Todd v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASON TODD, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-1336

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

COMMONWEALTH OF :

PENNSYLVANIA, et al., : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Statement of Facts and Procedural History

This case, which was referred to us on September 4, 2025, comes before us for

a legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 1). The pro

se plaintiff, Jason Todd, has recently filed a spate of lawsuits in this court, including

the instant case.1 Todd’s current complaint is a somewhat cryptic and enigmatic

document drafted in a stream of consciousness style which presumes some vast pre-

existing knowledge on the reader’s behalf of other unrelated events.

In this pleading, Todd sues a disability rights organization, Disability Rights

Pennsylvania, (DRP), Derry Township, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the

1 Todd v. Derry Township, 1:25-cv-435; Todd v. Commonwealth, 1:25-cv-1336;

Todd v. Disability Rights of Pennsylvania, 1:25-cv-1337.

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Relations Commission, (PHRC), agencies of state government. The fairly meager

factual recital which follows in support of the complaint alleges that Todd was

assaulted by a man named Shoemaker in September of 2024. In October of 2024,

Shoemaker pleaded guilty to a harassment charge but according to Todd “no ADA or

victim support followed.” Todd then asserts that he submitted “sealed suicide risk

documentation (Doc. 283) to federal court” in December. What this documentation

may be, what the nature of this altercation was, and how this documentation supports

any federal claim remains a mystery since nothing is included in the instant complaint

which provides further content, context, or coherence to this pleading. Instead, we

are left to try to ferret out the meaning and content of this averment, as well as the

meaning of its reference to a document which is not part of this case. Todd then states

that he also lodged otherwise unidentified formal complaints with the DRP, DHS and

the PHRC between but they closed his complaints. (Id.)

On the basis of this barebones factual recital, Todd then alleges in a cursory

manner that the defendants have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. §12203; the general civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §1983; the Protection and

Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, (PAIMI) 42 U.S.C. §§10801-

10805; as well as the Supremacy Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection

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averments, Todd demands $20,000,000 in damages; sweeping declaratory and

injunctive relief; the removal of officials from their jobs; and the appointment of a

“federal monitor” over PHRC and DRP. (Id.)

Todd was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis subject to a screening

review of this complaint. Todd has also filed a pleading consenting to proceed before

a magistrate judge. (Doc. 8). Therefore, since no other party has been served, for

screening purposes we have sufficient party consent to proceed. See Neals v.

Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995).

Having conducted this legally mandated screening review, for the reasons set

forth below, the complaint will be dismissed.

II. Discussion

A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints–Standard of Review

This court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review

of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the

complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a

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granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a

complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted

the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the

possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

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Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions

will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which

relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss,

a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the

Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a

review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts

that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

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whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the

factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District

Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but

may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,

a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.

A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the Court of Appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

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Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-

step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters

of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court

may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as

an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached]

documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,

1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the

complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically

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Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins,

281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not

consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly

relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to

dismiss into one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other

parts of the record in determining whether to dismiss a complaint or when

determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the

requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what

a complaint should say and provides that:

(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and

plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the

court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional

support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which

may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and

conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that

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speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.

Judged against these legal guideposts, as discussed below, in its current form

this complaint fails as a matter of law for several reasons.

B. This Complaint Will Be Dismissed

1. The Complaint Violates Rule 8.

At the outset, dismissal of this complaint is warranted because this pleading

fails to comply with Rule 8’s basic injunction that, “[a] pleading that states a claim

for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” It is well-settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that each

averment be ‘concise, and direct.’” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 F. App=x 221,

222 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1)). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible

or incomprehensible”, id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length,

but it is also largely unintelligible”, Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F. App=x 785, 787 (3d

Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate. See,

e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F.App=x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State

Superior Court, 260 F.App=x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos, 236 F.App=x at 787;

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450 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2005).

Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when a complaint “left the defendants

having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action],”

Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App=x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the

complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441

F.App=x 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in “those cases in

which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible

that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id. at 110 (quoting Simmons v.

Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1995) (quotations omitted); see also Tillio v.

Northland Grp. Inc., 456 F. App'x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012). Further, a complaint may be

dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is simply illegible and cannot be

understood. See, e.g., Radin v. Jersey City Medical Center, 375 F. App=x 205 (3d Cir.

2010); Moss v. United States, 329 F. App'x 335 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing illegible

complaint); Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. App=x 431 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint

where “complaint fails to clearly identify which parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”);

Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., CIV.A. 05-5509 (MLC), 2006 WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar.

22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of approximately 50 pages of mostly-

illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of Philadelphia Police, CIV.A.06-0130, 2006

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In its current form, this complaint is flawed in several fundamental respects.

At the outset, this complaint is bereft of well-pleaded facts. Instead, the complaint

seems to assume some prescience on the part of the reader, who must try to intuit

facts from matters that are alluded to, but not provided to, the court.

The enigmatic quality of the complaint is best illustrated by Todd’s ADA

failure to accommodate claim which alleges without further supporting facts that the

defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 12132 which provides that: “no qualified individual

with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in

or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or

be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Here Todd has not explained how

all of the defendants either discriminated against him or denied him the benefits of

some public program. The failure to allege facts, but rather assume that we can

surmise some facts, is fatal here. Simply put, this complaint in its current form often

leaves Adefendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a

cause of action].@ Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App=x 158 (3d Cir.

2011). Therefore Rule 8 calls for dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.

2. Todd Cannot Sue a Private Entity for Alleged Civil Rights

Violations.

In addition, Todd attempts to sue a private entity, Disability Rights

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this putative defendant Todd’s complaint fails as a matter of law because the plaintiff

has fundamentally misunderstood the reach of this civil rights statute. Simply put,

Todd may not bring claims against private persons as civil rights violations pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In this regard, it is well established that § 1983 does not by its own force create

new and independent legal rights to damages in civil rights actions. Rather, § 1983

simply serves as a vehicle for private parties to bring civil actions to vindicate

violations of separate, and pre-existing, legal rights otherwise guaranteed under the

Constitution and laws of the United States. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271

(1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). Therefore, any analysis of

the legal sufficiency of a cause of action under § 1983 must begin with an assessment

of the validity of the underlying constitutional and statutory claims advanced by the

plaintiff.

On this score, it is also well settled that:

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federally protected

rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. The two

essential elements of a § 1983 action are: (1) whether the conduct

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state

law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of a federally

protected right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68

L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).

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1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).

Thus, it is essential to any civil rights claim brought under § 1983 that the

plaintiff allege and prove that the defendant was acting under color of law when that

defendant allegedly violated the plaintiff's rights. To the extent that a complaint seeks

to hold private parties liable for alleged civil rights violations, it fails to state a valid

cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since the statute typically requires a showing

that the defendants are state actors. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,

49–50, (1999). In this regard, it has been held that disability rights organizations and

attorneys are not state actors for purposes of §1983. See Johnson v. Comm'n on Hum.

Rts. & Opportunities, No. 3:24-CV-728, 2024 WL 3649743, at *8 (D. Conn. July 8,

2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-2050, 2025 WL 2233884 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2025);

Spellman by Spellman v. Disability Rts. Wisconsin, Inc., No. 18-CV-1856-PP, 2020

WL 1249371, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2020).

This basic principle applies here and compels dismissal of Todd’s § 1983

claims against this private entity since its actions are simply beyond the reach of this

particular federal civil rights statute.

3. Todd May Not Bring a Claim under the Protection and

Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§10801-10805.

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Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§10801-10805, (PAIMI), is unavailing. This claim fails for a single, simple reason:

With the exception of actions brought by protection and advocacy organizations,

“[t]he PAIMI Act does not afford rights that may be enforced through a private cause

of action.” Stoltie v. Cerilli, No. 2:21-CV-267, 2023 WL 9381888, at *7 (W.D. Pa.

Oct. 2, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 21-267, 2024 WL 278284

(W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2024), and report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 21-267,

2024 WL 326791 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2024) (citing Brooks v. Johnson & Johnson,

Inc., 685 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1988)). Therefore, since the statute does not

provide for a private right of action on behalf of individuals like the plaintiff, Todd’s

pro se private PAIMI claim should be dismissed.

4. The Eleventh Amendment Shields the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, the DHS, and the PHRC from Liability under

42 U.S.C. §1983.

Further, to the extent that Todd is trying to lodge a §1983 civil rights claim for

damages against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the DHS or the PHRC,

agencies of state government, this claim fails for at least two reasons. As we have

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First, as a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States

shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced

or prosecuted against one of the ... States....”, U. S. Const. Amend XI.

By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of

federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and

state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in

his or her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and

therefore also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan

Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state

officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune

from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens.

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Under the Eleventh

Amendment, the Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law

unless waived by the state, or expressly and unequivocally abrogated by

Congress. Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional

immunity with respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Commonwealth clearly has

not waived its immunity. Quite the contrary, the Commonwealth has

specifically by statute invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity in 42

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). Thus, while Pennsylvania has, by law, waived

sovereign immunity in limited categories of cases brought against the

Commonwealth in state court, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522, Section

8521(b) flatly states that: “Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be

construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in

federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b).

The constitutional protections afforded to the states under the Eleventh

Amendment also expressly apply to claims involving the PHRC. As the

Third Circuit has observed:

The Eleventh Amendment provides a state with immunity “from

liability for damages in a suit brought in federal court by one of

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S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989). This immunity extends to

state agencies. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271

F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). While states can waive their

Eleventh Amendment immunity, see id., Pennsylvania has not

done so, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 8521(b). The PHRC is an

administrative commission within the executive department of

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, as such, it shares in the

Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 43 Pa.

Stat. Ann. §§ 956–7.

Opoku v. Educ. Comm'n for Foreign Med. Graduates, 574 F. App'x 197,

201 (3d Cir. 2014).

*********************************************************

Moreover, beyond these constitutional considerations, as a matter of

statutory interpretation, the plaintiff cannot bring a damages action

against the PHRC or Shippensburg University, as a state agency or arm

of state government since it is also well-settled that a state, a state

agency, or a state official acting in an official capacity is not a “person”

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principal federal civil rights

statute. Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

In sum, [the plaintiff’s] federal civil rights claims for . . . damages

against the PHRC, . . . [is] barred both by the Eleventh Amendment to

the United States Constitution and by cases construing the federal civil

rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, since the PHRC . . . cannot

be sued in this fashion in federal court, this complaint should be

dismissed.

Ally v. PHRC, No. 1:19-CV-1268, 2019 WL 3933661, at *4–5 (M.D. Pa. July 23,

2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-1268, 2019 WL 3928790

(M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2019). Therefore, both constitutional and statutory considerations

bar §1983 claims against the state and state agencies. Accordingly, these claims must

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Yet while this complaint fails on multiple scores, we recognize that in civil

rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a

complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp.

v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting

further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363

F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Therefore, acting out of a surfeit of caution, this

complaint will be dismissed without prejudice to affording Todd one final

opportunity to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, provided Todd amends

his complaint in a timely fashion.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed

without prejudice.

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S/Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: September 10, 2025

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