Com. v. Brown-Feliciano, A.

J-A20037-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

AVA BROWN-FELICIANO :

:

Appellant : No. 2193 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 17, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0002947-2021

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2025

Appellant, Ava Brown-Feliciano, appeals the judgment of sentence

imposed after she pleaded guilty to recklessly endangering another person

(“REAP”).1 She challenges the voluntariness of her guilty plea, alleging that

the trial court coerced her to enter into it. We affirm.

During Appellant’s oral guilty plea colloquy, the Commonwealth asserted

that it would have presented evidence that, on October 18, 2020, Appellant

engaged in conduct in the 500 block of North 19 th Street in Philadelphia that

placed Elijah Adams, the father of her child, at risk of serious bodily injury.

See N.T. Plea Hearing, 7/17/24, 23. On July 17, 2024, Appellant entered into

her guilty plea to REAP. Id. In exchange for the plea, the Commonwealth

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.

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agreed to drop Appellant’s remaining charges and recommend a sentence of

one year of reporting probation.2 See Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/17/24, ¶ 13.

On the same date, the plea court imposed the recommended one-year

probation term. See N.T. Plea Hearing, 7/17/24, 25, 29; Order (sentencing),

7/17/24, 1.

On the day of the plea hearing, Appellant arrived late for the court

proceeding, which the plea court noted was a repeated occurrence on

Appellant’s part throughout this criminal matter. See N.T. Plea Hearing,

7/17/24, 5 (the plea court: “We start court at nine, and every time you come

late. Not sometimes, but every time. We start at nine. You come in at 11:11,

and I don’t understand what is unclear about that.”). Appellant attributed her

lateness to her status as an unhoused person. Id. (Appellant: “It is because

I’m homeless. I have to find a shower and get dressed and get clothes and

stuff.”).

Prior to Appellant’s late arrival to court, the prosecutor remarked that,

“given the history of this case,” the complaining witness and testifying police

officer were “both on call.” Id. at 3. Assuming that Appellant arrived late (as

she eventually did), the Commonwealth asked the court for time to bring in

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2 The nolle prossed charges included: burglary of a place adapted for overnight

accommodations with a person present and a bodily injury crime was

committed, attempted, or threatened; possessing an instrument of crime;

simple assault; and criminal mischief involving damaged property. 18 Pa.C.S.

§§ 3502(a)(1)(i), 907(a), 2701(a), and 3304(a)(5), respectively. See Bills of

Information, 4/23/21, 1-2.

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its witnesses for trial. Id. By the time of Appellant’s late arrival, the

Commonwealth admitted that it was unable to then proceed with the

scheduled trial, but it could have done so if Appellant had timely arrived to

court. The Commonwealth accordingly requested that Appellant be taken into

custody pursuant to a bench warrant to ensure her presence at a rescheduled

listing:

[THE PROSECUTOR:] I had my complainant on call for obvious

reasons. I had an officer here at nine. He had to go to take his

son to an appointment. I tried to see if I could get him back. I

don’t have contact with him now, so I would not be able to proceed

today, and I would ask for a continuance, but I would ask the

defendant be taken into custody. This has been going on for years

now. This is a 2020 incident, and every time she comes in --

according to the docket -- with a similar explanation for why she

couldn’t be here on time, and she’s trying to beat these charges

by exhausting the complainant and the system and hoping we’ll

just withdraw this. That is unacceptable.

There is an F-1 burglary here. This is a crime of violence. The

complainant was injured in this case, the allegations are. We need

to prosecute this case or resolve this in a way that ensures

accountability, and she is unaccountable to show up for these

charges. So[,] we ask you to take her into custody, so we can get

that continuance and end this at the next listing.

N.T. Plea Hearing, 7/17/24, 8.

Appellant’s counsel disagreed with the notion that Appellant was

engaging in gamesmanship with the court, but agreed that another court

listing would be needed given the circumstances:

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL:] Your Honor, I understand what [the

prosecutor’s] point of view is. I completely disagree. I do not see

this as a situation where [Appellant] is trying to game the system.

I see this as a situation where [Appellant] has a lot of needs and

those needs are as of yet not met, and she is unable to be in the

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position she needs to be and wants to be in order to be where she

needs to be.

So, your Honor, because of all of those reasons and also the fact

that I have not had enough time to fully convey this [plea

agreement] offer to [Appellant], I would ask for [y]our Honor’s

indulgence and one more chance.

I understand the Commonwealth isn’t ready today. It is obviously

our date for us to have a long conversation and for us to try to

figure this out. I fully believe this is a case that should be figured

out outside of trial, [y]our Honor, and there are no ongoing

problems. There [are] just difficult lingering charges that have

held up this [c]ourt. And I understand there’s an issue with

judicial economy and how [Appellant’s] continued tardiness is not

good for [t]his court and it is unacceptable, and I acknowledge

that, and so does [Appellant], but I truly think we are very close

to being able to figure out what is going on with this case, and I

am asking for one more date.

N.T. Plea Hearing, 7/17/24, 10-11.

The court stated its intention to keep Appellant in custody until the next

listing for trial and asked the Commonwealth if its police witnesses would be

available two days later. See N.T. Plea Hearing, 7/17/24, 12. In between

those remarks by the court, Appellant told the court, “No, please. I just

started working … Please[,] I just got a job.” Id. The court summed up

Appellant’s options at that juncture: “You’re going to take the [plea] offer or

we’re going to trial.” Id.

After a break in the proceedings, the court explained to Appellant its

reason for issuing the bench warrant, and Appellant decided to enter a guilty

plea instead of waiting for trial in custody. The court questioned her desire to

proceed with a plea, as follows:

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THE COURT: The first thing I want to say, [Appellant], obviously,

I issued a bench warrant because you weren’t here on time, and

I have issued them before, and we have lifted them. I made the

decision to take you into custody, and we were going to do the

trial on Friday, because the officer who was here left already, so

we can’t do the trial today.

Now you decided you want to take the offer. You have every right

to take the offer. I just don’t want you to feel like you’re [taking]

the offer because we are putting pressure on you.

If you want a trial, the officer is available on Friday, and we will

have the trial on Friday. You have every right to a trial.

[APPELLANT:] I just don’t want to be discriminated against

because I’m homeless. A couple of times, I probably slept outside,

but not that much. I know you probably are trying to help me. I

didn’t do well in jail, and I was sexually assaulted. I don’t want

to be around molesters or rapists or people who actually do wrong

things when I [do not] feel I’ve done anything wrong.

This is my long-time boyfriend of ten years. We have a child

together. We lived together, and to be honest, we got into an

argument because he stayed out late and he wanted me out of

the apartment and filed a restraining order against me because

we had a lease together, and this was a few years ago. We have

dealt with it.

You know what I mean?

THE COURT: What I am saying to you is that if you are pleading

guilty, you need to be comfortable pleading guilty. I don’t want

you to feel like you have to plead guilty to help me, because it is

not my life. It is your life.

So[,] I need to know this is what you want to do, because if you

don’t want to plead guilty, the police officer is available on Friday,

[and] we’ll have a trial on Friday, if that is what you want. You

just have to be comfortable with your decision.

[APPELLANT:] I can make it on Friday without being arrested.

I’m going through situations.

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THE COURT: If you want to have it on Friday, you’re going to

stay in custody until Friday, because I want to make sure we go

forward on Friday.

Your option[s] are either –

[APPELLANT:] I’ll plead guilty then.

THE COURT: Is that something you want to do?

[APPELLANT:] Yes.

THE COURT: Because, like I said, I don’t want to force anybody

--

[APPELLANT:] I need an income. It is really important, and

she’s telling me I can work on probation, and I have to go --

THE COURT: You will be able to work on probation.

[APPELLANT:] I had something today at twelve. I thought I

could go to both today. I have one. I have something else at four

to do, and I won’t have an income --

THE COURT: This is what you want to do?

[APPELLANT:] I would rather plead guilty and be on probation.

THE COURT: I just wanted to be clear this is what you want.

So[,] the paperwork is in order. You have the colloquy. You can

start whenever you’re ready.

N.T. Plea Hearing, 7/17/24, 13-16.

The combined plea and sentencing hearing then followed, during which

Appellant twice agreed that no one forced, threatened, or coerced her into

entering her plea. Id. at 20, 23. When Appellant was asked whether she

understood her right to a jury trial, she responded: “Yes, or I’ll be arrested

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today. I’m pleading guilty. I want to go home. I need to continue with my

life.” N.T. Plea Hearing, 7/17/24, 22.

Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions. She subsequently filed

a timely notice of appeal and, after timely filing a request for an extension of

time to file a court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 because

notes of testimony for the plea hearing were unavailable, filed a Rule 1925(b)

statement. See Notice of Appeal, 8/15/24, 1; Order (Rule 1925(b)), 8/27/24,

1; Request for Extension of Time, 9/10/24, 1-2; Rule 1925(b) Statement,

10/25/24, 1. The record certified for this appeal does not contain a response

from the trial court with respect to her request for an extension of time to file

the Rule 1925(b) statement.3

Appellant presents the following question for our review:

Was not [A]ppellant’s guilty plea involuntary and the product of

coercion, in violation of state and federal due process and

[Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 590, where the trial

court issued an ultimatum by telling [A]ppellant that unless she

accepted the Commonwealth’s offer for a probationary sentence

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3 Here, any remand to address the facial untimeliness of Appellant’s Rule

1925(b) statement, in an absence of a ruling on Appellant’s request for an

extension of time to file the statement, is unnecessary because the trial court

addressed the merits of the issue raised in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement

in its opinion for our review. See Plea Court Opinion, 12/16/24, 2-4.

Accordingly, we will address the issue raised forthwith. See Commonwealth

v. Burton, 973 A.3d 428, 433 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (“Remand is not

necessary in this case because appellant’s counsel has filed a Rule 1925

concise statement setting forth the alleged error, and the trial court has filed

an opinion addressing the issue presented in the 1925(b) concise statement”).

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and pled guilty that day she would be taken into custody pending

trial?

Appellant’s Brief, 2.

Appellant argues that this Court should reverse and vacate her guilty

plea “because it was the product of coercion.” Appellant’s Brief, 7-8. She

alleges that the plea court violated her federal and state constitutional rights

to due process and caused her to enter an involuntary guilty plea by giving

her an ultimatum to either enter her guilty plea or await trial in two days’ time

during which she would be held in custody on a bench warrant. See id. at 7-

15. She compares her case to matters in which our appellate courts have

found error when plea courts have participated in plea bargaining conferences

or found plea counsel ineffective for failing to object to a plea court

participating in the plea-bargaining process. See id. at 8-10, citing

Commonwealth v. Evans, 252 A.2d 689, 690-91 (Pa. 1969) (finding error

where a plea court engaged in two side-bar plea bargaining conferences prior

to Commonwealth’s plea offer), and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 875 A.2d

328, 330-31 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to object when plea court “actively encouraged”

defendant to change his mind about rejection of plea offer and called

defendant’s choice to proceed with guilty plea “a wise decision”). Appellant

argues the plea court improperly used the power of the bench warrant, in the

circumstances presented, as a cudgel to improperly influence Appellant to

enter her guilty plea.

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Appellant’s argument fails to address the denial of any claim by the trial

court concerning the voluntariness of her guilty plea. Instead, her brief

implies that there is no issue preservation concern here because, without any

citation to supporting law, she alleges in the standard of review section of her

brief that “[w]hether a defendant’s guilty plea was the product of coercion and

therefore [is] involuntary is a question of law,” and states that our standard

of review for the instant claim is de novo. Appellant’s Brief, 1. Appellant is

incorrect, as discussed below.4

We apply an abuse of discretion standard in review of issues concerning

a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and apply different

legal standards for withdrawal depending on whether the request was made

prior to or after sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Forrester-Westad,

282 A.3d 811, 815-16 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“A trial court’s decision regarding

whether to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn should not be upset absent

an abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Pa. 2015) (addressing pre-sentence

plea withdrawal standard requiring “demonstration by a defendant of a fair-

and-just reason [for withdrawal], unless withdrawal would work substantial

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4 While contract interpretation issues involved in the criminal plea-bargaining

process present questions of law for which a de novo standard of review would

apply, see Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220 A.3d 607, 612 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(noting “contract interpretation” is question of law for which our standard of

review is de novo) (citation omitted), Appellant’s plea coercion claim cannot

be characterized as a contract interpretation issue.

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prejudice to the Commonwealth”); Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794

A.2d 378, 383 (Pa. Super. 2002) (addressing post-sentence plea withdrawal

standard requiring “showing of prejudice on the order of manifest injustice”).

An abuse of discretion standard of review is necessarily applied on direct

review of a challenge to the voluntariness of a guilty plea because, as a matter

of law, plea withdrawal claims and claims concerning the voluntariness of a

guilty plea need to be preserved in the first instance before the plea court.

Namely, this Court has held that “[a] defendant wishing to challenge the

voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the

plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of

sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-10 (Pa. Super.

2013). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(1)(a)(i) specifically

permits defendants to file post-sentence motions “challenging the validity of

a plea of guilty … or the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(1)(a)(i). The failure to present an in-court challenge to

the voluntariness of the plea at the guilty plea hearing or the failure to raise

a related claim in a timely-filed post-sentence motion “results in waiver.”

Lincoln, 72 A.2d at 610; see also Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945,

949 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[A] request to withdraw a guilty plea on the grounds

that it was involuntary is one of the claims that must be raised by motion in

the trial court in order to be reviewed on direct appeal”).

“The purpose of this waiver rule is to allow the trial court to correct its

errors at the first opportunity, and, in doing, further judicial efficiency.”

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Commonwealth v. Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d 466, 469 (Pa. Super.

2017). “It is for the court which accepted the plea to consider and correct, in

the first instance, any error which may have been committed.”

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 352 A.2d 140, 141 (Pa. 1975) (footnote

omitted).

Here, Appellant raised no challenge to the voluntariness of her guilty

plea during her combined guilty plea and sentencing hearing and, thereafter,

did not file any post-sentence motions. She thus raised her involuntary plea

claim for the first time in her Rule 1925(b) statement, at which point waiver

was mandated by Lincoln. See Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d at 469 (noting

in discussion of challenge to voluntariness of guilty plea, “a party cannot

rectify the failure to preserve an issue by proffering it in response to a Rule

1925(b) order”) (citation, emphasis, and brackets omitted). Appellant’s

related constitutional violation claims, raised in the exact same manner, were

also waived. See Commonwealth v. Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. Super.

2008) (“Even issues of constitutional dimension cannot be raised for the first

time on appeal.”).

Further, Appellant was specifically warned in her written guilty plea

colloquy about the possibility of waiver of any involuntary plea claims if she

did not file a post-sentence motion, as follows:

After pleading guilty and getting sentenced, if I wish to argue on

appeal that my guilty plea was not voluntary, … I must first raise

those claims in a post-sentence motion. If I don’t file a written

post-sentence motion within 10 days of my sentencing, I lose the

right to file the motion and to argue those claims on appeal.

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Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/17/24, 5. Although the trial court did not

appear to advise Appellant on the record as to her post-sentence motions

rights as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 704(C)(3), her

written colloquy serves as the basis for her notice of her rights, including her

responsibility to preserve any challenges to the voluntariness of her plea – at

the latest – in a post-sentence motion filed within ten days of sentencing. See

Commonwealth v. Torres, 223 A.3d 715, 717 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating

that defendant’s untimely post-sentence motion not excused where trial court

failed to advise him of his appellate and post-sentence motion rights because

written colloquy notified of such, and defendant confirmed that he read and

understood written colloquy). Where, as here, the record demonstrates that

Appellant never challenged the voluntariness of her guilty plea before raising

it in her Rule 1925(b) statement, her lone issue on appeal is unreviewable.

See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Accordingly, Appellant is not

entitled to relief on appeal.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 9/10/2025

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