Jones v. Metro Action Commission

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DEADERICK JONES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 3:25-cv-00929

)

METRO ACTION COMMISSION and ) JUDGE RICHARDSON

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF )

NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Deaderick Jones, a resident of Tennessee, has filed a pro se Complaint against

Defendant Metro Action Commission (“Defendant MAC”)1 and Defendant Metropolitan

Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Defendant Metro Government”), alleging

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 1st and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution,

and the Family and Medical Leave Act, as well as state law violations, related to Plaintiff’s

employment with Defendant MAC. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff further filed an Emergency Motion for

Preliminary Injunction to Halt Ongoing Retaliation and Constitutional Violations (Doc. No. 6) and

a Motion to Amend Plaintiff’s Contact Information (“Motion to Amend”) (Doc. No. 7).

On August 20, 2025, the Court entered an Order denying without prejudice Plaintiff’s

August 18, 2025 Emergency Motion (Doc. No. 6) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 7)

because both submissions lacked a proper signature. (Doc. No. 8).

1 Defendant Metro Action Commission is also known as the Metropolitan Action Commission.

Pending before the Court are two emergency motions and a motion to dismiss. On August

21, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction to Halt Ongoing

Retaliation and Constitutional Violations (“Emergency Motion 1”) (Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff also

filed his Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Emergency Motion 2”) (Doc. No. 11) on

August 26, 2025. Defendant MAC then filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in

Support (“Motion to Dismiss”) (Doc. No. 13) on August 29, 2025. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a

Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 14) on September 2, 2025, and

Defendant Metro Government filed both a Notice (Doc. No 15) and a Response in Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion 1 and Emergency Motion 2 (Doc. No 16) on September 8, 2025.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant MAC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) will

be granted, and, as a result, Defendant MAC will be dismissed as a party to this case. Plaintiff’s

Emergency Motion 1 (Doc. No. 9) and Emergency Motion 2 (Doc. No. 11) will be denied.

I. DEFENDANT METRO ACTION COMMISSION

In Defendant MAC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13), Defendant MAC argues that it is

not an entity capable of being sued. This Court agrees.

“Pursuant to Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the capacity of a

governmental corporation to be sued in federal court is governed by the law of the state in which

the entity was organized.” Haines v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 32 F. Supp. 2d

991, 994 (M.D. Tenn. July 17, 1998). “Political subdivisions of a state or local government have

capacity only if the law creating them recognizes them as separate legal entities having capacity

to sue or be sued.” Id.

Article I, Section 1.01 of the Code of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and

Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro Charter”) specifies the various powers and rights of

Defendant Metro Government. This provision specifically states that Defendant Metro

Government has the capacity to sue and be sued. Id.; Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 994.

The same cannot be said for Defendant MAC. Chapter 2.108 of the Metro Charter specifies

the powers and rights of Defendant MAC. However, Chapter 2.108 contains no provision stating

Defendant MAC can sue or be sued. “Accordingly, Plaintiff[] may seek redress for [his] injuries

but must pursue [his] cause of action against that entity with the capacity to be sued. Under

Tennessee law, such capacity lies with the Metropolitan Government . . . .” Haines, 32 F.Supp.2d

at 995. The Court agrees with MAC in that they are not a proper party to be sued in this action.

Defendant MAC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) will be granted, and Defendant MAC

will therefore be dismissed as a party to this case.

II. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Having dismissed MAC from this action, the Court now analyzes Plaintiff’s Emergency

Motion 1 and Emergency Motion 2 solely as to Defendant Metro Government.

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Persons seeking a preliminary injunction must meet four requirements.2 They must show

a likelihood of success on the merits; irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; the balance

2 Some published Sixth Circuit case law stands unmistakably for the proposition that these four

items are factors rather than requirements, except that irreparable harm is a requirement (and, if it

exists and thus keeps the possibility of a preliminary injunction alive, thereafter becomes a factor

to be balanced along with the other three factors). See, e.g., D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d

324, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2019). In other words, this case law stands for the proposition that the

question is not whether all four of these things exist, but rather: (i) whether irreparable harm exists,

and, if so, (ii) whether, considering the existence of irreparable harm and the extent to which the

other three things exist, a preliminary injunction is warranted. Alas, this case law is inconsistent

with at least some more recent Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court cases (including the two cases

cited above) describing these as all being requirements. The Court believes that it should follow

the latter line of cases, although the outcome would be the same in this case even if the Court were

to take the opposite approach and treat these four items as merely factors (except insofar as

irreparable harm is first a requirement and, if it exists, then a factor).

of equities favors them; and that public interest favors an injunction. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., 56 F.4th

400, 403 (6th Cir. 2022).

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the

movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet

v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). “The party seeking

the preliminary injunction bears the burden of justifying such relief, including showing irreparable

harm and likelihood of success.” McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction may not merely rely on unsupported allegations

but rather must come forward with more than “scant evidence” to substantiate their allegations.

See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); McNeilly, 684

F.3d at 614 (upholding denial of preliminary injunction when plaintiff made only a “small

showing” of evidence); Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2020) (vacating

preliminary injunction when plaintiffs made no evidentiary showing on some elements of their

claim, but instead relied on mere allegations); United States v. Certain Land Situated in City of

Detroit, No. 95-1118, 1996 WL 26915, at *1 n.1 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of a preliminary

injunction where the district court relied on a lack of evidence to support speculative allegations);

Boulding v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:06-cv-811, 2008 WL 2095390, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11,

2008), report and recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 2095387 (W.D. Mich. May 15, 2008)

(“Plaintiff did not marshal any evidence in support of his motion [for a preliminary injunction].

Notably, other courts have likewise treated the four items as requirements (prerequisites), rather

than as factors. E.g., Southern Poverty Law Ctr. v. United States Dep’t Homeland Sec., Civil

Action No. 18-760 (CKK), 2020 WL 3265533, *10 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020); Transatlantic, LLC

v. Humana, Inc., 8:13-CV-1925-T-17TBM, 2013 WL 3958361, *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2013).

Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations do not suffice.”). The decision whether to grant a preliminary

injunction is a matter within the discretion of the district court. Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass’n v.

Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009).

B. ALLEGED FACTS

Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction stems from alleged occurrences of

retaliation, humiliation, and “systematic work obstruction,” all while working for his current

employer, MAC. (Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 50; Doc. No. 11 at PageID# 66-67).

Plaintiff states he is an expert in fatherhood engagement, and he created the “Father to

Father” program serving over 8,000 men. (Id. at PageID# 49-50). According to Plaintiff, he took

leave from his employment through the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in April of

2024 to care for his wife after she suffered a serious car accident. (Id. at PageID# 50). Upon

Plaintiff’s return from leave, MAC expressed concerns about Plaintiff’s professional activities that

occur outside of his regular course of business. (Id.). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff states MAC

“implemented a punitive ‘transfer’ that was actually an unlawful demotion . . . .” (Id.).

In December 2024, Plaintiff states, MAC’s Board of Commissioners made various

“judicial admissions of systematic institutional discrimination . . . establish[ing] a pattern of

systematic discrimination . . . and . . . institutional misconduct.” (Id. at PageID# 50-51).

Plaintiff alleges that he was later humiliated by MAC when it distributed an agency

directory containing each employee’s proper title, with the entry for Plaintiff’s title reading, “what

is his title?” (Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 50). Plaintiff states that this directory created a hostile work

environment and damaged his professional reputation. (Id.).

Plaintiff states MAC consistently obstructed his work on federally mandated programs

from 2024 to the present by holding Father to Father program materials hostage, delaying

schedules past critical deadlines, restricting resources, and making arbitrary rule changes. (Doc.

No. 9 at PageID# 50).

According to Plaintiff, MAC’s retaliatory conduct is continuing and escalating since

Plaintiff filed complaints with the human resources department. (Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 50).

Alleged communication restrictions were implemented, and Plaintiff was directed to speak with

someone other than the individual to whom he originally sent his complaints. (Id.). Plaintiff

maintains that these communication restrictions prevent him from completing essential work. (Id.).

Plaintiff states he “observed and documented systematic evidence manufacturing” by

MAC after hearing the special projects manager “talking loudly to the other directors about

sending a spreadsheet and to document any trainings they’ve done in the past” on August 19, 2025.

(Doc. No. 11 at PageID# 67). Plaintiff states that further escalating retaliatory conduct has occurred

since he “served Defendants with a litigation hold notice” on August 22, 2025, because he was

asked to undergo a retroactive performance evaluation for the previous year, long after the

evaluation period had passed. (Id. at PageID# 66). Plaintiff believes that the evaluation was an

effort by MAC to create post-litigation documentation. (Id. at PageID# 67). On the same day

(August 22, 2025), Plaintiff received notice that Defendants filed counter-complaints against him

despite Defendants never having responded to the Complaint in the instant case. (Id.).

On the evening of the same day (August 22, 2025), Plaintiff claims, a team-wide email was

sent out within which Plaintiff’s status was “deliberately changed from the ‘To:’ field to the ‘Cc:’

field . . . constituting public humiliation and professional demotion . . . .” (Doc. No. 11 at PageID#

67). Plaintiff states he fears returning to work due to the “escalating retaliatory conduct and public

humiliation tactics designed to create a hostile work environment.” (Id.).

C. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has not shown he would suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. “This

conclusion is dispositive here because ‘a district court is “well within its province” when it denies

a preliminary injunction based solely on the lack of an irreparable injury.’” Netchoice v. Skrmetti,

No. 3:24-CV-01191, 2025 WL 1710228, at *14 (M.D. Tenn. June 18, 2025) (quoting D.T., 942

F.3d at 327). This remains so even if Plaintiff’s claims ultimately could prove meritorious,

although the Court notes that it need not and will not opine herein on whether those claims will

(or likely will) prove meritorious. See Netchoice, 2025 WL 1710228, at *14 (denying a motion for

a preliminary injunction while declining “to take any position on the merits of [the p]laintiff's

claims”).

Emergency Motion 1 and its attachment (Doc. Nos. 9, 9-1), as well as Emergency Motion

2 and its attachment (Doc. Nos. 11, 11-1), contain unsupported allegations and, at most, scant

evidence to substantiate Plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff fails to provide any emails, transcripts, or

other forms of evidence to substantiate his claims. Plaintiff thus has not made a showing sufficient

to support a finding of irreparable harm. See Libertarian Party of Ohio, 751 F.3d at 417; McNeilly,

684 F.3d at 614; Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 986; United States, 1996 WL 26915 at *1; Boulding,

2008 WL 2095390 at *1.

Furthermore, Plaintiff states that he is fearful of returning to work and that his projects

have been affected by the actions of Defendants. (Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 50; Doc. No. 11 at

PageID# 67). However, the Court cannot find on the instant record that a change in employment

position, an agency directory containing an error, alleged emails with the Plaintiff addressed in the

“Cc” section as opposed to the “To” section, and alleged retroactive evaluations, without more,

are actions that (even if shown by sufficient evidence at this stage) suggest Plaintiff would suffer

future irreparable harm absent an injunction.

Thus, Plaintiff's Emergency Motion 1 (Doc. No. 9) and Emergency Motion 2 (Doc. No.

11) will be denied.

IH. CONCLUSION

MAC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED, and MAC is DISMISSED as a

party to this case. Plaintiff's Emergency Motion 1 (Doc. No. 9) and Emergency Motion 2 (Doc.

No. 11) are DENIED.

Given the allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff has successfully invoked the Court’s

federal-question jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff paid the full civil filing fee (Doc. No. 1-1), there is

no required screening of this pro se, nonprisoner Complaint, and it is Plaintiff's responsibility to

ensure that Defendant Metro Government is served with a summons and a copy of the Complaint.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).

This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to oversee service of process, to enter

a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any

pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if

necessary, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of court.

Resources for pro se litigants, including instructions for how to accomplish service of

process, are available free of charge on the Court’s website as well as by request to the Clerk’s

Office so long as the privilege is not abused.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Chi Ruchoardson

Che Rech

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE