Charles v. LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

BRUCE CHARLES, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-0541

VERSUS JUDGE ELIZABETH E. FOOTE

JAMES M LEBLANC, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a motion for attorney fees and a supplemental motion for

attorney fees filed by Plaintiffs. Record Documents 805 & 842. As of the filing of this

memorandum ruling, Plaintiffs request $6,357,996.10 in fees and $542,630.41 in costs.

Record Documents 842 at 2 & 855-1 at 3. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motion,

arguing Plaintiffs do not qualify as “prevailing parties,” the motion is premature, and the

“fee request is unreasonable and seeks payment for hours that were excessive,

redundant, or unnecessary.” Record Document 845 at 6-7. Defendants alternatively

maintain $3,542,503.00 is a reasonable fee award for Plaintiffs. at 29.

For the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motions for attorney

fees [Record Documents 805 & 842] are GRANTED. In the interest of judicial efficiency

and in light of the unusual procedural posture of this case as described , the Court

makes a binding calculation of the attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court finds fees of

$6,313,505.20 and costs of $540,010.98 are reasonable for Plaintiffs’ work from January

19, 2016, to June 24, 2025.1

1 The Court notes that Plaintiffs seek compensation for hours expended after this cut-off

point. Record Document 855-4 at 2, 9 (requesting 45.9 hours for John Adcock

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the award of attorneys’ fees and costs is

STAYED until the resolution of Defendants’ pending appeal. The award shall remain

stayed until such time as the Court deems appropriate and upon motion of a party.

Background

Inmates at David Wade Correctional Center (“DWCC”) filed this class action suit

for injunctive and declaratory relief, challenging the conditions of confinement and

delivery of mental health services on extended lockdown. Plaintiffs alleged the policies

and practices in place at DWCC violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Section 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”).

On November 1, 2022, following a seventeen-day bench trial, the Court held that

(1) Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by housing inmates—including those with

a diagnosed mental illness—in inhumane conditions while on extended lockdown and by

failing to provide those inmates adequate mental health care; and (2) Defendants violated

the ADA and RA by failing to make reasonable accommodations for inmates with mental

disabilities and by employing unlawful methods of administration. Record Document

641. On July 18, 2024, following a fourteen-day bench trial, the Court held that Plaintiffs

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Eighth Amendment, ADA, and RA

violations for which they sought protection had continued since the liability phase of trial

(“Adcock”)). Because this portion of the fee request was raised in the reply, Defendants

did not have an opportunity to object. Accordingly, the Court did not consider these hours

in its assessment. Instead, the Court considered only those hours reflected in the time

sheets submitted for Plaintiffs’ original motion [Record Document 805] and supplemental

motion [Record Document 842].

and would continue. Record Document 754. The Court enjoined Defendants from (1)

continuing to violate the Eighth Amendment rights of the Class through the

unconstitutional conditions of confinement and provision of deficient mental health

services; and (2) continuing to violate the ADA and RA rights of the Subclass. .

Finally, the Court ordered Defendants to remedy the enumerated constitutional, ADA,

and RA violations. . The Court issued a Remedial Order setting forth a process for

determining if Defendants continue to engage in the identified violations. Record

Document 755.

On August 2, 2024, Defendants appealed the July 2024 rulings. That same day,

Defendants also sought a stay with this Court pending appeal and requested expedited

consideration. Record Document 758. On August 5, 2024, the Court denied the

request for expedited consideration. Record Document 762. On August 12, 2024,

before this Court ruled on the motion to stay, Defendants moved the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (“the Fifth Circuit”) to stay this Court’s orders pending

appeal. Mot. Admin. Stay & Stay District Ct.’s Order Pending Appeal,

, No. 24-30484 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2024), ECF. No. 16. On August 14, 2024,

Plaintiffs filed their response to the motion to stay filed in the Fifth Circuit. Opp’n to

Mot. Admin. Stay & Stay District Ct.’s Order Pending Appeal, , No. 24-30484 (5th

Cir. Aug. 14, 2024), ECF. No. 28. That same day, Plaintiffs also filed a motion in this Court

urging it to enter additional factual findings and/or amend the Court’s July 2024 rulings

in response to the Defendants’ arguments in their motion to stay. Record Document

787 at 2.

Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit ordered Defendants’ appeal be held in abeyance until

this Court ruled on Plaintiffs’ cross-motion. , No. 24-30484, 2024

WL 3842581, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024). On August 27, 2024, Defendants filed a

motion to hold in abeyance Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Record

Document 803. On August 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their first motion for attorneys’ fees

and costs.2 Record Document 805. On September 5, 2024, the Court denied

Defendants’ motion to hold Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees in abeyance, noting it

would not do so “absent a stay by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.”

Record Document 807.

On September 20, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion. Record

Document 809. On December 13, 2024, Defendants filed an opposed motion to stay

further proceedings in the Fifth Circuit pending the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

, No. 23-30825 (5th Cir.). Mot. Stay Further Proceedings, , No. 24-

30484 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2024), ECF. No. 74. The Fifth Circuit granted that motion.

Order, , No. 24-30484 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 2024), ECF No. 91. Left pending in the

Fifth Circuit is Defendants’ previously filed motion to stay this Court. On February 12,

2025, the Fifth Circuit panel dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and

vacated the stay of that district court’s remedial order. , 128 F.4th

691, 693 (5th Cir. 2025), , , 134 F.4th 867 (5th Cir.

2 Plaintiffs had previously filed a motion for leave to file excess pages on August 17, 2024,

in which they sought permission from this Court to file this motion for attorneys’ fees.

Record Document 790. Also on August 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a bill of costs. Because

Plaintiffs incorporated the bill of costs into their motion for attorneys’ fees, Record

Document 805-1 at 36, the Court addresses those costs in this memorandum ruling.

2025). On April 22, 2025, the Fifth Circuit granted the Defendants’ petition for

rehearing en banc and vacated the previous February 12, 2025, panel decision.

, 134 F.4th 867, 868 (5th Cir. 2025).

On May 14, 2025, Defendants renewed the motion to stay they had previously

filed in this Court and additionally moved this Court to stay its April 23, 2025, Order.

Record Document 827. On June 6, 2025, the Court denied Defendants’ motions to stay.

Record Document 836. On June 30, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion for

attorneys’ fees. Record Document 842. As of the filing of this memorandum ruling,

Defendants’ motion in the Fifth Circuit to stay this Court remains pending, and this Court

has not been stayed by the Fifth Circuit.

Law & Analysis

Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 42 U.S.C. §

12205, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b), and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(h) and 54(d), which

provide for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party. Record

Document 805. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this matter.3 Record Document

755 at 18 (“As the prevailing parties, Plaintiffs are directed to file a motion to award

attorneys’ fees and costs . . . .”). Where an appeal is pending, “the court may rule on the

3 Defendants contend Plaintiffs do not qualify as prevailing parties in light of

, 145 S. Ct. 659, 221 L. Ed. 2d 63 (2025). Record Document 845 at 6, 8-11.

The Court disagrees. In , the Supreme Court held “[a] preliminary injunction . . .

does not render a plaintiff a ‘prevailing party.’” 145 S. Ct. at 671. This Court does not find

persuasive Defendants’ arguments to extend outside of the preliminary injunction

context. Therefore, the Court holds Plaintiffs are prevailing parties for purposes of

deciding these attorneys’ fee motions.

claim for fees, may defer its ruling on the motion, or may deny the motion without

prejudice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment ¶ 2.

Here, the Court finds that judicial efficiency and this case’s unusual posture

demand a binding calculation of Plaintiffs’ reasonable fee request. Seven years have

passed since Plaintiffs first filed this case. One year has passed since Defendants appealed

this Court’s July 2024 Judgments and moved the Fifth Circuit to stay this Court. Eight

months have passed since Defendants filed a motion to stay its own appeal in the Fifth

Circuit. With this passage of time, lawyers have come and gone, lawyers have changed

firms, and memories have faded.

Additionally, this case presents an unusual procedural posture. Defendants’ appeal

has been stayed in the Fifth Circuit pending a decision in . The panel

previously dismissed that appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. As such, the Fifth Circuit

panel did not consider the merits of the defendants’ appeal. , 128 F.4th

at 693. If the Fifth Circuit ultimately decides it has jurisdiction to hear , the Fifth

Circuit would then need to decide the merits. Only once a decision has been rendered in

will the Fifth Circuit turn to the merits of Defendants’ appeal in this case.

Order, , No. 24-30484 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 2024), ECF No. 91 (“Appellants’ opposed

motion to stay further proceedings in this court pending a decision in case no. 23-30825,

, is GRANTED”). Consequently, it may take months or even years for the

appeal to be settled in this case. During that time, Plaintiffs’ fees and costs will continue

to accrue. If Plaintiffs are successful on appeal, this Court would be faced with a lengthier

and more complex fee motion. Deciding this portion of Plaintiffs’ fee request now will

expedite the Court’s future determinations.

For these reasons, judicial efficiency and this case’s unusual posture demand that

this Court make the factual determinations for a binding award. The Court will now make

that binding calculation.

I. Attorneys’ Fees

Courts engage in a two-step process to calculate attorneys’ fees.

, 829 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2016). First, the Court must calculate

the lodestar, “which is equal to the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by

the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work.” at 392 (quotation marks

omitted). “In calculating the lodestar, the court should exclude all time that is excessive,

duplicative, or inadequately documented.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted).

The calculated lodestar is presumed to be reasonable. “After the lodestar method

is applied, courts use a twelve-factor test4 to determine whether counsel's performance

requires an upward or downward adjustment from the lodestar.” ,

957 F.3d 563, 574 (5th Cir. 2020). Therefore, the Court will first calculate the lodestar

and will then determine whether an upward or downward adjustment is warranted.

A. Lodestar Calculation

“The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours

worked and rates claimed.” , 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “A party

4 These factors, set forth in , 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.

1974), , 489 U.S. 87 (1989), will

be discussed .

objecting to a motion for attorneys’ fees is required to ‘present specific objections to the

allowance sought and advance the reasons for a denial or reduction. . . . It is not the

duty of the Court to go through the record line-by-line to determine which fees a party

objects to.’” , No. 15-CV-0203, 2019 WL 1112666,

at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2019) (internal marks omitted) (quoting both

, 750 F.2d 396, 405 (5th Cir. 1985), and

, No. 17-CV-438, 2018 WL 2027745, at *13-14 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2018)).

i. Reasonable Rate

The Court begins with the calculation of a reasonable rate. “Hourly rates are to be

computed according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal market.”

, 236 F.3d 256, 281 (5th Cir. 2000). “The relevant legal market

is the community where the district court sits.” , No. 21-CV-04454, 2023

WL 3168676, at *2 (W.D. La. Apr. 13, 2023) (citing , 285 F.3d

357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002)), , No. 21-CV-04454, 2023

WL 3168343 (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2023). “An attorney's requested hourly rate is prima facie

reasonable when he requests that the lodestar be computed at his or her ‘customary

billing rate,’ the rate is within the range of prevailing market rates, and the rate is not

contested.” , No. 2-CV-1164, 2005 WL 8155807, at *4 (M.D. La.

Sept. 28, 2005) (quoting , 50 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir.

1995)).

Here, Plaintiffs request hourly rates ranging from $225 to $400 for attorneys and

$108 for paralegals and other interns. Record Document 805-1 at 27. Plaintiffs submit

affidavits from practicing attorneys to support the requested rates. Record

Documents 805-11, 805-12, 805-13, 842-8, & 842-9. Defendants do not contest those

rates,5 and jurisprudence supports the requested hourly rates. ,

, No. 21-CV-0981, 2021 WL 9274368, at *2 (W.D. La. Jul.

29, 2021) (awarding hourly rates between $235 and $405 depending on the attorney’s

experience and discussing hourly rates awarded in other cases);

, No. 18-CV-0160, 2022 WL 4110956, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 8, 2022) (awarding hourly

rate of $125 for law clerks and paralegals). Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ hourly

rates are reasonable.6

ii. Reasonable Hours

The Court turns now to Plaintiffs’ requested hours. In their supplemental motion,

Plaintiffs sought compensation for 22,033.60 hours. Record Document 842 at 1.

5 Defendants seemingly contest the rate only to the extent Plaintiffs request “full attorney

rates for clerical work.” Record Document 845 at 23. As will be discussed , the Court

excluded all entries for clerical work and thus redressed this objection.

6 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes a statutory cap on an attorney’s

hourly rate. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(d)(1), (3). Defendants have not raised this issue,

but they previously argued the PLRA’s requirements apply. Record Document

803. The Court does not intend to opine on the applicability of the PLRA. However, out

of an abundance of caution, the Court finds persuasive those cases holding that the

PLRA’s rate cap does not apply where the prisoner-plaintiffs are joined by a non-prisoner

entity and the work performed for those entities is not logically severable.

, No. 14-CV-1178, 2015 WL 12030114, at *1

(W.D. Wash. June 22, 2015); , 92 F. Supp. 2d 697, 704 (S.D. Ohio

1999); , No. 6-CV-0457, 2013 WL 5597134, at *10-11 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 11, 2013); , No. 11-CV-0396, 2015 WL 4756529, at

*1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 11, 2015). Because Disability Rights Louisiana is a plaintiff in this matter

and the work performed is not logically severable, the PLRA rate cap does not apply.

Defendants object to that fee request on several grounds.7 Record Document 845.

Namely, Defendants maintain reductions are necessary to address (1) duplicative and

excessive work, (2) block billed entries, (3) clerical entries, (4) vague entries, and (5)

incomplete entries.8 Plaintiffs reduced their requested hours to 21,525.99 to

redress some of Defendants’ objections, but Plaintiffs maintain the rest of Defendants’

objections are meritless. Record Documents 855 & 855-1 at 3. The Court discusses

each objection in turn.

1. Duplicative and Excessive Work

Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ time sheets include duplicative and excessive work.

Record Document 845 at 18-22. To begin, Defendants’ motion outlines specific

entries they consider duplicative. at 19-20. In response, Plaintiffs purportedly

reduced the identified hours from 44.1 hours to 8 hours. Record Document 855 at 9-

10. The Court notes two issues with this reduction. First, Defendants’ motion incorrectly

sums the hours for an August 19, 2021, meeting as 8.3 hours instead of 8 hours.

Record Document 845 at 19-20. Thus, while Plaintiffs state Defendants sought a

reduction of 44.1 hours, Record Document 855 at 10, Defendants actually sought a

7 Defendants provide the Court with an “expert” report prepared by Michele Avery

(“Avery”), CPA/ABV, CVA, MAFF, to supplement their objections. Record Document

845-1. The Court’s consideration of this report is not intended to opine on whether Avery

is qualified as an expert.

8 Defendants also object based on mathematical errors in Plaintiffs’ calculations and the

lack of date on one attorney’s time sheet. Record Documents 845 at 23-24, 28 &

845-1 at 6-7, 9, 86. Plaintiffs submitted a corrected time sheet for that attorney, and

mathematical errors were either corrected by Plaintiffs in their reply or by this Court .

Record Documents 855 at 4 n.1, 855-1, & 855-2. As such, the Court will not further

reduce Plaintiffs’ fee request on these bases.

reduction of 43.8 hours. Second, Plaintiffs do not identify which entries were reduced and

to what extent. at 9-10. Without that information, the Court cannot determine

whether Plaintiffs’ final calculated hours for each attorney, as seen in Record Document

855-1 at 3, accurately reflect and/or account for this reduction.

As such, the Court finds excluding all but one entry for each of the identified

meetings is a sufficient reduction. For each identified meeting, the Court included only

the entry with the lowest number of hours. This procedure reduced the identified 43.8

hours to 8.1 hours, which was an overall reduction of 35.7 hours from the Plaintiffs’ fee

request (8.5 hours for Melanie Bray (“Bray”), 8.2 for Jonathan Trunnell (“Trunnell”), 4 for

Sarah Voigt (“Voigt”), 11 for Katie Schwartzmann (“Schwartzmann”), and 4 for Emma

Douglas (“Douglas”)).

Defendants also point to the number of attorneys who worked on specific

pleadings or during a specific trial phase.9 Record Documents 845 at 18 & 845-1 at

10-12, 88-92. Defendants argue their proffered tables demonstrate “duplication of efforts

of attorneys” and that “the hours devoted . . . are excessive to the point of

unreasonableness.” Record Document 845 at 20. The Court does not agree. Defendants

ignore crucial context explaining both the hours expended and the number of attorneys.

For example, Defendants note seven Plaintiffs’ attorneys expended over 500 hours

researching, preparing, drafting, filing, and reviewing motions in limine and preparing for

oral arguments regarding those motions. Record Document 845-1 at 12, 89. But

9 Defendants’ tables do not include specific entries. Record Documents 845 at 18 &

845-1 at 10-12, 88-92.

Defendants do not acknowledge that approximately eleven motions in limine were filed

in this case. Record Document 855 at 14-15. This is but one example of the

complexity and numerosity of the documents filed in this case. Indeed, as of the filing of

this memorandum ruling, the docket contains 858 entries.

Certainly, where “more than one attorney is involved, the possibility of duplication

of effort along with the proper utilization of time should be scrutinized.”

, 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974),

, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). Here, however, the time and resources

Plaintiffs devoted in this case are eminently reasonable given the case’s complexity and

length. Therefore, the Court finds Defendants’ general objection based on duplicative and

excessive work is meritless, and no further reductions to Plaintiffs’ fee award are

warranted.

Defendants make two additional arguments seemingly related to the excessive

time objection. First, Defendants contend Plaintiffs likely “inflate[d] the time” by

frequently “bill[ing] in half-hour time increments.” Record Document 845 at 24.

Defendants’ motion does not clearly articulate whether Defendants are arguing Plaintiffs

only or primarily used half-hour increments to bill or if the selected half-hour interval

entries are for an excessive or inflated amount of time. Regardless of how the Court

interprets Defendants’ argument, it has no merit. A review of the selected entries in

context demonstrates the attorneys did not bill in half-hour increments.10 Further, that

10 For example, Defendants select multiple entries from Bray ending in “.5” to presumably

establish Bray billed in half-hour increments. Record Document 845-1 at 15.

Plaintiffs may have worked for half an hour, an hour, etc. on certain tasks does not mean

the Court should exclude that entry simply by virtue of it being in a half-hour interval. So

long as Plaintiffs’ time is reasonable, the expended time deserves compensation. Such is

the case here. Therefore, this excessiveness objection has no merit.

Second, Defendants contend this Court should reduce all entries that exceed ten

hours. Record Document 845-1 at 8-9, 83-84. These entries charge for tasks such as

site visits with experts, client interviews, drafting, mediations, deposition preparation, and

hearing preparation. at 83-84. The Court reviewed these entries and does not find

them to be unreasonable or excessive. Given the length and complexity of this case, the

distance between Plaintiffs’ counsel and DWCC, and the exorbitant amount of discovery

involved, this excessiveness objection likewise has no merit.

2. Block Billed Entries

“Block billing is a time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal assistant

enters the total daily time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time

expended on specific tasks.” , 335 F. Supp. 2d 736, 739 (N.D. Tex. 2004)

(quotation marks omitted), , No. 00-CV-1543, 2004 WL

2189634 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2004). “Courts disfavor the practice of block billing because

it impairs the required reasonableness evaluation [. . . because] the court cannot

accurately determine the number of hours spent on any particular task. . . .”

, 641 F. App'x 396, 399 n.7 (5th Cir. 2016)

However, Bray’s detailed time sheets do not solely include entries in half-hour increments.

Record Document 805-2 at 15 (including entries for .5, 2.1, .2, etc.).

(alterations in original) (quoting , No. 12-CV-

1621, 2014 WL 1322979, at *6 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 28, 2014)). Defendants contend Plaintiffs

improperly block billed. Record Document 845 at 25-26. In response, Plaintiffs

excluded four entries but maintain further reductions are not warranted. Record

Document 855 at 7-8.

The block billing in this case prevents the Court from ascertaining the

reasonableness of the identified entries. Some of these entries include a wide range of

tasks, which makes it impossible for the Court to accurately determine how the time was

allotted between those tasks and whether such allotment was reasonable. As such, this

objection has merit, and the Court shall exclude the identified entries. Record

Document 845-1 at 8, 70-71. This exclusion results in an overall reduction of 107.91

hours (30.4 hours for Bray, 4.2 hours for Trunnell, 21.9 hours for Douglas, 13.6 hours for

Emily Mueller (“Mueller”), .8 hours for Kellie “Plum” Birk (“Birk”), 1 hour for J. Dalton

Courson (“Courson”), 7.33 hours for Bruce Hamilton (“Hamilton”), and 28.68 hours for

Schwartzmann).

3. Clerical Entries

“A finding that some of the hours claimed were for clerical work may justify

compensating those hours at a lower rate, and, in some circumstances, might justify a

reduction in the number [of] compensable hours.” , 762 F.2d 1230, 1235

(5th Cir. 1985). “Tasks that are purely clerical in nature include faxing, mailing, filing, and

delivering legal documents.” , No. 20-CV-217, 2024 WL

4986059, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2024), , No. 20-

CV-217, 2024 WL 4979751 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2024). Additionally, courts have found that

clerical tasks include “calendaring, organizing documents, . . . copying documents, [and]

loading and organizing computer databases. . . .” ,

No. 16-CV-0572, 2020 WL 6480917, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2020) (quoting

, No. 305-CV-2097, 2008 WL 1958998, at *7 (N.D.

Tex. Apr. 30, 2008)).

Defendants contend Plaintiffs improperly included entries for clerical work.

Record Document 845 at 22-23. While Defendants identify some specific entries,

Defendants primarily direct the Court to a page number in Plaintiffs’ time sheets and a

corresponding category of clerical entries that may be found on that page. The

Court reminds Defendants it is not the Court’s duty “to go through the record line-by-line

to determine which fees a party objects to.” , 2019 WL 1112666, at *3 (internal

marks omitted) (quoting , 2018 WL 2027745, at *13–14). Nevertheless, the

Court has done its best to identify the pertinent entries. The identified entries charge for

tasks such as downloading and saving documents, hardware setup and testing, “issues

related to computer equipment,”11 filing pleadings, calling the Court or “ECF help desk”

about filing pleadings, organizing files for an expert, and marking items in a program

referred to as Filemaker. Record Document 845 at 23 and 23 n.101.

The Court agrees entries for downloading and/or saving files, hardware setup and

testing, “issues related to computer equipment,” filing pleadings, and calling the Court or

11 These entries primarily consist of preparing computers and setting up programs on

those computers for volunteers to organize documents.

“ECF help desk” about filing pleadings are clerical tasks. ,

, No. 22-CV-037, 2023 WL 2727550, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2023) (excluding

work for “filing, saving, and printing documents”),

, No. 23-10311, 2023 WL 8434174 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 2023);

, 197 F. Supp. 3d 952, 958 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (finding that “printing

and saving documents” was clerical work); , 2020 WL 6480917, at *5 (noting courts

have excluded as clerical work entries for loading and organizing computer databases).

Removing these clerical entries results in an overall reduction of 26.3 hours (19.4 hours

for Bray,12 6.1 hours for Trunnell,13 .3 hours for Ronald Lospennato (“Lospennato”),14

and .5 hours for Douglas).15

Further, in reviewing the pages cited by Defendants, the Court identified entries

that combine multiple discrete tasks, some of which were clerical.16 Record

Document 805-2 at 75 (“Downloaded, saved, and broke out discovery productions . . .”),

12 Record Document 805-2 at 26 (.8 hours), 37 (.4 hours), 51 (.7 hours), 56 (1, .6,

.8, and .3 hours), 60 (.2 hours), 62 (.4 hours), 72 (2.2 hours), 73 (.2 hours), 74 (.5, .5,

.1, and .4 hours), 75 (.3 and .5 hours), 85 (.2 hours), 99 (.1, .3, and .2 hours), 100 (1.5

hours), 101 (.4 hours), 103 (.3 hours), 108 (.5 hours), 125 (1.5 hours), 131 (3.7 hours),

151 (.5 and .3 hours).

13 at 156 (.4 and .3 hours), 157 (.4 hours), 158 (.3 hours), 163 (.5 and 1.2 hours),

188 (.3 hours), 190 (.5 hours), 196 (.3 hours), 200 (1.3 hours), 201 (.4 hours), 211 (.2

hours).

14 at 255 (.1 hours), 264 (.2 hours).

15 at 230 (.5 hours).

16 The Court confirmed none of these entries were included in the reduction for block

billing completed .

99 (“Revising reply to MSJ 8th Amend for DWCC, pulling documents and cites. Made

several attempts to file the MSJ, got the main pleading and 10 exhibits filed. . . . ”), 201

(“Finalizing and filing reply brief re MtC”), 248 (“Start scanning and reviewing

documents”). Because the Court cannot discern how much time was spent on each

clerical task, the Court excluded these entries from Plaintiffs’ fee request.

, 776 F. Supp. 3d 419, 487 (E.D. La. 2025) (“Reduction

is appropriate in the case of entries that mix legal and clerical work, such as ‘finalize and

file’. . . but leave the court ‘without any way to disentangle legal from administrative work

in these mixed time entries . . .’”) (quoting ,

No. 17-CV-9703, 2022 WL 4534728, at *8 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2022)). This exclusion

results in an overall reduction of 59.3 hours (23.6 hours for Bray,17 32.2 hours for

Trunnell,18 and 3.5 hours for Lospennato).19

The remaining “clerical” tasks identified by Defendants are legal in nature.

Specifically, the entries related to organizing files for an expert and marking items in a

computer program are not clerical in this case. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the

identified work is “actually legal work appropriately conducted by an attorney since [Bray]

spent considerable time determining which documents . . . were responsive . . . or

relevant.” Record Document 855 at 8 n.6. While organizing files may traditionally be

17 Record Document 805-2 at 73 (1.6 hours), 74 (1.8 hours), 75 (1.3 hours), 76 (1.4

hours), 99 (17.5 hours).

18 at 155 (6.9 hours), 158 (5.9 and 6.2 hours), 163 (1.7 hours), 169 (2.1 hours),

188 (2.7 and .8 hours), 190 (.9 hours), 201 (4.2 and .8 hours).

19 at 248 (1 and 2.5 hours).

considered clerical, here, the organization requires legal knowledge. Because these tasks

are not clerical, reductions are not warranted on this basis.

4. Vague Entries

Defendants contend Plaintiffs improperly included vague entries. Record

Document 845 at 26-28. In response, Plaintiffs removed the identified entries. Record

Document 855 at 9 n.7. Because Plaintiffs redressed this objection, the Court finds no

further reductions warranted. These entries account for 166.40 hours overall (32 hours

for Bray, 43.4 hours for Trunnell, 8.1 hours for Douglas, .5 hours for Lospennato, 2.1

hours for Mueller, 6.3 hours for Birk, 1.8 hours for Courson, 10.46 hours for Hamilton,

53.74 hours for Schwartzmann, 1.5 hours for Elena Malik (“Malik”), and 6.5 hours for

Nishi Kumar (“Kumar”)).

5. Incomplete Entries

Defendants contend Plaintiffs improperly included incomplete entries. Record

Document 845-1 at 8. In response, Plaintiffs removed the identified entries. Record

Document 855 at 9 n.7. Because Plaintiffs redressed this objection, the Court finds no

further reductions warranted. These entries account for 169.44 hours overall (.7 hours

for Bray, .3 hours for Courson, and 168.44 hours for Hamilton).

6. Summary of Court Findings

In sum, Plaintiffs seek compensation for 21,969.42 hours.20 The Court reduced

that fee request by 565.05 hours by removing duplicative entries (35.7 hours), block

20 The Court reached this total by adding the hours in the corrected table to the hours

requested in the supplemental motion. Record Documents 855-1 at 1 & 842 at 6.

The Court notes a small discrepancy in Plaintiffs’ corrected table in Record Document

billed entries (107.91 hours), clerical entries (26.3 hours), mixed clerical and legal entries

(59.3 hours), vague entries (166.40 hours), and incomplete entries (169.44 hours). This

reduction results in a fee request for 21,404.37 hours. These hours are reasonable and

reasonably expended.

iii. Lodestar

As explained , the lodestar is “equal to the number of hours reasonably

expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work.”

, 829 F.3d at 392 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the Court has found Plaintiffs’

requested rates are reasonable. The Court has further reduced Plaintiffs’ requested hours

to 21,404.37 hours to account for duplicative and excessive entries, blocked billed entries,

clerical entries, mixed clerical and legal entries, vague entries, and incomplete entries.

Those findings result in a lodestar of $6,313,505.20. The calculation is broken down as

follows:

TIMEKEEPER HOURS RATE LODESTAR

Melanie Bray 5,690.6021 $300 $1,707,180

J. Dalton Courson 1,236.9522 $400 $494,780

855-1 at 1. This table sums the total hours sought in the original motion as 21,410.78.

However, when the numbers in that column are added together, the total is

21,410.97 hours. Adding those hours (21,410.97) to the supplemental hours (558.45)

sums 21,969.42 hours.

21 Plaintiffs originally requested 5,805.20 hours for Bray. Record Documents 855-1

at 3 (5,740.65 hours) & 842-6 at 4 (64.55 hours). The Court reduced 114.60 hours from

that request.

22 Plaintiffs requested 1,240.05 hours for Courson. Record Documents 855-1 at 3

(1,172.50) & 842-5 at 4 (67.55 hours). The Court reduced 3.1 hours from that request.

Jonathan Trunnell 4,929.7023 $300 $1,478,910

Emma Douglas 2,013.1524 $250 $503,287.50

Sarah Voigt 248.3825 $400 $99,352

Emily Mueller 893.3026 $225 $200,992.50

Ronald Lospennato 546.6527 $400 $218,660

Katie Schwartzmann 2,528.5828 $400 $1,011,432

Bruce Hamilton 247.7929 $400 $99,116

Robert Cobbs 162.2530 $400 $64,900

Jamila Johnson 102.4431 $400 $40,976

Elena Malik 120.6832 $250 $30,170

Rebecca Ramaswamy 26.8033 $300 $8,040

23 Plaintiffs requested 5,023.80 hours for Trunnell. The Court reduced 94.1 hours

from that request.

24 Plaintiffs requested 2,047.65 hours for Douglas. The Court reduced 34.5 hours

from that request.

25 Plaintiffs requested 252.38 hours for Voigt. The Court reduced 4 hours from

that request.

26 Plaintiffs requested 909 hours for Mueller. The Court reduced 15.7 hours from

that request.

27 Plaintiffs requested 550.95 hours for Lospennato. The Court reduced 4.3 hours

from that request.

28 Plaintiffs requested 2,622 hours for Schwartzmann. The Court reduced 93.42

hours from that request.

29 Plaintiffs requested 434.02 hours for Hamilton. The Court reduced 186.23 hours

from that request.

30 Plaintiffs requested 162.25 hours for Robert Cobbs. The Court made no

reductions to that request.

31 Plaintiffs requested 102.44 hours for Jamila Johnson. Record Document 855-1 at

3. The Court made no reductions to that request.

32 Plaintiffs requested 122.18 hours for Malik. The Court reduced 1.5 hours from

that request.

33 Plaintiffs requested 26.8 hours for Rebecca Ramaswamy. The Court made no

reductions to that request.

Nishi Kumar 220.3034 $300 $66,090

Samantha Balsalavage 134.0035 $250 $33,500

John Adcock 25.4036 $400 $10,160

Others 2,277.4037 $108 $245,959.20

TOTALS 21,404.37 $6,313,505.20

B. Factors

The calculated lodestar is presumed to be reasonable. , 829 F.3d at

392. Having calculated the lodestar, the Court must now determine whether an

adjustment to the lodestar is warranted. sets forth twelve factors that may

warrant a departure: (1) “[t]he time and labor required,” (2) “[t]he novelty and difficulty

of the questions,” (3) “[t]he skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,” (4) “[t]he

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case,” (5) “[t]he

customary fee,” (6) “[w]hether the fee is fixed or contingent,” (7) “[t]ime limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances,” (8) “[t]he amount involved and the results

obtained,” (9) “[t]he experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys,” (10) “[t]he

34 Plaintiffs requested 226.8 hours for Kumar. The Court reduced 6.5 hours from

that request for vague entries.

35 Plaintiffs requested 134 hours for Samantha Balsalavage. The Court made no

reductions to that request.

36 As explained , the Court did not consider the additional 45.9 hours sought by

Adcock in the reply. The Court made no reductions to Adcock’s original request for 25.40

hours. Record Document 842-7 at 5.

37 Plaintiffs requested 2,284.50 hours for other team members, including Birk. Record

Documents 855-1 at 3 (1,883.55 hours) & 842-6 at 23 (400.95 hours). The Court reduced

7.1 hours from that request.

‘undesirability’ of the case,” (11) “[t]he nature and length of the professional relationship

with the client,” and (12) “[a]wards in similar cases.” , 488 F.2d at 717-19.

Plaintiffs seek an upward adjustment based on the factors. Record

Document 842 at 27-35. Defendants seek a downward adjustment based on the

factors. Record Document 845 at 28-29. The Court has considered the parties’

arguments and ultimately finds no adjustment warranted. An attorneys’ fee award of

$6,313,505.20 in this case is reasonable.

II. Costs

Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ request for costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1988(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12205, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(h)(1) and 54(d)(1).

Record Document 805-1 at 35-36. “Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides for an award of costs to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.

. . . 28 U.S.C. § 1920 defines recoverable costs.” , 5 F.3d

877, 891 (5th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted), ,

61 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1995). “A court may award only those costs specified in [§]

1920 unless there is explicit statutory or contractual authority to the contrary.”

, No. 13-CV-37, 2015 WL 1245770, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 2015).

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides for the recovery of “[a]ll reasonable out-of-pocket expenses

. . . because they are part of the costs normally charged to a fee-paying client.”

, 919 F.2d 374, 380 (5th Cir.

1990). 42 U.S.C. § 12205 “allows for possible recovery of both costs, which the courts

generally interpret to mean only those costs permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and litigation

expenses.” , 353 F. Supp. 3d 499, 516 (E.D. La.

2018) (internal marks omitted).

In the instant motion, Plaintiffs request $540,010.98 in costs.38 These costs include

(1) $44,361.23 for transcripts and deposition fees; (2) $419,495.02 for expert costs; (3)

$33,644.24 for hotels, per diem, meals, fuel, and car rentals; (4) $1,995.92 for postage

and document delivery to the court; (5) $26,496.10 for data processing and data entry

services for discovery review; (6) $10,598.59 for copies necessarily obtained for the case;

(7) $2,850.48 for postage costs to maintain communication with class members; and (8)

$72.70 for PACER fees to “access documents necessary to drafting the motion for fees.”

Record Documents 805-1 at 36, 842 at 7, & 842-7 at 5. Additionally, Plaintiffs request

compensation for necessary costs incurred by the Promise of Justice Initiative (“PJI”):

$469.00 for fuel, lodging, per diem costs, parking, and travel costs; $20.00 for research

and records retrieval and review; and $7.70 for postage and printing. Record

38 In Plaintiffs’ supplemental motion, they state they are requesting $542,630.41 in costs.

Record Document 842 at 2. This sum appears to result from a discrepancy in

Plaintiffs’ original motion. In the motion itself, Plaintiffs request $539,707.23. Record

Document 805 at 1. However, in the memorandum in support, Plaintiffs request

$537,087.80. Record Document 805-1 at 5, 36-37. Bray’s accompanying declaration

also calculates the costs to be $537,087.80. Record Document 805-2 at 12. The

itemized costs added together total $537,087.80, so the Court used this total. When the

additional $2,923.18 sought in the supplemental motion, Record Document 842 at 7,

is added to the correct total of $537,087.80, the total sought overall is actually

$540,010.98.

Documents 805-1 at 36 & 805-10 at 2. Defendants have not opposed Plaintiffs’ request

for costs.39 The Court ultimately finds Plaintiffs’ costs are recoverable.

To begin, Plaintiffs include transcripts, deposition fees, and copies in their bill of

costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Record Document 805-1 at 36. 28 U.S.C. § 1920

defines as costs “[f]ees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily

obtained for use in the case” and “making copies of any materials where the copies are

necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920(2), (4). Bray attests these

costs “were necessarily incurred in the case.” Record Document 805-2 at 12. The Court

has independently reviewed the records and agrees the transcripts, deposition fees, and

copies were necessarily obtained for use in the case and thus may properly be taxed as

costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Plaintiffs’ remaining costs are compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or 42 U.S.C. §

12205. Expert fees are compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 12205.40 , No.

3-CV-2286, 2007 WL 2427976, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2007 (awarding expert witness

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 12205); , 353 F. Supp. 3d at 517

(awarding only necessarily incurred, reasonable expert fees under 42 U.S.C. § 12205);

, 2015 WL 1245770, at *7 (awarding expert fees under 42 U.S.C. §

12205).

39 Defendants maintain Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties, the motion is premature, and

the fees are objectionable on multiple grounds. Record Document 842. However,

Defendants lodge no specific objections to Plaintiffs’ costs request.

40 The Court finds the ADA claim is so intertwined with Plaintiffs’ remaining claims that

the expert fees are not separable.

Further, the requested compensation for postage, document delivery, data

processing and data entry for discovery review, research, records retrieval and review,

printing, and PACER fees are compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Such costs are akin

to “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses” that are “part of the costs normally charged to a

fee-paying client.” , 919 F.2d at 380.

, No. 12-CV-2322, 2014 WL 3894371, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug.

8, 2014) (awarding costs for travel under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); , 628 F.2d

346, 349 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to

award postage costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); , No. 18-CV-2856,

2024 WL 4370975, *3, *6-7 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2024), , No. 24-20492, 2025 WL

2206973 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2025) (awarding costs for “research expenses, court costs, and

service fees” under 42 U.S.C. § 1920 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988); , No. 9-CV-

66, 2013 WL 12290978, at *14-15 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2013) (finding that “submitted

costs for legal research” and costs for “courier and delivery” were compensable under 42

U.S.C. § 1988).

Plaintiffs have properly supported their request for costs. Record Documents

805-2 at 12, 805-10 at 2, 805-15, 805-16, 842-6, & 842-7. Defendants do not object to

those costs. The Court, having conducted an independent review of Plaintiffs’ cost

request, finds these costs were reasonable and necessarily incurred. This is especially so

given the complexity, length, and nature of this case. As such, an award of costs of

$540,010.98 is proper.

Conclusion

For the reasons assigned herein, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motions for

attorney fees [Record Documents 805 & 842] are GRANTED. In the interest of judicial

efficiency and in light of the unusual procedural posture of this case as described ,

the Court makes a binding calculation of the attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court finds

fees of $6,313,505.20 and costs of $540,010.98 are reasonable for Plaintiffs’ work from

January 19, 2016, to June 24, 2025.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the award of attorneys’ fees and costs is

STAYED until the resolution of Defendants’ pending appeal. The award shall remain

stayed until such time as the Court deems appropriate and upon motion of a party.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 11th day of September, 2025.

ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE