Williams v. Richardson Independent School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ANDRE W. WILLIAMS, SR., §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:24-CV-1288-D-BW

§

RICHARDSON ISD, §

Defendant. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Richardson ISD’s (“RISD”) motion to dismiss

Plaintiff Andre W. Williams’s amended complaint, (see Dkt. No. 28 (“Mot.”)).

RISD filed a supporting appendix, (see Dkt. No. 29 (“Def. App.”)). On March 4,

2025, Williams filed his response, (see Dkt. No. 36 (“Resp.”)), and supporting

appendix, (see Dkt. No. 37 (“Pl. App.”)). RISD filed its reply on March 19, 2025,

(see Dkt. No. 38 (“Reply”)). Also before the Court is Williams’s March 24, 2025,

opposed motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 39), RISD’s

response to that motion (Dkt. No. 40), and Williams’s reply (Dkt. No. 41).

For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that the District

Judge GRANT RISD’s motion to dismiss, DISMISS Williams’s claims with

1 This case was referred to the United States magistrate judge for case management

and for findings and recommendations on dispositive matters pursuant to Special Order 3.

(See Dkt. No. 3.) On August 23, 2024, it was transferred and reassigned to the undersigned

magistrate judge by Special Order 3-354. (See Dkt. No. 19.)

prejudice, and DENY Williams’s motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural background.

Williams, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit in a Texas state court on April

26, 2024, alleging multiple claims of discrimination and retaliation against his former

employer RISD. (See Dkt. No. 1, Doc. 1-1.) RISD removed the case based on

federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1.) On June 4, 2024, RISD filed a motion to

dismiss the original complaint. (See Dkt. No. 7.) The undersigned filed Findings,

Conclusions, and Recommendations on December 23, 2024 (see Dkt. No. 20

(“FCR”)), recommending that the District Judge partially grant and partially deny

the motion to dismiss and recommended that Williams be allowed to replead his

non-time-barred claims.

Williams filed objections to the undersigned’s FCR on January 6, 2024. (Dkt.

No. 21.) He also filed an amended complaint against RISD on January 21, 2025.

(See Dkt. No. 24 (“Am. Compl.”).) United States Senior District Judge Sidney A.

Fitzwater “reviewed de novo the portions of the [FCR] to which objection was made,

and reviewed the remaining [FCR] for plain error. Finding no error, the court

adopt[ed] the [FCR][.]” (Dkt. No. 25 at ECF p. 1.) Additionally, because Williams

had already filed an amended complaint, “the court [re-referred] this case to the

United States Magistrate Judge for further proceedings and the completion of

screening.” (Id.)

RISD filed the present motion to dismiss aimed at the amended complaint on

February 18, 2025.

B. Scope of factual allegations.

As a preliminary matter, the undersigned determines which factual allegations

may be considered for purposes of this pending motion. Williams’s amended

complaint includes 120 pages. (See Am. Compl.) Of those 120 pages, 47 are the

amended complaint, and the remaining pages are attached exhibits. (See id.)

Because the exhibits are attached to the amended complaint, the undersigned may

consider them. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir.

2000).

Noticeably missing from the exhibits is Williams’s Texas Workers

Commission discrimination charge (“TWC Charge”). (See Am. Compl.) RISD filed

the TWC Charge in an appendix the same day it filed the motion to dismiss. (See

Def. App.)

Generally, when a court considers a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

the Court “must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments

thereto.” Collins, 224 F.3d at 498. In Collins, however, the Fifth Circuit explained

that “[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered

part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central

to [his] claim.” Id. at 498-99; see also Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546

(5th Cir. 2010) (stating that courts generally must not go outside the pleadings but

may consider documents attached to the motion to dismiss that “are referred to in

the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim”).

Here, RISD filed the TWC Charge as an appendix in support of its motion to

dismiss. Williams references the charge by alleging that “[he] timely filed

employment discrimination and retaliation charges against Richardson ISD with the

TWCCRD and the EEOC.” (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 21.) As with the previous

FCR, the undersigned finds it appropriate to consider the factual allegations in the

TWC Charge. (FCR at 10-11.)

In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Williams provides more factual

allegations and additional exhibits that he did not incorporate into the amended

complaint. (See Resp.; see also Pl. App.) “[B]ecause his evidence is not also attached

to the complaint, the court cannot consider it in deciding [RISD’s] motion to

dismiss.” McGee v. Hiland Dairy Foods Co., LLC, No. 3:23-CV-2630-D, 2024 WL

1251519, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2024). “This court has repeatedly held that,

when ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court does not consider additional facts that

are alleged in a response brief but not in the complaint.” Obinyan v. Prime

Therapeutics LLC, No. 3:18-CV-0933-D, 2019 WL 5647955, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31,

2019) (citing Wilson v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 2019 WL 2578625, at *4 (N.D.

Tex. June 24, 2019)); see also Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th

Cir. 2008) (“Because the court reviews only the well-pleaded facts in the complaint, it

may not consider new factual allegations made outside the complaint[.]”).

Therefore, in making these findings, the undersigned reviews only those facts

alleged in the amended complaint, the attached exhibits as referenced in the

complaint, and the TWC Charge attached to the motion.

C. Factual allegations.

This civil action arises from Williams’s employment at and termination from

RISD. (See generally Am. Compl.) He asserts that throughout his employment, and

leading to his termination, RISD discriminated against him due to his gender,

national origin, race, age, and disability, and it retaliated against him based on

protected conduct. (See id.)

Williams is a 62-year-old African-American and Native-American man. (Am.

Compl. at ECF p. 3.) His allegations of discrimination go back as far as 2020.2

Williams’s amended complaint addresses a series of events spanning multiple years,

many of which are vague or conclusory. Liberally construing his amended

complaint, the undersigned summarizes the relevant facts.

Williams worked as a school bus driver for RISD. (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 4.)

According to Williams, he had additional duties and responsibilities, such as being a

CDL instructor, school bus driver, and assistant to the safety supervisor. (Id. at ECF

pp. 4, 5.) He asserts that RISD knew about his alleged disability since 2016 and

points to one of his attached exhibits as evidence. (Id. at ECF p. 4.) The exhibit,

2 Williams mentions one alleged discrimination incident in 2019. (Am. Compl. at

ECF p. 4.) However, Williams had previously abandoned any claims from 2018 and 2019.

(See Dkt. No. 16 at 9; see also FCR at 13.)

however, does not identify a disability or reflect anything about a disability. (See id.

at ECF p. 58 (welcome email congratulating Williams about joining RISD and

giving further instructions about forms and documents to bring to orientation).)

In August 2020, Williams applied for the internal position of “Driver

Supervisor” and was a finalist for that position. (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 5.)

Ultimately, the job was given to external applicant Jennifer Stevens, a white woman.

(Id.) Williams alleges that multiple people—Thomas Crane, the Director of Human

Resources; Dr. Terry Harris, a Human Resources (“HR”) administrator; Larry

Hudson, the Director of Transportation; and Eric Thompson, Safety Supervisor—

informed him that “the position had to be given to a Caucasian female[.]” (Id. at

ECF p. 5.) Williams also asserts that after finding this out, he complained to HR

regarding racial and national origin discrimination. (Id.)

According to the amended complaint, a number of Williams’s colleagues

made derogatory comments to him regarding his Native American status around

September 2020. (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 5.) The following month, on October 6,

2020, an intoxicated woman rear-ended a school bus driven by Williams. (Id. at

ECF p. 6.) Williams alleges that the intoxicated woman and her son racially

slandered him. (Id.) RISD subsequently recognized Williams and gave him a card

featuring M&M cartoon characters and a package of M&M candy in appreciation for

his adherence to protocol and professional handling of the incident. (Id. at ECF pp.

71-72) Williams avers that RISD’s use of M&Ms exhibited racial animus. (Id. at

ECF p. 6.) Finally, in December 2020, Williams alleges that he filed a safety report

to Crane, Hudson, and Thompson addressing bus overcrowding. (Id.)

Williams alleges that he suffered a workplace injury on February 22, 2021.

(Am. Compl. at ECF p. 6.) He filed a workers’ compensation (“workers’ comp”)

claim following the injury. (Id. at ECF p. 7.) The following month, in March 2021,

Williams filed a public records request to obtain video footage during the time of his

workplace injury. (Id.) That same month, Williams alleges that Julie Whiteman, the

Director of Risk Management, made derogatory comments regarding his age, such

as “RISD should not be responsible for liability of injury just because you (Williams)

are getting old.” (Id.) Williams also asserts that he complained to HR about this.

(Id. at ECF pp. 7-8.)

Williams contends throughout his amended complaint that RISD retaliated

against him numerous times. In one instance, he asserts that RISD attempted to

manipulate his FMLA and sick leave hours in May 2021. (Am. Compl. at ECF pp.

7-8.) In another instance, he alleges that RISD retaliated against him by stating that

it terminated him on May 28, 2021.3 (Id. at ECF p. 8.) He also asserts that RISD

retaliated in June 2021 by logging into his employer-provided email account and

deleting important emails and by interfering with a home purchase and loan

approval. (Id.) Williams also asserts that RISD retaliated against him through

3 Notably, Williams’s exact termination date is disputed.

medical providers—for example, he attributes a long wait time at a CareNow as

RISD’s responsibility. (See id. at ECF p. 40.)

Williams avers that, by June 10, 2021, a physician declared him “fit for work

with no restrictions” after a physical examination. (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 9.)

Williams states that is when he “made the accommodation request to RISD to allow

him to return to his prior duties as an Instructor Trainer[.]” (Id.) Williams does not

mention what the requested accommodation was, and he simply asserts he requested

to return. (See id.)

During the following month, Williams avers, his supervisors made comments

relating to his age after his injury, such as “you are getting old man,” “you are not

getting any younger, after a while we all need to face getting old,” and “perhaps old

age is telling you, you just need to retire.” (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 10.) That

summer, Williams also applied to the positions of Safety Supervisor, Assistant Safety

Supervisor, and Driver Supervisor, which became available in July and August 2021.

(Id. at ECF p. 10.) Williams did not receive any of the positions he applied for. (Id.)

By January 2022, Williams filed for unemployment compensation with the

Texas Workforce Commission. (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 14.) Soon after, Williams

filed a discrimination complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights

Division (“TWCCRD”). (See Def. App.; see also Am. Compl. at ECF p. 21.) The

actual date of filing the charge is somewhat uncertain—Williams alleged to have

filed it on January 14, 2022, (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 21), but an email from the

TWCCRD states that Williams first filed a complaint on January 21, 2022, (id. at

ECF p. 50), and the TWC Charge lists a date of June 24, 2022, (Def. App. at 1).

Williams alleges that RISD’s retaliation continued until recently. For

example, he avers that RISD is colluding with medical centers to interfere with his

treatment. (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 18.) Williams also alleges that RISD has been

intentionally providing a long-term disability insurer with incorrect information. (Id.

at ECF p. 20.)

Williams received his EEOC right-to-sue letter on May 3, 2024, and his

TCHRA right-to-sue letter on February 29, 2024. (Id. at ECF p. 2.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court evaluates the

sufficiency of [the plaintiff’s] complaint by ‘accept[ing] all well-pleaded facts as true,

viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bramlett v. Med. Protective

Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 855 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (first alteration

added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,

495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). To state a claim upon which relief can be granted

and defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008). To

meet this “facial plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must

accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007).

However, the court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted

factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780

(5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that

all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations

omitted).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court limits its review to the face of

the pleadings. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). The

pleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins, 224 F.3d

at 498. The ultimate question is whether the complaint states a valid claim when

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan

Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). At the motion to

dismiss stage, the court does not evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success. It only

determines whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977).

A pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are liberally construed. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976). It is well established that a “pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Even so, ‘mere conclusory

allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.’” Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d

489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018);

United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989)). And “liberal

construction does not require that the Court . . . create causes of action where there

are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-CV-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at

*8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013).

A plaintiff may not amend his allegations through a response to a motion to

dismiss, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); leave to amend must be granted freely “when justice so

requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). One reason to deny leave is futility: “If the

complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal, then amendment is futile and

the district court [is] within its discretion to deny leave to amend.” Martinez v. Nueces

Cnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water

Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2022)).

III. ANALYSIS

Construing Williams’s amended complaint liberally, per his pro se status, he

asserts the following claims: (1) disability discrimination, including failure to

accommodate, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Texas

Commission on Human Rights (“TCHRA”), (2) discrimination based on a protected

status under Title VII and the TCHRA, (3) age discrimination under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), (4) retaliation for protected activities

under Title VII, the ADEA, and Texas law, (5) discrimination under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981, (6) breach of contract under Texas law, and (7) fraud under Texas law. (See

generally Am. Compl.) RISD moves to dismiss all Williams’s claims.

A. Williams fails to plausibly allege a disability discrimination claim under the

ADA and under the TCHRA.

Williams alleges that, beginning in July 2021, RISD began discriminating

against him because of a disability. (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 32.) He contends that

RISD refused to promote him, failed to accommodate him, and ultimately dismissed

him due to the alleged disability. (Id. at ECF p. 31-32.) Williams’s disability

discrimination claims are conclusory and contradictory.

The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a qualified individual

based on the individual’s disability.4 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc.,

773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical

or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of

such individuals; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having

4 “Because TCHRA parallels the language of the ADA, Texas courts follow ADA

law in evaluating TCHRA discrimination claims.” Williams v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 717

F. App’x 440, 444-45 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 285–

87 (5th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). Therefore, the analysis of

Williams’s claims ADA claims apply to his TCHRA disability claims as well.

such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The term “disability” is construed

broadly to ensure coverage in accordance with the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).

To “be substantially limited means to be unable to perform a major life activity that

the average person in the general population can perform, or to be significantly

restricted in the ability to perform it.” EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d

606, 614 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)). “[M]ajor life activities

include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,

hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,

learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42

U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

To make a prima facie showing of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must

allege that: “(1) [he] has a disability, or was regarded as disabled; (2) he was qualified

for the job; and (3) he was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of

his disability.” Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir.

2016) (citing LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d at 697). Adverse employment decisions are

‘ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging,

promoting, . . . compensating,’ or demoting.” Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., 2 F.4th

460, 470 (5th Cir. 2021). “To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff

‘must show that (1) [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability

and its consequential limitations were known by the covered employer; and (3) the

employer failed to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ for such known limitations.’”

Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions, L.P., 75 F.4th 469, 485 (5th Cir. 2023), as revised

(Aug. 4, 2023) (citation omitted).

As he did in his original complaint, Williams argues that he is disabled

because he meets the disability definition used by the Social Security Administration

(“SSA”). (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 29.) The Court previously rejected this basis for

claiming a disability, because the SSA’s disability determination differs from the

ADA’s standards. (FCR at 21.)

Williams’s remaining allegations do not plausibly allege a disability. He

asserts he has had at least one disability since 2009, but it “was accelerated to severe”

by the February 2021 injury. (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 30.) Because Williams

appears to allege that he was disabled both before and after the injury—but that he

was more so after the injury—the undersigned assesses Williams’s allegations to

determine whether he alleges that he was disabled during either period.

Prior to his injury, Williams asserts that he “possessed a mental impairment

affecting the major life activity of sleep since 2009[,]” (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 30),

and a “musculoskeletal disorder, nervous system disorder, and a circulatory disorder

which [a]ffect the major life activities of sitting, walking, and standing,” (id.). But he

also alleges that “[he] was asymptomatic to the effects of this disabilities[.]” (Id.)

Williams provides no further details because—as he asserts in his response without

support—“a plaintiff generally does not need to disclose specifics of the disability in

detail unless absolutely necessary to support the claim[.]”5 (Resp. at ECF p. 14.)

“Merely stating that his condition substantially limits various life activities is

conclusory. [Williams] fails to allege any facts about the actual or expected duration

and impact of the impairment.” Stewart v. AutoRevo, Ltd., No. 3:17-CV-0019-B, 2017

WL 5177119, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2017) (holding that plaintiff’s statements that

“[he] began suffering from a painful back/neck condition that substantially limited

his sleeping, sitting, lifting, and bending[]” was insufficient to establish disability and

granting motion to dismiss).

Likewise, Williams fails to plausibly allege a record of such disability or that

he was regarded as disabled. He conclusorily states that RISD knew about the

alleged mental impairment since 2018 but does not allege facts establishing RISD’s

knowledge of the disability. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Williams fails

to plausibly allege he was a qualified individual with a disability prior to his

workplace injury.

The undersigned next turns to whether Williams qualifies as disabled after his

workplace injury. According to Williams, his alleged disability “was accelerated to

severe as a result caused by his work related injury[.]” (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 30.)

Yet he simultaneously alleges that he passed a “medical exam that cleared him with

the ability to drive on June 10, 2021.” (Id. at ECF p. 31.) He also contends that the

5 In his response, Williams does allege that his mental impairment is related to post-

traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Resp. at ECF p. 4.) But this fact is not in his amended

complaint and thus, as explained above, is not properly before the Court.

physician declared him “fit for work with no restrictions[.]” (Id. at ECF p. 9.)

Williams does not provide additional details as to how his injury affected his work-

related abilities. (see id. at ECF pp. 32-33.) Instead, he simply avers he was denied

promotions because of his disability. (Id. at ECF p. 33.) Even considering the

leeway afforded pro se plaintiffs, Williams has failed to plead facts creating a

plausible inference that he is disabled under the ADA. Therefore, he has failed to

plead the first element of a disability discrimination prima facie case and the first

element of a failure to accommodate claim. The Court should dismiss his disability

claims under the ADA and the TCHRA.

B. Williams’s claims of disparate treatment under Title VII and the TCHRA

should be dismissed as time-barred.

Williams realleges his race, gender, and national origin disparate treatment

discrimination claims. In assessing RISD’s motion to dismiss the original complaint,

the undersigned recommended denying the motion to dismiss based on Williams’s

allegations that he was not promoted because RISD required that the position be

awarded to a white female. (FCR at 18-19.) The undersigned noted, however, that

Williams’s original complaint lacked factual allegations concerning essential details

and dates. (See FCR at 2 (“Williams’s pro se complaint addresses a series of events

spanning multiple years, and Williams does not clearly allege dates for certain

events.”).) In recommending that Williams be permitted to file an amended

complaint, the undersigned explained that any amended complaint “should be clear

and precise, which includes asserting dates for relevant events.” (Id. at 29.) Having

provided temporal clarity to his allegations of discriminatory treatment, it is apparent

that his claims are time-barred.

Williams avers that RISD discriminated against him: (1) in August 2020,

when he applied for the position of Driver Supervisor and did not receive it, (Am.

Compl. at ECF p. 5); (2) in September 2020, when Williams was subjected to

derogatory comments regarding his Native American status, (id. at ECF p. 5-6); and

(3) in October 2020, when he received a card depicting M&M characters from RISD

expressing appreciation for handling a difficult situation created by maltreatment by

an intoxicated driver who hit the bus he was driving, (id. at ECF p. 72). Williams

makes no mention of these events in his TWC Charge. (Def. App. at 1.)

Before an individual may pursue a Title VII claim in federal court, he must

timely exhaust administrative remedies. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376,

378–79 (5th Cir. 2002). Exhausting remedies is also a requirement before filing

under the ADEA, ADA, or the TCHRA. Garcia v. Penske Logistics, L.L.C., 631 F.

App’x 204, 207 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (“Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the

ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing employment

discrimination claims in federal court.”); Williams v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 717 F.

App’x 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Under [TCHRA], a Texas plaintiff must exhaust

administrative remedies by filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission or the Texas Workforce Commission.”). A plaintiff exhausts

administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC or the TWC within the

required deadlines.

In Texas, which provides a state administrative mechanism to address claims

of employment discrimination, a Title VII plaintiff must file a charge of

discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after learning of the conduct alleged.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Griffin v. City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610, 612-13 (5th Cir.

1994). And a complaint under the TCHRA “must be filed not later than the 180th

day after the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Tex. Lab.

Code Ann. § 21.202(a). Under the Worksharing Agreement between the EEOC and

the TWC, a complaint filed with the EEOC, and forwarded by the EEOC to the

TWC, satisfies the requirements of the TCHRA. See Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d

458, 461 (5th Cir. 2000).

Williams alleges that he filed his TWC Charge on January 14, 2022. (Am.

Compl. at ECF p. 21.) The actual charge, however, is dated June 24, 2022, and

notes that the earliest discrimination took place on February 1, 2021. (Def. App. at

1.) Using Williams’s earliest possible date, 180 days before January 14, 2022, is July

18, 2021; and 300 days before January 14, 2022, is March 20, 2021. Any events

occurring prior to those dates are time-barred and cannot support a claim of

discrimination. Here, each event Williams references in relation to the alleged

gender, race, and national-origin discrimination occurred in 2020, prior to both

deadlines. Therefore, Williams’s gender, national origin, and race disparate

treatment claims are time-barred, and the Court should dismiss them.

C. Williams fails to plausibly allege a claim under the ADEA.

Williams alleges that RISD discriminated against him because of his age when

it fired him. (Am. Compl. at ECF p. 35.) Williams supports his claim by describing

occasions when RISD employees made comments about his age. Specifically,

Williams alleges that Whiteman made derogatory comments about his age in March

2021 after his injury, saying “RISD should not be responsible for liability of injury

just because you (Williams) are getting old.” (Id. at ECF p. 7.) Williams also avers

that in July 2021, Crane, Hudson, and Thompson also commented on Williams’s

age when they said “you are getting old man[,]” “you are not getting any younger,

after awhile we all need to face getting old[,]” and “perhaps old age is telling you,

you need to retire[.]” (Id. at ECF p. 10.) He contends that he “was replaced by

someone younger,” but adds little detail to his allegations, stating that “[o]nly

discovery would reveal the names and exact ages.” (Id. at ECF p. 35.)

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA in

connection with the termination of his employment, Williams must show that

“(1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was within the

protected class at the time of discharge; and (4) he was either i) replaced by someone

outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise

discharged because of his age.” Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, LP, 793 F.3d 470, 474

(5th Cir. 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have not specified a

distinct pleading threshold for ADEA claims. Haskett v. T.S. Dudley Land Co., Inc.,

648 F. App’x. 492, 495 (5th Cir. 2016). “Thus, the typical Rule 12(b)(6) standard

applies: a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Id. (citing Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2013)) (internal

quotations omitted).

“[I]n order for comments in the workplace to provide sufficient evidence of

discrimination, they must be 1) related [to the protected class of persons of which the

plaintiff is a member]; 2) proximate in time to the [complained-of adverse

employment decision]; 3) made by an individual with authority over the employment

decision at issue; and 4) related to the employment decision at issue.” Rubinstein v.

Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal

quotations omitted).

Here, Williams fails to plausibly allege that the remarks are related to his

termination for several reasons. First, Williams fails to allege facts in his amended

complaint showing that those who made the remarks—Whiteman, Hudson, Crane,

and Thompson—had “authority over the employment decision at issue.” McIntyre v.

Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-237-Z, 2021 WL 489224, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb.

10, 2021) (dismissing ADEA claim in part because plaintiff failed to allege that

person who stated plaintiff was getting older had authority over her employment

decision or made ultimate termination decision). Apart from these remarks,

Williams does not allege additional facts supporting the contention that his age was a

factor in his termination. Accordingly, Williams fails to plausibly allege an age

discrimination claim.

As an independent reason to dismiss, Williams has failed to plausibly allege he

was replaced by someone substantially younger than him. Williams asserts in

conclusory fashion that he was replaced by someone younger. (Am. Compl. at ECF

pp. 35-36.) The Supreme Court has said “an inference [of age discrimination]

cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker

insignificantly younger.” O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313

(1996). Instead, the replacement must be “substantially younger than the plaintiff”

to support an inference of age discrimination. See id. Here, Williams does not

provide any age—or approximate age—of the person who allegedly replaced him.

Therefore, Williams has failed to plausibly allege a claim of age discrimination in

this regard too. Cf. Keplar v. Google, LLC, No. 3:22-CV-2281-B, 2023 WL 7360891, at

*6-7 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2023) (finding that plaintiff met the burden by pleading that

his replacement was 17 years younger).

Based on the above, the undersigned finds that Williams has not met Rule 8

standards on his age discrimination claim, and the Court should dismiss his claim.

D. The motion to dismiss should be granted with respect to Williams’s

retaliation claims.

Many of Williams’s allegations begin by stating that RISD’s actions were

retaliatory. (See e.g., Am. Compl. at ECF p. 7 (“Retaliation by Defendant occurs

when[,]”), 8 (“In further retaliation[,]”), 11 (“On or about August 4, 2021[,] RISD is

retaliating against Williams.”), 12 (“Acts of racial and retaliation have been

exercised[,]”).) In order for Williams to have a valid retaliation claim, though, he

must first plausibly allege that he engaged in a protected activity. Mitchell v. U T L X

Mfg., L.L.C., 569 F. App’x. 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[T]o establish a prima facie

case of retaliation, [Plaintiff] must prove . . . [that] he engaged in a protected

activity[.]”).

Liberally construing his amended complaint, Williams’s alleges that he

engaged in protected activities when he: (1) complained to human resources about

not receiving the driver supervisor position over Jennifer Stevens in August 2020;

(2) submitted a safety report addressing the overcrowding of his bus in December

2020; (3) requested the video from events underlying his injury in March 2021;

(4) complained to human resources about Whiteman’s derogatory remarks about his

injury and age on May 20, 2021; (5) reported in June 2021 that Whiteman retaliated

against him due to his workers’ comp claim; and (6) filed a workers’ comp claim.

1. Williams’s amended complaint fails to plausibly assert a retaliation

claim under Title VII and the ADEA.

The Court concluded upon review of the original complaint that Williams’s

following activities are not protected activities under Title VII: (1) submitting an

internal safety report; (2) submitting a request for video evidence; (3) filing a workers’

comp claim; and (4) complaining about retaliation based on a workers’ comp claim.

(FCR at 24-26.) The undersigned only addresses the two additional activities in the

amended complaint that Williams contends are protected activities: complaining to

human resources about Jennifer Steven’s promotion in August 2020 and the May 20,

2021, complaint about Whiteman’s derogatory remarks about his age. These two

alleged instances of retaliation should be dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies.

Generally speaking, “[t]o bring a suit under Title VII . . . or the ADEA (age), a

complainant must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC to exhaust his

administrative remedies.” Melgar v. T.B. Butler Publ’g Co., Inc., 931 F.3d 375, 378-79

(5th Cir. 2019) (citing Price v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 687 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir. 1982) (Title

VII); Foster v. Nat’l Bank of Bossier City, 857 F.2d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1988)

(ADEA))). To determine “whether a plaintiff has exhausted a particular claim, [the

Fifth Circuit has] noted that ‘the scope of an EEOC complaint should be construed

liberally.’” Patton v. Jacobs Eng’g Group, Inc., 874 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2006)). But this construction

must be weighed against Title VII’s goal of “trigger[ing] the investigatory and

conciliatory procedures of the EEOC, in attempt to achieve non-judicial resolution of

employment discrimination claims.” Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788-89. So, to attain a

balance between the two, courts in this circuit interpret

what is properly embraced in review of a Title–VII claim somewhat

broadly, not solely by the scope of the administrative charge itself, but

by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be

expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. . . . [Courts

should] engage in fact-intensive analysis of the statement given by the

plaintiff in the administrative charge, and look slightly beyond its four

corners, to its substance rather than its label.

Patton, 874 F.3d at 443 (internal cites and quotations omitted).

a. Williams did not exhaust his administrative remedies for his

retaliation claim based on a human resources complaint about

Jennifer Stevens’s 2020 hiring.

Williams’s did not allege in his TWC Charge that RISD retaliated against him

due to his complaint to human resources about Jennifer Stevens receiving a position

that he applied for. The charge makes no mention of the August 2020 promotion.

(See Def. App at 1.) It also does not mention any internal human resources

complaint of discrimination in relation to that job. As noted above, the charge only

makes references to events beginning in 2021. (See id.) An EEOC investigator would

have no reason to investigate events that occurred six months before the period when

Williams alleges that discrimination and retaliation began. Because Williams’s

complaint to HR about the promotion was not addressed in the TWC Charge, that

claim has not been administratively exhausted and should be dismissed.

b. Williams did not exhaust his administrative remedies for his

retaliation claim based on the internal complaint regarding

Julie Whiteman’s remarks.

Nor did Williams mention in the TWC Charge a complaint about Whiteman’s

remarks about his age. (See Def.’s App. at 1.) While a Court may look at the

substance and past the four-corners of the charge, Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 789, “[t]o

determine whether a claim is within the scope of the reasonable EEOC investigation,

the Court must look to the factual statements in the EEOC charge.” Cutrer v. Tarrant

Cnty. Workforce Dev. Bd., No. 4:18-CV-00159-O, 2020 WL 5878458, at *6 (N.D. Tex.

Oct. 2, 2020) (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 462 (5th Cir. 1970)

(“the crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained

[in the EEOC charge].”)). “The allegations contained within the EEOC Charge do

not have to exhaustively list every factual detail or possible claim that Plaintiff may

bring against Defendant; they only have to be sufficient to put an investigator on

notice of [his] claims.” Shelton v. Parkland Health, No. 3:24-CV-2190-L-BW, 2025

WL 1513441, at *10 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2025) (citing Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co.,

L.L.C., 332 F.3d 874, 879 (5th Cir. 2003)).

Although failing to check a box on the EEOC charge is not fatal to a

retaliation claim, “[d]iscrimination and retaliation claims are distinct,” and a court

may find that a plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies when “the factual

statement in [the plaintiff's] EEOC charge did not put [the defendant] on notice that

[the plaintiff] was asserting a retaliation claim.” Frazier v. Sabine River Auth. La., 509

F. App’x 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2013). Similarly, merely checking the box for retaliation

on the EEOC charge is not sufficient if the plaintiff fails to allege any facts

concerning retaliation that would have put the EEOC on notice about the possibility

of a retaliation claim. See Givs v. City of Eunice, 512 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536–37 (W.D.

La. 2007) (citing Randel v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 157 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Another court in this district found that a plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies for disability discrimination because she “summarily state[d]

that she believed that she was discriminated against based on disability in violation

of the ADA,” without providing facts supporting a claim of disability discrimination

in either her EEOC charge or her complaint with the court. Jones v. City of Dallas,

No. 3:22-cv-1477-L, 2024 WL 3207030, at *6 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2024), adopted,

2024 WL 3718064 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2024). In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found

that the plaintiff properly exhausted her administrative remedies for retaliation

claims when the plaintiff alleged that she was denied reasonable accommodations

and then was terminated five days later by her employer. Williams v. Tarrant Cnty.

Coll. Dist., 717 F. App’x 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2018). There, the court found that the

plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies despite not checking the retaliation

box or even mentioning “retaliation” in her charge because she described the general

nature of her retaliation claim. Id. at 445-46.

Williams’s charge does not contain factual allegations regarding remarks

about age by anyone, let alone by Whiteman, nor did Williams allege that he made

any report to human resources about such statements. Instead, Williams’s factual

allegations in the charge center around his post-injury work issues. As noted above,

Williams does mention in his charge that he was retaliated against for “exercising his

protected rights.” (Id.) But nothing in his factual statement reasonably implies that it

was due to remarks about his age and an internal complaint about it; instead, it all

seems to stem from his injury. (See id.)

Because Williams’s ADEA retaliation claim is outside the scope of the TWC

Charge, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to that claim.

See Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 792 (affirming a disparate-impact claim dismissal because an

investigation into it could not reasonably be expected to grow out of the plaintiff’s

charge). “[C]ourts must dismiss any claims where plaintiffs fail to show

administrative exhaustion.” Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 3d 652,

671 (N.D. Tex. 2023), reconsideration denied, 347 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Tex. 2024). The

Court should dismiss Williams’s Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims. See

Mitchell, 569 F. App’x. at 231 (holding that “the district court correctly dismissed

[Plaintiff’s] claim for retaliation because he failed to assert facts showing he was

engaged in [a] protected activity”).

2. The Court has dismissed Williams’s retaliation claim under Chapter

451 of the Texas Labor Code, and there is no reason to reconsider its

decision.

The undersigned recommended dismissal of Williams’s retaliation claim

under Chapter 451 of the Texas Labor Code because it is time-barred. (FCR at 26-

28.) Williams filed an objection stating that his claim was timely because RISD’s

actions in 2021 were unclear, and he did not know about his termination until some

point in 2022. (See Dkt. No. 21 at ECF pp. 3-5.) The District Judge reviewed de novo

the portions of the FCR to which objection was made and found no error. (Dkt. No.

25.)

In the amended complaint, Williams reiterates the same argument he made in

objection to the prior FCR. (See Am. Compl. at ECF p. 38.) He continues to argue

that RISD has been inconsistent regarding his termination date. (Id. at ECF p. 38.)

He argues that May, June, and August 2021 are all the wrong termination dates, and

that he was employed at least through September or October 2021. (See id. at ECF

pp. 38-39.) This is immaterial. In the analysis, the undersigned did not use any of

these dates; instead, it considered January 2022—when Williams filed for

unemployment benefits—as the accrual point. Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 952

F.2d 128, 134 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that the accrual date “commence[s] when the

employee receives unequivocal notice of his termination or when a reasonable

person would know of the termination”).

In addition to re-arguing that he did not know RISD terminated him,

Williams also asserts that his claim is timely because “there exist[s] evidence from

the TWCCRD that specifies the two year [s]tatute of [l]imitations date begins on

6/29/2022.” (Am. Compl. at ECF pp. 38, 53.) Williams attached an email from the

TWCCRD to the amended complaint that informs him that his charge was

formalized on or about June 29, 2022, and the Texas two-year statute of limitations

began on that date. (Id. at ECF p. 53.) Williams misinterprets this as asserting that

all his Texas claims began accruing on that date, but that is not the case.

“[T]he TCHRA requires a plaintiff to file suit within two years after a plaintiff

files a charge of discrimination[.]” Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d

500, 507 (Tex. 2012) (citing Tex. Lab. Code. § 21.256). Williams’s workers’ comp

retaliation claim is not under the TCHRA; instead, it is pursuant to Texas Labor

Code Chapter 451. (See FCR at 26-27.) Unlike the TCHRA, Chapter 451 does not

have an exhaustion of remedies provision. Larsen v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 296

S.W.3d 118, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (concluding

“chapter 451 does not impose a freestanding exhaustion requirement”); see also

Mancera v. City of Laredo, No. 04-04-00301-CV, 2005 WL 542793, at *4 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio Mar. 9, 2005, pet. denied) (“Chapter 451 [does not] include a

requirement that an individual go through an administrative process prior to filing a

retaliatory discharge claim.”). The TWCCRD email references Williams’s charge

perfection date as the accrual date for his Texas Chapter 21 claims, (see Am. Compl.

at ECF p. 53), and ultimately, has no bearing on the statute of limitations on a claim

filed under a different statute. Accordingly, Williams’s Chapter 451 claim is time-

barred.

Given Williams’s pro se status, the undersigned considers whether equitable

estoppel or equitable tolling should apply to his case. Equitable estoppel generally

applies when the defendant’s misconduct prevents the plaintiff from asserting his

rights within the limitations period. Pruet Prod. Co. v. Ayles, 784 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th

Cir. 1986). Nothing that Williams alleges suggests that RISD obstructed him from

timely filing his Chapter 451 retaliation claim.

The Fifth Circuit has recognized three possible bases for equitable tolling:

“(1) the pendency of a suit between the same parties in the wrong forum; (2)

plaintiff’s unawareness of the facts giving rise to the claim because of the defendant’s

intentional concealment of them; and (3) the EEOC’s misleading the plaintiff about

the nature of her rights.” Wilson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 65 F.3d 402, 404

(5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Here, Williams has not identified any suit pending

between the same parties that was pending in the wrong forum. Williams does assert

that he filed consistent with the information from the TWCCRD, however, the

information is not misleading. Williams’s THCRA claims related to the formalized

TWC Charge do have a two-year statute of limitations. Finally, while Williams

contends that RISD “has alleged various termination dates” as noted above,

Plaintiff’s claim is untimely even under the latest possible termination date—the day

he filed for unemployment benefits. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that

Williams’s allegations do not support applying equitable tolling.

Because the Court has already addressed and disposed of this claim, and the

new evidence does not support reconsideration, the undersigned finds no reason the

Court should reconsider this argument.

E. Williams does not allege a discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

RISD argues that Williams cannot maintain a § 1981 claim against it because

“[c]laims against governmental entities under section 1981 are subject to dismissal.”

(Mot. at 18.)

Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts,” which “includes

the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual

relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b). Section 1981 further states that the “rights

protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental

discrimination and impairment under color of State law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c).

Section 1981 “serves as a deterrent to employment discrimination and a

means of punishing employers who discriminate on the basis of race.” Jenkins v. City

of Dallas, No. 3:22-CV-0960-B, 2022 WL 6225559, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2022). It

“provides a cause of action to remedy racial discrimination by private employers in

private employment contracts.” See Lovelace v. Coppell Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:10-CV-

1015-B(BK), 2010 WL 3943515, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL

3943442 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6. 2010). In 1989, the United States Supreme Court found

that § 1981 does not provide a separate cause of action against local government

entities. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989); see also Sayibu v.

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas, No. 3:09-CV-1244-B, 2010 WL 4780732, at *2

(N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2010) (“It is settled law in the 5th Circuit that an individual

cause of action under § 1981 cannot be brought against a governmental entity like

Parkland.”)

In his response, Williams argues that RISD waived its governmental

immunity for a variety of reasons and can therefore be liable under § 1981. (Resp. at

ECF pp. 20-22.) Williams’s argument, however, concerns governmental immunity

and does not address the inability to sue a governmental employer under § 1981.

“Because [RISD] is [not] a private employer, [Williams] wholly fails to assert a cause

of action for civil rights violations under section 1981[.]” See Lovelace, 2010 WL

3943515, at *2.

F. Williams fails to allege a plausible claim for breach of contract.

Williams contends that RISD began to breach a contract on or about March

2021 and that its breaches continued until January 2025. (Am. Compl. at ECF p.

39.) Williams alleges that, pursuant to a contractual obligation, “[RISD] was to

provide access to professional, fair, in network medical care opportunity to any

employee who was injured during the scope of their employment [and] [t]o provide

access to medical care treatment with the intent of returning a[n] injured employee

back to work.” (Id. at ECF pp. 39-40.) He complains of long wait times, incorrect

descriptions, and generally negative experiences with medical providers, seemingly

implying these were RISD’s responsibility. (See id. at ECF pp. 40-43.)

RISD argues that Williams’s breach of contract claim fails “because these

vague allegations do not show the existence or breach of a valid contract with

[RISD] that waives the District’s immunity from such claims under Chapter 271.”

(Mot. at 21.) Williams counters that RISD is wrong because his claims are pursuant

to Texas Education Code Chapter 21 and not Texas Local Government Code

Chapter 271. (Resp. at ECF p. 23.) The parties disagree as to what the appropriate

applicable statutory provisions are.

Williams mentions the Texas Education Code Chapter 21 for the first time in

his response to the motion. (Resp. at ECF p. 23.) Therefore, any additional claims

under Texas Education Code Chapter 21 are not properly before the Court. See

Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A

claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in response to a

motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court.”). Regardless, even

if the claim was properly before the Court, it would fail. Williams simply points to

Chapter 21 without any further detail, and it is unclear what contract he refers to.

While Chapter 21 does deal with public education, educators, district employees,

and volunteers, Williams does not point to any specific provision of a contract that

he alleges RISD violated. This chapter is composed of many subchapters and

subsections, varying from topics related to teacher employment contracts to required

certifications. See Tex. Educ. Code § 21. Williams fails to provide any additional

details or guidance to what specific provision he is referring to, and the undersigned

declines to sift through the statute to find what might be an applicable provision.

Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x. 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Despite the

leniency afforded pro se plaintiffs, the district court does not have license to rewrite a

deficient pleading.”).

Williams fails to plausibly allege a breach of contract claim. The elements of a

breach of contract claim under Texas law are “(1) the existence of a valid contract;

(2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract

by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the

breach.” Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Egle Grp., LLC, 490 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotations omitted). Williams fails to allege any contract between him and RISD,

nor does he state the terms of the contract or identify any provision that RISD

allegedly breached. As a result, the Court should dismiss Williams’s breach of

contract claim.

G. RISD is immune from Williams’s claim for fraud.

RISD argues that it is immune from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act

(“TTCA”). (Mot. at 24-25.) Texas and its political subdivisions enjoy full immunity

from tort claims, except to the extent the immunity is waived by the TTCA. Leeds v.

Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services, No. 3:14-CV-3578-N-BK, 2015 WL 4736567,

at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2015) (citing Brown v. City of Houston, 8 S.W.3d 331, 333–

34 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999)). “The TTCA only waives a governmental entity’s

immunity for torts that involve property damage, personal injury, or death arising

out of the use of a motor vehicle or tangible personal or real property.” Id.; Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021. Moreover, § 101.057(2) expressly states that the

waiver does not apply to intentional torts. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.057.

Fraud is an intentional tort under Texas law. See LTTS Charter Sch., Inc. v.

Palasota, 362 S.W.3d 202, 209 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (noting “[f]raud is

an ‘intentional tort’ for which the TTCA provides no waiver of immunity”).

Accordingly, RISD is immune from Williams’s fraud claim under the TTCA, and

the Court should dismiss the claim.

H. The Court should not grant Williams leave to file another amended

complaint.

Williams recently filed an opposed motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint. (Dkt. No. 39.) Citing amendment standards in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2),

he avers that he has “new discovered facts” but does not specify them. (Dkt. No. 39

at ECF p. 1.) He merely states that he would “clarify roles and involvement of

decision makers, clarify disability and ADA claims, clarify Title VII retaliation

claims and [allegations] by Defendant that claims were not exhausted, clarify

regarding Section 1981 claims . . . , further clarify basis for reconsidering Chapter

451 . . . , and demonstrate District has no immunity from breach of contract and

fraud claims.” (Id. at ECF p. 2.)

“Ordinarily, a plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to amend [his]

complaint in response to a recommended dismissal or when the action is to be

dismissed pursuant to a court order.” Beam v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-

01201-M-BT, 2021 WL 4445350, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL

4439179 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2021). While “a court should freely give [a party]

leave” to amend his pleadings “when justice so requires[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2),

a court has discretion not to allow amendment when an amendment would be futile,

Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S. of Am. Co., 195 F.3d 765,

771 (5th Cir. 1999). A district court has discretion whether to grant or deny a motion

to amend, and it may consider several things in exercising that discretion, including

whether the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies through prior amendments, any

prejudice to the opposing party, or the futility of further amendment. Body by Cook,

Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Marucci

Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014)

(brackets omitted)).

An amendment would be futile if the plaintiff has already pleaded his best

case. See Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011). “A plaintiff has pleaded

[his] best case after [he] is apprised of the insufficiency of [his] complaint.” Wiggins

v. La. State Univ.—Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App’x. 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a district court need not grant a futile

motion to amend. Id. “Futility is determined under Rule 12(b)(6) standards,

meaning an amendment is considered futile if it would fail to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Williams has pleaded his best case. See Beam v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No.

3:19-CV-01201-M-BT, 2020 WL 5868567, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2020)

(dismissing plaintiff’s amended complaint after determining plaintiff pleaded her best

case), adopted as modified, 2020 WL 5848973 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2020). The Court

has previously explained the applicable pleading standards and the insufficiencies of

his factual allegations. In granting Williams prior leave to amend, the undersigned

specifically explained that “[t]o survive another motion to dismiss, the amended

complaint should be clear and precise, which includes asserting dates for relevant

events.” (FCR at 29.)

Williams filed this amended complaint in response to a prior motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). As detailed above, Williams’s amended

complaint fails to meet Rule 8 standards. Despite the amended complaint being

considerably longer than the original complaint, many of Williams’s allegations

remain vague and, in multiple instances, conclusory. (See Resp. at ECF p. 15

(“Williams stating that he is disabled is not a conclusory allegation; it is a fact.”).)

Williams has had an opportunity to plead his best case in response to motions

to dismiss. See also Thompson v. City of Weatherford, No. 4:23-CV-201-O-BP, 2023 WL

4239756, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 13, 2023) (“[Plaintiff] has pleaded [her] best case

after filing an Original and Amended Complaint and responding to the Court’s

Questionnaire.”), adopted, 2023 WL 4240158 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2023), aff’d sub

nom. Thompson v. City of Weatherford Municipality, No. 23-10767, 2023 WL 8368867

(5th Cir. Dec. 4, 2023). Williams does not identify any additional facts that he could

allege that might provide sufficient plausibility to his claims to survive dismissal.

Allowing another amendment would be futile, needlessly delay this case, and

prejudice Defendants by subjecting them to further litigation.

As an independent reason to deny Williams’s motion to amend, he failed to

comply with local rules. See N.D. Tex. L.R. 15.1. Williams did not “attach the

proposed amended pleading to the motion as an exhibit” as required. See id.

Therefore, the Court should dismiss without further leave to amend. See

Reliance Ins. Co. v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 110 F.3d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[J]udges

have the power to control their dockets by refusing to give ineffective litigants a

second chance to develop their case.”) (citations omitted).

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the

District Judge GRANT Defendant RISD’s 12(b)(6) motion (Dkt. No. 28), DISMISS

Wiuliams’s claims with prejudice, and DENY Plaintiff Williams’s motion for leave to

file a second amended complaint, (Dkt. No. 39).

SO RECOMMENDED on August 12, 2025.

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation will be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this

report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days of

being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be

specific, an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing

before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections

will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions

of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,

1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).