Millsaps v. Iredell County District Attorney's Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:22-CV-00095-KDB-DCK

GLENN S. MILLSAPS JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

DANNY LILES AND RON

HILLARD,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment

(Doc. Nos. 162, 164). The Court has carefully considered this motion, the parties’ briefs and

exhibits and oral argument on the motion from Plaintiff (appearing pro se) and Defendants’

counsel on August 7, 2025. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the motions.

This long running dispute stems from Plaintiff’s arrest in July 2019 for refusing to leave

the Iredell County District Attorney’s (“DA”) office, where he was trying unsuccessfully to

reschedule a hearing on a citation for a seat belt violation. It is important to understand what is and

is not before the Court with respect to the pending motions. The Court well understands that

Plaintiff passionately believes that he should have been allowed to reschedule his hearing without

engaging an attorney and that any policy otherwise is wrong. Relatedly, he believes that he should

not have been told to leave the DA’s office when he tried to reschedule his hearing. However, none

of those issues are now before the Court. Instead, the Court must decide if a reasonable jury could

find the two remaining individual Defendants, Danny Liles and Ron Hillard, liable for their

conduct in connection with his arrest. Because Plaintiff’s own testimony, much of which he

repeated at oral argument, confirms that Liles did not commit assault or battery as a matter of law

and Deputy Hillard had probable cause to arrest him and did not use excessive force in doing so,

the Court finds that the Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Mr. Millsaps’ claims.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States v.

8.929 Acres of Land in Arlington Cnty., Virginia, 36 F.4th 240, 252 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a)); see United States, f/u/b Modern Mosaic, LTD v. Turner Construction Co., et al.,

946 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2019). A factual dispute is considered genuine “if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252. “A fact is material if it might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v.

Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact through citations to the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits in the record. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986) (when the nonmoving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential

element of [his] claim with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof,” summary judgment is

warranted); United States ex rel. Gugenheim v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC, 36 F.4th 173, 178

(4th Cir. 2022). If the movant satisfies his initial burden to demonstrate “an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case,” the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “present specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252 (quoting

Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir.

2015)).

“The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Hixson v. Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 302

(4th Cir. 2021). Rather, the nonmoving party must establish that a material fact is genuinely

disputed by, inter alia, “citing to particular parts of the materials of record” and cannot rely only

on “conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36

F.4th at 252 (quoting Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)). And “a party cannot

create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his

or her own previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that

party’s earlier sworn deposition) without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the

disparity.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999); see also Tankesley v.

Vidal, No. 1:21-CV-I448, 2023 WL 4273763, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2023) (“It is … well-settled

within the Fourth Circuit that ‘where a party submits an affidavit that is inconsistent with a

witness’s deposition testimony, the contradictory affidavit is disregarded for purposes of summary

judgment.’”).

Still, summary judgment is not intended to be a substitute for a trial of the facts. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249. In determining if summary judgment is appropriate, “courts must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and refrain from weigh[ing] the

evidence or mak[ing] credibility determinations.” Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). “Summary judgment cannot be granted

merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.”

Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568–69 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed.1998)).

In the end, the relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must

prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff urges the Court to find there are disputed facts and questions as to the credibility

of the Defendants that preclude summary judgment. However, in considering the pending motions,

the Court has relied only on the facts described below, which is the version of the facts as testified

to by Plaintiff or which cannot be reasonably disputed.

Plaintiff failed to attend his July 17, 2019, scheduled hearing in traffic court for a seatbelt

violation because of a hamstring injury. After missing his court date, Plaintiff attempted to find

out how to reschedule the “call and fail” with the Clerk of Court’s office and the DA’s office, but

was unsuccessful. Although no one from the DA’s office advised Plaintiff that he could come to

the office to reschedule his hearing, (Doc. No. 163-1, Deposition of Glenn Millsaps, Jr. (“Dep”)

at 38:7-11, 43:23, 70:3-9), on July 19, 2019, Plaintiff went to that office, located in the Hall of

Justice Annex in Statesville, North Carolina, to do so. At the DA’s office, Plaintiff spoke with

Kathleen Burris, the receptionist, who told Plaintiff that he could not reschedule his “call and fail”

at the DA’s office and told him to leave. (Dep. at 45:15-47:4).

After the Clerk of Court’s office and a security guard suggested that Plaintiff should “return

to the DA’s office because that’s where you have to speak to our prosecutor in order to reschedule,”

(Dep. at 54:1-11), he returned to the DA’s office on Wednesday morning, July 24, 2019, despite

having previously been told that they would not reschedule his hearing there. (Dep. at 49:17-24;

50:15-16; 52:6-12, 55:9-57:8). Upon Plaintiff walking into the DA’s office lobby, Ms. Burris told

him that she had been instructed to call the police if he returned. (Dep. at 57:14-21, 132:11-17).

Burris also told him “to leave and go pay the fine or hire an attorney.” (Dep. at 60:20-25, 97:10-

25, 134:25-135:3).

Plaintiff then left the DA’s office and spoke with defendant Danny Liles, a Wilson Security

Company security guard, in the hallway. Plaintiff told Liles that he had come to speak with an

ADA to reschedule his hearing, but that Ms. Burris had told him that he could not reschedule his

“call and fail” at the DA’s office and that she had “instructed [Plaintiff] to leave because [Plaintiff]

was not an attorney, or to pay the fine.” Plaintiff testified that Liles told him: “Well, if you were

told to leave, then you need to leave.” (Dep. at 64:5-67:16; 134:7-136:7; 142:1-12; 156:19-157:3)

According to Plaintiff, he “stood his ground,” reasserted his right to speak with a DA, and told

Liles that “he [Liles] had no reason to tell me to leave.” (Dep. at 135:16-19, 144:8-20). Again,

Liles “demanded” that Plaintiff leave. (Dep. at 141:6-142:12).

Despite Burris and Liles having asked Plaintiff to leave, he did not. (Dep. at 70:15-22).

Believing that being told to leave was “clearly the wrong instruction,” and that “someone telling

me to leave for no apparent reason is not a lawful order,” (Dep. at 93:23-94:1; 154:4-20), Plaintiff

turned from Liles and started to move towards the DA’s office. (Dep. at 264:15-22). As Plaintiff

did so, Liles grabbed him by the arm in an effort to stop him. However, Plaintiff pulled away, told

Liles not to touch him and re-entered the DA’s office. (Dep. at 73:13-74:24, 264:15265:6). Liles

followed Plaintiff into the DA’s office, where he told Plaintiff to leave once more, and threatened

to summon a Sheriff’s Deputy if Plaintiff refused to leave. Plaintiff responded, “Well, then just go

ahead and get a deputy.” (Dep. at 149-20-150:23; 157:24-158:15; 161:13-161:22).

At that point, another Wilson security guard went next door to Courtroom C where traffic

court was being held and asked Deputy Ron Hillard, the courtroom bailiff, to come to the DA’s

office. (Doc. No. 165-3, Affidavit of Ron Hillard (“Hillard Aff.”) at ¶9). Hillard left the courtroom

(temporarily stopping traffic court, which needed a bailiff to proceed), id., and walked to the DA’s

office, where he spoke to Plaintiff. (Hillard Aff., ¶10; Dep. at 160:25-161:11; 163:11-23).

According to Plaintiff, Hillard asked him: “Are you an attorney?”; “Were you told to leave last

week?”; “What was your missed appearance?”; “Were you told to leave?” (Dep. at 166:7-18).

Plaintiff stated both in his deposition and at oral argument that he told Hillard that he had been

asked to leave the DA’s office, arguing that: “I have a right to represent myself.” ; “I’m here to

reschedule.”; “I was told to come back.”; “You have not witnessed any crime.” (Dep. at 166:20-

23).

Hillard then asked Plaintiff to leave and told Plaintiff that if he did not leave, Plaintiff

would be “placed under arrest.” (Dep. at 166:24-167:11; 168:20-24; 169:10-15; 171:4-7; 274:15-

275:17; Hillard Aff., at ¶11). Plaintiff made no movement to leave nor took any action that

suggested he intended to comply with Hillard’s order. (Dep. at 172:13-25; 299:24-25). Instead,

Plaintiff told Hillard that Hillard had not seen or witnessed anything for which Hillard could arrest

him. (Dep. at 167:24-168:3, 276:5-16, 282:4-19) (“So Deputy Hillard could not tell me to leave

legally.”). At that point, Hillard told Plaintiff that he was under arrest and ordered Plaintiff to step

out of the DA’s lobby and into the hallway, to turn around, and to place his hands behind his back.

(Dep. at 173:22-174:5; Hillard Aff., at ¶11). Hillard then handcuffed Plaintiff. (Dep. at 183:4-9,

229:17-21, 230:5-9; Hillard Aff., at ¶15).

Plaintiff told Hillard that the handcuffs were put on incorrectly and were too tight on his

wrists. (Dep. 174:7-9, 186:18-187:2, Ex.3, p.3; Hillard Aff., at ¶12). At the time Hillard arrested

Plaintiff and handcuffed him, Hillard was the sole law enforcement officer in the building. (Hillard

Aff., at ¶¶6, 12). Hillard testifies that he did not loosen the handcuffs at that time due to officer

safety concerns because he feared that unlocking the handcuffs in order to loosen them could place

him, alone and without backup, at a tactical disadvantage. (Hillard Aff., at ¶12). Instead, Hillard

advised Plaintiff that other officers would soon arrive to take custody of him. (Hillard Aff., at ¶16).

Hillard radioed his supervisor and requested support in handling Plaintiff. (Hillard Aff., at ¶16).

Hillard did not double lock the handcuffs, again because he anticipated that other officers would

soon arrive to take control over Plaintiff. (Hillard Aff., at ¶15).

Within a few minutes, four other court Bailiffs arrived at the Hall of Justice Annex and

took custody of Plaintiff. (Dep. at 175:24-176:5; Hillard Aff., at ¶¶18-19). Plaintiff told these

arriving Bailiffs that the handcuffs were put on wrong, that they were too tight, and that they were

not double locked. (Dep. at 176:10-15, 187:3-6). One of the other Bailiffs adjusted the handcuffs,

but did not double-lock the handcuffs or adjust them to Plaintiff’s satisfaction. (Dep. at 180:25-

181:15, 181:23-182:9, 187:9-14, 192:17-20). However, there is no dispute that at that point a

different deputy had taken charge of the Plaintiff. (See Doc. No. 75 at 69; Hillard Aff., at ¶19).

Bailiffs other than Hillard, escorted Plaintiff out of the Hall of Justice Annex, while Hillard

followed behind them carrying Plaintiff’s briefcase. (Dep. at 187:20-189:15; Doc. No. 75 at 69;

Hillard Aff., at ¶21). He was then taken to a Statesville Police Department patrol car. (Dep. at

197:25-199:21). Plaintiff testified that he pleaded with the other Bailiffs to double-lock the

handcuffs, but that they did not do so. (Dep. at 201:12-202:2). Ultimately, after Plaintiff began

“kicking and screaming,” Dep. at 203:2-11), the other Bailiffs removed him from the patrol car,

re-adjusted the handcuffs and double-locked them, and placed him back into the patrol car. (Dep.

at 203:2-15, 204:22-205:2; Doc. No. 75 at 69). After the other Bailiffs placed Plaintiff into Officer

Johnson’s patrol car, Hillard went back inside the Hall of Justice Annex to resume his duties as

the traffic court bailiff. (Hillard Aff, at ¶24).

While sitting in the patrol car, Plaintiff told the officer that the handcuffs were still on

wrong (despite their having been adjusted at least twice by officers other than Hillard). The officer

“didn’t do anything,” and instead told Plaintiff to wait until they got to the jail at which point he

would adjust the handcuffs. (Dep. at 203:17-205:7). At the jail, the officer removed the handcuffs,

put them back on Plaintiff, and double-locked them. (Dep. at 205:8-17). Plaintiff was then taken

before Magistrate Mike Nethken, to whom Plaintiff explained his version of the events that had

transpired. (Dep. at 208:17-213:25). Magistrate Nethken issued a Magistrate’s Order charging

Plaintiff with second degree trespassing in the DA’s office. (Dep. at 218:2-219:10) and then

released him on the condition that he have “No contact with the DA’s office. No contact with

Iredell County DA by telephone.” (Dep. at 219:11-221:23).

After going home and sleeping, Plaintiff states he noticed a blood stain on the cuff of his

left shirt sleeve, with an approximate overall area the size of a dime. (Dep. at 227:16-229:9).

Plaintiff also states that there was some bruising to his wrists. (Dep. at 230:18-20). Plaintiff admits

he does not know when any breaking of the skin happened – whether it was when he sat down in

the patrol car or before then. (Dep. at 229:11-230:16). Plaintiff did not take any photographs or

otherwise document any bruising or bleeding of his wrist(s) and has not sought any medical

attention or care for any injury he claims he sustained on July 24, 2019. (Dep. at 230:21-231:15,

234:2-236:18, 239:18-244:12).

Plaintiff, represented by counsel, was tried and convicted of second-degree trespassing in

Iredell County Criminal District Court in a bench trial held on November 15, 2019. Plaintiff

appealed his conviction to Iredell County Criminal Superior Court, where he was re-tried in June

2021, which resulted in a hung jury. In his third trial, he was acquitted by the jury. In both of his

jury trials, he made motions to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence. In both cases, the

presiding Judge denied his motions to dismiss and allowed the case to go the jury. (Dep. at 224:3-

227:2).

Plaintiff filed this case in July 2022 and an Amended Complaint in October 2022. The

Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims, except for those remaining against the Defendants here,

in March 2024. Doc. No. 82. In February 2025, Plaintiff filed a second Amended Complaint only

against Liles and Hillard. Doc. No. 122. Against Liles, Plaintiff asserts a single claim for Assault

under North Carolina law. Plaintiff’s three claims against Deputy Hillard include: False Arrest

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and North Carolina Law, First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Violation of First and Fourteenth Amendments) and Excessive Force under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment Violation). Id. In May 2025, Liles and Hillard filed their

Motions for Summary Judgment, which have been fully briefed, including a rebuttal and surreply

by Plaintiff. On August 7, 2025, the Court held an oral argument at which Plaintiff appeared and

represented himself and the Defendants were represented by counsel. The motions are ripe for the

Court’s ruling.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against Mr. Liles

Plaintiff’s lone cause of action against Liles alleges that Liles assaulted Plaintiff under

North Carolina law when Liles “grabbed his arm” as Plaintiff was going back to the DA’s office

(after being told to leave by both Burris and Liles). As described in Hensley v. Suttles, 167 F. Supp.

3d 753, 764 (W.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Hensley on behalf of N. Carolina v. Price, 876 F.3d

573 (4th Cir. 2017), North Carolina looks to the common law for the definition of the intentional

tort of assault:

North Carolina follows common law principles governing assault and battery. An

assault is an offer to show violence to another without striking him, and a battery

is the carrying of the threat into effect by the infliction of a blow. The interest

protected by the action for battery is freedom from intentional and unpermitted

contact with one's person; the interest protected by the action for assault is freedom

from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with one’s person.

(quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 445, 276 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1981)). The elements of

assault, therefore, are: (1) intent, (2) offer of injury, (3) reasonable apprehension, (4) apparent

ability, and (5) imminent threat of injury. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 101 N.C.App. 529, 533, 400 S.E.2d

472, 475 (1991) aff’d, 331 N.C. 743, 417 S.E.2d 447 (1992). “The gist of an action for assault is

apprehension of harmful or offensive contact.” Morrow v. Kings Department Stores, Inc., 57 N.C.

App. 13, 19, 290 S.E.2d 732, 736, disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d 210 (1982). “The

display of force or menace of violence must be such to cause the reasonable apprehension of

immediate bodily harm.” Dickens, 302 N.C. at 445, 276 S.E.2d at 331 (emphasis in original,

citation and quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff’s testimony and admissions during oral argument make clear that he was not

fearful of imminent injury from Liles. Instead, he says that he was upset at Liles’ touching and

forcefully told Liles not to touch him, but did not fear physical harm. Rather, he was “pained in

my head” by feeling that he was being told to leave a place where he believed he had a right to be.

While the Court does not minimize the sincerity of Plaintiff’s feelings, he was not “placed in

apprehension of harmful or offensive contact” and did not suffer an “assault” under North Carolina

law.1 Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment for Liles on Plaintiff’s claim.

B. Claims Against Deputy Hillard

1. Probable Cause

The core requirement of all of Plaintiff’s claims against Deputy Hillard is that he establish

that Hillard violated the constitution in effecting his arrest. And he did not. As found by the

independent state court magistrate and two North Carolina Superior Court judges, Deputy Hillard

had probable cause (or the even higher standard that a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt with respect to the trial judges) to cite Plaintiff for second degree trespassing. In the absence

of a wrongful arrest and lacking any causative evidence of “excessive force” against Hillard (even

though Plaintiff unfortunately says he was injured by the use of handcuffs by multiple officers),

Plaintiff’s claims fail both on the merits and are bared by Hillard’s qualified immunity. Therefore,

Hillard is entitled to summary judgment.

In order to bring a claim for unlawful arrest, under either federal or state law, a plaintiff

must allege that the arrest was made without probable cause. See Miller v. Prince George’s Cty.,

MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007); Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 213 (1988). Probable

cause requires the Court to review the totality of the circumstances and “is informed by the

‘contours of the offense’ at issue.” See Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting

1 Moreover, at the time of the incident, Liles was working as a private security guard who was

governed by North Carolina’s Private Protection Services Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 74C-1 et al. The

Act authorizes licensed security guards to protect “patrons and persons lawfully authorized to be

on the premises” such as the employees of the DA’s office in this instance. While the Court need

not and does not decide the full scope of the authority of a private security guard with respect to

allegations of assault or battery, Liles’ limited conduct alleged here appears to be consistent with

the authority granted by the statute (which allowing an action for common law assault based on

the same conduct would undermine).

Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 291 (4th Cir. 2001)). In North Carolina, the elements of

second-degree trespass are met when a person:

without authorization…enters or remains on any of the following: (1) On premises

of another after the person has been notified not to enter or remain there by the

owner, by a person in charge of the premises, by a lawful occupant, or by another

authorized person. (2) On premises that are posted, in a manner reasonably likely

to come to the attention of intruders, with notice not to enter the premises. (3) On

the curtilage of a dwelling of another between the hours of midnight and 6:00 A.M.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-159.13.

Probable cause exists if the “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are

sufficient to warrant a prudent person ... in the circumstances shown, [to conclude] that the suspect

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443

U.S. 31, 37 (1979). “The validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually

committed a crime; the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which he is

arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest.” Id. at 36.

“In assessing the existence of probable cause, courts examine the totality of the

circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest.” Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 434

(4th Cir. 1996). “Probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion,’ but requires less than

evidence necessary to convict.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998). Also,

reasonable law enforcement officers need not “resolve every doubt about a suspect’s guilt before

probable cause is established.” Torchinsky v. Siwinsky, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991). Probable

cause is a “commonsense, nontechnical” concept that deals “with the factual and practical

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (internal citations omitted).

While Plaintiff’s third trial resulted in an acquittal, the Court finds that it cannot be

reasonably disputed that Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by probable cause. Plaintiff acknowledges

that he told Deputy Hillard that he had been told to leave the DA’s office and then remained there

after Hillard notified him that he had to leave. Indeed, Hillard informed Plaintiff that he would be

arrested if he did not leave and Plaintiff still chose not to comply with the request. Therefore,

Hillard had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for second degree trespassing. See District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (probable cause “requires only a probability or

substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. Probable cause is

not a high bar.”).

Further, the finding of probable cause by the magistrate judge and later the trial judges

dooms Plaintiff’s claims. “Once a pretrial seizure has been rendered reasonable by virtue of a

probable cause determination by a neutral and detached magistrate, the continuing pretrial seizure

of a criminal defendant . . . is reasonable.” Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 435–36 (4th Cir.1996).

“A magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing

courts,” and should not be disturbed if “sufficient information [was] presented to the magistrate to

allow that official to determine probable cause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)

(citation modified). As long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable

cause for the arrest existed, “the Fourth Amendment requires no more.” Id.; United States v.

Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1996). There is no dispute that an officer explained the grounds

for Plaintiff’s arrest to the magistrate (and that Plaintiff took the occasion to make comments in

his defense). Thus, the magistrate’s finding of probable cause further establishes that Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.2 Accordingly, Deputy Hillard is entitled to summary

2 Of course, the conclusion of two trial court judges that the charges against Plaintiff could go to

the jury (that is, that there was enough evidence that a reasonable jury could find him guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt) is even stronger evidence that the arrest satisfied the much lower standard of

“probable cause.”

judgment on all of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims to the extent they depend on his allegations of

a false arrest.

2. Qualified Immunity

Also, even if the Court had found that Hillard lacked probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest

(which he did not), it would find that Hillard has qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims. When, as here, a law enforcement officer is sued in his individual capacity, he is “entitled

to invoke qualified immunity, which is ... immunity from suit itself.” Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d

153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013). “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions

were lawful.” Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 214 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Henry v. Purnell,

652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011)). The doctrine balances two important values—“the need to hold

public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

The Fourth Circuit has stated:

The basic rules of § 1983 [qualified] immunity are well known. Underlying the doctrine is

a desire to avoid overdeterrence of energetic law enforcement by subjecting governmental

actors to a high risk of liability. The concerns behind the immunity defense are especially

salient in the context of street-level police work, which frequently requires quick and

decisive action in the face of volatile and changing circumstances. The law thus shields

police officers from civil liability unless the officer reasonably should have known that his

actions violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

In carrying out the qualified immunity analysis, a court’s “first task is to identify the

specific right that the plaintiff asserts was infringed by the challenged conduct.” Winfield v. Bass,

106 F.3d 525, 530 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The court then engages in a two-step inquiry, asking

“whether a constitutional violation occurred” and “whether the right violated was clearly

established” at the time of the official’s conduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231; Melgar ex rel. Melgar

v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2010). Courts have discretion to take these steps in either

order. Id.

As discussed above, the Court finds that a constitutional violation did not occur so it need

only further address the second alternate question. A right is “clearly established” if “the contours

of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526

U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). The inquiry into whether a right is clearly established must “be undertaken

in light of the specific context of the case” and “not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 195 (2001).

It is not required, however, that a court previously found the specific conduct at issue to

have violated an individual’s rights. The unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct need only be

manifestly apparent from broader applications of the constitutional premise in question. Put

differently, a right may be clearly established if a general constitutional rule already identified in

the decisional law applies with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question. E.W. by &

through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 185 (4th Cir. 2018); A.G. v. Fattaleh, No.

520CV00165KDBDCK, 2022 WL 2758607, at *8–9 (W.D.N.C. July 14, 2022).

With respect to his claims of false arrest, Plaintiff has not offered nor has the Court found

any authority that would clearly establish that a reasonable officer would have known that there

was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the facts alleged. To the contrary, as discussed

above, there is no dispute that Hillard had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the

circumstances. Therefore, Hillard is entitled to summary judgement based on qualified immunity

for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims based on “false arrest.”

3. Excessive Force

Plaintiff’s final claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges that Deputy Hillard used excessive

force in effecting his arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment

prohibits police officers from using force that is “excessive” or not “reasonable” in the course of

making an arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); E.W. by and through T.W. v.

Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018). Whether an officer has used excessive force to effect

an arrest is based on “objective reasonableness,” taking into account “the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396,

399.

Objective reasonableness means that the focus is not on the officer’s subjective intent. Even

“[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively

reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable

use of force constitutional.” Id. at 397; see also Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022).

However, “[i]n questioning the split-second decisions of police officers, [the Court] must avoid

hindsight bias and try to place ourselves in the heat of the moment.” Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233. Thus,

to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims can proceed, the Court must ask whether the officers’ use

of force was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,

viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, without regard to the officers’ underlying intent

or motivation. Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 214 (4th Cir. 2022). The Court must focus on

“the totality of the circumstances” based on the “information available to the Officers ‘immediately

prior to and at the very moment [they used force to arrest the Plaintiff].’ ” Id.

First, in considering the circumstances here, the Supreme Court has stated that “[i]f an

officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal

offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). In Atwater, the arrestee committed a seat

belt violation punishable only by a fine. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth

Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for such a minor violation. Id.; see Pegg v.

Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 118 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that force used in arresting (and taking

to the ground) a driver after a traffic stop was not excessive).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegation of “excessive force” reflects his complaint that his handcuffs

were too tight, which ultimately resulted in an injury to his wrists. Although the Court does not

question the sincerity of the alleged injury, after having carefully reviewed the full record, the

Court finds that a reasonable jury could not conclude that Hillard handcuffed Plaintiff using

“excessive force.” Rather, he did so in a normal, standard way, even though Plaintiff soon

complained that the cuffs were too tight. Not long after Plaintiff was initially handcuffed by

Hillard, he was turned over to the custody of other law enforcement officers, who in turn readjusted

Plaintiff’s handcuffs at least twice, but never to his satisfaction. Indeed, Plaintiff is unable to say

when in the course of his detention he suffered the injury to his wrists (thus any finding of liability

against Hillard personally could only be based on speculation). So, the Court concludes that no

jury could reasonably find that Hillard’s conduct was objectively unreasonable.

Moreover, as discussed above in connection with Plaintiff’s false arrest claims, Hillard is

entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s claims based on excessive force. Plaintiff has

suggested no authority which “clearly establishes” that Hillard’s conduct was excessive nor has he

presented evidence that could reasonably support a finding that Hillard acted with malice against

Plaintiff. See Jetton v. Caldwell County Board of Education, 2007 WL 3015252 (N.C. App. August

7, 2007) (‘While Defendants may not have always acted in a professional manner, or treated

Plaintiff with patience, respect, or kindness, there is no evidence they intended to hurt Plaintiff.

Any alleged harm resulting to Plaintiff from Defendants’ allegedly improper conduct was simply

a collateral consequence”). Therefore, Hillard did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment in arresting the Plaintiff and/or is entitled to qualified immunity, and Summary

Judgment will be granted to Hillard on Plaintiff's claims.

IV. ORDER

NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. Nos. 162, 164) are

GRANTED;

2. The remaining pending motions in this matter are denied as moot; and

3. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.

SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.

Signed: August 11, 2025

Kenneth D. Bell

United States District Judge woe

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