Stovall v. Vilsack

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MICHAEL STOVALL,

Plaintiff,

No. 24-cv-3066 (EGS)

v.

BROOK ROLLINS,

Secretary of Agriculture et

al., 1

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Michael Stovall (“Mr. Stovall”), brings this

action against Brook Rollins in her official capacity as

Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of

Agriculture (collectively the “Department”) alleging claims for:

(1) Count I: Breach of Contract; (2) Count II: Violation of the

Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et

seq.; (3) Count III: Violation of the Administrative Procedure

Act (“APA”) 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; (4) Count IV: Due Process

Under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (5) Count V:

Negligence; and (6) Count VI: Intentional Infliction of

1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

the current Secretary of Agriculture is substituted for the

prior Secretary of Agriculture. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

Emotional Distress. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 16-22. 2 Mr. Stovall

seeks the following relief:

(a) finding and declaring that the

[Department] has unlawfully discriminated

against Mr. Stovall in connection with the

[Department]’s loan program in violation of

ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) and the APA, 5 U.S.C.

§ 551;

(b) finding and declaring that the

[Department]’s treatment of Mr. Stovall in

connection with the [Department]’s loan

program and Settlement Agreement violated Mr.

Stovall’s constitutional right to equal

protection and due process;

(c) finding and declaring that Defendants

breached and continue to breach the 1998

Settlement Agreement it had with Mr. Stovall;

(d) finding and declaring that Defendants are

liable to Mr. Stovall in negligence for

breaching its duty owed in performing agreed

upon tasks outlined in the 1997 Settlement

Agreement; and

(e) finding and declaring that Defendants are

liable to Mr. Stovall in [intentional

infliction of emotional distress] for its

outrageous conduct towards Mr. Stovall over

the past two decades;

(f) awarding monetary relief pursuant to 15

U.S.C. §§ 1691e(a) and (c);

(g) awarding attorney’s fees . . . and

(h) [i]ncluding such other and further

declaratory and monetary relief.”

2

When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the

Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page

number of the filed document.

2

Id. at “Prayer for Relief.”

The Department moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Mot., ECF No. 9. 3 Upon careful consideration of

the motion, the response, the reply thereto, and the applicable

law, the Court GRANTS the Department’s Motion to Dismiss.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts—drawn from the Complaint—are assumed to

be true. See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119,

1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Mr. Stovall is an African-American,

fourth generation farmer who began farming in the 1960s. Compl.,

ECF No. 1 ¶ 34. In 2019, the Department attempted to foreclose

on his property because it accused him of being delinquent in

repaying a 1998 loan. Id. ¶ 52. The foreclosure was vacated when

it was discovered that this was a mistake. Id. ¶ 53. In 2021,

the USDA agreed in writing to deposit $173,000 (apparently in

Mr. Stovall’s account) but failed to fulfill the promise, id. ¶

3 Mr. Stovall brings this action against Brook Rollins, Secretary

of Agriculture in her official capacity, and the United States

Department of Agriculture. See generally docket for Case # 24-

cv-3066. The Court construes the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9,

as brought by all Defendants even though the case caption on the

Motion to Dismiss does not include “et al.” and Defendants are

referred to in the singular in the motion. The docket clearly

indicates government counsel’s intent to represent both named

defendants. See e.g., Notice of Appearance, ECF No. 7;

Defendants’ Consent Motion for Enlargement of Time, ECF No. 8.

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54; and it promised to write off $876,00 but failed to fulfill

this promise also, id. ¶ 55.

B. Procedural History

Mr. Stovall filed this lawsuit on October 30, 2024. See

Compl., ECF No. 1. The Department filed its Motion to Dismiss on

February 18, 2025. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9. Mr.

Stovall filed his five and a half-page opposition brief on March

2, 2025, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 10; and the Department filed

the reply brief on March 10, 2025, see Reply, ECF No. 11. The

briefing is now complete, and the motion is ripe and ready for

the Court’s adjudication.

II. Legal Standards

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing that the court has subject-

matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 561 (1992). “The court must address the issue of

jurisdiction as a threshold matter, because absent jurisdiction

the court lacks the authority to decide the case on any other

grounds.” Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91 (D.D.C.

2000). Moreover, because subject-matter jurisdiction relates to

the Court's power to hear the claim, the Court must give the

plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a

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Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Uberoi v. EEOC, 180 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2001). In

resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction, the Court “may consider the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's

resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion

v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning

v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To survive a

12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (“Iqbal”), 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”),

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not amount to a

“probability requirement,” but it does require more than a

“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

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When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the court “may consider

only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either

attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of

which [courts] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Furthermore, the court “must accept as true all of the factual

allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v. D.C. Off.

of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal

quotations omitted). The court must also give the plaintiff the

“benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts

alleged.” Id. at 677 (internal quotations omitted). However, the

court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986). And “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678.

III. Analysis

A. Jurisdictional Arguments

1. Mr. Stovall Does Not Allege a Declaratory

Judgment Cause of Action

Mr. Stovall asserts in the “Subject Matter Jurisdiction”

section of his Complaint that the Court has jurisdiction over

his Declaratory Judgment Act (“DCA”) “claim” under 28 U.S.C. §§

6

2201, 2202. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 7. The Department argues that

the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Stovall’s DCA “claims”

since the DCA “is not an independent source of federal

jurisdiction.” Mot., ECF No. 9 at 12 (citing Lovitky v. Trump,

918 F.3d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Under the DCA, a court may “declare the rights and other

legal relations of any interested party seeking such

declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be

sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The DCA is not, however, “an

independent source of federal jurisdiction.” Metz v. BAE Sys.,

Tech. Solutions & Servs. Inc., 774 F.3d 18, 25 n.8 (D.C. Cir.

2014) (citation omitted). Despite Mr. Stovall’s assertion in the

Subject Matter Jurisdiction portion of his Complaint, however,

his Complaint does not contain a cause of action under the DCA.

See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 16-22 (listing the six Counts in the

Complaint). Nor could it since the DCA does not “provide a cause

of action.” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

Rather, as listed above, the relief Mr. Stovall seeks includes

that the Court make various declarations, which it could be

empowered to do under the DCA. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips

Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (explaining that the DCA

“enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts

but did not extend their jurisdiction”). Accordingly, there is

no DCA cause of action to dismiss.

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2. The United States Has Not Waived Its

Sovereign Immunity with Respect to the

Constitutional Claim for Money Damages

Mr. Stovall alleges a Due Process claim under the Fifth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution based on racial

discrimination he allegedly suffered as a result of the

Department’s actions over the years. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶

78-82. The Department moves to dismiss this claim on the ground

that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for

constitutional claims for money damages. Mot., ECF No. 9 at 12-

13. Mr. Stovall fails to respond substantively to the

Department’s arguments. See generally Opp’n, ECF No. 10. His

only response is that the Department’s “assertions and argument

for dismissing this claim is displaced and therefore hold no

merit.” Opp’n, ECF No. 10 at 4. Mr. Stovall cites no points or

authorities in support of his claim that the Department’s

argument has no merit. See id.

Constitutional claims for money damages

against federal agencies are claims against

the United States. Clark v. Library of Cong.,

750 F.2d 89, 103–104 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Kline

v. Republic of El Salvador, 603 F. Supp. 1313,

1316 (D.D.C.1985). And, the United States can

be sued only to the extent that it consents to

suit. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.

535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607

(1980) (“It is elementary that the United

States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save

as it consents to be sued ... and the terms of

its consent to be sued in any court define

that court's jurisdiction to entertain the

8

suit.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted).

The D.C. Circuit has “recognized the well-

established rule that sovereign immunity bars

suits for money damages against officials in

their official capacity, absent a specific

waiver by the government.” Ward v. Kennard,

133 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing

Clark, 750 F.2d at 103). The United States has

not waived its sovereign immunity for

constitutional torts. See Kline, 603 F.Supp.

at 1317 (“the Federal Tort Claims Act does not

waive sovereign immunity with respect to

constitutional torts”); Birnbaum v. United

States, 588 F.2d 319, 327–28 (2d Cir. 1978)

(same).

Stovall v. Veneman, 394 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2005).

Since Mr. Stovall seeks monetary relief, see Compl., ECF No. 1

at 23; and since the government has not waived sovereign

immunity for constitutional torts, Mr. Stovall’s constitutional

claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

3. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Mr.

Stovall’s Breach of Contract Claim

Mr. Stovall seeks “actual and consequential” damages in the

amount of 25 million dollars based on the alleged breach of the

settlement agreement between the Department and him in which he

alleges that the Department agreed to deposit $173,000 in his

account and write off $876,000. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶

60-62. The Department argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction

over this claim pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §

1346(a)(2), because since the claim exceeds $10,000, it is

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subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court of

Claims. Mot., ECF No. 9 at 13.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

(“D.C. Circuit”) interprets the Tucker Act

to confer exclusive jurisdiction over breach

of contract claims against the United States

seeking more than $10,000 in damages on the

Court of Federal Claims,” Hammer v. United

States, 989 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491(a); Greenhill v.

Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 573 (D.C. Cir.

2007)), and thus “to ‘impliedly forbid[ ]’

contract claims against the Government from

being brought in district court under the

waiver in the APA,” 5 Perry Cap., 864 F.3d at

618–19 (quoting Albrecht v. Comm. on Emp.

Benefits of Fed. Rsrv. Emp. Benefits Sys., 357

F.3d 62, 67–68 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (alteration in

original)).

Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. General Services

Administration, 38 F.4th 1099, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Whether a

claim against the United States is “‘at its essence’ contractual

for the Tucker Act ‘depends both on the source of the rights

upon which the plaintiff bases its claims, and upon the type of

relief sought (or appropriate).’” Id. (quoting Megapulse, Inc.

v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Citing Crowley

Government Services, Mr. Stovall asserts that the Court has

jurisdiction over his contract claim because it is brought under

the APA. Opp’n, ECF No. 10 at 4-5. For the reasons explained

below, Mr. Stovall’s reliance on Crowley Government Services is

misplaced.

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The “source of the rights upon which [Mr. Stovall] bases

[his] claim[]” are clearly contractual. First, he alleges that

the Department breached a settlement agreement with him. Id. ¶¶

60-61. Second, the relief he seeks are “actual and consequential

damages” resulting from the alleged breach. Id. ¶ 62. D.C.

Circuit precedent identifies “money damages as . . . [the]

type[] of relief that are specific to actions that sound in

contract.” Crowley Government Services, Inc. 38 F.4th at 1107.

Since Mr. Stovall seeks money damages in excess of $10,000 for

the alleged breach of the settlement agreement, the Court of

Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim.

It is Mr. Stovall’s initial burden to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that this Court has subject matter

jurisdiction over his claim. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Citizens for

Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland

Sec., 527 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2007). Since he has not

met this burden, the Court will dismiss his breach of contract

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

See Brown v. Mattis, No. 16-cv-1025, 2018 WL 6433754, at *5

(D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2018).

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4. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Mr.

Stovall’s Tort Claims

Mr. Stovall alleges that the Department was negligent when

it breached the agreement to deposit $173,000 in Mr. Stovall’s

account and write off $876,000. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 85. He

further alleges that the Department is liable to him for

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress because its

discrimination against him in the loan process was reckless and

severe. Id. ¶ 90.

The Department argues that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Mr. Stovall’s claims for negligence and

intentional infliction of emotional distress because he does not

allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Mr.

Stovall fails to respond substantively to these arguments. See

generally Opp’n, ECF No. 10. His only response is that he will

have the opportunity to prove that he exhausted his

administrative remedies during discovery. See id. at 5. He cites

no points or authorities in response to the Department’s

arguments.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) waives sovereign

immunity in limited circumstances, permitting a plaintiff to sue

the United States for torts in situations in which “the United

States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in

accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission

12

occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Sloan v. Dep't of Hous. &

Urban Dev., 236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The FTCA gives

federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims

against the United States for “injury or loss of property, or

personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act

or omission” of a federal employee “acting within the scope of

his office or employment.” Millbrook v. U.S.,133 S. Ct. 1441,

1443, (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(1).

Before filing suit under the FTCA, a plaintiff must first

present his alleged claims “to the appropriate Federal

agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Exhaustion of administrative

remedies is a mandatory, jurisdictional prerequisite to filing

such a lawsuit in federal court. See Jones v. United States, 296

Fed. Appx. 82, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108

F.3d 366, 370–71 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

To exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA, a

plaintiff must have presented the agency with “(1) a written

statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the

agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-certain

damages claim.” GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 905

(D.C. Cir. 1987). Further, the agency must have either denied

the claim in writing or failed to provide a final disposition

within six months of the filing of the claim. Id. Importantly,

an individual submitting an administrative claim to an agency

13

must do so within two years of discovery of “both his injury and

its cause.” Sexton v. United States, 832 F.2d 629, 633 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 119

(1979)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).

In his Complaint, Mr. Stovall fails to allege that he

exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claims

for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

He further fails to respond substantively to the Department’s

argument, asserting that he will prove that he exhausted his

administrative remedies during discovery. Opp’n, ECF No. 10 at

5.

It is Mr. Stovall’s initial burden to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that this Court has subject matter

jurisdiction over his claim. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Citizens for

Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland

Sec., 527 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2007). Since he has not

met this burden, the Court will dismiss his tort claims for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. See Brown v. Mattis, No. 16-cv-

1025, 2018 WL 6433754, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2018).

B. Mr. Stovall’s APA and Equal Credit Opportunity Claims

Must Be Dismissed

Mr. Stovall alleges that the Department violated the APA

when it discriminated against him by: (1) “failing to timely

14

process his loan application”; (2) “failing to conduct due

diligence to confirm his current debt”; (3) “subjecting his loan

to adverse terms and burdensome supervision”; (4) “failing to

properly service his loan”; (5) “failing to investigate his

civil rights complaint”; and (6) “failing to enforce its

conflict-of-interest regulations.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 76. The

Department argues that Mr. Stovall’s APA claims lack merit

because he has failed to cite any statute or regulation that

requires the Department to take the actions he alleges they

failed to take. Mot., ECF No. 9 at 16-17.

Mr. Stovall alleges that the Department violated the ECOA

by discriminating against him on the basis of his race by: (1)

“failing to timely process loan applications”; (2) “denying loan

applications or causing them to be withdrawn”; (3) “failing to

conduct due diligence to confirm Mr. Stovall’s current debt”;

(4) “subjecting loans to adverse terms and burdensome

supervision”; and (5) “failing to property service loans.”

Comp., ECF No. 1 ¶ 70. The Department argues that Mr. Stovall

has not plausibly alleged an Equal Credit Opportunity (“ECO”)

Claim and that any such claim is time-barred. Id. at 17-19.

In response to both of the Department’s arguments, Mr.

Stovall states that the Department’s assertions “are just not

true and fail [sic] the plausibility test set forth in Ashcroft

v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.” Opp’n, ECF No.10

15

at 5. Mr. Stovall has failed to respond substantively to the

Department’s arguments regarding his APA and ECOA claims. See

generally Opp’n, ECF No. 10. He has not pointed to any statute

or regulation that requires the Department to take the actions

that he alleges it failed to do in violation of the APA. Nor has

he responded substantively to the Department’s arguments

regarding the plausibility of his ECOA claim nor that the claim

is time-barred. Because Mr. Stovall has failed to respond

substantively with points and authorities to the Department’s

arguments, he has failed to address the arguments and so has

conceded them. Cf. Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Glob.

Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2002) (“It is well

understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an

opposition to a motion . . . addressing only certain arguments

raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that

the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”). Therefore, the

Court will dismiss Mr. Stovall’s APA and ECOA claims.

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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9; and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

this action.

A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

September 10, 2025

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