issues raised in a “perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))
How later courts described this case
- issues raised in a “perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MARSHALL EDWARDS and )
ALICE EDWARDS, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) CaseNo. 3:24-cv-00831
) JudgeAleta A.Trauger
WILSON COUNTY GOVERNMENT et )
al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM
The Magistrate Judge to whom this case has been referred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) has issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc.
No. 67), recommending that the Motions to Dismiss and renewed Motions to Dismissfiled by the
City of Lebanon Police Department (“LPD”) (Doc. Nos. 13, 61) and the Wilson County
Government, Wilson County Court, Wilson County Board of Commissioners, Wilson County
Judicial District, and Wilson County Human Resources Department (collectively, the “Wilson
County defendants”) (Doc. Nos. 20, 56) be granted in their entirety and that the claims against
those defendants be dismissed. The R&R also recommends that the claims against defendant
Michael Collins, Wilson County Circuit Court Judge,be dismissed on the grounds that the record
does not reflect that he has been served with process and, even if he had been timely served, he is
entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit.
The plaintiffs timely filed Objections (Doc. No. 68) to the R&R. The LPD and Wilson
County defendants both filed Responses to the Objections (Doc. Nos. 69, 72), prompting plaintiff
Alice Edwards to file untimely Supplemental Objections (Doc. No. 76).1 Both sets of defendants
filed Responses to the Supplemental Objections (Doc. Nos. 78, 81), and the plaintiffs filed a Reply
to LPD’s Supplemental Response (Doc. No. 79).
For the reasons set forth herein, the Objections and Supplemental Objections will be
overruled in their entirety, and the Motions to Dismiss filed by the LPD and the Wilson County
defendants will be granted. The court will also dismiss sua sponte the claims against defendant
Michael Collins.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Within fourteen days after being served with a report and recommendation as to a
dispositive matter, any “party may serve and file specific written objections to [a magistrate
judge’s] proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The district court
must review de novo any portion of the report and recommendation “that has been properly
objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In conducting its review, the district court “may accept,
reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to
the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.
However, the district court is not required to review—under a de novo or any other
standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt the magistrate judge’s findings
1 Plaintiff Alice Edwards filed a Notice of Death (Doc. No. 70) dated July 12, 2025—but
received and docketed on August 4, 2025—providing notice that her husband, plaintiff Marshall
Edwards, died. She continues to proceed pro se on her own behalf. She has not filed a motion for
substitution of the party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). The court finds that,
because the Motions to Dismiss were fully briefed and the R&R was issued prior to Marshall
Edwards’ death, and because the claims against the moving defendants are clearly subject to
dismissal for the reasons set forth herein and in the R&R, substitution is not required prior to a
ruling on these motions. Despite Marshall Edwards’ death, the court continues to refer herein to
the “plaintiffs” in the plural.
and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. Id. at 151. “The filing of vague, general, or
conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a
complete failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Langley
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 502 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2007) (issues raised in a “perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck
Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))). Likewise, “[a]
general objection to the entirety” of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation has the same
effect as a complete failure to object. Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505,
509 (6th Cir. 1991). Finally, arguments made in an objection to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation that were not first presented to the magistrate judge for consideration are deemed
waived. Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).
Although pro se pleadings and filings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted
by lawyers, see, e.g., Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), pro se litigants are not
entirely exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural History
Plaintiffs Alice Edwards and Marshall Edwards, residents of Atlanta, Georgia, initiated
this lawsuit pro se and in forma pauperis on July 9, 2024, asserting claims arising out of a traffic
accident that took place on August 25, 2022 in Wilson County, Tennessee. Their car was struck
by a semi-truck driven by defendant William Brown, who was employed by defendant Fresh Co.
Foods, LLC (“Fresh Foods”), causing traumatic injuries to both plaintiffs.
The claims against the LPD are based on the actions of the police officer who responded
to the accident scene and allowed Brown to leave the scene of the accident without issuing him a
traffic citation.
After the accident, the plaintiffs filed suit in Wilson County Circuit Court, but their lawsuit
was dismissed by Wilson County Circuit Judge Michael Collins.
In their present lawsuit, the plaintiffs contend that their federal constitutional rights were
violated by the LPD officer’s conduct at the scene of the accident and by Judge Collins in
dismissing the lawsuit. The claims against the LPD and the various Wilson County defendants are
entirely premised upon those allegations, though the Complaint also contains numerous conclusory
allegations concerning negligence, fraud, conspiracy, and a pattern of discrimination. (See
generally Doc. No. 1.) The Complaint sets out the following claims for relief: (1) a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants for allegedly violating the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment rights; (2) a claim for violation of the Elder Justice Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1397j et seq.,
against all defendants; (3) negligence and gross negligence against all defendants; (4) negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision against Wilson County and the City of Lebanon; (5) a claim for
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., against the Wilson
County Circuit Court, the LPD, and the “other government entity Defendants”; (6) a claim for
fraud and conspiracy to defraud against defendants Brown & Brown, Fresh Foods, and “Does 1–
20”; (7) a claim for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 et seq., against Brown & Brown, Fresh Foods, and “Does 1–20”; and, (8) claims for
violations of the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection by
the government entity defendants. (Docket Entry No. 1 at 15–25.)
When they filed their lawsuit, the plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Class Certification and
a Petition for Writ of Mandamus, both of which the court denied. (Doc. Nos. 49–50.) Defendant
Brown & Brown was dismissed from the case with prejudice upon Agreed Order. (Doc. No. 34.)
Defendants William Brown and Fresh Foods have filed a Motion to Dismiss that was not ripe when
the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R now before the court. That motion remains pending. As
noted, Judge Collins has not been served and has never entered an appearance. The LPD and the
Wilson County defendants filed initial Motions to Dismiss prior to being served. They renewed
the motions after being served. The Magistrate Judge treated each party’s motion and renewed
motion as a single motion, as does this court.
B. The LPD’s Motion
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the LPD’s motion be dismissed on the grounds that
a police department is not a separate and distinct entity that is suable under state law. (Doc. No.
67 at 9.) The R&R further finds that the plaintiffs’ request to amend their Complaint to substitute
(or add) the City of Lebanon as a defendant would be futile, because the proposed claims are
conclusory and spurious, and the plaintiffs do not allege facts that, even if true, would show or
even imply liability on the part of the City of Lebanon. (Id. at 13.) The plaintiffs object on the
grounds that the Magistrate Judge should have substituted the City of Lebanon as the proper
defendant, rather than dismissing the claims altogether, and that they should be granted leave to
amend, because the allegations “against City employees and police officers” are sufficient to state
plausible municipal liability claims under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). (Doc. No. 68 at 4.)
The LPD’s Response to the Objections incorporates the arguments raised in support of its
Motion to Dismiss—including that any claims against the City would be time-barred—and
otherwise urges the court to overrule the plaintiffs’ Objections and adopt the R&R. (Doc. No. 69.)
The plaintiffs filed Supplemental Objections, claiming to be in possession of new evidence
that further supports their claims. (Doc. Nos. 76, 76-1.) This evidence, however, is not new, and it
has nothing to do with the claims against the LPD. Rather, it concerns the plaintiffs’ allegations
that defendants William Brown and Fresh Foods provided them fraudulent or invalid insurance
documents after the traffic accident.
The court has reviewed de novothe issues raised by the plaintiffs’ Objections and finds no
error in the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations that the claims against the LPD be dismissed
with prejudice. Even if the court were to construe the Complaint as asserting claims against the
City of Lebanon rather than the LPD, the Complaint utterly fails to state a colorable claim against
the City of Lebanon. The plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish that the individual police officer
who responded to the scene of the crash violated their constitutional rights, and the claims against
the City, in any event, are clearly barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.
Amendment of the Complaint would be futile. The court therefore will accept in its entirety the
R&R’s recommendation that the LPD’s Motion to Dismiss be granted and that the plaintiffs’
request to amend the pleading be denied.
C. The Wilson County Defendants’ Motion
The Wilson County defendants’ motion is likewise properly granted. The Magistrate Judge
declined to consider the plaintiffs’ Response to the Wilson County defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
on the grounds that it was untimely and failed to comply with Local Rule 7.01. At the same time,
the Magistrate Judge thoroughly considered the Wilson County defendants’ arguments in light of
the allegations in the Complaint and found that, whatever dissatisfaction the plaintiffs have with
Judge Collins’ rulings in the state court case, the Complaint does not contain plausible factual
allegations showing or even implying that Collins is a Wilson County official, that the Wilson
County defendants had anything to do with his decisions, or that any individual employed by
Wilson County violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights or otherwise took any action that could
be deemed unlawful.(Doc. No. 67 at 10–11.)
The plaintiffs’ Objections are entirely conclusory. They essentially allude tothe arguments
raised in opposition to the Wilson County defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and assert that their
Complaint “detailed multiple acts of misconduct,” including the “[f]ailure of public institutions to
address or correct” the wrongs they suffered. (Doc. No. 68 at 4.) Their Supplemental Objections,
as noted, only address the allegedly fraudulent insurance documents produced by defendants
William Brown and Fresh Foods. (Doc. No. 76.)
The court has reviewed de novo the Complaint and the arguments raised by the Wilson
County defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The court has also considered the plaintiffs’ untimely and
overly long Response in opposition to the Wilson County defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc.
No. 61.)2 Like the Magistrate Judge, the court finds that the Complaint fails to allege facts that
state a colorable claim of any kind against the Wilson County defendants. In particular, the
plaintiffs have not alleged facts that, if true, would establish that any Wilson County defendant
committed a constitutional violation or that Wilson County had any policy, practice, or procedure
that violated their constitutional rights under the governing law. Most notably, the plaintiffs’
claims arise from the actions of Judge Michael Collins, who is employed by the state,not Wilson
County.AccordFischiettie v.Shelby Cnty.,No. 2:24-cv-02353-MSN-TMP, 2024 WL 5233184, at
*2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 27, 2024).3
2 This Response is labeled on the docket as having been filed in response to the LPD’s
motion. In fact, it responds to the Wilson County defendants’ motion.
3 The Wilson County Circuit Court is actually the Circuit Court for Tennessee’s fifteenth
judicial district.Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-2-506(15)(A). And circuit court judges are state employees.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations will be accepted in their entirety.
The Wilson County defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and the claims against these
defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
D. Judge Michael Collins
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, if any defendant is not served
with process within 90 days of the date anaction is filed,“the court—on motion or on its own after
notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order
that service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that the claims against Collins be dismissed for failure to effect service of process
within 90 days constituted notice to the plaintiffs that they should show cause for the failure to
serve. Accord, e.g., Brown v. Tennessee, No. 3:22-CV-00754, 2023 WL 6054614, at *1 n.1 (M.D.
Tenn. Sept. 15, 2023) (“This Report and Recommendation provides notice to Plaintiff of the
Court’s intention to sua sponte dismiss the action, and the fourteen-day period for filing objections
provides him with the opportunity to show good cause for why the action should not be dismissed
under Rule 4(m).”), R&R adopted, No. 3:22-cv-00754, 2023 WL 8101878 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 20,
2023).
As the Magistrate Judge also noted, however, state court judges are “immune from suit for
monetary damages unless the action complained of was non-judicial or was performed in the
complete absence of jurisdiction.” Tobias v. State, No. 18-1892, 2018 WL 8969133, at *3 (6th Cir.
Dec. 17, 2018) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–12 (1991)). A judge’s immunity from suit
is “absolute: all of a judge’s actions taken in an official judicial capacity are immune from suit.”
Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 63 F.4th 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2023). Moreover, in lawsuits filed in
forma pauperis, such as this one, the court must dismiss a claim at any time if the claim seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Tobias, 2018 WL 8969133)
(citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), 1915A(b)(2)).
The plaintiffs object to the recommended dismissal of Judge Collins solely on the grounds
that their allegations show that Judge Collins “denied them access to court, refused to process
filings, and acted in a discriminatory and retaliatory manner.”(Doc. No. 68 at 5.) They claim that
these allegations would be sufficient, if proven, to establish that he “acted outside the bounds of
his judicial authority.” (Id.)
The plaintiffs do not address the fact that they have not served process on Judge Collins
and have made no attempt to show good cause for that failure. Further, they are simply incorrect
that the allegations in the Complaint would be sufficient, if true, to show that Judge Collins acted
outside his judicial capacity. Their claims are based entirely on Judge Collins’ dismissal of their
state court lawsuit. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 27–28 (“Defendant Judge Michael Collins improperly
dismissed their case despite compelling evidence of negligence, fraud, and misconduct by
Defendants. . . . Despite this overwhelming evidence, Judge Collins dismissed the case without
proper consideration, raising serious concerns about judicial misconduct and potential bias. The
dismissal not only ignored the merits of the case but also denied the Plaintiffs their rightful
opportunity to seek justice and compensation for their injuries and losses.”).) Judge Collins’
decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ lawsuit is clearly an action taken in his judicial capacity, as this
was the “type of act normally performed only by judges.” Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 63 F.4th
510, 519 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The plaintiffs’ recourse in the event of an incorrect
judicial decision is to appeal, not to sue the judge. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). “A
judge is entitled to immunity from suit even when accused of acting in bad faith, maliciously, or
10
corruptly.” Morgan v. Kentucky, No. 3:23-cv-594-DJH, 2024 WL 2884568, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June
7, 2024) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11).
In short, the court will dismiss the claims against Judge Collins based both on the failure
to effect timely service of process and absolute judicial immunity.
I. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiffs’ Objections and Supplemental Objections
(Doc. Nos. 68, 76) will be overruled, and the R&R (Doc. No. 67) will be accepted in its entirety.
Accordingly, the LPDs and Wilson County defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and renewed Motions
to Dismiss ( 13, 20, 56, 61) will be granted, and the claims against those defendants will be
dismissed. The court will dismiss sua sponte the claims against Judge Collins.
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.
United States District Judge