“A trial court has ‘broad discretion’ in determining time-sharing matters and parenting plans, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”
How later courts described this case
- “A trial court has ‘broad discretion’ in determining time-sharing matters and parenting plans, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”
- “When a pleading fails to make a specific demand, courts will accept the issue as being ‘tried by implied consent’ where a pre-trial statement raises the issue and the other party fails to object at the hearing.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed September 10, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D24-0454
Lower Tribunal No. 19-8255 FC-04
________________
Susanna Alan,
Appellant,
vs.
Roger West,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ivonne
Cuesta, Judge.
Susan R. Brown, P.A., and Susan R. Brown (Plantation), for appellant.
Abramowitz and Associates, and Jordan B. Abramowitz, for appellee.
Before GORDO, LOBREE and GOODEN, JJ.
GORDO, J.
Susanna Alan (“Mother”) appeals a supplemental final judgment
granting modification of timesharing, parental responsibility and child support
in favor of Roger West (“Father”). We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P.
9.030(b)(1)(A). We find the record amply supports the trial court’s order and
affirm.
“We review a trial court’s modification of timesharing for an abuse of
discretion, and we must affirm if the trial court’s order is supported by
competent substantial evidence.” Sordo v. Camblin, 130 So. 3d 743, 744
(Fla. 3d DCA 2014). “The standard of review governing a trial court’s
decision to modify child support is abuse of discretion.” Escobar v. Escobar,
76 So. 3d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). “We review a claim of deprivation
of procedural due process de novo.” Pena v. Rodriguez, 273 So. 3d 237,
240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).
Contrary to the Mother’s arguments on appeal, we find the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in its modification of timesharing, parental
responsibility and child support as competent, substantial evidence exists for
these modifications. See Miedes v. Ideses, 346 So. 3d 686, 686 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2022) (“We find no error in the trial court’s detailed thirty-four-page
order granting modification of the parenting plan and child support, made
after a seven-day trial with evidence from the parties and experts, as it
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contained explicit findings of fact supported by competent, substantial
evidence[.]”); Ouslander v. Ouslander, 398 So. 3d 1002, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA
2024) (“As to the court’s award of shared parental responsibility and . . .
timesharing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.”);
Smith v. Daniel, 246 So. 3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“A trial court
has ‘broad discretion’ in determining time-sharing matters and parenting
plans, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion.”).
Further, we find no due process violation occurred as the issue of
whether the Father should have sole parental responsibility was tried by
consent. See Clark v. Clark, 147 So. 3d 655, 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)
(“When a pleading fails to make a specific demand, courts will accept the
issue as being ‘tried by implied consent’ where a pre-trial statement raises
the issue and the other party fails to object at the hearing.”); Anchor Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Trif, 322 So. 3d 663, 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“An issue is
tried by consent when there is no objection to the introduction of evidence
on that issue. For example, an issue is tried by consent where a party never
objected to the evidence or argument regarding the issue on grounds that
the issue was not framed in the pleadings.”) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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Affirmed.
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