Swanson v. Warden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BENJAMIN GODWIN SWANSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-1176

)

WARDEN, FCI Pekin, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is Petitioner Benjamin Godwin Swanson’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1), Motion for Extension of Time to

File Reply (Doc. 26), and Motion for Subpoenaed Documents (Doc. 27).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Swanson is serving a 480-month federal imprisonment sentence imposed by the

District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. At the time he filed this petition,

he was imprisoned at FCI Pekin in Pekin, Illinois.2 His current projected release date is

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from Respondent’s brief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2248

(“The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show

cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent

that the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.”).

2 While Swanson has now been transferred out of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, the

Court maintains jurisdiction over Petitioner’s Petition. See In re Hall, 988 F.3d 376, 378 (7th Cir.

2021).

September 20, 2049. See Find an inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (Reg. No.

34056-058) (last visited Jul. 8, 2025).

In January 2023, Swanson was imprisoned at USP Marion, in Marion, Illinois.

During a search of his cell, prison personnel discovered he had constructed a vest out of

various pieces of inmate clothing. Prison officials determined that the vest was

“fashioned in a manner to closely resemble the stab resistant place carriers worn by staff

members.” (Doc. 18 at 1). Prison staff issued an incident report that charged Swanson

with a violation of Code 299: “Conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or

orderly running of the institution . . . most like another High severity prohibited act.” The

violation was charged as “most like” Code 211: “Possessing any officer’s or staff

clothing.” Id.; BOP Program Statement 5270.09, Inmate Discipline Program (July 8, 2011)

at 47–48, available at https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270_009.pdf (“Inmate

Discipline Program”) (last visited July 24, 2025).

Swanson received a copy of the incident report on January 26, 2023. The Unit

Discipline Committee (UDC) held a hearing on February 1, 2023, and advised Swanson

of his rights. At the hearing, Swanson stated “I plead guilty to having a grey sweatshirt

with intentions to be more productive as an orderly.” Id. at 4–5. The UDC referred the

matter to the Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO). Swanson was informed of his

disciplinary hearing rights prior to appearing before the hearing officer and

acknowledged receipt of the notice in writing. (Doc. 18-1 at 26).

Swanson’s hearing was held on February 10, 2023, before DHO Shannon Wallace.

Swanson requested BOP Recreation Specialist Fields represent him at the hearing and for

BOP Officer Lehmann and inmate Mendoza be presented as witnesses. Recreation

Specialist Fields did appear as Swanson’s staff representative at the hearing. The DHO

report found Swanson guilty of the charge after considering the following evidence:

• Recreation Specialist Fields statement: “[Swanson] asked me if he

could wear this vest for work, I told him he could only on the yard

for work and nowhere else. I am confident he was not trying to make

this look like staff clothing. I told him it was for him to use on the

yard only;”

• The reporting officer’s statement: “On January 26, 2023, at

approximately 12:15 pm, I conducted a search of G02-008, which was

assigned to inmate Swanson, Benjamin, Reg. No. 34-56-058. During

the course of this search, I discovered an inmate made vest. This vest

had been constructed from various pieces of inmate clothing and

was fashioned in a manner to closely resemble the stab resistant plate

carriers worn by staff members. This item was removed from the

cell, and sent to the Lieutenant’s Office;”

• Photographs of the altered clothing, reaffirming the reporting

officer’s statements;

• Swanson’s statements during the UDC hearing: “I plead guilty to

having a grey sweatshirt with intentions to be more productive as an

orderly;”

• Swanson’s statements at the DHO hearing: “The evidence presented

at the [hearing] supports a plea of not guilty. The information

written in section 11 of the incident report does not fit the description

of the prohibited act code. A Grey sweatshirt, no matter how

defaced, is and will always be inmate clothing. The Photo presented

to the DHO blatantly shows a Grey sweatshirt with albeit, handy

pockets labeled inmate clerk for work. The inmate personal property

program statement permits improvisions [sic] with institutional and

or personal materials as long as staff authorize it. The questioned

conduct was permitted and used under direct supervision. [] Officer

Fields is extremely credible and his witness testimony presented as

evidence, outweighs the uninvestigated allegations. [M]y intentions

are to always follow my supervisors orders. I implore the DHO to

shelve this report based on the exculpatory evidence presented;” and

• Statements of Swanson’s witnesses--

o Inmate Mendoza’s written witness statement: “The vest in

question was made with a gray sweater and had no

resemblance to a guard’s stab vest. It was designed to be like

an inmate orange vest. It was not colored but had pockets to

hold utensils and the such. Though it was altered sweater

equipment, I would like to point out it had a clear difference

to a guard’s uniform stab vest, and in no way intended for

nefarious reasons;” and

o Officer Lehmann’s statement that she “wasn’t present for this

incident” and was not able to provide a witness statement.

(Doc. 18-1 at 40–42). In addition to other sanctions, the DHO revoked 27 days of good

conduct time. Swanson received a copy of the DHO’s report and was notified of his

appeal rights on February 23, 2023.

Swanson exhausted his administrative remedies at the BOP, including appealing

to the Regional Director. The Regional Director denied the appeal, agreeing that

Swanson’s vest “closely resembled a staff [member’s] stab resistant vest,” and reiterating

that “inmates have used similar items to attempt to escape from [BOP] institutions by

posing as a staff member.” (Doc. 18 at 9).

Swanson filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

on February 20, 2024. (Doc. 1). He alleges his disciplinary proceedings did not comply

with due process and raises ten grounds that he argues entitle him to relief:

(1) An informal resolution was warranted instead of disciplinary

proceedings;

(2) The DHO was not impartial and was significantly involved in the

situation;

(3) The disciplinary decision was not based on the greater weight of the

evidence;

(4) Swanson’s supporting witness was asked irrelevant questions

regarding the incident,

(5) Swanson is not guilty of violating Program Statement 5580.08 because

his conduct was authorized;

(6) A confiscation form should have been filed so he could have proved

rightful ownership of the vest;

(7) A 305 (or a 399) infraction only occurs if the item was not approved, and

because the vest was approved, he is exempted from culpability;

(8) Swanson’s behavior was not disruptive because he was obeying a verbal

order and “receiving policy-granting permission to help increase

productivity”;

(9) The DHO improperly used invalid, unrelated and redundantly false

information to support a bogus finding in that the DHO used

Petitioner’s rights to “support” my falsely claimed guilt.;

(10) All inmate would attire would be considered contraband in the

possession of unauthorized inmates.

Respondent filed a response in opposition to the Petition. (Doc. 18). Swanson then

filed both a Motion to Subpoena Documents (Doc. 27), as well as a Reply (Doc. 28).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Extension of Time and Motion for Discovery

Swanson’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply (Doc. 26) is granted for good

cause as stated in the motion.

Swanson has also filed a Motion for Subpoenaed Documents (Doc. 27). However,

“[d]iscovery in habeas corpus actions is extremely limited.” See Glascoe v. Bezy, 421 F.3d

543, 549 (7th Cir. 2005). “A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal

court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.” Bracy v. Bramley, 520

U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Rather, Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases allows habeas

corpus petitioners to conduct civil discovery “if, and to the extent that, the judge in the

exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not

otherwise.” Id.; See also Rule 1(b) (allowing a district court to apply the rules to habeas

corpus petitions other than those under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). “Good cause” means that the

petitioner must make specific factual allegations that demonstrate that there is good

reason to believe that the petitioner may, through discovery, be able to garner specific

evidence to entitle him to relief. Id. at 908–09. The factual allegations supporting a habeas

petitioner’s discovery request “must not be speculative or conclusory,” as “discovery is

not intended to be a fishing expedition.” Higgason v. Lemmon, 6 Fed. App’x 433, 436 (7th

Cir. 2001). A habeas petitioner’s speculation that the discovery sought would support his

claims does not constitute “good cause” for the discovery. See Jones v. United States, 231

Fed. App’x 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2007).

In Swanson’s Motion for Subpoenaed Documents, he requests “essentially any

disclosable document containing anything to do with [Swanson].” (Doc. 27 at 1). He

argues that with these documents, he would be able to demonstrate the bias of the DHO

hearing officer. As detailed below, Swanson was entitled to an impartial decisionmaker.

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570–71. However, “the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is

high” because “[a]judicators are entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity.”

Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47

(1975); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986)). “To overcome that

presumption, [a prisoner] need[s] to present clear evidence of bias.” Nelson v. Stevens, 861

F. App'x 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2021). Bias can be shown where the adjudicator was

“substantially involved in the investigation of the charges against an inmate.” Prude v.

Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 534 (7th

Cir. 1995). Moreover, “predetermining the outcome of a disciplinary hearing—no matter

how that is accomplished—is [not] consistent with due process.” Id. at 658.

Swanson has not provided good cause to believe that a search of all documents

related to him would uncover evidence to support his contention that the adjudicator—

DHO Wallace—was biased against him. Swanson states he believes DHO Wallace was

biased because he called Swanson annoying in the past, because of DHO Wallace’s

comments made at the disciplinary hearing that he was “trying to figure out what to get

[Swanson] with,” and because DHO Wallace examined the vest prior to issuing his

decision. However, as further addressed below, none of the alleged comments and

conduct alone or together demonstrate DHO Wallace was involved in the investigation

or otherwise rebut the presumption DHO Wallace was impartial in the result of the

disciplinary hearing. Moreover, the request is not narrowly tailored, but simply seeks all

documents the BOP has related to Swanson related, regardless of DHO Wallace’s

involvement and including those unrelated to the prison disciplinary charges. However,

general evidence Swanson was disliked by DHO Wallace or others, which appears to be

Swanson’s goal in seeking this information, is not sufficient to show unconstitutional

bias.

Accordingly, the Court finds Swanson has not shown good cause for discovery

and his request represents no more than a fishing expedition. Thus, Swanson’s Motion is

denied.

B. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition.

Challenges to the denial of good conduct time, are properly brought in a § 2241

petition. Waletzki v. Keohane, 13 F.3d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir. 1994). Federal prisoners have a

statutory right to good conduct time and the loss of such credits affects a liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 448 (1985); see also Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2011). Due process

requires that prison administrators cannot revoke good time credits without “(1) advance

written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with

institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary

evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied

on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S.

at 563-67). Further, the findings must be made by an impartial decisionmaker, Wolff, 418

U.S. at 570–71, and “supported by some evidence in the record.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454–55.

Here, the record shows, and Swanson does not contend otherwise, that he was

given advance written notice of the disciplinary charges and a written statement by the

factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Instead,

Swanson advances the following arguments: 1) he should not have been charged at all;

2) his adjudicator was not impartial; 3) there was not sufficient evidence to support the

findings, and 4) one of his witnesses was misled. However, as explained below, the Court

finds Swanson’s disciplinary proceedings complied with the minimal due process

standards.

A. Swanson had no due process right to an informal resolution (Ground 1).

Swanson first argues that the conduct only warranted an informal resolution and

should not have been a formal disciplinary charge. However, there is no constitutional

right to informal resolution of prison rule violations or otherwise to the lightest possible

response to a violation of prison rules. While Swanson may be right that the officers could

have resolved the issue informally, whether to do so was entirely within the officer’s

discretion. The prison officer’s decision to bring a formal disciplinary charge does not

violate due process. To show a due process violation, Swanson must show that the

proceeding itself did not comply with due process.

B. Swanson has not shown the decisionmaker was impartial (Ground 2).

Swanson’s second ground does invoke a due process claim: he argues DHO

Wallace was not impartial. While Swanson was entitled to an impartial decisionmaker,

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570–71, “the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is high”

because “[a]judicators are entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” Piggie v.

Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975);

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986)). “To overcome that presumption, [a

prisoner] need[s] to present clear evidence of bias.” Nelson v. Stevens, 861 F. App'x 667,

670 (7th Cir. 2021). Bias can be shown where the adjudicator was “substantially involved

in the investigation of the charges against an inmate.” Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 657–58

(7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995). Moreover,

“predetermining the outcome of a disciplinary hearing—no matter how that is

accomplished—is [not] consistent with due process.” Id. at 658.

Swanson alleges that DHO Wallace was his former supervisor and unit manager

“who always described [Swanson] as annoying.” (Doc. 1 at 9). Swanson also alleges DHO

Wallace stated that he was “trying to figure out what to get [Swanson] with.” Id. A review

of Swanson’s Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal provides some additional

context. In this appeal, he states “[d]uring the hearing, the DHO admitted, that he [and]

the Lieutenants were figuring out what to charge me with, he also stated he physically

examined the authorized vest in person, proving he was significantly involved in some

way.”(Doc. 18-1 at 11). In this case, Swanson’s ownership and possession of the vest was

uncontested. The only question for DHO Wallace was whether this conduct violated

prison rules. Accordingly, even if DHO Wallace physically examined the vest it does not

follow that he participated in the investigation nor would it otherwise be evidence of bias.

Rather, it would be a useful step to consider and determine whether possessing the vest

violated institutional rules. Moreover, deciding on the proper charges is not the same as

investigating the conduct. In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, this

statement would most logically mean DHO Wallace was deciding on the correct charges

based on the evidence before him, not that he was out to “get” Swanson with a fabricated

charge. Accordingly, without more, the Court cannot find that the DHO’s alleged

statement and actions were evidence of impartiality.

In his reply brief, Swanson provided additional details about alleged bullying and

mistreatment by other staff members. He alleges that prior to the search that found the

vest, another inmate heard Officer Lang tell “custody staff to find the approved vest and

make-up a story convincing enough to get [Swanson] in trouble.” (Doc. 28 at 3). He does

not allege DHO Wallace was involved with this action or otherwise was one of the staff

members that “tried to thwart [Swanson’s] institutional adjustment.” Id. at 5. Moreover,

Swanson has not argued that he did not own and possess the vest found in his cell, rather

he disputes that possession of the vest qualified as a disciplinary violation.

Swanson also states in his reply that “the Respondent[] did not and do[es] not

dispute that the DHO was directed to find me guilty, no matter what.” (Doc. 28 at 9).

Swanson’s Petition did not contain this allegation, nor did any of his administrative

appeals. Swanson states this now without any context as to who he believes directed the

DHO or why he believes the DHO was so directed, let alone an explanation as to why he

did not include this allegation in his administrative appeals or original Petition.

Accordingly, the Court does not find the allegation credible. See also Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases, Rule 5(e) (“The petitioner may file a reply to the respondent’s answer

or other pleading.”); see, e.g., Griffin v. Bell, 694 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2012)

(“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are deemed waived.”).

C. The DHO’s decision was based on “some evidence.”

In grounds 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, Swanson argues he should not have been found

guilty of the offense for various reasons. First, in ground 3, Swanson argues that the

DHO’s findings were not supported by the “greater weight of the evidence.” (Doc. 1 at

9). However, review by a federal court is limited to determining whether the DHO’s

finding was “supported by some evidence in the record.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. “This

standard is met if there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the

administrative tribunal could be deduced.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). An

examination of the entire record is not required, nor should the court independently

weight the evidence or attempt to determine the credibility of witnesses. Id. Instead, the

Court needs only to determine if “there is any evidence in the record that could support”

the decision, such that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the

disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Id. Only a modicum of

evidence is needed under this lenient standard. Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th

Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 999 (2000).

The DHO’s report includes the evidence that the DHO considered and relied on

in finding that Swanson violated Code 299: “Conduct which disrupts or interferes with

the security or orderly running of the institution . . . most like another High severity

prohibited act,” with, the “most like” act being Code 211: “Possessing any officer’s or

staff clothing.” (Inmate Discipline Program at 47–48). Notably, Swanson’s defenses at the

hearing primarily focused on his alleged good intentions in making the vest and that a

staff member gave him permission to use the vest. However, the language of the charges

does not indicate that Swanson’s intent was relevant or that staff permission would

excuse the conduct. The evidence relied on by the DHO showed that the vest was found

in Swanson’s cell and that Swanson admitted to possessing the vest. (Doc. 18-1 at 41). The

evidence also included the investigating officer’s statement that the vest was “fashioned

in a manner to closely resemble the stab resistant plate carriers worn by staff members.”

Id. Moreover, the DHO relied on his own examination of the photographic evidence,

which showed Swanson created a vest with shoulder epaulets, Velcro-style name tapes,

tactical strap connectors, and several pockets. Id. The DHO found that "[b]y possessing

any officers or staff clothing or Altered inmate clothing made to look like staff clothing,

[Swanson] not only disrupted the security and orderly operation of the institution, but

created the potential for a larger disturbance to occur as well. In the past, inmates have

in fact attempted to escape from secure confines posing as staff members exiting the

institution.” Id. at 42. According to this record, the Court finds the DHO’s decision was

based on “some evidence.”

Swanson’s arguments to the contrary largely do not address the actual charges he

faced. In grounds 5, 6, and 7, Swanson argues he is not guilty of violating Program

Statement 5580.08 because his conduct was authorized, that a confiscation form should

have been filed so he could have proved rightful ownership of the vest, and that a Code

305 (or a 399) infraction only occurs if the item was not approved, and because the vest

was approved, he is exempted from culpability. (Doc. 1 at 10). However, these arguments

are irrelevant, because Swanson was not charged with violating Program Statement

5580.09 or charged with a violation of Code 305 or 399, and the ownership of the vest was

not disputed.

Swanson also argues, in ground 8, that his behavior was not disruptive because he

was obeying a verbal order and “receiving policy-granting permission to help increase

productivity.” (Doc. 1 at 11). As Respondent notes, Recreation Specialist Fields did not

state, that he “ordered” Swanson to create or use the vest, but that Swanson “asked . . . if

he could wear [the] vest for work.” (Doc. 18-1 at 42). At best, Swanson may be arguing

that a staff member’s consent to him having the vest exculpates him from a finding that

possessing the vest could qualify as “conduct which disrupts or interferes with the

security or orderly running of the institution.” (Inmate Discipline Program at 47–48). The

Court is not unsympathetic to Swanson’s alleged predicament: he claims a staff member

gave him approval to make and possess the vest, but it turned out that making and

possessing the vest violated prison rules. However, informal staff approval is not a logical

defense to “conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of

the institution.” And, as the DHO also noted in his report, Swanson “participate[d] in

Admissions and Orientations (A&O), wherein [he] [was] advised of BOP rules and

regulations and [his] responsibility to abide by these rules” and given a A&O handbook

which detailed the prohibited acts. (Doc. 18-1 at 42). Essentially, Swanson was

responsible for knowing and following the rules.

Next, in ground 9, Swanson states “[t]he DHO was desperately grasping for straws

by improperly using invalid, unrelated, [and] redundantly false information to support

a bogus finding. Specifically, the DHO used my rights I exercised to ‘support’ my falsely

claimed guilt.” (Doc. 1 at 11). While this ground is not entirely clear, to the extent

Swanson is complaining that his own statements were considered by the DHO, this does

not entitle him to relief. The record shows the DHO considered Swanson’s statements

and evidence, but still found him to have violated the prison rules. As noted above,

Swanson’s statements did not exonerate him of the charges, and the DHO’s decision was

otherwise based on some evidence.

In ground 10, Swanson argues that all inmate attire would be considered

contraband in the possession of unauthorized inmates, but should not be considered

contraband. (Doc. 1 at 11). Again, this addresses the wrong charge: Swanson was charged

with “conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the

institution,” not possessing contraband. Swanson ignores that the DHO’s decision relied

on the specific way the vest was altered to resemble the stab resistant place carriers worn

by staff members. And, while Swanson has consistently pointed out the differences—i.e.,

the vest was grey whereas stab resistant place carriers are black—the vest also shares

similarities to the stab resistant place carriers and thus the decision still relies on “some

evidence.”

D. Swanson’s right to call witnesses in his defense was not violated (Ground 4).

Finally, Swanson’s fourth ground for relief is that his supporting witness, Officer

Lehmann, was asked irrelevant questions regarding the incident. (Doc. 1 at 9). Swanson

had a qualified right “when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to

call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454.

“Although prison disciplinary committees may deny witness requests that threaten

institutional goals or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary, they may not exclude

witnesses requested by an offender with no explanation at all.” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d

660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003).

Swanson expected Officer Lehmann to state that she had seen the vest many times

and knew Swanson had used it for work under the supervision of Officer Fields. Id.

However, her witness statement merely said that “she wasn’t present for this incident

and was not able to write a witness statement for this.” (Doc. 18-1 at 40). Swanson argues

that this meant that his witness was asked the wrong question. (Doc. 1 at 9). If a witness

is intentionally misled into believing she had no information regarding an incident, a

prisoner’s right to call a witness could arguably be violated. However, the Court does not

find any basis to conclude that the witness was misled merely because Swanson expected

a certain statement.

Moreover, even if Swanson could show that the witness was misled and that this

would qualify as a denial of his due process rights, he must also show prejudice. Piggie v.

Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 750 (2d

Cir.1991)). Here, even if Officer Lehmann made the statement Swanson believes she

should have made, there is no basis to find prejudice. The fact that another officer had

seen Swanson use the vest for work under the supervision of Officer Fields is not a

defense to the charges and would not have impacted the result. Accordingly, the Court

finds that any error that occurred was harmless.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion for Extension of

Time to File Reply (Doc. 26), and DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Subpoenaed Documents

(Doc. 27) and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). The

Clerk is directed to issue the judgment in favor of Respondent and close the case.

Signed on the 10th of September 2025.

/s/ Colleen R. Lawless

Colleen R. Lawless

United States District Judge