmates did not need to take further action after having a grievance
“approved.” ECF No. 44 at 2, 6-8. While Plaintiff made general assertions
of exhaustion, the only specific statement made was that Plaintiff had a
grievance “approved and reported to the Office of the Inspector General,”
which was - according to Plaintiff - “all that’s required” for exhaustion. Id. at
9.
2 The response also advised Plaintiff of several deficiencies with his appeal - grieving
more than one issue and improperly requesting monetary compensation. See ECF No.
37-2 at 13.
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
Page 8 of 11
Plaintiff did not, however, provide the Court with a copy of his
approved grievances,3 nor did Plaintiff specifically state when the
grievances were submitted. Therefore, because Plaintiff suggested that he
had submitted a grievance which was “approved,” Plaintiff was provided an
opportunity to substantiate his contention.4 ECF No. 45. Plaintiff was
directed to submit a copy of the grievance which he contends was
“approved” to demonstrate that he exhausted administrative remedies. Id.
Plaintiff responded, ECF No. 49, but he provided argument only.
Plaintiff claimed that “all the grievance appeals has [sic] been denied,” but
Plaintiff did not provide copies of any “grievance appeal.” Id. at 1. Indeed,
Plaintiff’s assertion in his second response, ECF No. 49, contradicts his
first response, ECF No. 44, because there he claimed to have “exhausted
‘informal’ grievances remedies . . . .” ECF No. 44 at 9 (emphasis added).
His first response said only that he had filed “two informal grievances,” and
Plaintiff did not claim to have filed a grievance appeal. An informal
3 Plaintiff’s response says he filed “two informal grievances that were approved and
forwarded to the Office of the Inspector General” for review and investigation. ECF No.
44 at 9.
4 At another point in his response, Plaintiff indicated his “initial two informal
grievances . . . were approved and forwarded to the Office of the Inspector General for
review . . . .” ECF No. 44 at 9.
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
Page 9 of 11
grievance is the first step in the process and a grievance appeal is the third
step; they are different.
The Court has reviewed the copies of grievances submitted by the
Defendant. Plaintiff submitted an informal grievance about a disciplinary
report he received on November 6, 2023. Ex. B (ECF No. 37-1 at 7). It did
not assert, however, that the Defendant failed to protect him. Id. At any
rate, the grievance was “returned” and was not approved. That grievance
does not show exhaustion.
Similarly, Plaintiff submitted two formal grievances to the warden
about the disciplinary report. ECF No. 37-1 at 10, 12. Both of those
grievances were “denied.” Id. at 9, 11. Yet even if the grievances were
granted, Plaintiff only complained about the results of the disciplinary
report. Plaintiff did not raised the claim he presented in this case - that the
Defendant failed to protect him. Id. at 10, 12. Thus, neither grievance
shows exhaustion.
Plaintiff then filed three grievance appeals to the Secretary’s Office.
ECF No. 37-2 at 6-7, 10 (log # 23-6-39142, log # 2311-211-044, and log #
23-6-39131). Plaintiff complained about errors in “the decision of the DR
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
Page 10 of 11
Committe[e],” but he never claimed that Defendant Miller failed to protect
him. Id. All three appeals were denied. Id. at 5, 8, and 9.
As Defendant has correctly argued, the only evidence that Plaintiff
complained about Defendant Miller’s conduct was in grievance appeal 24-
6-10761. It was received and accepted in the Secretary’s Office, but it was
neither denied or approved. ECF No. 37-2 at 13. It was “returned without
action” and, therefore, does not show exhaustion. Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 37, should be granted. In light
thereof, there is no need to address Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff
failed to honestly disclose his litigation history.
RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss, ECF
No. 37, be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s amended complaint be DISMISSED
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997(e).
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on August 13, 2025.
S/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF
Page 11 of 11
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other
parties. A party may respond to another party’s objections within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. If a
party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Case No. 4:24cv162-MW-MAF