United States v. Joshua Eugene Gaines

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FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10117

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSHUA EUGENE GAINES,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cr-00165-LCB-HNJ-1

____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:

After pleading guilty to a crime classified by Alabama law as

a Class D felony, Joshua Gaines was caught in possession of a fire-

arm. He was charged with and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1)—colloquially, the federal “felon-in-possession” statute.

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

Gaines appealed, arguing, as relevant here, that the government

had presented insufficient evidence to convict him and, therefore,

that the district court erred in refusing to grant his motion for judg-

ment of acquittal. For reasons we will explain, we agree with

Gaines that the statute doesn’t cover his conduct. Accordingly, we

vacate Gaines’s conviction and remand to the district court with

instructions to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal.

I

In November 2019, Joshua Gaines pleaded guilty in an Ala-

bama court to the crime of “receiving stolen property in the third

degree.” Gov’t Trial Ex. 2, at 1, Dkt. No. 74-2 (citation modified).

Alabama law classifies that offense as a Class D felony. See Ala.

Code § 13A-8-18.1(b). Before pleading guilty, Gaines’s lawyer told

him (and a state-provided “Explanation of Rights and Plea of

Guilty” form confirmed) that he would receive a “non-prison” sen-

tence of 13 to 31 months, suspended—meaning that it would be

deferred provided that he continued to satisfy his terms of proba-

tion. See Gov’t Trial Ex. 2 at 4; Jury Trial Tr. II, at 260:16–22, Dkt.

No. 89.

Gaines’s lawyer was right. Given Gaines’s criminal history,

the applicable law foreclosed a sentence that included any actual

prison time. Under Alabama law at the time, a Class D felony gen-

erally triggered a “definite term of imprisonment” of “not more

than 5 years or less than 1 year and 1 day”—but, importantly, it also

mandated that any sentence be “in accordance with subsection (b)

of Section 15-18-8.” See Ala. Code § 13A-5-6(a)(4) (2019) (amended

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24-10117 Opinion of the Court 3

2023). Section 15-18-8(b), in turn, barred judges from imposing

prison sentences on Class D felons who hadn’t been convicted of

either (1) three or more felonies or (2) two or more serious felonies.

See Ala. Code § 15-18-8(b), (e) (2019) (amended 2023). Instead, for

those offenders, it required a sentence of “probation, drug court,

or a pretrial diversion program,” or confinement in “a consenting

community corrections program” for “a period not exceeding two

years”—or, if no community corrections program existed, in a

“high-intensity probation under the supervision of the Board of

Pardons and Paroles.” Id.

After pleading guilty, Gaines was given a 24-month sus-

pended sentence and was placed on probation for two years. Fol-

lowing his sentencing, Gaines signed a “Registration of Felons”

form notifying him that, pursuant to the Federal Gun Control Act

of 1968, he couldn’t possess a firearm.

Six months later, police officers stopped a car in which

Gaines was a passenger. The officers discovered a gun in the car,

and Gaines admitted that it was his. The officers arrested Gaines

and took him to jail.

II

The government indicted Gaines on two counts: (1) posses-

sion of a firearm after having “been convicted in any court of[] a

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,”

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and (2) possession of an unreg-

istered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

At trial, after the government rested, Gaines moved for a

judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

29, contending, as relevant here, that there was insufficient evi-

dence to prove the key fact underlying count one—namely, that he

had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court denied

Gaines’s motion but gave him leave to refile at the close of all evi-

dence. He did so, but the district court again denied relief. Alt-

hough the jury acquitted Gaines on the § 5861(d) count, it con-

victed him on the § 922(g)(1) count. He was thereafter sentenced

to 51 months in prison and three years of supervised release.

Before us, Gaines presents assorted challenges to evidentiary

rulings, jury instructions, and sentencing determinations. Because

we hold that Gaines is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the

§ 922(g)(1) count, we needn’t reach any of the remaining issues. 1

III

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evi-

dence, “the verdict must stand if the[re] is substantial evidence to

support it, that is unless no trier of fact could have found guilt be-

yond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314,

1324 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation modified). Here, Gaines’s challenge

1 “This Court reviews de novo whether there is sufficient evidence to support

a guilty verdict in a criminal trial,” “view[ing] evidence in the light most favor-

able to the Government and resolv[ing] all reasonable inferences and credibil-

ity evaluations in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278,

1296 (11th Cir. 2014).

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to the sufficiency of the evidence turns on the meaning of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1) is colloquially—indeed, almost ubiq-

uitously—known as the “felon-in-possession” statute. See, e.g.,

United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 889 (11th Cir. 2025). As it

turns out, though, it doesn’t actually use the word “felon.” If it did,

this would be an easier case. After all, Gaines was convicted of a

crime that Alabama law expressly classifies as a Class D felony, and

he thereafter possessed a firearm.

But alas, § 922(g)(1) doesn’t prohibit felons from possessing

firearms. Rather, its terms are more precise: “[I]t shall be unlawful

for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [to]

possess in or affecting commerce[] any firearm or ammunition.”

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The question for us is whether § 922(g)(1), as

written, covers Gaines’s conduct. We conclude that it does not. 2

The case turns on the meaning of one statutory phrase—

“convicted . . . of[] a crime punishable by”—and one term—“im-

prisonment.” In the discussion that follows, we will explain the

proper interpretation of both and then apply § 922(g)(1), so inter-

preted, to Gaines’s case.

2 It’s true, of course, that as a general matter, “[a] ‘felony,’ . . . is a ‘serious

crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by

death.’” Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 574 (2010) (quoting Felony,

Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). But as this case demonstrates, that’s not

uniformly true.

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

A

First up, “convicted . . . of[] a crime punishable by.” 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). That phrase might be understood in either of

two different ways. Perhaps, as the government argues, it should

be read in an “offense-specific” manner, such that a reviewing court

looks to the term of imprisonment generally authorized by the stat-

ute underlying the predicate conviction, without regard to the de-

fendant’s particular circumstances. Alternatively, as Gaines con-

tends, it could be read in a “defendant-specific” manner, such that

its application turns on the length of the term of imprisonment to

which the defendant himself was potentially subject given the cir-

cumstances of his case.

On its face, § 922(g)(1)’s would seem to suggest the govern-

ment’s preferred offense-specific understanding. Most notably, the

phrase “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year” modifies the word “crime”—not some other term in the stat-

ute, such as “person” or “convicted.” 3 So, the argument goes, a

3 Technically speaking, the term “punishable” is a postpositive adjective that

modifies the noun “crime.” “The basic rule for the placement of adjec-

tives . . . is that single adjectives . . . occur in attributive position”—which is to

say that the adjective comes right before the noun it modifies. Rodney Hud-

dleston & Geoffrey K. Pullum, The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language

445 (2002). One exception is when the adjective has its own “post-head de-

pendents,” which are words describing the adjective. Id. In that case, the ad-

jective occurs postpositively—that is, comes after the noun it modifies. For

example, in the phrase “members [dissatisfied with the board’s decision],”

“members” is the noun, “dissatisfied” is the postpositive adjective modifying

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reviewing court should examine the “punish[ment]” available for

the “crime” of conviction generally, rather than the defendant’s

particular conduct. Moreover, as we have clarified in another con-

text, “[b]y their very nature, ‘able’ and ‘ible’ words connote a per-

son’s or thing’s character, quality, or status—which, importantly

for present purposes, exists independent of any particular facts on

the ground.” Barton v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir.

2018). So, one might say, just as in Barton “an alien [could] be ren-

dered inadmissible regardless of whether he is actually seeking ad-

mission,” id., a crime can be “punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year” regardless of whether the defendant him-

self is actually subject to imprisonment for such a term, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). Finally, it’s worth noting that before

the Supreme Court’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560

U.S. 563 (2010)—more on that shortly—a number of our sister cir-

cuits had interpreted § 922(g)(1) in an offense-specific manner. See,

e.g., United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated

by United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2011) (en

banc); United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005),

overruled by United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215, 1219

the noun, and the words “with the board’s decision” are the adjective’s post-

head dependents. Id. Section 922(g)(1) is organized in exactly the same way.

For “crime [punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year],”

“crime” is the noun, “punishable” is the postpositive adjective modifying the

noun, and the words “by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” are the

adjective’s post-head dependents.

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

(9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Hill, 539 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.

2008), overruled by United States v. Brooks, 751 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th

Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Guzman-Tlaseca, 546 F.3d 571, 579

(8th Cir. 2008) (interpreting the materially identical 21 U.S.C.

§ 802(44)), overruled by United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881, 883

(8th Cir. 2011).

But—and it’s a big but—whatever the merits of the offense-

specific interpretation of § 922(g)(1), we think that analogous Su-

preme Court precedent forecloses it and requires the defendant-

specific reading instead. First, there is Carachuri. There, the Court

examined a “maze” of statutory provisions in the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537. 560 U.S. at 567. The base-

line provision allows certain immigrants subject to removal to ap-

ply for discretionary relief if, among other things, they haven’t

been “convicted of any aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).

In relevant part, the term “aggravated felony” is defined as “any

felony punishable under . . . the Controlled Substances Act.” 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). And finally, the term “felony” is defined—again,

in relevant part—as “a crime for which the ‘maximum term of im-

prisonment authorized’ is ‘more than one year.’” Carachuri, 560

U.S. at 567 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)).

Importantly, therefore, the architecture of the interlocking

statutes in Carachuri was materially identical to § 922(g)(1)’s. To-

gether, those provisions applied to aliens “convicted” of any “ag-

gravated felony,” defined to mean any “felony punishable” in a cer-

tain manner. But the Supreme Court rejected what it called the

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“hypothetical felony approach.” Id. at 580. The Court said that

manner of interpreting the provisions—in effect, what we’ve called

the offense-specific approach—“ignore[d] the text of the INA.” Id.

at 575–76, 580. Rather than focusing on the word “punishable,” as

the offense-specific reading would, the Court trained its attention

on the word “convicted,” saying that it “indicates that we are to look

to the conviction itself as our starting place, not to what might have

or could have been charged.” Id. at 576. Ultimately, the Court

there rejected the government’s appeal to “[t]he mere possibility

that the defendant’s conduct, coupled with facts outside of the rec-

ord of conviction,” could have authorized an aggravated-felony

conviction. Id. at 582.

The Supreme Court’s follow-on decision in Moncrieffe v.

Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), is perhaps even more closely on point.

Interpreting the same INA provision at issue in Carachuri, the Court

said that § 1229b(a)(3)’s “upshot” was “that a noncitizen’s conviction

of an offense that the Controlled Substances Act [] makes punishable

by more than one year’s imprisonment will be counted as an ‘aggra-

vated felony’ for immigration purposes.” Id. at 188 (emphasis

added). The similarities between Moncrieffe and this case go be-

yond statutory architecture. Like Gaines here, Moncrieffe was con-

victed of an offense that prescribed a default term of imprisonment

of more than a year but that was subject to exceptions—in particu-

lar, a crime “punishable by five years’ imprisonment ‘except as pro-

vided’ in paragraph (4),” which made it “punishable as a misde-

meanor” if it involved “only ‘a small amount of marihuana for no

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

remuneration.’” Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 196 (quoting 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(D), (b)(4)).

Just as it had in Carachuri, the Court in Moncrieffe embraced

a defendant-specific interpretation. The Court held that the statute

at issue there created two “exclusive” categories—felony and mis-

demeanor. Id. Importantly for our purposes, it then explained that

no “conviction is ‘presumptively’ a felony” and that § 1229b(a)(3)

would apply only if “the record of conviction of the predicate of-

fense” had “necessarily establishe[d]” conduct implicating the fel-

ony category. Id. at 196–98.

So in both Carachuri and Moncrieffe, the Supreme Court re-

jected an offense-specific interpretation of § 1229b(a)(3), reasoning

that the word “convicted” modifies the term “punishable” in a way

that requires the defendant-specific reading. See Carachuri, 560 U.S.

at 575–76; Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 197–98. Faced with those deci-

sions interpreting a statute with a materially identical structure to

§ 922(g)(1)’s, we must follow the Supreme Court’s lead and con-

clude, as well, that the presence of the word “convicted” modifies

“punishable” in a way that requires the defendant-specific interpre-

tation of § 922(g)(1).

Tellingly, the very same circuit courts that had embraced

the offense-specific reading of § 922(g)(1) and other materially iden-

tical statutes before Carachuri reversed course thereafter. The Su-

preme Court GVR’d Fourth and Eighth Circuit decisions adopting

offense-specific interpretations in light of Carachuri, and on remand

both courts renounced their earlier positions and embraced the

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defendant-specific reading. See Simmons, 649 F.3d at 239 (abrogat-

ing Jones), 241; Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d at 882–83 (overruling Guzman-

Tlaseca). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, both of which had also

initially read § 922(g)(1) in an offense-specific manner, soon fol-

lowed suit, likewise overruling their pre-Carachuri precedents. See

Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d at 1219 (overruling Murillo); Brooks, 751

F.3d at 1209 (overruling Hill).4

* * *

Accordingly, despite what we take to be strong textual indi-

cations that § 922(g)(1) might best be understood in an offense-spe-

cific manner—such that it covers any crime for which the law au-

thorizes punishment of more than a year in prison, regardless of

any particular defendant’s situation—we are constrained by Su-

preme Court precedent to conclude that the statute must be read

4 The lone exception to this trend is a post-Carachuri decision of the D.C. Cir-

cuit that appears to adopt an offense-specific reading, but it doesn’t discuss

Carachuri or any of the circuit-court decisions that flipped their interpretations

in Carachuri’s wake. See Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

We also note that Judges Duncan and Agee dissented from the Fourth Cir-

cuit’s reversal in Simmons. They focused on textual differences between

§ 1229b(a)(3) and the statutory provisions at issue there, 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(D), 802(44). See Simmons, 649 F.3d at 250 (Duncan, J., dissenting);

id. at 250–59 (Agee, J., dissenting). True, the statutes aren’t precisely identi-

cal—either to each other or to § 922(g)(1)—but for reasons explained above

the line, § 1229b(a)(3) is materially identical both to § 922(g)(1) and to the pro-

visions at issue in Simmons, at least as the Supreme Court has interpreted them.

Moncrieffe, in particular, seems to foreclose any argument that the statutes are

meaningfully different. See supra at 9–10.

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

in a defendant-specific manner to apply only when the defendant

was himself punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment.

B

Presumably recognizing as much, the government has a

backup argument. It contends in the alternative that the term “im-

prisonment” covers more than just im-prison-ment—more, that is,

than time in the slammer, and, in particular, that it includes time in

a community-corrections program or jailtime that could follow

from the hypothetical revocation of a suspended sentence. So un-

derstood, the government insists, Gaines himself actually was

“punishable”—and indeed punished—“by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). We

are not persuaded.

The government initially asserts that we should look to state

law to determine what constitutes “imprisonment” for § 922(g)(1)

purposes—and that “Alabama courts make clear that a term of im-

prisonment can be served through community corrections.” Br. of

Appellees at 27–29 (collecting cases). With respect, we think the

government’s major premise is incorrect. Unless Congress

“plain[ly] indicat[es]” otherwise—which it hasn’t here—when con-

struing a term in a federal law we use traditional tools of statutory

interpretation and look to federal precedent, not to state rules and

practices. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591 (1990) (“[A]bsent

plain indication to the contrary, federal laws are not to be con-

strued so that their application is dependent on state law . . . .” (ci-

tation modified)).

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In search of the required “plain indication,” the government

points to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). That statute opens by explaining—

for federal-law purposes—that “[t]he term ‘crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ does not include” ei-

ther (A) federal or state antitrust, unfair-trade-practice, or similar

business-related offenses or (B) state offenses classified as misde-

meanors punishable by less than two years in prison. It then says

the following, the first sentence of which the government insists

requires us to defer to Alabama law’s understanding of “imprison-

ment”:

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be

determined in accordance with the law of the juris-

diction in which the proceedings were held. Any con-

viction which has been expunged, or set aside or for

which a person has been pardoned or has had civil

rights restored shall not be considered a conviction

for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, ex-

pungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly

provides that the person may not ship, transport, pos-

sess, or receive firearms.

Id.

We think the government overreads a single sub-subclause

of § 921(a)(20). The sentence it quotes says only that “[w]hat con-

stitutes a conviction of such a crime”—that is, a crime punishable by

more than a year in prison—shall be determined in accordance

with the law of the jurisdiction in which the predicate proceedings

were held. Id. (emphasis added). In Beecham v. United States, 511

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14 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

U.S. 368 (1994), the Supreme Court dubbed the sentence that the

government emphasizes the “choice-of-law clause” and interpreted

it this way: “Section 922(g) imposes a disability on people who

‘ha[ve] been convicted.’ The choice-of-law clause defines the rule for

determining ‘[w]hat constitutes a conviction.’” Id. at 371 (emphasis

added). We read Beecham as cabining the role of the choice-of-law

clause to determining whether a “conviction” exists—and as not

extending to the definition of the term “imprisonment.” So, for

instance, the choice-of-law clause directs a reviewing court to look

to the law of the jurisdiction in which the predicate proceedings

were held to determine whether a proper “conviction” resulted—

say, from a guilty plea, a nolo contendere plea, etc. Compare, e.g.,

United States v. Willis, 106 F.3d 966, 967–70 (11th Cir. 1997) (relying

on § 921(a)(20) to hold that, under the governing state law, a nolo

plea in which the adjudication has been withheld was not a “con-

viction” for § 922(g)(1) purposes), with, e.g., United States v. Anton,

546 F.3d 1355, 1357 (11th Cir. 2008) (relying on § 921(a)(20) to hold

that, under the governing state law, a nolo plea following an adju-

dication of guilt was a “conviction” for § 922(g)(1) purposes). 5

5 Our decision in United States v. Nix, 438 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2006), which the

government cites, is not to the contrary. We said there that “[t]he only limi-

tation on predicate convictions contained in § 922(g)(1) itself is that they must

be ‘punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,’ and it is that

condition which § 921(a)(20) provides ‘shall be determined in accordance with the law

of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.’” Id. at 1285 (emphasis

added). Although the government never quite specifies, its theory is presum-

ably that the italicized phrase extends the choice-of-law clause’s application to

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24-10117 Opinion of the Court 15

To be sure, there are numerous instances in which a state

conviction might bear on the application of a federal law. But that

doesn’t mean that we define terms in the federal law by reference to

state law. Just the opposite, in fact, and Carachuri is illustrative.

There, the Court explained that while a state-law felony can trigger

§ 1229b(a)(3), “in order to be an ‘aggravated felony’ for immigra-

tion law purposes, a state drug conviction must be punishable as a

felony under federal law.” 560 U.S. at 569. We think it clear, there-

fore, that the term “imprisonment” in § 922(g)(1) must be inter-

preted in accordance with ordinary rules of statutory interpreta-

tion, as informed by federal law.

So, state-law characterizations aside, how, as a matter of fed-

eral law, should § 922(g)(1) be understood? We begin with the

most fundamental rule of all: “[T]he oldest and most commonsen-

sical interpretive principle” is that “[i]n their full context, words

mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they

were written . . . .” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 15–16 (2012). Accordingly, we

the entire phrase “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”

and thus to the word “imprisonment.”

Clever, but not right. We made clear in Nix that the defendant there

“d[id] not deny that his Alabama conviction was for a crime punishable by a

term of imprisonment exceeding one year” and that “it [wa]s undisputed that

his marijuana conviction was punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding

one year.” Id. Because the applicability of that requirement was undisputed,

the language the government cites wasn’t necessary to—and really had noth-

ing to do with—the case’s holding.

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16 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

ask how the ordinary person would have understood the term “im-

prisonment” at the time Congress enacted what is now § 922(g)(1)

in 1961. See An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub.

L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961).

Although not always foolproof guides, dictionaries are a de-

cent place to begin the search for ordinary understanding. And

both ordinary-language and legal definitions of the cognate word

“imprison” strongly indicate that “imprisonment” was (and is)

commonly understood to refer to actual confinement in a prison

or jail. The contemporaneously published Webster’s Third, for in-

stance, primarily defines “imprison” to mean “to put in prison :

confine in a jail,” Imprison, Webster’s Third New International Diction-

ary 1137 (1961), and only secondarily as an analogy—“to limit, re-

strain or confine as if by imprisoning,” id. (providing, as one exam-

ple, “[imprison]ed little sausages in pastry and baked them”). The

pertinent edition of Black’s likewise focuses on the formal defini-

tion—“[t]o put in a prison; to put in a place of confinement”—and

only secondarily on an analogical definition—“[t]o confine a per-

son, or restrain his liberty, in any way.” Imprison, Black’s Law Dic-

tionary (4th ed. 1968). And frankly, it seems to us inconceivable

that, as used in a statute trained on serious criminal offenses, the

term “imprisonment” would be understood by the ordinary Amer-

ican, in 1961 or today, to cover any limitation on one’s freedom—

tellingly, not even the government advances such a sweeping

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24-10117 Opinion of the Court 17

interpretation. Section 922(g)(1) is thus properly read to employ

the usual—and narrower—definition. 6

The overwhelming weight of persuasive authority in a re-

lated context—interpreting the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines—sup-

ports that commonsense conclusion. Then-Judge Alito explained

more than two decades ago that, as used in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, the

term “imprisonment” doesn’t cover parole, probation, supervised

release, home detention, or other similar non-jail limitations on

personal liberty. See United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir.

2004) (collecting cases). Rather, he wrote for the Third Circuit—

citing common-language and legal definitions—“[i]n ordinary us-

age, ‘imprisonment’ generally means physical confinement.” Id. at

361. Moreover, he emphasized that the common, everyday under-

standing of the term comported with the clinical meaning: “For

example, if a parolee were informed at the end of a parole revoca-

tion hearing that the outcome was ‘imprisonment,’ the parolee

would not think that this meant that he was going to be returned

to parole.” Id. Judge Alito also noted that with a single outlying

exception, “every other court that ha[d] considered the question

6 The word’s “im-” prefix confirms as much. “Im-” is a variation of the prefix

“in-” that occurs when the next letter in line is a “b,” “m,” or “p.” See in- or il-

or im- or ir- prefix, Webster’s Third 1139. The “in-” (and thus the “im-”) prefix is

used to indicate location: “in : within : inward : into : toward : on.” Id. Exam-

ples of words using the “im-” version of the prefix include “imperil” (“to bring

into peril”) and “impanel” (“to enter in or on a panel”). Imperil, Webster’s Third

1133; Impanel, Webster’s Third 1131. The prefix (“im-”) transforms the root

word (“peril,” “panel,” etc.) into a verb that means to place the subject in the

root word. Just so here. “Imprison” means to place the subject in prison.

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18 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

ha[d] held that parole, supervised release, and probation do not

qualify as ‘imprisonment’ under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3.” Id. at 362 (cit-

ing decisions of the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); see

also United States v. Rosado, 254 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

(“The Guidelines use the word imprisonment in several sections,

and the term appears to consistently mean time spent in jail, as op-

posed to any form of release.”). 7

In support of its novel and more liberal interpretation of the

word “imprisonment,” the government cites 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).

But that statute is pretty far afield of § 922(g)(1) and thus, we think,

of only limited relevance. Under it, the Director of the Bureau of

Prisons is directed to ensure that a prisoner “spends a portion of the

final months” of “a term of imprisonment” under “conditions that

will afford [him] a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare

for the reentry of that prisoner into the community”—such as in a

“community correctional facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1). The

government’s reliance on § 3624, though, boomerangs back

around on itself. True, that statute provides that the waning days

of a “term of imprisonment” may be spent outside the four walls

of prison, but in so doing it confirms that, except in that narrow

window, “imprisonment” means exactly what the dictionaries at-

test and common usage confirms: in prison. See also, e.g., 18 U.S.C.

7 The lone exception was United States v. French, in which the Eighth Circuit

relied on a state statute in adopting a broader definition of “imprisonment.”

46 F.3d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 1995). Notably, Judge Alito rejected that court’s

reliance on state law for precisely the reasons that we have rejected the gov-

ernment’s. See Pray, 373 F.3d at 362; supra at 17–18.

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24-10117 Opinion of the Court 19

§ 3621(b) (describing the “place of the prisoner’s imprisonment” as

being somewhere with “bed[s]” and as being subject to the “mini-

mum standards of . . . habitability”). So § 3624 doesn’t get the gov-

ernment very far—and certainly provides no warrant for ignoring

the ordinary understanding of the term “imprisonment.”8

* * *

For these reasons, we hold that, as used in § 922(g)(1), the

term “imprisonment” means confinement in a prison or jail, not

participation in some non-carceral community-corrections pro-

gram or the like.

C

Having done the hard work of interpreting § 922(g)(1), ap-

plying it to Gaines’s case is relatively straightforward. To recap,

§ 922(g)(1) reads as follows: “[I]t shall be unlawful for any per-

son . . . who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punisha-

ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [to] possess

in or affecting commerce[] any firearm or ammunition.” We have

concluded that, under Carachuri and Moncrieffe, we are obliged to

read § 922(g)(1) in a defendant-specific manner, such that its appli-

cation depends on the length of the term of imprisonment to which

a particular criminal defendant was potentially subject given the

8 The government’s citation to 18 U.S.C. § 3622, suffers from the same flaw,

only more acutely. That provision specifies the circumstances in which “[t]he

Bureau of Prisons may release a prisoner from the place of his imprisonment for a

limited period.” 18 U.S.C. § 3622 (emphasis added).

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20 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

facts and circumstances of his case. And we have concluded that,

as used in § 922(g)(1), the term “imprisonment” refers to actual

confinement in a prison, jail, or comparable facility. The question,

therefore, is whether, given the circumstances of his case, Gaines

himself was actually subject to a sentence requiring him to spend

at least a year in such a facility.

He was not. For reasons already explained, given Gaines’s

criminal history, Alabama law foreclosed the possibility that he

would serve any time in prison for his Class D felony. See supra at

2–3. To be sure, Gaines was subject to other punishments: proba-

tion, drug court, pretrial diversion, and time in a “community cor-

rections program.” Ala. Code § 15-18-8(b), (e) (2019) (amended

2023). But none of those, as implemented in Alabama, is tanta-

mount to jail-like “imprisonment.”

The only one of the sanctions that Gaines faced that requires

any explanation is “community corrections.” In multiple places

and ways, though, Alabama law makes clear that a community-

corrections program isn’t comparable to prison. As an initial mat-

ter, the 2019 statute under which Gaines was sentenced expressly

distinguishes community-corrections programs from “prisons” and

“jail-type institution[s].” Id. § 15-18-8(b). It states that unless a

judge sentences a Class C or Class D felon to probation, drug court,

or a pretrial-diversion program, he “shall order that the convicted

defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, treatment

institution, or community corrections program for a Class C felony

offense or in a consenting community corrections program for a

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24-10117 Opinion of the Court 21

Class D felony offense.” Id. Two aspects of that statute are instruc-

tive. First, even with respect to Class C felons, it describes a “com-

munity-corrections program” as an alternative to—not the equiva-

lent of—“a prison [or] jail-type institution.” Id. Second, and relat-

edly, the statute makes clear that while a Class C felon can be con-

fined in a prison or jail, a Class D felon like Gaines cannot be; ra-

ther, a Class D felon can be sentenced only to probation, drug

court, pretrial diversion, or “confine[ment] . . . in a consenting

community-corrections program.” Id. By its terms, therefore, the

statute forecloses the possibility that a defendant in Gaines’s shoes

can be confined in an actual prison or jail.

Separately, in multiple respects, the Alabama Community

Punishment and Corrections Act, see Ala. Code § 15-18-170 et seq.,

makes clear that a community-corrections sentence isn’t tanta-

mount to imprisonment. First, and most conspicuously, the Act

expressly defines the term “[c]ommunity punishment and correc-

tions program” as “an alternative to incarceration.” Ala. Code § 15-

18-171(6). The “alternative to incarceration” language was added

to the statute in 2003, and contemporaneous dictionaries (unsur-

prisingly) define the term “incarceration” and its cognates as syno-

nyms of “imprisonment” and its cognates. See, e.g., Incarceration,

Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (“[T]he act or process of con-

fining someone; IMPRISONMENT.”); Incarcerate, Merriam-Web-

ster’s Dictionary of Law (1996) (“IMPRISON.”); Incarcerate, Amer-

ican Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2001)

(“1. To imprison; 2. To confine.”). So like the statute under which

Gaines was sentenced, the Act indicates that a community-

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22 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

corrections sentence is an alternative to—i.e., different from—tra-

ditional imprisonment. Accord, e.g., id. § 15-18-175(d)(1) (describing

community corrections as an “alternative to prison”).

Second, and similarly, the Act identifies one of its “goals” as

being to “reduce the number of offenders committed to correc-

tional institutions and jails by punishing such offenders in alterna-

tive punishment settings.” Id. § 15-18-173(3). So again, the Act

identifies community corrections as an “alternative” to incarcerat-

ing offenders in “correctional institutions and jails.”

Third, the Act expressly catalogues the types of facilities and

services that might constitute “[c]ommunity-based programs.” Id.

§ 15-18-180(b). None of those listed bears any meaningful resem-

blance to prison. For instance: (1) “[c]ommunity service supervi-

sion; victim restitution, community detention and restitution cen-

ters; day reporting centers; victim-offender reconciliation pro-

grams; home confinement/curfew; electronic surveillance; inten-

sive supervision probation; alcohol/drug outpatient treatment and

psychiatric counseling”; (2) “[s]hort-term community residential

treatment options that involve close supervision in a residential set-

ting,” including “[d]etoxification centers; community detention

centers for special needs offenders and probation and parole viola-

tors; and inpatient drug/alcohol treatment”; (3) “[r]esidential in-

house drug and alcohol treatment for detoxification and residential

and nonresidential drug and alcohol counseling”; and even (4)

“[c]hurches or other nonprofit facilities that provide religious-

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24-10117 Opinion of the Court 23

based counseling, education, or other rehabilitative services.” Id.

§ 15-18-180(b)(1)–(3), (5).

Finally, the Act specifies the circumstances under which a

community-corrections sentence may be altered or revoked—and,

in so doing, clearly distinguishes between community-corrections

programs and actual imprisonment. For instance, the Act provides

that if the offender violates a condition of his community-correc-

tions sentence, the court may (among other options) “[m]odify the

conditions of serving the sentence, possibly including the inclusion

of short periods of confinement in local facilities . . . .” Id. § 15-18-

175(d)(3)(a)(4). The Act then goes on to state that “[t]he court shall

not revoke” a community-corrections sentence “and order the con-

finement to prison of the offender” unless the court finds that “[n]o

measure short of confinement” will adequately protect the com-

munity and address the seriousness of the offender’s violation. Id.

§ 15-18-175(d)(3)(d). Both provisions make clear that a commu-

nity-corrections sentence does not itself entail “confinement” in

“prison”—which, to the contrary, results only from both (1) a vio-

lation and (2) a judicial finding of necessity.

Bottom line: Alabama law, both as written and as inter-

preted and implemented, makes clear that a “community correc-

tions program” of the sort referred to in the statute under which

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24 Opinion of the Court 24-10117

Gaines was sentenced does not constitute “imprisonment” as that

term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 9

* * *

Because Gaines couldn’t receive any real-deal jail time for

his Class D felony, that offense doesn’t qualify as a “crime punish-

able by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” within the

meaning of § 922(g)(1). 10

9 We acknowledge some inconsistency in the way Alabama courts have re-

ferred to community-corrections programs. Compare, e.g., Ex parte Hill, 71 So.

3d 3, 8 (Ala. 2009) (“[T]he trial court . . . sentenced Hill to 20 years’ imprison-

ment, to be served in the community-corrections program.”), with, e.g., Turner

v. State, 981 So. 2d 444, 445 n.1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (“The Montgomery

Community Corrections Program . . . provides sanctions that lie somewhere

between prison and routine probation with respect to their restrictiveness.”),

and, e.g., State v. Wright, 976 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (“Just as

a ‘traditional’ inmate (that is, an inmate incarcerated within prison walls) who

escapes from a penal institution can be charged with first-degree escape . . . an

inmate in the community corrections program who fails to stay within the

parameters of the dictates of the program can also be charged with first-degree

escape . . . .”). But we think the applicable statutes make clear that a commu-

nity-corrections program is not the functional equivalent of prison for present

purposes.

10 One last thing: Although the government doesn’t seriously press the issue

on appeal, the district court seemed to think that it was bound to deny Gaines’s

motion for judgment of acquittal by our decision in United States v. Gardner, 34

F.4th 1283 (11th Cir. 2022). See Trial Tr. Vol. 3, 308, Sept. 13, 2023 (“[I]f we

did not have the Gardner case in the Eleventh Circuit, I probably would be

going [Gaines’s] way. But . . . the Eleventh Circuit . . . has said we . . . take a

categorical approach to looking at this matter.”). We disagree. In Gardner, we

held that, for purposes of the serious-drug-offense provision of the Armed

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24-10117 Opinion of the Court 25

IV

The Class D state-law felony for which Gaines was con-

victed is not a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-

ceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Accordingly, the evi-

dence at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction for that of-

fense. We therefore VACATE the district court’s order denying

Gaines’s motion for judgment of acquittal and REMAND with in-

structions for it to enter the judgment in his favor.

Career Criminal Act, the “maximum term of imprisonment . . . prescribed by

law,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), is the statutory maximum penalty—not, as

the defendant there contended, the upper end of a state’s applicable sentenc-

ing-guidelines range, Gardner, 34 F.4th at 1288–90. In so holding, we applied

a “categorical approach”—meaning, as we used the term there, that “we

‘look[ed] to the maximum sentence for the offense category’ and not to ‘the

particular sentence’ the defendant received or to the ‘particular facts of the

defendant’s crime.’” Id. at 1286 (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 135 F.3d

754, 757 (11th Cir. 1998)). Notably, though, the Supreme Court has held that

in determining the “maximum term of imprisonment . . . prescribed by law”

for ACCA purposes, a court should consider all state statutes that affect the

maximum prison term to which a defendant is subject given his conviction

record. See United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 393 (2008) (holding it

proper to consult state recidivist-offender statutes that enhanced the base stat-

utory maximum where the defendant’s conviction record supported an en-

hancement). Thus, even if it applied here foursquare, Gardner’s “categorical

approach” wouldn’t move the needle because, for reasons already explained,

under the law applicable at the time—including, most notably, Ala. Code § 15-

18-8(b) (2019) (amended 2023)—the statutory maximum penalty for a Class D

felon with Gaines’s conviction record wouldn’t involve any time in a prison

or comparable facility.