Caldwell v. Cambra

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

CLIFTON CALDWELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE )

OFFICERS TODD CAMBRA, NATALE )

LAPRIORE, LORI TRIPP, and )

UNKNOWN MASSACHUSETTS STATE )

POLICE OFFICERS; BROCKTON ) No. 1:24-cv-12924-JEK

POLICE OFFICERS JENNIFER HAYES, )

EMANUEL GOMES, and UNKNOWN )

BROCKTON POLICE OFFICERS; the )

CITY OF BROCKTON, )

MASSACHUSETTS; ASSISTANT )

PLYMOUTH COUNTY DISTRICT )

ATTORNEY FRANK MIDDLETON; )

NORA BUCKLEY; and ROBIN ANAPOL, )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

KOBICK, J.

Plaintiff Clifton Caldwell served over eighteen years in prison before his conviction for

aggravated rape was vacated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in May 2021. After the

Commonwealth declined to pursue a retrial and dismissed the charge, Caldwell filed this civil

action against those involved in the investigation and prosecution of his criminal case. He alleges

that the defendants—the City of Brockton, officers with the Brockton Police Department, officers

with the Massachusetts State Police, a prosecutor, a victim witness advocate, and an employee

with the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families—violated his civil rights under

federal and state law while investigating and securing his conviction. The defendants have

collectively filed four motions to dismiss his claims. For the reasons that follow, those motions

will be granted in part and denied in part, such that most of his claims may proceed to discovery.

BACKGROUND

The following facts, which are assumed true on a motion to dismiss, are drawn from the

complaint, documents fairly incorporated by reference in that complaint, and documents subject

to judicial notice. See Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc., 113 F.4th 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2024).

In October 1999, Caldwell’s twelve-year-old niece, S.J., alleged that her father—

Caldwell’s brother—had raped her eight years earlier, when she was four years old. ECF 1, ¶¶ 2,

26-27. S.J. also claimed that Caldwell and a third brother assisted her father in the assault. Id. ¶¶ 2,

26. She said she could identify Caldwell as one of her attackers by his laugh, but not by sight. Id.

¶ 4.

These allegations by S.J. came about because four of the defendants—Jennifer Hayes, a

Brockton Police Officer; Frank Middleton, a Plymouth County Assistant District Attorney

(“ADA”); Nora Buckley, a victim advocate employed by the Commonwealth; and Robin Anapol,

an employee at the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (“DCF”)1—used

suggestive interview techniques that caused S.J. to make up her claim of rape against her father

and uncles. Id. ¶ 33. S.J. had not complained of an injury or reported the assault in 1991, when it

had allegedly occurred, and there was no physical evidence, including trauma or bleeding, from

that time or any time after. Id. ¶¶ 3, 28-29, 31. No medical provider ever opined that S.J. had

experienced sexual assault, and S.J. had admitted to lying under oath when she had previously

1 Anapol represents that she did not work at DCF, as Caldwell alleges, but was instead the

Director of the Child Advocacy Center at the Plymouth County District Attorney’s Office. ECF

49, at 4 n.3. The Court nevertheless takes as true, at this stage in the case, Caldwell’s allegations

regarding Anapol’s employment. See Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 2009).

alleged that her uncle, Caldwell’s other brother, assaulted her on a separate occasion. Id. ¶¶ 30, 32.

Nevertheless, the suggestive techniques used by Officer Hayes, ADA Middleton, Buckley, and

Anapol induced the fabricated story of the rape. Id. ¶ 33.

At the time of S.J.’s claim, Caldwell was 42 years old and had difficulties communicating

clearly. Id. ¶¶ 17, 38. The police arrested him in November 1999, the month after S.J.’s allegation.

Id. ¶¶ 2, 48. He was jailed and placed in a cell with a man named George Thompson. Id. ¶¶ 37, 49.

Unbeknownst to Caldwell, Thompson had a history of working with police officers to procure

evidence of confessions against other criminal defendants in exchange for benefits. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 41-

42, 57-58. Defendant Todd Cambra, an officer with the Massachusetts State Police, had previously

used Thompson to solicit a purported confession from a suspect. Id. ¶¶ 9, 41. Defendant Natale

Lapriore, another officer with the Massachusetts State Police, likewise knew that Thompson was

a long-time police informant. Id. ¶ 56. Lapriore had acted as a surety to Thompson in a prior

criminal case as an incentive for Thompson to create evidence against other criminal defendants.

Id. ¶ 57.

Three of the defendants—Cambra, Hayes, and Lori Tripp, another Massachusetts State

Police officer—convinced Thompson to exploit Caldwell’s communication difficulties and extract

statements that Thompson could falsely claim to be a confession. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Thompson complied

with the officers’ request and secured the fabricated confession from Caldwell during the time the

two shared a cell, between November 24 and December 9, 1999. Id. ¶¶ 7, 37, 49-50. Buckley, the

victim advocate, also put Thompson in touch with S.J.’s mother, who offered money to Thompson.

Id. ¶ 44.

Caldwell was tried separately from his brothers on charges of aggravated rape. Id. ¶ 36.

Based on the lack of physical and other incriminating evidence of the assault, Caldwell’s brothers,

who were tried together, were acquitted of the charges. Id. ¶¶ 5, 36. Caldwell, however, was found

guilty and sentenced to 27 to 35 years in prison. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. No forensic evidence was introduced

against Caldwell at trial, and no physical evidence linked him to the alleged assault. Id. ¶¶ 51, 53.

Instead, the prosecutors relied on testimony from S.J. and Thompson, some of which the

defendants knew to be false. Id. ¶¶ 52, 81.2 The fabricated testimony from Thompson about

Caldwell’s confession was the only difference between the evidence introduced in the two trials

and, Caldwell alleges, made the difference between his conviction and his brothers’ acquittals. Id.

¶¶ 6, 47.

The defendants and the prosecution team did not disclose to Caldwell that the testimony

against him had been fabricated, nor did they disclose relevant impeachment evidence. Id. ¶¶ 39,

43, 80-82, 84. The police hid their relationship with Thompson from the prosecutors and from

Caldwell’s counsel. Id. ¶ 43. Cambra and Lapriore, in particular, suppressed Thompson’s history

of creating evidence for law enforcement officers in exchange for benefits. Id. ¶¶ 10, 55, 58. The

government also failed to disclose to Caldwell that Buckley had put Thompson in touch with S.J.’s

mother, who had offered Thompson money. Id. ¶¶ 44-45. As a result of this suppression, Caldwell

was unable to pursue further discovery about the extent of Thompson’s relationship with the police

or raise it at trial. Id. ¶ 46. Anapol also withheld evidence that S.J. had made other allegations that

Anapol knew to be false. Id. ¶ 35.

Caldwell maintained his innocence over the course of his incarceration. Id. ¶¶ 60, 64.

Because he was convicted of a sex crime involving a child, he was subject to especial violence and

harassment. Id. ¶¶ 61, 69. He was detained in maximum security prisons, where he was physically

2 Caldwell alleges that Hayes, Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol also fabricated other evidence

that was used in furtherance of his wrongful prosecution, but he does not identify the substance of

this other evidence. ECF 1, ¶¶ 34, 85.

injured and assaulted. Id. ¶ 69. He suffered, among other injuries, multiple concussions from blows

to his head, repeated beatings, and a broken hip. Id. ¶¶ 69, 73. These harms were exacerbated by

his learning disability, hearing loss, and long-term disabilities. Id. ¶ 74.

On May 6, 2021, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated Caldwell’s conviction and remanded

for a new trial. Id. ¶¶ 11, 62; see Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 487 Mass. 370 (2021). The Court

concluded that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence—namely, a note by

the prosecutor concerning Thompson’s testimony in a prior rape case about a jailhouse confession

he had extracted—had prejudiced Caldwell’s defense. See Caldwell, 487 Mass. at 375, 379. This

note, the SJC explained, would have provided Caldwell with a powerful basis for impeaching

Thompson’s credibility. Id. at 377-78. On January 11, 2023, the Commonwealth dismissed all

charges against Caldwell and entered a nolle prosequi “in the interest of justice,” accompanied by

S.J.’s affidavit explaining that she did not wish to proceed with another trial and testify again. ECF

1, ¶¶ 62, 108; ECF 49-3; ECF 49-4, ¶¶ 3, 6.

On November 22, 2024, Caldwell initiated this action, asserting nine federal and state law

claims against the defendants: the City of Brockton; Brockton Police Officers Hayes and

Emmanuel Gomes; Massachusetts State Police Officers Cambra, Lapriore, and Tripp; ADA

Middleton; victim advocate Buckley; DCF employee Anapol; and unknown officers in the

Massachusetts State Police and Brockton Police Department. ECF 1. The individual defendants

are sued in their individual capacities. Id. ¶ 25. Caldwell’s federal claims, brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, allege a violation of his right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment, in the form of deliberate fabrication of false evidence and withholding of exculpatory

evidence (Count I); malicious prosecution, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

(Count II); conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights (Count III); and failure to

intervene to prevent the violation of his constitutional rights (Count IV). Id. ¶¶ 78-122. Under state

law, he asserts claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V); malicious

prosecution (Count VI); negligence (Count VII); interference with his federal and state

constitutional rights, in violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”), M.G.L. c. 12,

§§ 11H, 11I (Count VIII); and civil conspiracy (Count IX). Id. ¶¶ 123-50.

All of the defendants except Lapriore moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The City of Brockton and Brockton Police Officers

Hayes and Gomes filed one motion to dismiss, see ECF 23; Massachusetts State Police Officer

Cambra filed another, see ECF 28; Massachusetts State Police Officer Tripp filed a third, see ECF

44; and ADA Middleton, victim advocate Buckley, and DCF employee Anapol filed a fourth, see

ECF 48. The Court held a hearing after receiving Caldwell’s opposition briefs. See ECF 35, 38,

45, 52, 54. At the hearing, Caldwell represented that he was abandoning his claims against

Lapriore, who is now deceased. See ECF 54.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court

must determine “‘whether, construing the well-pleaded facts of the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintif[f], the complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted.’” Cortés-

Ramos v. Martin-Morales, 956 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-

Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011)). The complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to relief.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “While

legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

allegations.” Id. at 679. The Court “may properly consider only facts and documents that are part

of or incorporated into the complaint.” Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15

(1st Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Pleadings.

Before addressing the substance of Caldwell’s claims, the defendants make a threshold

argument for dismissal: they contend that his complaint fails to adequately distinguish each

defendant’s conduct and therefore does not satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8. The grouped allegations in the complaint, they insist, impede their

understanding of the claims against them and their ability to mount a meaningful defense.

On a motion to dismiss, the court must ascertain “whether, as to each defendant, a

plaintiff’s pleadings are sufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” Sánchez v.

Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 48 (1st Cir. 2009). Still, the analysis should be “context-specific,”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and “[t]he complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece

to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible,” Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723

F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.

2011)). In some cases, “allegations that would individually lack the heft to make a claim plausible

may suffice to state a claim in the context of the complaint’s other factual allegations.” Ocasio-

Hernández, 640 F.3d at 15. And “‘some latitude may be appropriate’ in applying the plausibility

standard” when “a material part of the information needed is likely to be within the defendant’s

control.” García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Menard v.

CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2012)). For example, for some types of claims brought

under Section 1983, the “precise knowledge of the chain of events leading to the constitutional

violation may often be unavailable to the plaintiff” at the motion to dismiss stage, such that courts

should consult “judicial experience and common sense” in making a “contextual judgment about

the sufficiency of the pleadings.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 16 (quotation marks omitted).

Looking to the “cumulative effect” of Caldwell’s factual allegations, which concern events

from over twenty years ago, the Court concludes that his complaint easily clears the specificity

threshold required by Rule 8. See id. at 14. Many of the allegations in his complaint do specify the

particular defendants who allegedly took actions that caused the deprivation of his rights under

federal and state law. See, e.g., ECF 1, ¶¶ 33-35, 37, 39, 41, 44, 50, 55-58, 91-93. For example, he

alleges that Hayes, Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol caused S.J. to make up the rape allegation

through their suggestive interview techniques, id. ¶ 33, and that Cambra, Tripp, and Hayes asked

Thompson to secure a false confession from Caldwell, id. ¶¶ 37, 50. To be sure, other paragraphs

in the complaint, including those pertaining to the causes of action, make allegations against the

“Defendants” in general, rather than a particular defendant. See, e.g., ¶¶ 79-88, 101-02, 104-05.

But this does not warrant dismissal. As this Court observed in Echavarria v. Roach, which involved

largely identical causes of action based on the plaintiff’s wrongful conviction for murder, dismissal

on this basis is particularly inappropriate where “much of the information [Caldwell] seeks is in

the sole possession of [the] Defendants,” and his “difficulty in acquiring the evidence necessary to

prove his claims” is compounded by their alleged fabrication and concealment of evidence. No.

16-cv-11118-ADB, 2017 WL 3928270, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2017). The defendants here have

adequate notice of Caldwell’s claims and the alleged conduct that gives rise to those claims. See

id.; Carter v. Newland, 441 F. Supp. 2d 208, 214 (D. Mass. 2006). That is enough. The Court will

not dismiss Caldwell’s complaint based on insufficiency of the pleadings.

II. Absolute Immunity.

One defendant, ADA Middleton, next contends that he has absolute prosecutorial immunity

as to all of the claims asserted against him under Section 1983.3 To determine whether a prosecutor

may enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, courts apply a functional approach, assessing “the

nature of the function performed,” “not the identity of the actor who performed it” or “the

particular act in isolation.” Penate v. Kaczmarek, 928 F.3d 128, 135-36 (1st Cir. 2019) (quotation

marks omitted). Absolute immunity is warranted when a prosecutor takes action to prepare for “the

initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial” or to act “as an advocate for the State,” Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993), because broad protection for activities “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” ensures the “vigorous and fearless

performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal

3 One heading in ADA Middleton’s memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss contends

that he “has absolute prosecutorial immunity for all claims raised in the complaint.” ECF 49, at 12

(capitalization omitted and italics added). But the absolute immunity doctrine he invokes derives

from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 1983, which incorporates certain “immunities

‘well grounded in history and reason.’” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (quoting

Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)). And the substance of Middleton’s absolute

immunity argument relies only on cases addressing absolute immunity from federal claims brought

pursuant to Section 1983, not state law claims. See ECF 49, at 12-15. Except with respect to

Caldwell’s common law malicious prosecution claim in Count VI, Middleton develops no

argument that he is entitled to absolute immunity under Massachusetts law from the state law

claims asserted in the complaint. While “the scope of prosecutorial immunity under State common

law and [the MCRA] is at least as broad as under § 1983,” Chicopee Lions Club v. Dist. Atty. for

Hampden Dist., 396 Mass. 244, 251 (1985), Massachusetts courts have also expressed that they

are “quite sparing in [their] recognition of absolute immunity, . . . refus[ing] to extend it any further

than its justification would warrant,” Cady v. Marcella, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 334, 340 (2000) (quoting

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 n.4 (1993)). Under the circumstances, where

Middleton makes no separate argument that he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity under

Massachusetts law for Counts V, VII, VIII, and IX of the complaint, the Court considers that

argument forfeited. See Chestnut v. City of Lowell, 305 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2002) (Torruella, J.,

concurring) (“Immunity, whether qualified or absolute, is an affirmative defense that can be

forfeited, if not asserted in a timely manner, or waived.” (citing Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz,

98 F.3d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1996))).

justice system,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28, 430 (1976). But where prosecutors

engage in “administrative” or “investigative” functions, as when they advise police officers during

criminal investigations, or take actions, such as fabricating evidence, before there is probable cause

for an arrest or before an indictment has been returned, only qualified immunity applies. See

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 (“A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate

before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.”); Penate, 928 F.3d at 135-36. This is

because “[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a

detective or police officer, it is ‘neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity

should protect the one and not the other.’” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago,

484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)). A government official seeking absolute immunity bears a

“heavy” burden of showing that such immunity is appropriate. Penate, 928 F.3d at 135.

The complaint alleges that ADA Middleton “participated in the investigation stage” of

Caldwell’s criminal case, and it seeks to hold him responsible for “actions he undertook in

conspiracy with the Police Officer Defendants in his investigatory capacity.” ECF 1, ¶ 21.

Specifically, the complaint alleges that Middleton, in concert with Hayes, Buckley, Anapol, and

other unknown actors, used suggestive interview techniques that caused S.J. to fabricate her claim

of a sexual assault, and then fabricated additional evidence in furtherance of Caldwell’s

prosecution. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. This conduct is not, as Middleton contends, actions “undertaken by a

prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the

course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Rather, Middleton’s

conduct allegedly came early in the investigation, before anyone suspected Caldwell of criminal

conduct, and it manufactured the probable cause to arrest Caldwell by inducing S.J.’s fabricated

allegations. ECF 1, ¶ 33. Accepting these allegations as true, Middleton was acting in the role of

an investigator, not as an advocate, and he is not entitled to absolute immunity on Counts I through

IV, all of which concern, at least in part, his actions taken in an investigatory capacity. See Guzman-

Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1995) (when prosecutors act to “uncover evidence

in the first instance, . . . they are not performing a function ‘intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process’” (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430)).

Middleton is, however, entitled to absolute immunity with respect to Caldwell’s claims that

he improperly withheld exculpatory evidence. In Reid v. State of New Hampshire, the First Circuit

concluded that “prosecutors retain discretion to determine what evidence is to be disclosed . . . and

that absolute immunity attaches to their exercise of discretion.” 56 F.3d 332, 336-37 (1st Cir. 1995)

(emphasis omitted) (“[I]t is now [a] well-settled rule that a prosecutor cannot be held personally

liable for the knowing suppression of exculpatory information.” (quotation marks omitted)). The

First Circuit accordingly found that absolute prosecutorial immunity applied to allegations that

prosecutors “repeatedly misled the trial court in order to conceal their alleged misconduct” and

“continued to withhold the exculpatory evidence long after [the petitioner’s] conviction.” Id. at

337-38. Middleton is likewise protected by absolute immunity insofar as the complaint accuses

him of initiating the prosecution and presenting false testimony during trial. See Diaz-Colon v.

Fuentes-Agostini, 786 F.3d 144, 151 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[p]rosecutors regularly prepare and present

testimony by witnesses to whom the government has offered inducements to secure their

cooperation,” and “trial itself is the quintessential judicial proceeding”).

III. Qualified Immunity.

Certain individual defendants—Brockton Police Officers Hayes and Gomes, ADA

Middleton, victim advocate Buckley, and DCF worker Anapol—next argue that they are entitled

to qualified immunity on the Section 1983 claims asserted in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the

complaint.4 Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions

from civil damages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The doctrine “seeks to balance two opposing interests: ‘the need to hold

public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Berge v.

Sch. Comm. of Gloucester, 107 F.4th 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 231 (2009)). “Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, an officer’s claim of

qualified immunity ‘ought to be resolved as soon as possible in [the] litigation.’” Brown v. Dickey,

117 F.4th 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Norton v. Rodrigues, 955 F.3d 176, 183 (1st Cir. 2020)).

“The qualified immunity inquiry proceeds with a now-familiar two-part test: (1) whether

the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) if

so, whether the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged violation.”

Penate v. Hanchett, 944 F.3d 358, 366 (1st Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted); see Est. of Rahim

4 In moving to dismiss, Cambra and Tripp also assert, in a conclusory manner, that they are

“entitled to qualified immunity as the Complaint provides insufficient facts to support Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claims for violations of his right to due process, malicious prosecution, conspiracy to

deprive him of his constitutional rights, and failure to intervene.” ECF 28, at 6-7; ECF 44, at 7. To

support this assertion, they offer a single sentence of argument—namely, that “a § 1983 claim for

malicious prosecution was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest and conviction

and claims for failure to intervene are typically confined to cases involving excessive force.” ECF

28, at 7; ECF 44, at 7. This is not sufficient to preserve a qualified immunity defense. Cambra and

Tripp offer no argument at all as to why they are entitled to qualified immunity on Caldwell’s due

process claim in Count I or his conspiracy claim in Count III. And their single-sentence argument

with respect to Counts II and IV is devoid of any case citation or elaboration. Lacking any effort

at developed argumentation, Cambra and Tripp’s argument is not sufficient to raise and preserve a

qualified immunity defense as to Counts I through IV of the complaint. See United States v.

Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (issues are deemed waived where, as here, they are

“adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed

argumentation”).

by Rahim v. Doe, 51 F.4th 402, 410 (1st Cir. 2022) (“The prongs need not be addressed in order,

and an officer may be entitled to immunity based on either prong.”). The “clearly established”

prong involves two sub-inquiries. The first “‘focuses on the clarity of the law at the time of the

violation.’” Penate, 944 F.3d at 366 (quoting Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 42 (1st Cir.

2013); Berge, 107 F.4th at 40 (courts may look to controlling and persuasive caselaw finding a

violation under similar facts or providing a general standard that “appl[ies] with obvious clarity to

the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has [not] previously been

held unlawful” (quotation marks omitted)). The second “‘focuses more concretely on the facts of

the particular case and whether a reasonable defendant would have known that his conduct violated

the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.’” Penate, 944 F.3d at 366 (quoting Drumgold, 707 F.3d at 42).

“The salient question is whether the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave the

defendant fair warning that his particular conduct was unconstitutional.” Maldonado v. Fontanes,

568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009); see Alfano v. Lynch, 847 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2017) (in

determining whether “clearly established” prong is met, plaintiff need not “identify cases that

address the ‘particular factual scenario’ that characterizes his case,” so long as “existing precedents

establish the applicable legal rule with sufficient clarity and specificity to put the official on notice

that his contemplated course of conduct will violate that rule”).

A. Due Process Claim.

Count I of the complaint asserts that the defendants violated Caldwell’s due process right

to a fair trial by fabricating incriminating evidence, including S.J.’s allegation against Caldwell

and Thompson’s false report of Caldwell’s confession, and withholding material evidence. Hayes,

Gomes, Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol counter that they are entitled to qualified immunity on

all of Caldwell’s theories of liability. The Court will address each in turn.

1. Fabrication of Evidence: S.J.’s Allegation and False Confession to Thompson.

Hayes, Gomes, Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol first argue that they are entitled to

qualified immunity because Caldwell’s complaint does not allege a due process violation with

respect to the purported fabrication of S.J.’s allegations. The “self-evident” truth that due process

prohibits “those charged with upholding the law . . . from deliberately fabricating evidence and

framing individuals for crimes they did not commit” is well established. Limone v. Condon, 372

F.3d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004). While courts have also recognized that “[t]here is no constitutional

due process right to have child witnesses in a child sexual abuse investigation interviewed in a

particular manner,” Caldwell does not seek to vindicate a right to have had S.J. interviewed in a

particular way. Mondol v. City of Somerville, No. 15-cv-13697-ADB, 2017 WL 4845019, at *11

(D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2017) (quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Mondol v. City of Somervile,

746 F. App’x 35 (1st Cir. 2018). Rather, he alleges that Hayes, Middleton, Buckley, Anapol, and

other unknown actors “caused” S.J. to “make up an incriminating story against [Caldwell] and his

brothers” through “suggestive” interview techniques. ECF 1, ¶ 33. This allegation—that these

defendants fabricated S.J.’s claim to create evidence that was used to frame Caldwell for a crime

he did not commit—is enough to state a constitutional violation. See Limone, 372 F.3d at 44-45.

However, the complaint makes no allegations linking Gomes to the solicitation of S.J.’s allegation,

so this due process theory with respect to Gomes must be dismissed.

Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol separately argue that this right was not clearly established

at the time of the alleged violations. But “the right not to be framed by law enforcement agents

was clearly established” by 1967. See id. at 45. Though “clearly established law must not be

gauged at too high a level of generality,” a “[g]eneral statemen[t] of the law [is] not inherently

incapable of giving fair and clear warning to public officials.” Alfano, 847 F.3d at 76 (quotation

marks omitted). By 1999, the “duty to refrain from procuring convictions by the presentation of

testimony known to be perjurious” applied “broadly to the sovereign and its agents.” Limone, 372

F.3d at 47. “[N]o reasonable official under similar circumstances would have thought it was

constitutionally permissible” to fabricate evidence accusing a person of rape. Guillemard-Ginorio

v. Contreras-Gómez, 585 F.3d 508, 529 (1st Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

qualified immunity does not shield Hayes, Middleton, Buckley, or Anapol from Caldwell’s claim

that the fabrication of S.J.’s allegation violated his right to due process.

Middleton, Buckley, Anapol, Hayes, and Gomes also contend that they are entitled to

qualified immunity because the complaint does not plausibly state a constitutional violation

relating to the alleged solicitation of a false confession via Thompson. The complaint alleges that

“police, including but not limited to Defendants Cambra, Tripp, and Hayes, fabricated a false

‘confession’” by requesting that Thompson exploit Caldwell’s communication difficulties and

manipulate him into providing statements that could form the basis of the confession. ECF 1,

¶¶ 37-38, 49-50. It further alleges that Gomes, also a police officer, knew the confession was false

but did not disclose to prosecutors that the confession testimony from Thompson had been

fabricated. Id. ¶¶ 19, 39. Caldwell also alleges that Buckley put Thompson in contact with S.J.’s

mother, who offered Thompson money. Id. ¶ 44. Taken as true, these allegations plausibly state a

due process violation against the police officer defendants—Hayes, Gomes, Tripp, and Cambra—

and Buckley for fabrication of evidence vital to Caldwell’s conviction. See Limone, 372 F.3d at 44

(allegation that “appellants purposefully suborned false testimony from a key witness” states a due

process violation). As this due process right was clearly established in 1999, at the time of the

alleged fabrication, qualified immunity does not bar Caldwell’s claim against them on this theory.

Id. at 45, 47. Because these allegations are limited to the conduct of the police officers and Buckley,

however, the complaint does not state a plausible claim against ADA Middleton or Anapol related

to the use of Thompson to fabricate a false confession. ECF 1, ¶¶ 37-59 (claiming that the “police

. . . fabricated a false ‘confession’”).

Accordingly, Caldwell’s due process claims against Middleton and Anapol survive insofar

as they concern fabrication of S.J.’s allegations but must be dismissed insofar as they concern

fabrication of a false confession through Thompson. Caldwell’s due process claim against Gomes

must be dismissed insofar as it concerns fabrication of S.J.’s allegations but survives insofar as it

concerns fabrication of a false confession through Thompson. The due process claim pertaining to

fabrication survives in full as to the remaining individual defendants.

2. Withholding Evidence.

Buckley, Anapol, Hayes, and Gomes next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity

on Caldwell’s theory that his due process right to a fair trial was violated by the defendants’

withholding or suppression of exculpatory evidence.5 “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material

either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This principle is an “extension” of the Supreme Court’s

decisions in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) and Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216

(1942), which held that the deliberate suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant violates

due process. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86; Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 50 (1st Cir. 2011)

(“Deliberate concealment of material evidence by the police, designed to grease the skids for false

testimony and encourage wrongful conviction, unarguably implicates a defendant’s due process

rights.”). The First Circuit has been “careful to distinguish between the proscription originating

5 As discussed, ADA Middleton has absolute prosecutorial immunity from this claim.

in Mooney and Pyle against the deliberate suppression of evidence and the more recent affirmative

disclosure obligation announced in Brady,” which applies even absent bad faith. Drumgold v.

Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir. 2013); see Haley, 657 F.3d at 46.

Here, Caldwell’s allegations appear to implicate both theories of suppression. See, e.g.,

ECF 1, ¶¶ 35, 39, 43, 45-46, 58-59, 80-81, 84-85, 87. With respect to his deliberate suppression

theory, Caldwell alleges that the defendants “deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence from

Caldwell and from state prosecutors, . . . thereby misleading and misdirecting the criminal

prosecution.” Id. ¶ 80. The complaint sets forth a litany of alleged disclosure violations, including

that Gomes was aware of but did not disclose the false confession from Thompson, id. ¶ 39; that

the police “hid” their relationship and contacts with Thompson from prosecutors and Caldwell, id.

¶¶ 41-46, 58-59; and that “Anapol and/or other unknown actors were aware of other allegations

by S.J. that were known by her and/or them to be untrue but withheld this evidence from

[Caldwell],” id. ¶ 35. Viewed in their totality, these allegations suffice to state a due process

violation. See Haley, 657 F.3d at 49-51 (allegation that police officers deliberately withheld

statements from witnesses given on the day of a murder, but which were inconsistent with trial

testimony, stated a due process claim). The defendants do not dispute that the right against

deliberate suppression of material evidence was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violations. See id. at 50-51 (deliberate withholding of exculpatory statements by police was a

clearly established violation of due process by 1972). Qualified immunity accordingly does not

attach to this theory of liability.

With respect to his theory that the defendants violated their affirmative no-fault duty to

turn over material evidence, Caldwell alleges, for example, that the extent of the defendants’

contacts with Thompson were not disclosed to Caldwell. ECF 1, ¶ 45. The defendants do not,

however, meaningfully address this theory of suppression. Though Hayes and Gomes generally

assert that Caldwell failed to state a violation of his right against the withholding of exculpatory

evidence, the qualified immunity argument in their brief cites only the deliberate concealment

standard set forth in Haley and does not address Brady’s no-fault disclosure obligation. ECF 24,

at 9. And Buckley and Anapol merely state that it does not “make sense that individuals in [their]

positions . . . have any role or duties in the production of evidence.” ECF 49, at 6. Absent any

“developed argumentation” as to why the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on

Caldwell’s no-fault disclosure theory of a due process violation, the Court considers a qualified

immunity defense with respect to this theory of liability forfeited. United States v. Zannino, 895

F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).6

B. Malicious Prosecution Claim Under the Fourth Amendment.

Count II asserts that the defendants initiated criminal proceedings against Caldwell to

frame him for a crime they knew he did not commit, in violation of his rights under the Fourth and

6 Contrary to Gomes’ argument, see ECF 24, at 14, Caldwell has also stated a due process claim

against him on a supervisor liability theory, and qualified immunity does not shield him from

liability on that theory at this stage in the proceedings. Under Section 1983, while supervisors may

not be held liable for the misconduct of their employees on a respondeat superior theory, they may

be found liable for their own actions or omissions. See Wadsworth v. Nguyen, 129 F.4th 38, 62 (1st

Cir. 2025); Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999) (describing when supervisory

liability can attach). Caldwell alleges that the supervisor defendants, including Gomes, directly

participated in the violation of his due process rights by signing incriminating reports and

documents, even though the supervisors knew they contained false information. ECF 1, ¶ 82.

Caldwell also claims that the supervisors in charge of his investigation, including Gomes, knew of

the improper suppression of exculpatory evidence and fabricated evidence against him, but

intentionally ignored and effectively acquiesced in this misconduct. Id. ¶¶ 39, 87. Finally, he

alleges that the City supervisors caused his injuries by their deliberate indifference to adequate

training, supervision, and discipline of officers regarding proper use of witness interviews,

handling of exculpatory evidence, disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and use of informants. Id.

¶¶ 95-96. At this early stage in the case, these allegations plausibly state a due process claim on a

supervisory liability theory against Gomes. Gomes makes no argument that Caldwell’s due process

rights were not clearly established at the time of his investigation and prosecution.

Fourteenth Amendments. Hayes and Gomes argue that Caldwell’s malicious prosecution claim is

barred by qualified immunity because Caldwell can neither show that his right against malicious

prosecution was abridged nor that such a claim was clearly established by 1999, when the

defendants first initiated their investigation.7

A claim for malicious prosecution protects individuals “targeted for unreasonable, baseless

prosecutions, and who, as a result, are detained without probable cause during the pretrial period.”

Hernandez-Cuevas, 723 F.3d at 98. The First Circuit has recognized such a claim under the Fourth

Amendment, but not the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 98-99; see Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d

46, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2001) (no procedural due process claim because Massachusetts law provides

an adequate remedy, and no substantive due process claim, consistent with the Supreme Court’s

plurality opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)). The plaintiff must establish that “the

defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable

cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s favor.” Hernandez-Cuevas, 723 F.3d

at 101 (quotation marks omitted). Probable cause exists “when, at the time of the arrest, the ‘facts

and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person,

or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has

committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’” Holder v. Town of Sandown, 585

F.3d 500, 504 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)).

The complaint alleges that Hayes, Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol manufactured probable

cause to arrest Caldwell by using suggestive interview techniques that caused S.J. to make a false

accusation against him. ECF 1, ¶¶ 33, 81. This alleged inducement of a false accusation formed

7 Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol do not make any developed argument that they are entitled

to qualified immunity on Count II. They have, accordingly, forfeited the argument. See Zannino,

895 F.2d at 17.

the basis for Caldwell’s arrest and detention before his prosecution. ECF 1, ¶¶ 33, 48-49. No

defendant contends that probable cause to arrest Caldwell on suspicion of aggravated rape would

have existed absent S.J.’s allegations against him. As against these defendants, then, Caldwell’s

allegations are sufficient to plead the first two elements of a malicious prosecution claim under the

Fourth Amendment, and his allegations support the plausible inference that any warrant to arrest

Caldwell was not supported by facts believed by these defendants to be true. See Hernandez-

Cuevas, 723 F.3d at 101-02. As against Gomes, however, the complaint lacks factual allegations

linking him to the suggestive interview of S.J., so he is entitled to qualified immunity. The

remaining individual defendants have not disputed, as to the Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution claim, that Caldwell plausibly alleges that the criminal proceedings terminated in his

favor when his conviction was vacated and the charges against him were dismissed. See Thompson

v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022). Caldwell has therefore adequately pled a Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution claim against the remaining individual defendants.8

Whether Caldwell has satisfied the clearly established inquiry is a more difficult question.

In 2001, the First Circuit held that “[i]t is an open question whether the Constitution permits the

assertion of a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution on the basis of an alleged Fourth

Amendment violation,” Nieves, 241 F.3d at 54, and this uncertainty persisted until the First

Circuit’s 2013 decision in Hernandez-Cuevas, 723 F.3d at 99-100. The defendants claim that as a

result, the right against malicious prosecution was not “clearly established” in 1999, when the

relevant events of this case took place. In Caldwell’s view, the inquiry should be defined at a

different level of abstraction—namely, whether the Fourth Amendment right not to be seized

8 Because Cambra and Tripp make no developed argument that Caldwell has failed to plausibly

allege the elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against them, any such

argument is forfeited.

without probable cause was clearly established by 1999. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 580

U.S. 357, 364-65 (2017) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975)).

The focus of qualified immunity is on the officer’s conduct, not the plaintiff’s asserted

cause of action. See Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 54 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005). “The

relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). If “courts have agreed that certain conduct is a

constitutional violation under facts not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in the

case at hand, the officer would not be entitled to qualified immunity based simply on the argument

that courts had not agreed on one verbal formulation of the controlling standard.” Id. at 202-203.

The proper inquiry, then, is not whether the constitutional source of the right against malicious

prosecution was clearly settled in 1999, but whether there was a clearly established right to be free

from an arrest unsupported by probable cause due to government officials’ fabrication of evidence.

See Hernandez-Cuevas, 723 F.3d at 97 n.7 (in evaluating qualified immunity argument regarding

malicious prosecution claim, noting that “the government’s decision to forfeit the clearly

established prong may have been motivated by the reasonable conclusion that such an argument

would be hopeless in any event” because “[t]hough the question of whether the Fourth Amendment

provides substantive protection during the pretrial period is a question of first impression in this

circuit, it cannot be seriously argued that an objectively reasonable officer . . . would have been

ignorant of the fact that fabricating evidence was constitutionally unacceptable”). The First Circuit

has deemed it “self-evident” and “fundamental” that “those charged with upholding the law are

prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not

commit.” Limone, 372 F.3d at 44-45. Because the conduct underlying Caldwell’s malicious

prosecution claim—that is, fabricating evidence to create probable cause to seize an innocent

defendant—was clearly prohibited in 1999, Caldwell has satisfied the clearly established inquiry.

Hayes is not, accordingly, entitled to qualified immunity on his malicious prosecution claim.

C. Civil Rights Conspiracy Claim.

Count III asserts a Section 1983 claim based on the defendants’ alleged conspiracy to

deprive him of his constitutional rights. Hayes and Gomes argue that qualified immunity shields

them from liability because Caldwell has failed to plausibly allege a conspiracy.9 Tripp and

Cambra separately assert that Caldwell has failed to state a civil rights conspiracy claim against

them. The Court will address both contentions here.

A civil rights conspiracy claim under Section 1983 involves “‘a combination of two or

more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful

means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong

against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damages.’” Sánchez v. Foley, 972

F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Est. of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 178 (1st Cir. 2008)).

The plaintiff must show both a “conspiratorial agreement” and “an actual abridgment of some

federally-secured right.” Nieves, 241 F.3d at 53.

Count III alleges that the defendants, “acting in concert with other co-conspirators, known

and unknown, reached an agreement among themselves to frame [Caldwell] for crimes that he did

not commit, and thereby to deprive him of his constitutional rights,” and intentionally committed

overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. ECF 1, ¶¶ 111, 113; see also id. ¶¶ 79, 101. It also

“incorporates each paragraph of [the] Complaint,” including Caldwell’s allegations that Hayes,

9 Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol do not make any developed argument that they are entitled

to qualified immunity on Count III. They have, accordingly, forfeited the argument. See Zannino,

895 F.2d at 17.

Middleton, Buckley, Anapol, and other unknown actors fabricated S.J.’s claim; that Cambra, Tripp,

Hayes, Gomes, and other police officers fabricated and suppressed a false confession through

Thompson; that Thompson had a longstanding relationship with the police in which he fabricated

evidence against other defendants in exchange for benefits; and that the defendants deliberately

suppressed exculpatory evidence to secure Caldwell’s conviction. Id. ¶¶ 33, 37, 41-46, 56-58, 80,

84-86, 110.

At this stage, these allegations are enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Tripp and Cambra

argue that the relationship between themselves and Thompson is not enough to infer the wide-

ranging conspiratorial agreement alleged in the complaint, but the First Circuit has cautioned that

“a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of the agreement.” Sánchez, 972 F.3d at 12. Rather,

because direct proof of an agreement is rarely available—particularly on a motion to dismiss—

“more often than not[,] such an agreement must be inferred from all the circumstances.” Earle v.

Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 843 (1st Cir. 1988); see, e.g., Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 389 (1st Cir.

1989) (district court erred in directing verdict on conspiracy claim because where plaintiff and

other witnesses “testified to discussions between the officers,” there was sufficient circumstantial

evidence for a jury to find a conspiracy, should “the jury believ[e] that there was no probable cause

for the arrest and that the officers’ story was fabricated”). At this stage, the complaint, read as a

whole, states a plausible claim of civil rights conspiracy against each of the individual defendants.

And because they make no argument that this right was not clearly established in 1999, Hayes and

Gomes are not entitled to qualified immunity.

D. Failure to Intervene Claim.

Count IV asserts a Section 1983 claim based on the defendants’ failure to intervene to

prevent the violation of Caldwell’s constitutional rights. Hayes, Gomes, Middleton, Buckley, and

Anapol argue that Caldwell’s failure to intervene claim is barred by qualified immunity because a

duty to intervene under the facts of this case—involving fabrication of evidence and withholding

of exculpatory evidence—had not been clearly established by 1999. In Caldwell’s view, because

law enforcement officers have a duty to uphold the law, the clearly established inquiry is satisfied

if the underlying constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the violation, and it is

immaterial whether a separate duty to intervene to prevent a violation of that right was clearly

established at the time.

The defendants have the better of the arguments. The First Circuit has explained that a duty

to intervene “arises in a variety of factual circumstances and the phrase by itself cannot determine

either whether a duty arises or how claims of violation of the duty are to be evaluated.” Torres-

Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[e]ven when the claim is that a state

actor . . . causes the injury, that alone does not tell us enough to make dispositive judgments,” as

“[t]here are a variety of state actors and a variety of settings within which they act”). To determine

if a duty to intervene is clearly established in a particular context, the pertinent question is not

whether a duty to intervene exists writ large, but instead whether the law would have put an officer

in the defendant’s circumstances on notice that he had a duty to intervene. See id. at 55. In 1999,

when the alleged constitutional violations occurred, cases in the First Circuit addressing duty-to-

intervene claims “primarily, if not exclusively, concerned allegations of failure to intervene in the

excessive force context.” Echavarria, 2017 WL 3928270, at *10 (citing cases). Caldwell does not

point to any pre-1999 cases imposing on government officials a duty to intervene in circumstances

involving another government actor’s falsification or suppression of evidence. Because the clearly

established inquiry is satisfied only if “controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of

persuasive authority” have “placed the constitutionality of the officer’s conduct beyond debate,”

qualified immunity shields Hayes, Gomes, Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol from liability for

failure to intervene. Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quotation marks omitted);

see Weichel v. Town of Braintree, No. 20-cv-11456-IT, 2021 WL 1948096, at *6 (D. Mass. May

14, 2021) (duty to intervene not clearly established outside excessive force context); Cosenza v.

City of Worcester, 355 F. Supp. 3d 81, 101 (D. Mass. 2019) (same); Echavarria, 2017 WL

3928270, at *11 (same).

IV. State Law Claims Against the Individual Defendants.

The Court next addresses the individual defendants’ arguments with respect to Counts V,

VI, VII, and IX of the complaint, which assert claims arising under Massachusetts common law,

and Count VIII, which asserts a violation of the MCRA, M.G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I.

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim.

Count V asserts that the individual defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress on

Caldwell by fabricating evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence. Plaintiffs alleging

intentional infliction of emotional distress must demonstrate “(1) that the actor intended to inflict

emotional distress or that [she] knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely

result of [her] conduct . . .; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all

possible bounds of decency and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community . . . ; (3) that the

actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff’s distress . . . ; and (4) that the emotional

distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” Butcher v. Univ. of Massachusetts, 483 Mass. 742,

758 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). “Liability cannot be predicated on mere insults, indignities,

threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities, nor even is it enough that the defendant

has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal.” Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379,

385 (2014) (quotation marks omitted).

Hayes, Gomes, Middleton, Buckley, and Anapol argue that Caldwell has not plausibly

alleged that they engaged in the behavior underlying his claim—that is, the fabrication of evidence

and withholding of exculpatory evidence. As with Caldwell’s Section 1983 claims, however, his

allegations are sufficiently detailed to survive a motion to dismiss. Caldwell alleges that, despite

knowing he was innocent, the defendants initiated a case against him without probable cause,

fabricated evidence of S.J.’s allegation and a false confession against him, and withheld

exculpatory evidence in the course of securing his conviction for the aggravated rape of his niece.

Caldwell was deprived of his liberty for over eighteen years before his conviction was vacated by

the Supreme Judicial Court. During and after his incarceration, he experienced severe physical and

mental health challenges. ECF 1, ¶¶ 63-77. Caldwell’s allegations against the defendants, taken as

true, describe the sort of extreme and outrageous conduct that can ground a plausible claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and his complaint adequately alleges that the

defendants’ conduct was the cause of his distress. See Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418,

425 (7th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff alleging that law enforcement framed him stated a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress); Echavarria, 2017 WL 3928270, at *12 (similar claims

deemed sufficient to establish claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress).

B. Malicious Prosecution Claim.

Count VI asserts a common law malicious prosecution claim. “The essence of the tort of

malicious prosecution is ‘interference with the right to be free from unjustifiable litigation.’”

Chervin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 Mass. 95, 102 (2006) (quoting Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381

Mass. 545, 552 (1980)). To allege malicious prosecution based on the unjustified initiation of

criminal proceedings, a plaintiff must plead “(1) the institution of criminal process against the

plaintiff with malice; and (2) without probable cause; and (3) the termination of the criminal

proceeding in favor of the plaintiff.” Gutierrez v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 437 Mass. 396,

405 (2002) (quotation marks omitted). In this context, “malice” means that “‘the proceedings must

have been initiated or continued primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper

adjudication of the claim on which they are based.’” Chervin, 448 Mass. at 107 (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 676 (1979)).

ADA Middleton first contends that, under Massachusetts law, he has absolute immunity

from Caldwell’s malicious prosecution claim. In support of this contention, he cites Chicopee

Lions Club v. District Attorney for the Hampden District, which explained that under the absolute

immunity doctrine applicable to Section 1983 claims, “a prosecutor is absolutely immune from a

damage suit under § 1983 for actions taken in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.” 396

Mass. 244, 247 (1985) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. 409). As previously explained, Middleton does not

have absolute immunity on his Section 1983 claims—including the Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution claim—insofar as he acted in an investigative capacity to allegedly induce a false

accusation from S.J. through suggestive interview techniques. Middleton does not contend that

absolute immunity under state law is any broader than absolute immunity under Section 1983, so

his argument for absolute immunity from the common law malicious prosecution likewise fails.

Further, the first element of a common law malicious prosecution claim—the institution of

criminal process—can occur before the filing of the criminal complaint. See Correllas v. Viveiros,

410 Mass. 314, 318 (1991) (“It is well established that a person need not swear out a criminal

complaint in order to be held answerable for malicious prosecution.”). “In broad brush,” the First

Circuit has explained, “an individual may be said to have instituted criminal proceedings against

another if he caused those proceedings to be initiated.” Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 89

(1st Cir. 2009); see also Yacubian v. United States, 750 F.3d 100, 109-10 (1st Cir. 2014) (allegations

in the complaint “must permit the ‘reasonable inference’” that the defendant “in some sense caused

the bringing of the” criminal charges (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). The complaint plausibly

alleges that, while acting in an investigative capacity, Middleton caused the aggravated rape charge

against Caldwell to be instituted by inducing S.J. to fabricate allegations that Caldwell assisted his

brother in raping her. See ECF 1, ¶ 33; Limone, 579 F.3d at 89 (“If an individual induces another

person (say, a police officer or prosecutor) to lodge formal criminal charges, he may be held to

have instituted the criminal proceedings.”). Thus, the allegation that Middleton instituted criminal

proceedings is not enough, at this stage, to entitle him to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Anapol and Buckley next assert that Caldwell has not plausibly alleged that they, as a DCF

employee and a victim advocate, respectively, were involved in instituting criminal proceedings

against Caldwell. Again, a person has instituted criminal proceedings, for purposes of a malicious

prosecution claim, if they “caused those proceedings to be initiated” by, for example, “induc[ing]

another person . . . to lodge formal criminal charges,” “exercis[ing] a peculiar degree of control

over the charging official[,] or adamantly press[ing] that official to bring a criminal complaint.”

Limone, 579 F.3d at 89. A plaintiff may also treat all defendants who allegedly acted together to

cause an injury as jointly liable. See Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 387 (1st Cir. 1989). On the

other hand, “[t]he mere transmission of information to a police officer, who using his or her

independent judgment, then pursues the matter and institutes criminal proceedings, has never been

held sufficient to support an action for malicious prosecution.” Correllas, 410 Mass. at 318; see

Ziemba v. Fo’cs’le, Inc., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 484, 488 (1985). At bottom, “[t]he question of whether

such an individual has instituted a criminal proceeding depends on the circumstances.” Limone,

579 F.3d at 90. Here, the complaint asserts that Anapol and Buckley, together with Middleton and

Hayes, fabricated S.J.’s testimony. ECF 1, ¶ 33. Though Caldwell does not suggest that Anapol

and Buckley hid that fact from prosecutors or adamantly pressed them to bring charges against

him, he does contend that they fabricated the testimony jointly with a prosecutor and police officer.

See id. This allegation—that they acted together—is therefore enough to open the door to

discovery regarding Anapol’s and Buckley’s conduct on this charge.

For similar reasons, the Court rejects Hayes’ and Gomes’ contention that Caldwell failed

to plausibly allege the first and second elements of his claim as against them. Caldwell alleges that

Hayes, together with Middleton, Buckley, Anapol, and other unknown actors, fabricated S.J.’s

allegation against him to create probable cause for his arrest. ECF 1, ¶ 33. Malice “may be inferred

from a lack of probable cause.” Miller v. Pugliese, 693 F. Supp. 3d 163, 182 (D. Mass. 2023). He

also alleges that Hayes and Gomes were involved in securing and suppressing a confession, with

Thompson’s assistance, that they knew to be false. ECF 1, ¶¶ 37-39. Taken together, and viewing

the complaint as a whole, these allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege the first and second

elements of a malicious prosecution claim.

Finally, Middleton, Anapol, and Buckley argue that Caldwell cannot meet the third element

because a nolle prosequi is considered a termination in favor of the plaintiff only when “the reasons

stated for the nolle prosequi or dismissal [are] consistent with the innocence of the accused.”

Wynne v. Rosen, 391 Mass. 797, 800-01 (1984). “The circumstances of the abandonment must

compel an inference that there existed a lack of reasonable grounds to pursue the prosecution.” Id.

at 801. Here, the nolle prosequi was entered “in the interest of justice.” ECF 49-3. Accompanying

the nolle prosequi was an affidavit that indicated two things: (1) S.J. did not wish to testify at a

retrial, and (2) had S.J. been willing to testify, the prosecutor would have been willing to go ahead

with the retrial, but acknowledged that retrial would be “very challenging.” ECF 49-4, ¶¶ 5-6. It is

plausible that these justifications for the nolle prosequi are consistent with Caldwell’s innocence.

See Finamore v. Miglionico, 15 F.4th 52, 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2021) (plaintiff asserting malicious

prosecution claim “plainly” established that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor after

the prosecutor dismissed one charge against him and nolle prossed the second charge, even though

the “state district court made a finding of probable cause”); cf. Thompson, 596 U.S. at 45-46

(explaining that, under Massachusetts common law as of 1871, “a plaintiff could maintain a

malicious prosecution claim when, for example, the prosecutor abandoned the criminal case or the

court dismissed the case without providing a reason (citing Bacon v. Waters, 84 Mass. 400, 401-

02 (1861), and Sayles v. Briggs, 45 Mass. 421, 425-26 (1842))). And accepting the allegations in

the complaint as true, the broader circumstances of the nolle prosequi establish a plausible

inference that no reasonable grounds existed for the prosecution and that the defendants acted with

malice to manufacture probable cause. Caldwell alleges that the defendants instituted the

prosecution against him for the improper purpose of framing him for a crime he did not commit,

fabricated the evidence that formed the basis of the probable cause to arrest him, and solicited a

false confession to secure his conviction. These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss. See Williams v. City of Boston, 771 F. Supp. 2d 190, 206 (D. Mass. 2011) (denying motion

to dismiss malicious prosecution claim where plaintiff alleged that “his conviction was obtained

by the defendants’ false testimony and as a result of a conspiracy between the defendants to deprive

him of his constitutional rights”).

C. Negligence Claim.

Count VII alleges negligence, premised on the contention that the defendants violated two

duties of care: “to refrain from framing [Caldwell] for a crime he had not committed and to conduct

a legal and thorough investigation of the claimed assault.” ECF 1, ¶ 139. At the hearing, Caldwell

clarified that he is not pursuing negligence claims against Buckley, Anapol, or Middleton, but he

did not similarly abandon his negligence claims against Hayes, Gomes, Tripp, and Cambra. Those

individual defendants argue, however, that his negligence claims are barred by the Massachusetts

Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), which provides that the exclusive remedy for injuries “caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee while acting within the scope of his

office or employment” shall be an action against the public employer. M.G.L. c. 258, § 2. Under

the statute, public employers include “the commonwealth and any county, city, town, educational

collaborative, or district,” as well as “any department, office, commission, committee, council,

board, division, bureau, institution, agency or authority thereof.” Id. § 1.

Cambra and Tripp were employees of the Massachusetts State Police, and Hayes and

Gomes were employees of the Brockton Police Department, both of which are public employers

under M.G.L. c. 258, § 1. Because Hayes, Gomes, Tripp, and Cambra’s investigation of Caldwell

was undertaken within the scope of their responsibilities as police officers, Caldwell’s claim

against them for negligence in conducting their investigation is barred by the MTCA and may only

be asserted against their employers.

Caldwell protests that the MTCA’s immunization of public employees is contingent on the

employees’ “reasonable cooperation [with] the public employer in the defense of any action

brought under [the] chapter.” Id. § 2. He argues that, at this stage, the extent of the officers’

cooperation is not yet clear, so dismissal would be premature because “[f]ailure to provide such

reasonable cooperation on the part of a public employee shall cause the public employee to be

jointly liable with the public employer, to the extent that the failure to provide reasonable

cooperation prejudiced the defense of the action.” Id. This language, however, is “concerned with

the relationship of the employer and the employee” and does not act “as a bar to dismissal of an

action against an employee, subject, however, to the employer’s rights against any employee who

does not reasonably cooperate.” Taplin v. Town of Chatham, 390 Mass. 1, 2 n.2 (1983). Caldwell’s

negligence claim against the individual defendants is accordingly dismissed.

D. MCRA Claim.

Count VIII alleges that the defendants violated the MCRA by fabricating evidence of

Caldwell’s confession to Thompson. ECF 1, ¶ 144.10 Under the MCRA, an injured person has a

cause of action when another person, “whether or not acting under color of law,” interferes or

attempts to interfere “by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment . . . of

[their] rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the

constitution or laws of the commonwealth.” M.G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I. While “[a] direct violation

of a person’s rights does not by itself involve threats, intimidation, or coercion and thus does not

implicate the [MCRA],” Longval v. Comm’r of Corr., 404 Mass. 325, 333 (1989), if that action

“also includes threats against, or intimidation or coercion of, a particular individual or individuals,

liability under the MCRA can be established, and will be established if such threats, intimidation,

or coercion interfered with that individual’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by law,”

Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 473 (1994).

To plead an MCRA violation, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the exercise or enjoyment of

some constitutional or statutory right; (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered

with; and (3) such interference was by threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Barron v. Kolenda, 491

10 In his oppositions to the motions to dismiss, Caldwell appears to assert for the first time that

the defendants’ fabrication of S.J.’s allegation also violated the MCRA. Compare ECF 38, at 34;

ECF 52, at 18, with ECF 1, ¶ 144 (arguing that the defendants interfered with Caldwell’s exercise

of his rights “by fabricating false ‘confession’ evidence against him”). But a plaintiff cannot amend

his complaint by adding new allegations or theories in an opposition to a motion to dismiss.

Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 421 F.3d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005). The Court

accordingly considers only whether the defendants’ fabrication of Caldwell’s confession to

Thompson amounted to a violation of the MCRA.

Mass. 408, 423 (2023) (quotation marks omitted); Planned Parenthood, 417 Mass. at 474 (whether

conduct constituted threats, intimidation, or coercion is measured by an objective standard). A

“threat” means “the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of

injury or harm.” Id. at 474. “‘Intimidation’ involves putting [another] in fear for the purpose of

compelling or deterring conduct.” Id. “Coercion” means “the application to another of such force,

either physical or moral, as to constrain him to do against his will something he would not

otherwise have done.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). While “threats” and “intimidation” often

involve “actual or threatened physical force,” “coercion is a broader category that may rely on

physical, moral, or economic coercion.” Kennie v. Nat. Res. Dep’t of Dennis, 451 Mass. 754, 763

(2008). “Threatening, intimidating, or coercive actions directed at third parties should be included

in considering any conduct that forms the basis of a claim.” Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 503-

04 (2006).

Hayes, Gomes, Middleton, Anapol, and Buckley contend that Caldwell does not plausibly

allege that they violated his constitutional rights or engaged in conduct amounting to “threats,

intimidation or coercion.” The Court agrees that the complaint does not plausibly state an MCRA

claim against Middleton and Anapol because all the allegations in the complaint pertaining to the

false confession solicited through Thompson are limited to actions by Buckley and police officers

in the Brockton Police Department and Massachusetts State Police. As to Hayes and Gomes, the

complaint alleges that “police, including but not limited to Defendants Cambra, Tripp, and Hayes,”

were involved in “convinc[ing] Thompson to fabricate the ‘confession’” and also “manipulat[ed]

[Caldwell] into providing statements that Thompson could falsely claim to be a confession because

[Caldwell] had difficulties in communicating clearly.” ECF 1, ¶¶ 37-38. And as to Buckley, the

complaint alleges that she connected Thompson with S.J.’s mother, who offered Thompson money.

Id. ¶ 44. These allegations plausibly allege that the police officer defendants and Buckley coerced

Thompson and Caldwell to do something they “would not otherwise have done.” Planned

Parenthood, 417 Mass. at 474.

Furthermore, as discussed, Caldwell has plausibly alleged that this coercion led to the

violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. “[P]urposefully suborn[ing]

false testimony from a key witness” violates due process because “those charged with upholding

the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes

they did not commit.” Limone, 372 F.3d at 44-45. Caldwell asserts that the police officer

defendants “convinced Thompson to fabricate” a false confession and “fabricated evidence

through [him] by manipulating [Caldwell] into providing statements that could form the basis of

the confession because [Caldwell] had difficulties in communicating clearly.” ECF 1, ¶¶ 37-38.

He further contends that Buckley put Thompson in contact with S.J.’s mother, who offered

Thompson money. Id. ¶ 44. Viewed in the light most favorable to Caldwell, these allegations

plausibly establish a violation of Caldwell’s right to due process. Caldwell’s MCRA claim

accordingly survives the defendants’ motions to dismiss, though only as to Hayes, Gomes,

Buckley, Cambra, and Tripp.

E. Civil Conspiracy Claim.

Count IX asserts a civil conspiracy claim against the defendants. “Massachusetts law

recognizes two distinct theories of liability under the umbrella term of civil conspiracy: concerted

action conspiracy, and true conspiracy based on coconspirators exerting some peculiar power of

coercion.” Greene v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 491 Mass. 866, 871 (2023) (citations and quotation

marks omitted). To plead a true conspiracy, “a plaintiff must prove that alleged conspirators agreed

to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means, and then caused harm

to the plaintiff via some peculiar power of coercion that they would not have had, had they been

acting independently.” Id. at 875 n.10 (citations and quotation marks omitted). A concerted action

conspiracy is “akin to a theory of common law joint liability in tort” and “applies to a common

plan to commit a tortious act where the participants know of the plan and its purpose and take

affirmative steps to encourage the achievement of the result.” Id. at 871-72 (quotations marks

omitted).

Count IX, which incorporates all paragraphs of the complaint, hews to the concerted action

theory of civil conspiracy. ECF 1, ¶¶ 146-149. Caldwell asserts that the defendants, “acting in

concert with other co-conspirators, known and unknown, reached an agreement among themselves

to frame [Caldwell] for a crime he did not commit and conspired by concerted action to accomplish

an unlawful purpose by an unlawful means,” agreeing to “protect one another from liability for

depriving [him] of these rights.” Id. ¶ 147. He also claims that the defendants intentionally

“committed overt acts and were otherwise willful participants in joint activity” to further the

conspiracy. Id. ¶¶ 148-49. For the same reasons that Caldwell’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim in

Count III survives the individual defendants’ motions to dismiss, his common law conspiracy claim

likewise may proceed to discovery.

V. Claims Against the City of Brockton.

The Court next addresses Caldwell’s claims against the City of Brockton.

A. Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 (Counts I through IV).

Counts I through IV assert Section 1983 claims against the City. Under Section 1983, a

municipality’s liability cannot be premised on the unconstitutional actions of the municipality’s

non-policymaking employees but instead must be based on the municipality’s own illegal actions.

Cosenza v. City of Worcester, 120 F.4th 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2024). A plaintiff must allege that the

municipality, “through its deliberate conduct, . . . was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury

alleged,” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997),

and that the illegal action was taken “pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature,” Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). “[O]fficial municipal policy

includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and

practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). It may also encompass a municipality’s failure to train its

employees, though only under limited circumstances. Id.

To establish a Monell claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was “a direct causal

link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights,” and “that the municipal

action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404; see Haley, 657

F.3d at 51 (liability arises “if the governmental body itself subjects a person to a deprivation of

rights or causes a person to be subjected to such deprivation” (quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs

alleging that “a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do

so,” need show only that the “municipality’s legislative body or authorized decisionmaker . . .

intentionally deprived [them] of a federally protected right” to establish the requisite level of

culpability. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404-05. Plaintiffs asserting a claim based on a failure to train theory

must demonstrate that “municipal decisionmakers either knew or should have known that training

was inadequate but nonetheless exhibited deliberate indifference to the unconstitutional effect of

those inadequacies.” Wadsworth v. Nguyen, 129 F.4th 38, 68 (1st Cir. 2025) (quotation marks

omitted). “Deliberate indifference requires a showing that [the City] disregarded a known or

obvious risk of serious harm following from its failure to develop an adequate training program.”

Id. Such knowledge may be imputed “through a pattern of prior constitutional violations” or, rarely,

without such a pattern when the violation is a “highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip

[government actors] with specific tools to handle recurring situations.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted).

Caldwell’s allegations invoke several theories of Section 1983 liability against the City. He

alleges (1) that the Brockton Police Department maintained an unwritten policy of not

investigating or disclosing exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants, fabricating false evidence

and witness testimony, and pursuing wrongful prosecutions and convictions, ECF 1, ¶¶ 91, 96,

109, 116, 122; (2) that final decisionmakers for the City were deliberately indifferent to these

policies, and either knew and approved of or directly committed the constitutional violations that

he suffered, id. ¶¶ 97-98, 109, 116, 122; (3) that the City failed to supervise and train its police

officers regarding the proper use of witness interviews, the proper handling of exculpatory

evidence, the government’s disclosure obligations to criminal defendants, and the use of

informants, even though violations of these responsibilities were “widespread” and “so well-

settled as to constitute the de facto policy of the City,” id. ¶¶ 95-96, 109, 116, 122; and (4) that the

City failed to institute policies to prevent the false introduction of evidence into investigations, and

instead promulgated “deficient rules, regulations, policies, and/or procedures governing witness

interviews, the use of incentives to fabricate witness testimony, the preservation and disclosure of

investigative materials and evidence, in-court testimony, preparation and presentation of witness

testimony, and training, supervision, and discipline of” City employees, id. ¶¶ 91-92. All of these

practices and policies, he contends, were the “moving force” behind the constitutional violations

he plausibly alleged against the individual defendants. Id. ¶¶ 91, 96; see Wadsworth, 129 F.4th at

66 (underlying constitutional violation necessary to establish municipal liability claim).

These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The First Circuit’s decision

in Haley v. City of Boston is instructive. There, the complaint alleged that the Boston Police

Department had a standing policy, “under which Boston police officers regularly kept helpful

evidence from criminal defendants,” and that the policy “was designed to encourage successful

prosecutorial outcomes despite the existence of evidence pointing to innocence.” 657 F.3d at 52.

It also asserted, in the alternative, a failure to train theory, arguing that the Boston Police

Department unconstitutionally suppressed exculpatory evidence as a result of insufficient training,

“despite notice of persistent and ongoing violations.” Id. at 51. Explaining that “this is neither the

time nor the place to resolve the factual disputes between the parties,” the First Circuit concluded

that these allegations, though “couched in general terms,” contained sufficient factual detail to

proceed to discovery. Id. at 52-53; see also Echavarria, 2017 WL 3928270, at *5; Cosenza, 355 F.

Supp. 3d at 92.11 “Disclosure abuses are a recurring problem in criminal cases,” the Court

observed, and the violation alleged was “wholly unexplained” and pertained to evidence that

“clearly would have undermined the prosecution’s theory of the case.” Haley, 657 F.3d at 53.

The City of Brockton protests that the complaint does not identify specific faults with its

programs and training or plausibly plead deliberate indifference. The Court disagrees. The level of

11 In Wadsworth, the First Circuit “assume[d] without deciding that [the insufficient policy

theory was] a viable theory of liability.” 129 F.4th at 66. Caldwell points out, however, that the

Supreme Court has noted that a municipality’s “policy of inaction in light of notice that its program

will cause constitutional violations is the functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to

violate the Constitution.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61-62 (quotation marks omitted); see Glisson v.

Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 381 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The key is whether there is a conscious

decision not to take action. . . . A single memo or decision showing that the choice not to act is

deliberate could . . . be enough.”). Caldwell adequately pleads that the City’s failure to institute

policies represented a “deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . from among various

alternatives” by alleging that there was “an obvious need for these policies” and the illegal

activities were “widespread.” Connick, 563 U.S at 62 (quotation marks omitted); see ECF 1, ¶¶ 91,

96.

detail in Caldwell’s allegations mirrors that found adequate in Haley. Moreover, as this opinion

has detailed, there is ample caselaw regarding fabrication of evidence and deliberate suppression

of evidence. “Given th[is] volume of cases,” as well as the violations Caldwell alleges, which were

“wholly unexplained” and central to the “prosecution’s theory of the case,” Caldwell has laid a

sufficient factual foundation to support his municipal liability claims. Id. If the City’s police

officers intentionally committed the alleged violations “even when such activity was condemned

by the courts . . . , it seems entirely plausible that their conduct was encouraged, or at least

tolerated,” by the City. Id.

The City also argues that Caldwell has not identified facts to suggest that its alleged policies

proximately caused the constitutional violations he suffered. For claims that a municipality itself

violated federal law or directed such a violation, “causation is straightforward”: “the conclusion

that the action taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates

federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury

of which the plaintiff complains.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. Caldwell claims that the City had a

policy that encouraged its police officers to not properly investigate cases, to hide exculpatory

evidence from criminal defendants, to fabricate false evidence, and to pursue wrongful

prosecutions. ECF 1, ¶¶ 91, 96, 109, 116, 122. He also alleges that the City’s final decisionmakers

were deliberately indifferent to these policies, and either knew and approved of or directly

committed the constitutional violations that he suffered. Id. ¶¶ 97-98, 109, 116, 122. Viewed in the

light most favorable to Caldwell, these allegations plausibly establish that the City’s policies and

decisionmakers directed and therefore caused the constitutional violations that Caldwell has

asserted.

For failure to train claims, the causation element is satisfied if “the injury [would] have

been avoided had the employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the

identified respect.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1989) (explaining that a more

lenient standard “would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities” and

“engage the federal courts in an endless exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training

programs”). “[T]he identified deficiency in [the] city’s training program must be closely related to

the ultimate injury.” Id. at 391. Here, the inadequacies in the City’s training that Caldwell

pinpoints—that is, failure to supervise and train officers in the proper use of witness interviews,

the proper handling of exculpatory evidence, the disclosure obligations to criminal defendants, and

the use of informants—are closely related to the constitutional harms he asserts.

Finally, insufficient policy claims, like failure to train claims, are “predicated upon a failure

to act.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 394-95 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(characterizing failure to train theory). The Court accordingly adopts the same causation standard

applied to failure to train claims. Caldwell argues that the City should have instituted policies to

prevent the false introduction of evidence into investigations, and that its rules regarding witness

interviews, incentives to fabricate testimony, preservation and disclosure of evidence, in-court

testimony, and witness testimony were deficient. These missing policies, like the deficiencies in

training, are directly relevant to the constitutional harms he alleges. Accordingly, the complaint

contains sufficient factual content to allege proximate causation between the City’s official actions

and Caldwell’s injuries.

B. Intentional Tort Claims.

The City next argues—and Caldwell does not contest—that Caldwell’s intentional tort

claims in Counts V, VI, and IX are barred by the MTCA. The MTCA selectively abrogates the

Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity, creating a cause of action against public employers for their

employees’ negligent or wrongful acts and omissions within the scope of their employment. Nelson

v. Salem State College, 446 Mass. 525, 537 (2006). This waiver of immunity does not apply,

however, to “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . intentional mental distress

[and] malicious prosecution.” M.G.L. c. 258 § 10(c). Based on the text of the MTCA and

Massachusetts caselaw categorizing conspiracy as an intentional tort where, as here, the conspiracy

arises out of intentionally tortious behavior, the Court concludes that Caldwell’s claims for

malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy against the

City must be dismissed. See Shaoguang Li v. Off. of Transcription Servs., No. 16-P-152, 2016 WL

6609796, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 8, 2016) (conspiracy is an intentional tort); Cruthird v. Keefe

Commissary Network, No. 13-P-1287, 2014 WL 1325657, at *1 & n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4,

2014) (civil conspiracy claim based on intentionally tortious conduct qualified as an intentional

tort under Section 10(c)).

C. Negligence Claim.

The City contends that Caldwell’s negligence claim in Count VII was not timely presented,

as required by the MTCA, M.G.L. c. 258 § 4, or, in any event, fails to state a plausible claim for

relief. The Court will address the latter contention first, as it is dispositive. Caldwell asserts two

duties underpinning his negligence claim—“to refrain from framing him for a crime he had not

committed and to conduct a legal and thorough investigation of the claimed assault.” ECF 1, ¶ 139.

The City argues, and the Court agrees, that to the extent Caldwell asserts a negligence claim based

on the “duty to refrain from framing him,” that claim is more appropriately characterized as an

intentional tort claim and is thus barred by the MTCA. See M.G.L. c. 258 § 10(c) (sovereign

immunity not waived for intentional torts by employees of public employers); ECF 1, ¶ 139. As

this Court has concluded, such a claim is “essentially a claim that the officers involved in the

investigation intentionally framed [Caldwell], which led to his improper arrest and prosecution.”

Echavarria v. Roach, 565 F. Supp. 3d 51, 98 (D. Mass. 2021).

To the extent Caldwell bases his negligence claim on a theory of negligent investigation,

that claim must fail as well. To establish a claim for negligence in Massachusetts, a plaintiff must

allege that “a defendant owes a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff, the defendant committed a

breach of that duty, the plaintiff suffered damage, and a causal relationship existed between the

breach of duty and the damage.” Hill-Junious v. UTP Realty, LLC, 492 Mass. 667, 672-73 (2023)

(quotation marks omitted). For a negligent investigation claim, “[a]n investigator’s duty runs to

the person or entity on whose behalf the investigation is conducted, not to the person being

investigated.” O’Connell v. Bank of Boston, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 416, 419 (1994) (“A slipshod or

incomplete investigation, without more, is a disservice to the one who commissioned the

investigation, not to its subject.”). Once the investigation leads to “ill-founded allegations or

charges of criminal conduct,” the injured subject may bring claims of defamation, malicious

prosecution, or tortious infliction of emotional distress, “but negligence alone does not make his

or her accuser liable.” Id. at 419-20 (dismissing negligent investigation claim because it “added

nothing to the count for malicious prosecution”). Here, the City did not owe a duty of care to

Caldwell, “the person being investigated,” and he has already asserted a malicious prosecution

claim to redress the injury he suffered as result of the investigation and ensuing criminal charges.

Cf. Echavarria, 565 F. Supp. 3d at 97. His negligence claim must therefore be dismissed.

D. MCRA Claim.

Finally, Caldwell conceded at the hearing that his MCRA claim in Count VIII does not

extend to the City. See Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 591-93 (2001)

(distinguishing definition of “person” in Section 1983 claims from that in MCRA claims and

noting that “there is no indication in the MCRA that the word ‘person’ includes either the

Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions”); M.G.L. c. 4, § 7 (“‘Person’ or ‘whoever’

shall include corporations, societies, associations and partnerships.”). Caldwell’s MCRA claim

against the City is therefore dismissed.

CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERS

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, ECF 23, 28, 44, 48, are

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:

With respect to defendant City of Brockton, Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, IX are DISMISSED,

and Counts I, II, III and IV remain.

With respect to defendant Jennifer Hayes, Counts IV and VII are DISMISSED, and Counts

I, II, III, V, VI, VIII, and IX remain.

With respect to defendant Emanuel Gomes, Counts II, IV, and VII are DISMISSED; Counts

III, V, VI, VIII, and IX remain; and Count I is DISMISSED insofar as it concerns fabrication of

S.J.’s accusation but otherwise remains.

With respect to defendant Frank Middleton, Counts IV, VII, and VIII are DISMISSED;

Counts II, III, V, VI, and IX remain; and Count I is DISMISSED insofar as it concerns fabrication

of false confession evidence through Thompson and withholding of evidence, but otherwise

remains.

With respect to defendant Robin Anapol, Counts IV, VII, and VIII are DISMISSED; Counts

II, III, V, VI, and IX remain; and Count I is DISMISSED insofar as it concerns fabrication of false

confession evidence through Thompson but otherwise remains.

With respect to defendant Nora Buckley, Counts IV and VII are DISMISSED, and Counts

I, II, III, V, VI, VIII, and IX remain.

With respect to defendant Todd Cambra, Count VII is DISMISSED, and Counts I, II, III,

IV, V, VI, VIII, and IX remain.

With respect to defendant Lori Tripp, Count VII is DISMISSED, and Counts I, II, III, IV,

V, VI, VIII, and IX remain.

And with respect to defendant Natale Lapriore, all Counts are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Julia E. Kobick

JULIA E. KOBICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 10, 2025