The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Vermilion Campaign Commt. for Jean A. Anderson v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip
Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-3250.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2025-OHIO-3250
THE STATE EX REL . CITY OF VERMILION CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE FOR JEAN
A. ANDERSON ET AL. v. LORAIN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Vermilion Campaign Commt. for Jean A.
Anderson v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-3250.]
Elections—Mandamus—R.C. 3513.31(F)—Relators failed to strictly comply with the
requirements to fill a vacancy caused by a withdrawn candidate under R.C.
3513.31(F)—Writ denied.
(No. 2025-1079—Submitted September 3, 2025—Decided September 10, 2025.)
IN MANDAMUS.
__________________
The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Relators, the City of Vermilion Campaign Committee for Jean A.
Anderson, Jean A. Anderson, and Beth A. Deck, commenced this action after
respondents, the Lorain County Board of Elections and its members and director1
(collectively, “the board”), declined to place Deck’s name on the November 4, 2025
general-election ballot as a candidate for mayor of Vermilion to replace Anderson,
who had withdrawn her candidacy. Contending that R.C. 3513.31(F) allows the
committee to appoint Deck to replace Anderson on the ballot, relators seek a writ
of mandamus ordering the board to place Deck’s name on the November 4 general-
election ballot as a candidate for Vermilion mayor. Relators have also filed a
motion to strike the exhibit attached to the board’s merit brief.
{¶ 2} We grant relators’ motion to strike the board’s evidence. But because
relators have not complied with R.C. 3513.31(F)’s requirements for replacing a
withdrawn candidate, we deny the writ.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Anderson Runs for Mayor and Then Withdraws
{¶ 3} Anderson is a registered elector and resident of Vermilion. On
February 5, 2025, Anderson filed a nominating petition and statement of candidacy
declaring her intent to run for the nonpartisan office of mayor of Vermilion.
Anderson’s petition consisted of 10 part-petitions, which contained 81 valid
signatures. The board subsequently certified Anderson as a candidate for
Vermilion mayor on the November 4, 2025 general-election ballot.
{¶ 4} Anderson used Form 3-N, a petition form prescribed by the Ohio
secretary of state for use in municipal elections, for the candidate petition she filed
with the board in February 2025. Consistent with R.C. 3513.261, Form 3-N
1. The Lorain County Board of Elections chairperson and members are, respectively, Marilyn
Jacobcik and Michael E. Witte, Inez James, and Anthony B. Giardini, and its director is Paul R.
Adams.
2
January Term, 2025
contains a section where the candidate can designate a committee to represent her
and list the persons who make up the committee. It is undisputed that Anderson
did not designate a committee in her part-petitions filed in February 2025 for her
mayoral candidacy.
{¶ 5} However, on August 6, 2025, relators’ counsel, Gerald W. Phillips,
filed a letter with the board, identifying himself as “Chairman of Jean A. Anderson
Campaign Committee.” Enclosed with Phillips’s letter was a document identified
as a copy of Anderson’s nominating petition. The copy of the petition enclosed
with Phillips’s letter showed Anderson’s signature under the statement of
candidacy and was dated December 2, 2024, just like the petition Anderson filed
with the board in February 2025. But unlike the part-petitions that Anderson filed
with the board in February 2025, the copy of the nominating petition that Phillips
enclosed with his August 6 letter listed five persons whom Anderson purportedly
designated as a committee to represent her. Phillips’s letter stated the intention that
the committee have the duties and functions provided by law, including those in
R.C. 3513.31(F). That statute provides:
If a person nominated by petition as an independent or
nonpartisan candidate for election at the next general election
withdraws as that candidate . . . , the vacancy so created may be
filled by a majority of the committee of five, as designated on the
candidate’s nominating petition, if a member of that committee
certifies in writing and under oath to the election officials with
whom the candidate filed the candidate’s nominating petition, not
later than the eighty-sixth day before the day of the general election,
the name of the person selected to fill the vacancy. The certification
shall be accompanied by the written acceptance of the nomination
3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
by the person whose name is certified and shall be made in the
manner provided for a major political party.
{¶ 6} Phillips also enclosed with his letter a memorandum of law,
purporting to support the propriety of declaring a five-member committee in
support of Anderson’s candidacy even though a committee had not been designated
on the nominating petition she previously filed.
{¶ 7} Less than 20 minutes after Phillips’s filing, Anderson filed a
withdrawal of her mayoral candidacy with the board.
B. Attempt to Replace Anderson with Deck on the Ballot
{¶ 8} On August 7, Phillips filed with the board a document titled
“Certification by Committee to Fill Vacancy in Nomination.” The certification
stated that the committee for Anderson’s mayoral candidacy had duly nominated
Deck to replace Anderson on the ballot. Phillips attached his own affidavit to
support the certification. Also included with the filing was Deck’s sworn statement
that she was accepting the committee’s nomination to replace Anderson on the
ballot as a candidate for mayor of Vermilion.
{¶ 9} On August 14, the board held a meeting to certify candidate petitions
and issues for the November 4, 2025 general-election ballot. The board voted at
the meeting to approve all petitions that had not previously been rejected for the
November 4 general-election ballot. Deck’s candidacy was not considered at the
meeting.
{¶ 10} The following day, Phillips sent a letter to board director Adams,
demanding that the board respond by 4:00 p.m. that same day to inform him of
when the board would hold a meeting to vote on Deck’s placement on the ballot.
The Lorain County Prosecutor’s Office sent a letter to Phillips later that day,
informing him that the board would not place Deck’s name on the ballot as a
candidate for mayor of Vermilion.
4
January Term, 2025
C. Relators File This Action
{¶ 11} Relators commenced this expedited election action on August 18. In
their amended complaint, relators seek a writ of mandamus ordering Deck’s
placement on the November 4, 2025 general-election ballot as a candidate for
mayor of Vermilion. The board filed a timely answer to the complaint and the
parties filed evidence and merit briefs in accordance with the schedule for expedited
election cases under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08.
II. MOTION TO STRIKE
{¶ 12} Relators move to strike the exhibit that the board attached to its merit
brief as evidence. The exhibit purports to be copies of Anderson’s part-petitions
filed with the board in February 2025 and board correspondence related to some of
the part-petitions. We grant the motion and disregard the exhibit.
{¶ 13} Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06(A), evidence in original actions in this
court “shall be submitted by affidavits, stipulations, depositions, and exhibits.” We
have explained that “[e]vidence submitted under this rule ‘should comport with the
Rules of Evidence.’” State ex rel. Maher v. Oda, 2023-Ohio-3907, ¶ 13, quoting
State ex rel. Brenders v. Hall, 1995-Ohio-106, ¶ 17, fn. 1. In this case, the board’s
exhibit is not authenticated by affidavit or otherwise under Evid.R. 901(A) or (B).
Nor does the exhibit contain self-authenticating certified copies of public records
under Evid.R. 902(4). The exhibit is therefore inadmissible. See State ex rel. Mun.
Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, 2007-Ohio-3831, ¶ 39, 41
(striking unauthenticated exhibits filed in an original action).
III. ANALYSIS
{¶ 14} To obtain their requested writ of mandamus, relators must establish
by clear and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to have Deck’s name placed
on the ballot as a mayoral candidate, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the board
to place Deck’s name on the ballot, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections,
5
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
2020-Ohio-524, ¶ 6. In this case, relators lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law because the general election is approximately two months away.
State ex rel. Clark v. Twinsburg, 2022-Ohio-3089, ¶ 16.
{¶ 15} As to the remaining elements, this court must determine whether the
board has engaged in fraud or corruption, abused its discretion, or acted in clear
disregard of applicable legal provisions by refusing to place Deck’s name on the
ballot. State ex rel. New Carlisle v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-814,
¶ 11. Relators have made no allegation of fraud or corruption. Therefore, the
relevant inquiry is whether the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded
applicable law by not allowing Deck to replace Anderson on the ballot as a
candidate for Vermilion mayor.
A. Relators Did Not Meet the Requirements for Replacing a Candidate
Under R.C. 3513.31(F)
{¶ 16} It is undisputed that Anderson submitted a valid nominating petition
for the office of Vermilion mayor and was certified for the November 4, 2025
general-election ballot as a candidate for that office. Because Anderson has
withdrawn as a candidate, relators contend that they have a clear legal right under
R.C. 3513.31(F) to replace Anderson with Deck on the ballot and that the board has
a clear duty under the statute to place Deck’s name on the ballot. A plain reading
of R.C. 3513.31(F), however, compels denial of relators’ requested relief.
{¶ 17} If a person nominated by petition as a nonpartisan candidate at the
next general election withdraws her candidacy, like Anderson did here, R.C.
3513.31(F) allows the vacancy to be filled “by a majority of the committee of five,
as designated on the candidate’s nominating petition” if a member of that
committee certifies under oath to the appropriate election officials the name of the
person selected to fill the vacancy. (Emphasis added.) In this case, however,
Anderson’s nominating petition filed in February 2025 did not designate a
6
January Term, 2025
committee. Indeed, the space on the nominating petition for identifying a five-
person committee was left blank on all the part-petitions that Anderson filed.
{¶ 18} “[I]t is well-settled that ‘election laws are mandatory and require
strict compliance and that substantial compliance is acceptable only when an
election provision expressly states that it is.’” State ex rel. Maras v. LaRose, 2022-
Ohio-866, ¶ 23, quoting State ex rel. Commt. for the Referendum of Lorain
Ordinance No. 77-01 v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2002-Ohio-4194, ¶ 49. R.C.
3513.31(F) does not state that substantial compliance is permitted, meaning that
strict compliance is required. And strict compliance with R.C. 3513.31(F) requires,
for a candidate’s committee to fill the vacancy created by the candidate’s
withdrawal, that the committee be designated on the candidate’s nominating
petition. Anderson’s nominating petition did not designate a committee. Because
relators failed to strictly comply with R.C. 3513.31(F), the board did not abuse its
discretion or disregard applicable law in declining to place Deck’s name on the
ballot to replace Anderson as a mayoral candidate.
B. Relators’ Argument Conflates the Validity of Anderson’s Petition with
the Requirements of R.C. 3513.31(F)
{¶ 19} Though the nominating petition that Anderson filed in February
2025 did not designate a committee to represent her, relators argue that no statute
foreclosed Anderson from designating her committee at a later date. Relators then
argue that the committee Anderson designated on August 6, 2025, validly certified
Deck to replace her on the general-election ballot under R.C. 3513.31(F).
{¶ 20} In support of their argument, relators rely on State ex rel. Phillips v.
Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 62 Ohio St.3d 214 (1991). But Phillips does not
inform the result in this case. In Phillips, this court held that “R.C. 3513.261 does
not expressly require the appointment of a committee” on a nominating petition.
Phillips at 216. This court explained in Phillips that whereas previous versions of
R.C. 3513.261 had required a candidate to name a committee on the nominating
7
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
petition, that requirement was eliminated in 1930 and does not exist in the current
version of R.C. 3513.261. Phillips at 216. While the form of the petition includes
a space for the candidate to designate a committee, the candidate may leave the
space blank. Id. at 217. Accordingly, this court in Phillips rejected an argument
that the nominating petitions of several candidates for municipal office were invalid
for failing to designate a committee of five persons. Id. at 214, 217.
{¶ 21} Because Anderson was not required to designate a committee on her
nominating petition when she filed it in February 2025, relators say they should not
be foreclosed from utilizing R.C. 3513.31(F) to replace Anderson on the general-
election ballot after designating a committee later. This argument is without merit,
however, because it conflates the validity of Anderson’s nominating petition filed
in February 2025 with what R.C. 3513.31(F) requires before a withdrawn candidate
can be replaced on the ballot. Put another way, whether Anderson’s petition was
validly certified for the ballot is a different issue than whether she can be replaced
with another candidate after withdrawing her candidacy.
{¶ 22} As explained above, a candidate committee cannot fill a vacancy
caused by the candidate’s withdrawal from the election unless the committee was
first designated on the candidate’s nominating petition. In this case, Anderson did
not designate a committee on the nominating petition she filed in February 2025.
Therefore, the process set forth in R.C. 3513.31(F) could not occur, because there
was no committee that could properly fill the vacancy created by Anderson’s
withdrawal.
C. Failure to Designate a Committee on a Nominating Petition May Not Be
Excused or Corrected to Invoke R.C. 3513.31(F)
{¶ 23} Relators expressly deny that there was any defect in the manner in
which they designated Anderson’s committee. In the alternative, relators argue that
the omission of the committee members’ names on Anderson’s February 2025
nominating petition was a mere “technical defect” that could not have misled
8
January Term, 2025
anyone who signed Anderson’s petition. Though not entirely clear, relators appear
to suggest that because the omission was only a “technical defect,” they should be
allowed to correct it by way of Anderson’s August 6 filing. This argument fails.
{¶ 24} A “technical defect” will be excused only when the applicable statute
permits “substantial compliance.” See Stern v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga Cty.,
14 Ohio St.2d 175, 183-84 (1968). For example, this court has permitted minor
deviations from the requirements of R.C. 3513.261, which provides that petition
papers and statements of candidacy be only “substantially” in the form prescribed
in that section. See State ex rel. Osborn v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio
St.3d 194, 197 (1992); State ex rel. Saffold v. Timmins, 22 Ohio St.2d 63, 64 (1970).
{¶ 25} Although relators frame the failure to designate a committee on
Anderson’s nominating petition filed in February 2025 as a technical omission, that
framing misses the point. Anderson’s nominating petition was not rejected. As
relators correctly (though unnecessarily) argue elsewhere, the “appointment of a
committee . . . is not mandatory” under R.C. 3513.261, Phillips, 62 Ohio St.3d at
217. Thus, the failure to designate a committee was no defect at all—technical or
otherwise—and did not affect Anderson’s substantial compliance with R.C.
3513.261.
{¶ 26} What relators really seek is permission to alter Anderson’s
nominating petition by way of the belated August 6 submission designating a
committee. But as noted above, this is not a question of substantial compliance;
R.C. 3513.31(F) requires strict compliance, and the technical-defect exception is
therefore inapplicable. Further, relators are barred from altering, correcting, or
adding to Anderson’s nominating petition. See R.C. 3501.38(I)(1) (“No alterations,
corrections, or additions may be made to a petition after it is filed in a public
office.”). The board therefore did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable
law in refusing to place Deck’s name on the ballot as Anderson’s replacement.
9
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
D. Policy Favoring Free and Competitive Elections Does Not Excuse
Relators’ Failure to Comply with R.C. 3513.31(F)
{¶ 27} Relators also argue that public policy favoring free, competitive
elections should favor allowing Deck to replace Anderson on the ballot. In
furtherance of this policy, relators contend that this court should not construe the
election laws in such a way as to defeat this public policy. This argument is
meritless.
{¶ 28} For their policy argument, relators rely heavily on State ex rel. Flex
v. Gwin, 20 Ohio St.2d 29 (1969). In Flex, the sole Democratic candidate for a
judicial office had been declared ineligible because of age by a separate decision of
this court made before the primary election but too late for another candidate to
qualify for the primary ballot. R.C. 3513.31 then (as now) permitted political
parties to fill vacancies created when persons nominated at primary elections timely
withdrew their candidacies. Former R.C. 3513.31, Am.H.B. No. 246, 129 Ohio
Laws 1223; R.C. 3513.31(C). The board of elections in Flex, however, had refused
to allow the relator to take the ineligible candidate’s place on the general-election
ballot, taking the position that there was no “vacancy” occasioned by withdrawal
or death that would permit substitution of a candidate. Id. at 30. This court
disagreed and granted a writ of mandamus ordering the relator’s placement on the
ballot, as a person duly appointed by his party’s county central committee to fill the
vacancy under R.C. 3513.31. Id. at 32.
{¶ 29} In granting the writ, this court opined, “[When] a political party has
a candidate who appears to be qualified for nomination at a primary election, but
who is determined to be ineligible to be a candidate at a time too late for another
candidate to be duly nominated, a vacancy exists which the proper political agency
is entitled to fill.” Id. at 31. This court therefore interpreted the term “vacancy” in
a manner that forwarded the “basic” policy that “a political party is entitled to have
a candidate for each office at the general election.” Id.
10
January Term, 2025
{¶ 30} Here, relators’ reliance on the policy considerations emphasized in
Flex is misplaced. As this court later explained, it “employed the policy favoring
free and competitive elections” in Flex (and other cases) “to construe ambiguous
election statutes and preserve candidates’ placement on the ballot.” (Emphasis
added.) State ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 5, 7
(1992). But when the election statutes at issue are not ambiguous, “we cannot use
public policy to circumvent them.” Id. Such is the case here. For a candidate’s
committee to fill the vacancy occasioned by a withdrawn candidate, R.C.
3513.31(F) unambiguously requires the withdrawn candidate’s committee to have
been designated on the candidate’s nominating petition. In seeking a writ of
mandamus to place Deck’s name on the ballot in Anderson’s stead, relators are
asking this court to circumvent R.C. 3513.31(F)’s unambiguous requirement.
E. Constitutional Arguments
{¶ 31} Quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968), relators also
argue in their merit brief that the board’s refusal to replace Anderson with Deck as
a candidate for mayor of Vermilion unconstitutionally burdens the First
Amendment “‘right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political
beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to
cast their votes effectively.’” They argue that the board’s rejection of Deck’s
candidacy infringes on their rights to peaceably assemble and to petition for redress
of grievances under Article I, Sections 1 and 3 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 32} Relators’ constitutional argument is largely conclusory. Without
meaningful explanation, they argue that the board’s refusal to give effect to the
August 6, 2025 designation of Anderson’s committee and to allow Deck to replace
Anderson on the ballot “serves no legitimate state interests” and places an
unconstitutional burden on relators by severely restricting ballot-access rights. Yet,
on its face, there is nothing in R.C. 3513.31(F) that imposes a burden on one’s
candidacy. Indeed, if Deck wanted to run for mayor of Vermilion, she could have
11
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
timely filed her own nominating petition. And if Anderson wanted to be sure that
someone would be able to replace her on the ballot if she withdrew her candidacy,
all she had to do was designate a committee on her nominating petition to trigger
R.C. 3513.31(F)’s procedures for filling the vacancy. Given the underdeveloped
nature of relators’ constitutional argument, we decline to address it. See State ex
rel. Cox v. Youngstown Civil Serv. Comm., 2021-Ohio-2799, ¶ 28; see also Bronx
Park S. III Lancaster, L.L.C. v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2018-Ohio-1589,
¶ 10 (declining to address a constitutional challenge when the party had “not
formulated a clear argument” in support); In re Application of Columbus S. Power
Co., 2011-Ohio-2638, ¶ 19 (“it is not generally the proper role of this court to
develop a party’s arguments”).
{¶ 33} More fundamentally, it is not even clear how mandamus is an
appropriate remedy for the relators’ constitutional claims, such as they are.
Relators seek a writ of mandamus compelling the board to place Deck’s name on
the general-election ballot as a candidate for mayor of Vermilion. To the extent
that relators’ constitutional argument is asking this court to simply ignore R.C.
3513.31(F)’s plain text and order Deck’s placement on the ballot, mandamus is an
inappropriate remedy. Courts cannot create the legal duty that is enforceable in
mandamus; the creation of a duty enforceable in mandamus is a legislative and not
a judicial function. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Sandusky Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2012-
Ohio-4837, ¶ 31.
F. Attorney Fees
{¶ 34} Relators argue that they are entitled to recover their attorney fees
under various exceptions to the American Rule, which generally provides that “a
prevailing party in a civil action may not recover attorney fees as a part of the costs
of litigation,” Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 2009-Ohio-306, ¶ 7. In this case,
however, we need not reach the applicability of the exceptions, because relators are
not a prevailing party.
12
January Term, 2025
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 35} We grant relators’ motion to strike the board’s evidence. But because
relators failed to strictly comply with the requirements to fill a vacancy caused by a
withdrawn candidate under R.C. 3513.31(F), we deny the writ.
Writ denied.
__________________
Phillips & Co., L.P.A., and Gerald W. Phillips, for relators.
Anthony Cillo, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Leigh S. Prugh,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents.
__________________
13