Fletcher v. Cartwright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ALBERT LEON FLETCHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 3:24-cv-286-MMH-LLL

ALLEN A. CARTWRIGHT, ET AL.,

Defendants.

___________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Albert Leon Fletcher, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action by filing a pro se Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint; Doc. 1). Fletcher is proceeding in forma

pauperis and names four Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC)

employees as Defendants in the Complaint: Lieutenant Allen Cartwright;

Sergeant Malik L. Thomas; Lieutenant A. Arnette; and “Warden” Kody J.

Williams.1 Complaint at 1–3. He asserts the Defendants violated his rights

1 While Fletcher refers to this defendant as Warden, Defendants presented

evidence that Kody Williams is a Classification Officer at the Reception and Medical

Center (RMC) and has never held the position of Warden or Assistant Warden during

his employment with FDOC. See Doc. 11-5.

under the Eighth Amendment and committed state torts of battery and

assault. See generally id.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss

(Motion; Doc. 11). Fletcher filed a response to the Motion. (Response; Doc. 14).

Thus, the Motion is ripe for review.

In his Response, Fletcher states that he mistakenly believed Defendant

Kody Williams was the warden responding to his grievances when he listed

him as a Defendant in this case. Upon reviewing the Defendants’ evidence that

Kody Williams never served as a Warden or Assistant Warden, Fletcher

requests that “Classification [Officer] Kody Williams be took off my law suit.”

Response at 9. Based on Fletcher’s voluntary request, this action will be

dismissed against Defendant Kody Williams.2

II. Fletcher’s Allegations3

In his Complaint, Fletcher alleges that on December 20, 2023, while

housed at RMC, Defendant Thomas woke him up by kicking his bed and telling

Fletcher to “get the f- [sic] up” and “get the F- [sic] up befor[e] I put my boot in

2 For this reason, the Court will not discuss Defendant Williams further in this

Order.

3 In considering Defendants’ Motion, the Court must accept all factual

allegations in the Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most

favorable to Fletcher, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from

such allegations. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003); Jackson v.

Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). As such, the facts recited here

are drawn from the Complaint and may well differ from those that ultimately can be

proved.

your ass white boy.” Complaint at 4, 5. Fletcher states he stood up and asked

Defendant Thomas, “who you talking to like that[?]” Id. Defendant Thomas

grabbed Fletcher’s arm, and, in turn, Fletcher grabbed Defendant Thomas’s

arm. Id. at 5. Fletcher asserts Defendant Thomas tried to push Fletcher over a

locker rack. Id. at 5. Defendant Thomas then yelled for Defendant Arnette, who

entered and “la[id] across [Fletcher’s] back” while Defendant Thomas laid on

Fletcher’s legs. Id. During this time, Fletcher alleges he was flat on the floor

with the left side of his face to the ground. Id. He then states Defendant

Cartwright ran in, “jumped down,” and punched Fletcher “in the right side of

[his] temp[]le” five times. Id. at 4, 5. Fletcher asserts this caused the left side

of his face to hit the floor. Id. at 5. Fletcher alleges Defendants Arnette and

Thomas “did nothing” to stop Defendant Cartwright from hitting him. Id. at 4.

As a result of the use of force, Fletcher avers he has a “plate in [his] left

temple and eyebrow,” and his eyebrow is no longer the same shape, his eyesight

is “just a blur[],” his temple “hurts all the time,” and he is unable to see out his

left eye. Id. He further states he was denied medical treatment. Id. Fletcher

alleges Defendants’ actions violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment’s

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and constituted battery and assault.

Id. at 3, 6. As relief, he requests monetary damages and medical care. Id.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while

“[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (quotations, citation, and

original alteration omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court

must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held

to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,

therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve

as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in

order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,

1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132

F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds as

recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

IV. Discussion

Defendants argue Fletcher’s Complaint should be dismissed because: (1)

Fletcher failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) Fletcher failed to

give pre-suit notice pursuant to section 768.28, Florida Statutes, for his state

tort claims; (3) Fletcher’s claim is conclusively contradicted by video records;

(4) Fletcher failed to disclose his litigation history; (5) Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity for claims brought against them in their official

capacities; and (6) Fletcher’s request for punitive damages is barred under 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). See generally Motion.

A. Sua Sponte Frivolity

To the extent Fletcher attempts to raise a claim of deliberate indifference

based on the denial of medical care, the Court is obligated to conduct an

independent frivolity review. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the

Court to dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines that the action is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison]

officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials

must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical

care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the

inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment

violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry

regarding a prison official’s conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285

(11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison

officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has

described a “more than mere negligence” or “more than gross negligence

standard” in determining whether an official acted with deliberate indifference

to that serious medical need. See Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d

1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that the prison officials (1) had subjective knowledge of a

risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) acted with more than

gross negligence.”) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Wade v. McDade,

106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024). Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit

determined that those standards conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision

in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit should apply the “subjective

recklessness” standard as used in criminal law. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1253.

Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that to establish liability on

an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered

a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with

“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if

he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Id. at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).4

“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard

sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Indeed, the law is

well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of

corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330–31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in

Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or

substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”). The

Eleventh Circuit has also noted that “[n]othing in our case law would derive a

constitutional deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to subordinate his

4 The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to

the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit

deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue

to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

own professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the contrary, it is well

established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does not constitute

deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir.

2007)5 (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033). Similarly, “the question of whether

governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or

forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and

therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth

Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted).

Here, Fletcher’s assertions fail to state a claim for deliberate

indifference. Fletcher makes conclusory allegations that he was denied medical

care without any factual assertions to support that any action by a named

Defendant rose to the level of deliberate indifference. In the Complaint,

Fletcher provides no assertions regarding the denial of medical care while

outlining the “facts underlying [his] claim(s).” See Complaint at 5. The only

factual assertion beyond the conclusory statement that Fletcher was “denied

medical treatment” is his assertion within the Injuries section of his

5 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61

(11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished

opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive

authority.”).

Complaint, stating that “the sick call nures [sic] would pick up my sick call but

then [] I did not see no body [sic].” Id. at 5. Fletcher names no nurses as

defendants in this action. As there are no factual allegations to suggest any

action by any of the named Defendants constituted deliberate indifference, the

claim is due to be dismissed.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. PLRA Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires exhaustion of

available administrative remedies before a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action regarding

prison conditions may be initiated by a prisoner in a district court. See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.”); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006) (noting that

a prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies before challenging the

conditions of confinement, and concluding that the PLRA demands “proper

exhaustion”). Still, prisoners are not required to “specially plead or

demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

216 (2007). Instead, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that

“failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA[.]” Id.

Importantly, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is “a

precondition to an adjudication on the merits[.]” Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368,

1374 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. The Supreme Court has

instructed that while “the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not

jurisdictional[,]” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 101, “exhaustion is mandatory . . . and

unexhausted claims cannot be brought[.]” Pavao v. Sims, 679 F. App’x 819, 823

(11th Cir. 2017) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 211). Not only is there a recognized

exhaustion requirement, “the PLRA . . . requires proper exhaustion” as set

forth in the applicable administrative rules and policies of the institution.

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93.

Because exhaustion requirements are designed

to deal with parties who do not want to exhaust,

administrative law creates an incentive for these

parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to

do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full

opportunity to adjudicate their claims.

Administrative law does this by requiring proper

exhaustion of administrative remedies, which “means

using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so

properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on

the merits).”

Id. at 90 (citation omitted). Indeed, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance

with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules[.]” Id.

In Ross v. Blake, the Supreme Court instructed that “[c]ourts may not

engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception onto the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement. The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one

baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies

as are ‘available.’” 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). For an administrative remedy to

be available, the “remedy must be ‘capable of use for the accomplishment of

[its] purpose.’” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084 (11th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2007)). In

Ross, the Court identified three circumstances in which an administrative

remedy would be considered “not available.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 643. First, “an

administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or

guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with

officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved

inmates.” Id. Next, “an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it

becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.” Id. Finally, a remedy may be

unavailable “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking

advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or

intimidation.” Id. at 644.

Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense, the defendant bears “the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed

to exhaust his available administrative remedies.” Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082.

The Eleventh Circuit has articulated a two-step process that district courts

must employ when examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative

remedies.

In Turner v. Burnside we established a two-step

process for resolving motions to dismiss prisoner

lawsuits for failure to exhaust. 541 F.3d at 1082. First,

district courts look to the factual allegations in the

motion to dismiss and those in the prisoner’s response

and accept the prisoner’s view of the facts as true. The

court should dismiss if the facts as stated by the

prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id. Second, if

dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner’s view of

the facts, the court makes specific findings to resolve

disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based on those

findings, defendants have shown a failure to exhaust.

Id. at 1082–83; see also id. at 1082 (explaining that

defendants bear the burden of showing a failure to

exhaust).

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).

The FDOC provides inmates with a three-step grievance process for

exhausting administrative remedies. As the Eleventh Circuit has described it:

The grievance procedure applicable to Florida

prisoners is set out in § 33-103 of the Florida

Administrative Code. Section 33-103 contemplates a

three-step sequential grievance procedure: (1)

informal grievance; (2) formal grievance; and then (3)

administrative appeal. Dimanche, 783 F.3d at 1211.

Informal grievances are handled by the staff member

responsible for the particular area of the problem at

the institution; formal grievances are handled by the

warden of the institution; and administrative appeals

are handled by the Office of the Secretary of the

FDOC. See Fla. Admin. Code. §§ 33-103.005–103.007.

To exhaust these remedies, prisoners ordinarily must

complete these steps in order and within the time

limits set forth in § 33-103.011, and must either

receive a response or wait a certain period of time

before proceeding to the next step. See id. § 33-

103.011(4).

Pavao, 679 F. App’x at 824.

According to Rule 33-103.014, an informal grievance, formal grievance,

direct grievance, or grievance appeal “may be returned to the inmate without

further processing if, following a review of the grievance, one or more . . .

conditions are found to exist.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1). The rule

provides an enumerated list as “the only reasons for returning a grievance

without a response on the merits.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1)(a)–

(y). A grievance can be returned without action if it: is untimely; “addresses

more than one issue or complaint”; is “so broad, general or vague in nature that

it cannot be clearly investigated, evaluated, and responded to”; is “not written

legibly and cannot be clearly understood”; is a supplement to a previously-

submitted grievance that has been accepted for review; does not “provide a

valid reason for by-passing the previous levels of review as required or the

reason provided is not acceptable”; or does not include the required

attachments. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1).

2. The Parties’ Positions Regarding Exhaustion

In his Complaint, Fletcher asserts he exhausted his administrative

remedies, but notes that some of his grievances “came up missing.” Complaint

at 6–8. In support of his claim of exhaustion, Fletcher attached numerous

grievances and appeals. Doc. 1-1 at 1–28.6

Defendants, however, argue Fletcher failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies with respect to any Eighth Amendment claim. Motion

at 5–10. Specifically, Defendants state Fletcher only raised allegations of

excessive use of force in Formal Grievance 2401-209-022 and Appeal 24-6-

01726, but the grievance focused on overturning the disciplinary action, rather

than the use of force, and the appeal was returned to Fletcher as no informal

or formal grievance was filed prior to appealing and because Fletcher raised

multiple issues in the appeal. Id. at 6–8. Defendants also suggest the Formal

Grievance and Appeal filed are insufficient because they do not: (1) name the

officer who allegedly punched Fletcher; (2) name Defendant Arnette in any

way; (3) allege Thomas or Arnette failed to prevent Cartwright from allegedly

punching him; or (4) allege Thomas or Arnette used excessive force. Id. at 8.

With their Motion, Defendants provide declarations and records

regarding Fletcher’s exhaustion efforts. See Docs. 11-1 through 11-3. In a

sworn declaration, Lawanda Sanders-Williams, an Operations Analyst for the

FDOC Bureau of Policy Management and Inmate Appeals, states that between

6 The Court notes that there are many duplications of documents within this

attachment, though some copies contain different handwritten notes from Fletcher.

See generally Doc. 1-1. The Court has reviewed all the documents and will include

citations to all pages on which a document may be found even where it may be

duplicative.

December 20, 2023, to March 18, 2024, Fletcher filed five appeals, three of

which discussed the December 20, 2023 use of force. Doc. 11-1 at 1. Sanders-

Williams further states that all three of those appeals “were returned without

action for grieving multiple issues, not providing a formal grievance with the

appeal, or not filing a grievance at the lower level.” Id. at 2. Jeffery McClellan,

FDOC Assistant Warden of Programs at Florida State Prison also states under

the penalty of perjury that from December 20, 2023, to March 18, 2024,

Fletcher filed seventeen informal and six formal grievances, that none of the

grievances complained of excessive use of force, and that none of the grievances

referencing the December 20, 2023 incident were approved. Doc. 11-2 at 1.

Defendants further submitted a sworn statement from FDOC’s backup

Grievance Coordinator at Reception and Medical Center, Cordelia McDowell,

who states “there was no hinderance or impediment to Inmate Fletcher’s use

of the grievance procedure at any level.” Doc. 11-3 at 1. As support, McDowell

outlines the procedure for submission of grievances. Id. at 1–2. McDowell

states that every day a classification officer walks around to collect the

grievances with a locked box, which has a slot only big enough to slip the

grievances inside, and that if an inmate has a grievance the inmate will hold

it up to the flap or window then either place it into the box or have the

classification officer place it in the box while in the inmate’s view. Id. at 1.

McDowell explains the classification officer will continue through the wing,

before continuing to the next wing or to return the box to the grievance

coordinator, who is the only person in possession of a key to unlock the

grievance box. Id. at 2.

In his Response, Fletcher states that he did exhaust his administrative

remedies but that he “filed it over and over [but] it comes up missing parts or

disappear[s] all together [sic].” Response at 1. Fletcher requests this Court “see

all grievances and informales [sic] that I sent with the 1983 form to the courts

on 3-18-2024.” Id. at 1.7

3. Turner Step One

Under the first step of the Turner analysis, the Court must review the

allegations in the Motion and Response and accept as true Fletcher’s

allegations. See Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1209. If Fletcher’s allegations in the

Response show a failure to exhaust, then dismissal would be appropriate. See

id.

Accepting Fletcher’s allegations that he exhausted these claims through

grievances and that some of those grievances went missing, the Court finds

7 In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit suggests that a pro se

plaintiff must receive notice of his opportunity to develop the record on

exhaustion. See Kinard v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-10359, 2024 WL 4785003, at *7

(11th Cir. Nov. 14, 2024) (per curiam). Here, the Court notified Fletcher that he had

forty-five days to respond to any motion to dismiss. See Order (Doc. 5) at 3. Fletcher

responded to the Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 14) and addressed the exhaustion

argument by relying on the grievance records that he attached to his Complaint. He

does not suggest that he requires additional discovery. As such, Fletcher has received

notice and an opportunity to develop the record on exhaustion.

dismissal of the claims against Defendants for lack of exhaustion is not

warranted at the first step of Turner. Thus, the Court proceeds to the second

step of the two-part process and considers the Defendants’ arguments about

exhaustion and makes findings of fact.

4. Turner Step Two

As dismissal would not be appropriate based on the allegations in the

Motion and Response, the Court turns to the second prong of the Turner

analysis and finds Fletcher had available administrative remedies that he

failed to properly exhaust before filing this action. The purpose of

administrative exhaustion “is to put the [administrative authority] on notice

of all issues in contention and to allow the [authority] an opportunity to

investigate those issues.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1287 (quotations and citation

omitted) (alterations in original). However, to properly exhaust administrative

remedies, “prisoners must complete the administrative review process in

accordance with the [prison’s] applicable procedural rules,” Jones, 549 U.S. at

218 (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, prisoners must “properly take each

step within the administrative process.” Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1378

(11th Cir. 2008). The FDOC’s rules require that informal and formal

grievances be legible, include accurately stated facts, and address only one

issue or complaint; however, it does not include any requirements regarding

the level of detail required for grievances. Fla. Admin. Code. R. 33-

103.005(2)(b)2; 33-103.006(2)(d)-(f). Where a prison’s grievance procedure does

not require a certain level of specificity, “a grievance suffices if it alerts the

prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Strong v. David,

297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002), overruled in part on other grounds by Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007); see Harvard v. Inch, 411 F.

Supp. 3d 1220, 1244 (N.D. Fla. 2019).8

As a preliminary matter, the Court observes that prison officials

returned without action many of the grievances and appeals Fletcher submits

to show exhaustion due to his failure to comply with procedural requirements.

In Informal Grievance 209-2401-0104, Fletcher requested the retention of

video records related to the disciplinary report stemming from the December

20, 2023 incident, but officials returned the grievance without action because

Fletcher had addressed the issue previously in Grievance 2401-209-022. Doc.

1-1 at 11. In Appeal 24-6-01726, Fletcher requested the retention of video

recordings and a housing log, grieved the lack of medical treatment, and stated

Fletcher would be filing a federal lawsuit for abuse and lack of treatment. Id.

at 7. Officials returned it without action because the appeal “address[ed] more

8 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union

Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court

would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision

would have significant persuasive effects.”).

than one issue and/or complaint.” Id. at 6. In Appeal 24-6-05037, Fletcher

complained of lack of medical treatment and lack of responses to grievances,

discussed the December 20, 2023 incident, and requested “money and job for

remedy,” but officials returned that appeal without action because Fletcher

failed to provide a copy of the formal grievance or an acceptable reason to

bypass that level of the grievance procedure. Id. at 25–26, 28. In Appeal 24-5-

05234, Fletcher complained of “cruel and unusual punishment” based on the

December 20, 2023 incident, but officials also returned this appeal without

action because Fletcher failed to provide a copy of the formal grievance or an

acceptable reason to bypass that stage of the grievance process. Id. at 1, 2.

Because Fletcher failed to follow the procedural rules and take each step in the

administrative process, Fletcher did not properly exhaust his administrative

remedies through these grievances and appeals. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90;

Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; see also Hersh v. Scott, No. 3:22-CV-408-BJD-LLL,

2023 WL 2242551, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2023) (finding that where

grievances were returned without action, “they d[id] not satisfy the exhaustion

requirement”).

Fletcher’s Informal Grievance 209-2401-0070, and corresponding Formal

Grievances 2401-209-057 and 2402-205-032, do not show that he exhausted all

administrative remedies as he failed to submit an appeal following the denials

of the formal grievances. Doc. 1-1 at 3–5, 12–14. Fletcher’s failure to take “each

step within the administrative process” precludes these grievances from

establishing exhaustion. See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1378. More importantly, even

if there was an appeal, these grievances would not have exhausted the claims

presented in his Complaint. In his Informal Grievance 209-2401-0070, Fletcher

stated:9

I put in 4 sick calls about my left temple and eyesight

[since] the [] date of 12-20-2023. I am in pain, the

shape of my temple plate is changed, and my left

eyesight is really bad. I was beat in right temple left

against floor banging, was warned to not complain

about issue when being locked up staff responsible

runs lock up 5 days a week if I spoke to nurses or

doctor in dorm, they will report it to him, and I’ll be

retaliated on for sure. I am being denied medical

treatment. Turned in 4 medical request[s] seen nobody

about temple [or] eyesight. Was told off by nurse who

picks up sick call when asked about a form and about

ones turned in. I’m in pain my plate is [illegible]. Was

warned when locked up to keep quiet.

Doc. 1-1 at 5 (cleaned up). The prison official denied the informal grievance on

January 11, 2024, stating that there was no record Fletcher submitted any sick

call with his concerns, that there were no injuries or complaints during

Fletcher’s post use of force evaluation, and that the nurse makes rounds daily

and Fletcher could request a sick call or declare a medical emergency for

evaluation. Id.

9 When quoting Fletcher’s grievances and appeals throughout this Order, the

Court has corrected numerous spelling and punctuation errors for ease of reading.

In one of the formal grievances following this denial, 2401-209-057,

Fletcher wrote:

This is a grievance after doing an informal grievance

about medical not responding to sick call requests. I

put in about my temple plate and eye. Not seeing me

and denying I put them in. I’ve put in 4[,] that one was

concerning my ankles and feet hurting [and] 3 about

my plate that was bent out of shape on 12-20-2023.

The day I got locked up my temple was on the floor,

and I got hit 3 or 4 times on the right temple and

caused my left to hit the floor. I’m in pain and my

eyesight is out of focus and blurry. I was warned on

the way to medical to keep my mouth shut so I did so

when being checked out before going to lock up. The

beating took place in F1 at 10:07 with me laying [sic]

flat on ground [with] palms flat on [the] floor, not

moving at all. I’m trying to see a doctor about my

temple plate being bent out [of] its normal shape and

pain and eyesight being blurry. I turned in medical

request[s] on 12-27-2023 and on 1-3-2024 about this in

morning to sick nurse. I’ve seen [a] doctor over a sick

call. I did in population a few days before getting

locked up about sores all over me and about my med

levels for seizure med. No body[’]s seen me over the

plate and eye or about my feet. I was talked to bad

about turning in sick call request and another nurse

made comment about me [illegible]. Request remedy

to see a doctor about issue.

Id. at 4, 13 (cleaned up). Prison officials denied this formal grievance on

January 26, 2024, stating the response to his informal grievance was

appropriate since there was no record of his sick call requests on the specified

dates, he had been seen by the primary care physician on January 8, 2024 for

a follow-up, and the records of that visit had no mention of the listed

complaints. Id. at 14.

In the other formal grievance, 2402-205-032, Fletcher stated:

This is a request for remedy for relief for an informal

grievance that was denied on 1-11-202410 about me

being denied medical treatment. I turned in 4 sick

calls about my temple plate being bent out [of] shape,

my eyesight [can] no longer see [] out [of] my left eye.

It feels like something is scratching my eyeball when I

look to the left. This was done to me at Reception and

Medical Center Lake Butler in F1 Dorm at 10:07. I was

laying on the floor with 3 officers holding on to me, my

hands were flat on the floor so were my arms, I was

not resisting, and Lt. Cartwright came running in

dorm and started punching me in my right temple

causing my left to hit the floor 4 or 5 times until Major

Starling told him to stop hitting me. 69 inmates [saw]

this. I called 45s and 47s as witnesses. They got word

to me nobody ever came to them about being [a]

witness in my DR investigation. There [are] 4 cameras

in sleeping bay of F1[.] I called for them to be view[ed]

to prove CO Thomas DR statement of facts were false.

He never asked any inmate for medical passes. He

kicked my bed and told me to get my fucking ass up

before he kicked it. When I stood up, he grabbed my

arm. I pulled his [arm] off because he was hurting me.

He then pushed me over an empty locker frame I held

on and held him to keep from being hit then I go to lock

up where Lt. Cartwright is the housing Lt. 5 days a

week. The nurse’s offices [are] right beside his office. I

turned in 4 sick calls on wing 2, cell 2107, see auto

recording of nurse doing pickup for sick calls on 1-3-

2024, 1-11-2024, 1-17-2024, 1-4-2024, and 12-27-2023.

I seen [sic] nurse one time about blood in stool [but]

never about eyesight, pain, and shape of plate. I put in

informal grievances never heard back. I put in a direct

grievance to the secretary[’s] office never heard back.

The person picking them up clearly took them for

10 Informal grievance 209-2401-0070.

remedy. Nurse and staff need firing.

Doc. 1-1 at 10 (cleaned up) (footnote not in original). Prison officials denied the

grievance on February 7, 2024, stating that further investigation could not

corroborate his allegations regarding the health care staff member and that

there were no medical encounters documented for his specified dates. Id. at 8.

In the Complaint, Fletcher asserts Defendants violated the Eighth

Amendment when they allegedly subjected him to constitutionally excessive

force and/or failed to intervene during others’ excessive use of force. However,

while Fletcher mentions the December 20, 2023 incident in these grievances,

what he complains about is the denial of medical care, not the use of force and

failure to intervene. In the first sentence of both formal grievances, Fletcher

makes clear that the grievances were “about medical not responding to sick

call requests” and “being denied medical treatment.” Doc. 1-1 at 4, 10, 13.

Further, he requested to see a doctor and for medical staff to be disciplined. Id.

It is evident from the responses that the prison officials also understood the

grievances to complain about medical care, not the use of force. Accordingly,

the Court finds these grievances did not suffice to alert officials to the claims

Fletcher raises in the Complaint. See Hamze v. Warner, No. 3:21-CV-565-

MMH-JBT, 2024 WL 111923, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2024) (finding plaintiff’s

grievances that challenged a disciplinary report arising from corrections

officers’ use of force did not properly exhaust his Eighth Amendment excessive

force claims); Berry v. Keith, No. 3:20-CV-261-MMH-JBT, 2021 WL 1561493,

at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2021) (same); Lawson v. Crutchfield, No. 5:15-CV-150-

MP-GRJ, 2016 WL 5219466, at *7 (N.D. Fla. July 5, 2016) (same), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 5:15-CV-00150-MP-GTJ, 2016 WL 5219626

(N.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2016).

Similarly, in Formal Grievance 2401-209-022 and Appeal 24-6-04261,

Fletcher challenges the disciplinary report related to the December 20, 2023

incident, not an unconstitutional use of excessive force or failure to intervene.

Doc. 1-1 at 16, 18, 22. While he discusses the alleged use of force, the remedy

he seeks is that the disciplinary report “be overturned” and “taken off [his] DR

list.” Id. In the formal grievance 2401-209-022, Fletcher stated:

Log # 209-231594.11 This is [an] appeal for

administrative remedy or appeal. On 12-28-2023, I

was found guilty of violation code 0115 title[d]

Batt/Att/CO, was giv[en] 60 days DC, 260 days lost

gain time, and 9 day credit. The DR statement of facts

is wrote in a false statement which is against the law.

At no time did Officer Thomas say, “show me a pass.”

He kicked my bed [when] I was sleeping [and] said,

“get your fucking ass up before I kick your ass.” I was

startled, jumped up and said, “who you talking to?” He

grabbed my arm. I pulled away. He pushed me over

locker rack. I got up with him and held on. At no time

did I try to hit him I was just coming fully awake when

other staff got there[,] I laid flat [with] hands on

ground. Someone started punching me in the side of

the temple [until] a higher white shirt said, “stop

11 This is the log number for Fletcher’s Disciplinary Report stemming from the

December 20, 2023 incident. See Doc. 1-1 at 19–20, 23–24.

hitting him.” Inmate in bed F1147s yelled, “do not hit

him again.” Look at camera. At no time did Officer

Thomas check any body’s passes like he stated. That’s

a false statement on a legal document. Plus, I was hit

punched in my temple[,] my other temple was against

the floor it’s now out of shape. I have a plate in temple

[and] take seizure meds. I’m in pain. Eyesight is

blurry. Put in sick calls. This DR should be took [sic]

off my DR list [and] overturned. I’m also going to seek

damages for pain and damage. I’m also requesting the

auto video of F1 Bay sleeping be kept from the time he

came in dorm [until] leaving.

Doc. 1-1 at 18, 22 (cleaned up) (footnote not in original). Fletcher included

documents related to his disciplinary report with his grievance. Id. at 19–20,

23–24. After review, prison officials denied the grievance on January 19, 2024,

finding Fletcher had not “provided evidence to substantiate [his] allegation

that the Reporting Officer furnished false information,” the requested video

did not support his statement, Fletcher chose to enter a plea of no contest to

the charge, and Fletcher failed to provide “evidence, reason, information, or

documentation that would warrant the consideration of overturning this

disciplinary charge.” Id. at 17, 21. In Appeal 24-6-04261, Fletcher wrote:

This is a request for administrative remedy for a DR

appeal that was denied on 1-19-24 at the

institution[al] level for DR that I was found guilty on

12-28-2023 for violation code 115 [title]

Battery/Att/CO. Was [given] 60DC and CM1. This DR

Log # 2401-209-022. I was told to plead no contest by

Lt. Cartwright who is the housing LT 5 days a week in

K dorm at RMC. He is the officer that jumped down

and punched me in the temple with a closed fist [until]

Major Starling told him to stop hitting me in front [of]

the whole dorm on camera. I requested all 4 bay area

camera recordings be kept plus the housing log. My

temple has a plate in it. Now it’s bent and my eyesight

in left eye is all blurry. I sent 303 direct grievance to

the secretary[’s] office was sealed in a[n] envelope.

This was 1-4-2024 about abuse. I’ve never heard

anything. I put in 3 informal grievances about abuse

and requesting the video and housing log be kept and

I never got them back. I put in 5 sick calls about temple

and eyesight never got seen and [illegible]. I was told

there was no record of sick calls. The nurse’s station

was right beside Lt. Cartwright[’s] office. I put sick

calls in on 12-27-2023 and on 1-3-2024, all on video on

wing 2 K-Dorm cell 2107 at sick call, same with

grievances. Grievances sent to Tallahassee on 1-4-

2024. Lt. Cartwright sat in DR hearing. I was warned

when going to per confinement not to say nothing.

Officer Thomas never asked nobody for a pass. He lied

on a legal document. He passed by 3 wheelchairs and

a walker, kicked my bed, I stood up. He had said get

your ass up before I kick it. When I stood up, [I] asked

“who you talking to?” He grabbed my arm hard. I

pulled away. He pushed me over a[n] empty locker

frame not tried to direct me on a bed. I grabbed him so

he could not hit me. When laying on floor not

[resisting] Lt. Cartright came running in, jumped

down, and punched me 4 or 5 time[s] with closed fist

in temple. It’s bent and eyesight is really bad. I’m in

pain. DR should be overturned. I’m seeking money for

damage.

Id. at 16 (cleaned up). On February 9, 2024, C. Neel denied the appeal, stating

that Fletcher entered a voluntary plea of no contest to the charge and

statement of facts as written and he had “not presented sufficient evidence or

information to warrant overturning the disciplinary report.” Id. at 15.

In this grievance and appeal, Fletcher stated he was requesting an

administrative remedy or appeal based on the DR violation and a “DR appeal,”

repeatedly alleged that Officer Thomas provided false information, and

requested that his disciplinary report be overturned. It is clear by the

institution’s responses that the prison officials understood these grievances as

challenges to the disciplinary report, not grievances regarding an alleged

excessive use of force. Accordingly, the Court finds Formal Grievance 2401-

209-022 and Appeal 24-6-04261 did not sufficiently alert officials to the Eighth

Amendment violations Fletcher raises in his Complaint. See Hamze, 2024 WL

111923, at *8; Berry, 2021 WL 1561493, at *6; Lawson, 2016 WL 5219466, at

*7.

Fletcher also references ”DOC Number[] 24-6-06339” in his Response,

see Response at 1, but he did not submit a copy of that grievance with his

Complaint or his Response, see generally Doc. 1-1 at 1–28; Response. However,

Defendants’ submission shows that this appeal was again regarding medical

grievances, rather than the excessive use of force. See Doc. 11-1 at 1–2 (stating

that only three of the appeals were “directly related to the use of force on

December 20, 2023,” and that all three of those appeals were returned to

Fletcher without action), 4–5 (table of appeals showing that appeal 24-6-06339

was related to medical allegations and denied rather than returned).

Accordingly, this grievance appeal would be insufficient to show exhaustion of

Fletcher’s Eighth Amendment claims of excessive use of force or failure to

intervene.

Turning to Fletcher’s allegations of missing grievances, the Court does

not find Fletcher has shown the grievance process was unavailable to him.

“While the burden is on the defendant to show an available administrative

remedy, once that burden has been met, the burden going forward shifts to the

plaintiff, who, pursuant to Turner, must demonstrate that the grievance

procedure was ‘subjectively’ and ‘objectively’ unavailable to him.” Geter v.

Baldwin State Prison, 974 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Turner,

541 F.3d at 1085). Here, Defendants have established that FDOC has an

administrative grievance process and that Fletcher failed to adequately resort

to that process to exhaust his claims. Through Fletcher’s assertions that his

grievances “were being lost, my letters never sent or disregarded,” see

Response at 2, he seemingly suggests the grievance process was unavailable

because prison officials interfered with the grievance process. However, his

vague allegations fail to satisfy his burden and any suggestion that relevant

informal or formal grievances were not logged lacks credibility. First, it is

evident that Fletcher knows how to access and navigate the FDOC’s grievance

process, as he filed seventeen informal grievances, six formal grievances, and

five appeals, in just three months. See Docs. 11-1; 11-2. Second, Fletcher

provides no details about the allegedly missing grievances, such as when or

how he submitted them, what he wrote in them, or how they would have been

different from those discussed here. While he mentions in some of the attached

grievances that he felt some grievances were missing, he does not state in those

grievances or in his Response whether he attempted to proceed to the next step

of the grievance process when he did not receive a timely response from the

appropriate prison official. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(4) (notifying

inmates how to proceed if they do not receive a timely response to a grievance

at any step: expiration of a time limit at any step in the process shall entitle

[an inmate] to proceed to the next step of the grievance process”); see also

Turner, 541 F.3d at 1084 (finding that a prison’s failure to respond to a formal

grievance did not relieve the prisoner of his obligation to file an appeal when

the grievance procedure provided that prisoners could file an appeal if they did

not receive a response to a formal grievance within thirty days.).

Lastly, it strains credulity that there were grievances related to the

allegations in this action that were not routed to the grievance coordinator

given that Fletcher successfully filed twenty-eight grievances in a three-month

span, many of which discussed the December 20, 2023 incident, and that the

only person with a key to the grievance box is the grievance coordinator. See

Doc. 11-3 at 2. In other words, placing a grievance in the grievance box fairly

ensures it will be routed to the grievance coordinator absent obvious and

intentional tampering by a prison officer, of which Fletcher makes no such

allegation. For the above reasons, the Court finds Defendants have carried

their burden to demonstrate Fletcher did not exhaust his administrative

remedies for the claims within his Complaint before initiating this action.

Fletcher’s Eighth Amendment claims of excessive use of force and failure to

intervene are thus due to be dismissed.

C. State Law Claims

In the Complaint, in addition to his federal § 1983 claims, Fletcher also

asserts claims for relief under Florida state law for assault and battery. See

Complaint at 3, 6. However, the Court has determined that Fletcher’s federal

claims over which the Court has original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 are due to be dismissed. Thus, the Court must now consider

whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

state law claims.

“The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pend[e]nt state

claims rests within the discretion of the district court.” Raney v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004). The Court may decline to exercise

jurisdiction over a state claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or

claims over which the district court has original

jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling

reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).12 Notably, “[a]ny one of the section 1367(c) factors is

sufficient to give the district court discretion to dismiss a case’s supplemental

state law claims.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743

(11th Cir. 2006). However, upon determining that it has the discretion to

decline jurisdiction, “[a district court] should consider the traditional

rationales for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and convenience

in deciding whether or not to exercise that jurisdiction.” Palmer v. Hosp. Auth.

of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994). Upon due

consideration, the Court finds that judicial economy and convenience would

not be served by retaining jurisdiction over Fletcher’s state law claims. Thus,

the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court has determined that the § 1983

claims in the Complaint, over which the Court has original jurisdiction, are

due to be dismissed. What remain are uniquely state law claims that are best

addressed by the state courts. The Court has not issued any dispositive rulings

pertaining to the state law claims, and no discovery deadlines have been set.

Thus, the procedural posture of this case weighs in favor of declining

12 In § 1367, Congress codified the concepts of pendent and ancillary

jurisdiction under the umbrella label of supplemental jurisdiction. Artis v. District of

Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 74 (2018).

jurisdiction to allow the case to proceed fully in state court. Moreover, when,

as here, the federal claim is dismissed prior to trial, the Eleventh Circuit has

“encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims.” Raney, 370

F.3d at 1089; Busse v. Lee Cnty., 317 F. App’x 968, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2009)

(“Since the district court ‘had dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction,’ it therefore had the discretion not to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over [Appellant’s] state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Furthermore, we expressly encourage district courts to take such action when

all federal claims have been dismissed pretrial.”); see also Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be

considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”).

Upon consideration of the § 1367 factors and the “traditional rationales

for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and convenience,” see

Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Fletcher’s remaining state law claims. Accordingly, Fletcher’s

state law claims for assault and battery are due to be dismissed without

prejudice to Fletcher refiling these claims in the appropriate state court.

D. Defendants’ Remaining Arguments

Because Fletcher’s claims against Defendants are due to be dismissed

for failure to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and the Court has

decided not to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the Court need

not address Defendants’ arguments that Fletcher failed to give pre-suit notice

for his state law claims, that his claim is conclusively contradicted by video

records, that the action should be dismissed due to Fletcher’s failure to disclose

his litigation history, that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for

claims brought against them in their official capacities, and that Fletcher is

barred from seeking punitive damages.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Fletcher’s request to terminate Defendant Kody Williams as a

Defendant from this action is GRANTED. All claims against Kody Williams

are dismissed.

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is GRANTED to the

extent that Defendants seek dismissal for Fletcher’s failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies. In all other respects, the Motion is denied without

prejudice.

3. Fletcher’s state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice

to refiling in the appropriate state court.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update Fletcher’s address to

South Bay Correctional Facility, 600 U.S. Highway 27 South, South Bay,

Florida 33493.

5. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing Defendant Kody

Williams with prejudice and all remaining claims in this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 10th day of

September, 2025.

United States District Judge

JaxP-12

C: Albert Leon Fletcher, 103151

Counsel of Record

35