Com. v. Streamer, J.

J-S30017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

JEFFREY REESE STREAMER :

:

Appellant : No. 381 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 3, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0005572-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2025

Jeffrey Reese Streamer (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed, upon resentencing, for his conviction of burglary. 1 This

matter returns to us following remand for resentencing based on this Court’s

conclusion that Appellant’s additional convictions of simple assault and

criminal mischief2 merged with his burglary conviction for sentencing

purposes. Commonwealth v. Streamer, 328 A.3d 525, 2983 EDA 2023 (Pa.

Super. 2024) (unpublished memorandum). After careful review, we affirm

Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a), 3304(a)(5).

J-S30017-25

The trial court previously summarized the factual history underlying this

appeal:

Priscilla Sims-Brown [(Sims-Brown)] hired [Appellant]

around March 2022[,] through a friend’s referral[,] to perform

weekly outdoor gardening services at her home in Springfield

Township, Montgomery County. [Appellant] was not given a key

to the residence, did not have permission to enter the residence[,]

and[,] on an occasion when he knocked on the door to give Sims-

Brown her mail, was advised by her “not to worry about the mail

and not to do that again.”

During the summer of 2022, while Sims-Brown was

traveling and only sporadically returning to the property, her

longtime family friend[,] Dail St. Claire [(St. Claire),] resided at

the property by herself. Sims-Brown had introduced St. Claire to

[Appellant] before leaving and had informed her that [Appellant]

was the gardener. St. Claire subsequently had little contact with

[Appellant] over the summer, with the exception of him asking

several times when Sims-Brown would be returning[,] and on one

occasion when he had entered the home to deliver mail. St.

Clair[e] told [Appellant] he did not need to get the mail and

reported the event to Sims-Brown.

On September 1, 2022, [Appellant] arrived at the property

with his dog at 9:49 a.m. St. Claire was sitting outside by the

pool working remotely on her laptop. [Appellant’s] dog

approached her[,] and [Appellant] retrieved the dog

apologetically. [Appellant] performed his gardening services and

left at 10:49 a.m. St. Clair[e] eventually went inside the residence

to prepare for a [Z]oom work meeting.

Unbeknownst to St. Clair[e], [Appellant] returned to the

property at 11:43 a.m. With St. Claire inside preparing for her

soon-to-begin [Z]oom meeting, [Appellant] entered the residence

and approached her at an accelerated pace. She was not

immediately concerned because she knew of [Appellant] and was

focused on the upcoming [Z]oom meeting. That quickly changed,

however, when she saw the intensity of [Appellant’s] facial

expression. [Appellant] grabbed St. Claire by the upper left arm

and said[,] “let’s do this.” [St. Claire] felt pain in her arm when

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[Appellant] grabbed her. [St. Claire] pushed [Appellant] away[,]

and [Appellant] began to pursue her around a large table in the

center of the room while holding a tool of some kind. [Appellant]

pushed the contents of the table to the floor while following St.

Claire, breaking vases and St. Claire’s laptop and phone.

[Appellant] eventually shoved the table toward St. Claire,

admittedly flipping it over and breaking it.

With the table no longer a barrier between them, St. Claire

ran from the home with [Appellant] in pursuit. [St. Claire] outran

[Appellant and proceeded] in the direction of a nearby park,

during which time she suffered an injury to her foot because she

had fled while not wearing shoes. [St. Claire] eventually

encountered bystanders who assisted her in calling 911.

Responding police found St. Claire to be distraught and emotional.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/24, at 1-3 (citations to record omitted).

Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the

above-described offenses. The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered

the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report. Additionally, the

Commonwealth moved for Appellant to be sentenced as a “second-strike”

offender under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a), which we detail infra. On October 18,

2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant, as a second-strike offender, to the

mandatory term of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for burglary. The court also

imposed consecutive 1- to 2-year sentences for Appellant’s simple assault and

criminal mischief convictions.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the imposition

of consecutive sentences, which the trial court denied. On direct appeal, this

Court concluded Appellant’s convictions of simple assault and criminal mischief

merged with his burglary conviction for sentencing purposes, and therefore,

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the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. See Steamer, 328

A.3d 525 (unpublished memorandum at 10-12). Accordingly, we vacated

Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing.

Id. (unpublished memorandum at 12).

The trial court conducted a resentencing hearing on January 3, 2025.

On that date, the trial court sentenced Appellant to the mandatory term of 10

to 20 years’ imprisonment for burglary as a second-strike offender. See N.T.,

1/3/25, at 15. The court then declared the simple assault and criminal

mischief convictions merged with the burglary conviction. See id. at 17.

Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion following resentencing.

This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue for review: “Whether the trial court

erred in sentencing [] Appellant under the ‘strike two’ or ‘second-strike’

statute pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 9714(a)(1) … where the statute violates

due process and is therefore unconstitutional[?]” Appellant’s Brief at 3 (some

capitalization modified).

The trial court opined that Appellant waived this claim by failing to raise

it during the resentencing hearing or in a post-sentence motion, and by failing

to specify why Appellant believes section 9714 is unconstitutional. See Trial

Court Opinion, 2/24/25, at 3. However, it is well settled that “a challenge to

the legality of a sentence cannot be waived[.]” Commonwealth v. Starr,

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234 A.3d 755, 764 (Pa. Super. 2020); see also Commonwealth v. Prinkey,

277 A.3d 554, 565 (Pa. 2022) (stating that “because a sentencing court loses

its authority to exercise discretion when a mandatory minimum sentence

applies, the question of the propriety of applying a mandatory minimum

sentencing provision implicates legality.” (citation omitted)).

“When reviewing the legality of a sentence, our standard of review is de

novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez,

328 A.3d 1159, 1165 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).

Appellant argues section 9714, under which he was sentenced as a

second-strike offender, is unconstitutional. Appellant’s Brief at 12-13 (citing

Commonwealth v. Butler, 760 A.2d 384 (Pa. 2000)). Therefore, Appellant

claims, his sentence is illegal and must be vacated. Id. at 13.3

Section 9714 of the Sentencing Code provides, in relevant part, as

follows:

(a) Mandatory sentence.--

(1) Any person who is convicted in any court of this

Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if at the time of the

commission of the current offense the person had previously been

convicted of a crime of violence, be sentenced to a minimum

____________________________________________

3 The argument section of Appellant’s counseled appellate brief contains only

cursory citations to Butler, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, and the relevant sentencing statute, without any discussion of

those authorities. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing an appellate argument

shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed

pertinent.”). Because the undeveloped nature of Appellant’s argument does

not impede our review, and because his claim implicates the legality of his

sentence, we decline to find waiver on this basis.

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sentence of at least ten years of total confinement,

notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute

to the contrary. …

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(1); see also id. § 9714(d) (defining “crime of

violence” as used in this sentencing scheme). Here, “[a]t a sentencing hearing

on October 18, 2023, the Commonwealth presented certified copies of

[Appellant’s] prior convictions for arson….” Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/24, at

3.

Appellant suggests our Supreme Court’s decision in Butler declared 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 unconstitutional. In Butler, the defendant was sentenced

under a prior version of section 9714(a)(1), which included the following

language:

Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth

of a crime of violence shall, if at the time of the commission of the

current offense the person had previously been convicted of a

crime of violence and has not rebutted the presumption of

high risk dangerous offender as provided in subsection (c), be

sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least ten years of total

confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or

other statute to the contrary. If at the time of the commission of

the current offense the person has previously been convicted of a

crime of violence and has rebutted the presumption of high

risk dangerous offender as provided in subsection (c), the

person shall be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five

years of total confinement….

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). Under former

subsection (b), the presumption that the offender was a high-risk offender

arose if 1) he had previously been convicted of a crime of violence, and 2) the

previous conviction occurred within seven years of the date of the instant

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offense. Id. § 9714(b). After the trial court determined the presumption

applied, the offender could offer evidence rebutting the presumption. Id. §

9714(c). The offender was required to rebut the high-risk dangerous offender

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 9714(c)(5). The Butler

Court held that this scheme, which placed the burden of proof on the offender

to rebut the presumption that he was a high-risk dangerous offender, violated

the defendant’s due process rights. Butler, 760 A.2d at 332-33; see also

id. at 333 (noting that former section 9714(c)(2) detailed a list of factors for

the court to consider when conducting a subjective assessment of an

offender’s potential future dangerousness, and thus, “resolution of competing

facts presented at the post-trial proceeding, which is not governed by the rules

of evidence, will most likely be outcome determinative.”).

After our Supreme Court’s decision in Butler, “the legislature amended

section 9714(a)(1) by removing the presumption … found unconstitutional in

Butler and requiring a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’

imprisonment if the defendant has one previous conviction for a crime of

violence.” Commonwealth v. Belak, 825 A.2d 1252, 1254 n.3 (Pa. 2003).

The current version of the statute, under which Appellant was sentenced, does

not include the presumption deemed unconstitutional in Butler. Appellant’s

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claim of an illegal sentence, based upon our Supreme Court’s holding in

Butler, warrants no relief.4

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Olson joins the memorandum.

P.J.E. Ford Elliott concurs in the result.

Date: 9/11/2025

____________________________________________

4 We note that Pennsylvania courts have also rejected challenges to the

constitutionality of section 9714(a)(1) premised on Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact, other than a prior conviction,

“that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”), and Alleyne

v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (“Any fact that, by law, increases

the penalty for a crime [or increases the mandatory minimum sentence] is an

‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable

doubt.”). See Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 784 (Pa. Super.

2015) (rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of section 9714(a)(1)

under Alleyne, reasoning that “Alleyne did not overturn prior precedent that

prior convictions are sentencing factors and not elements of offenses.”);

Commonwealth v. Forbes, 867 A.2d 1268, 1277-78 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(rejecting the appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of section

9714(a)(1) under Apprendi, because prior convictions—which are matters of

record—are specifically excepted from the Apprendi rule, and section

9714(a)(1) sets a mandatory minimum penalty rather than increasing the

statutory maximum).

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