Cymbler v. New York State

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------------------------------- X

:

CAROL S. CYMBLER, on behalf of herself and all

others similarly situated, :

Plaintiff, :

: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

– against – ORDER

:

24-CV-2792 (AMD) (SIL)

NEW YORK STATE, NASSAU COUNTY, :

NASSAU COUNTY TRAFFIC AND PARKING

:

VIOLATIONS AGENCY, VERRA MOBILITY

CORPORATION, AMERICAN TRAFFIC :

SOLUTIONS, INC.,

:

Defendants.

:

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A NN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:

The plaintiff brought this action on behalf of herself and other class members against

New York State, Nassau County, Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency

(“NCTPVA”), Verra Mobility Corporation and Americ an Traffic Solutions, Inc.1 She claims

that the defendants violated the United States and New York constitutions by installing and

operating red light cameras in Nassau County. The plaintiff also brings claims for fraud,

invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, abuse of process, concert of action and racketeering.

Nassau County and NCTPVA (the “Nassau defendants” ) move to dismiss the complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for lack of standing, failure to state a claim and because

NCTPVA is not a suable entity. Verra Mobility Corporation and American Traffic Solutions,

Inc. (the “corporate defendants”) move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil

1 The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims against New York State. (ECF No. 31.) Although she did

not specify which claims she was withdrawing, the Court construes her filing to dismiss the First,

Second, Third and Fourth causes of action, which challenge the constitutionality of a New York State

statute, VTL § 1111-b.

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. For the reasons

that follow, the Court grants the defendants’ motions to dismiss the federal claims and declines

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims.

BACKGROUND2

I. Statutory Background

In 2009, New York amended the Vehicle and Traffic Law (“VTL”) to add VTL § 1111-b,

which authorized counties, including Nassau County, to install and operate “traffic-control signal

photo violation-monitoring devices” — red light cameras — at intersections throughout the

county.3 (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 20–21.) VTL § 1111-b(a)(1) “authorized and empowered” Nassau

County “to adopt and amend a local law or ordinance establishing” a red light camera program.

(Id. ¶ 22.) To implement the program, the Nassau County legislature passed Local Law 12-2009

on May 18, 2008, which became effective on June 18, 2009, and added Title 72 to the

Miscellaneous Laws of Nassau County. (Id.) Title 72 § 1(a) provides that the Department of

Public Works “shall be authorized to install traffic-control signal photo violation-monitoring

2 The Court considers the complaint and the parties’ briefing. The Court also takes judicial notice of the

Nassau defendants’ exhibits A and B, which are resolutions and ordinances passed by the Nassau

County Legislature. (ECF Nos. 36-3, 36-4.) See Lewis v. Livingston Cnty. Ctr. for Nursing & Rehab.,

30 F. Supp. 3d 196, 203 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (taking judicial notice of county resolution). However, the

Court does not consider the corporate defendants’ exhibit A, which is a transcript of the plaintiff’s

January 31, 2023 hearing before the NCTPVA. (ECF No. 35-3.) See Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67

(2d Cir. 2004) (the “paraphrasing of certain events” at a hearing does not incorporate the hearing

transcripts by reference into a complaint), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223 (2009). The Court also considers documents from other cases: exhibits A and B, which the plaintiff

submitted with her opposition to the corporate defendants’ motion (ECF Nos. 38-2, 38-3), and exhibits

A–D, which she submitted with her opposition to the Nassau defendants’ motion (ECF Nos. 39-2, 39-3,

39-4, 39-5). See Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[C]ourts routinely

take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts . . . to establish the fact of such litigation and

related filings.”). The Court does not consider plaintiff’s exhibit E, which is not mentioned in the

complaint or incorporated by reference. (ECF No. 39-6.) Id. at 773.

3 VTL § 1111-b was supposed to expire in December 2014, but the state extended the expiration date.

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 21.) At first, the legislature authorized red light cameras for 50 intersections, and then for

100 intersections. (Id. ¶ 21 n.5.)

devices and to operate such devices at no more than fifty intersections within and under the

jurisdiction of the County at one time.” (Id. ¶ 25.)

Under VTL § 1111-b(a)(1), Nassau County was to install and operate the red light

cameras. (Id. ¶ 26.) Similarly, Title 72 placed responsibility for the installation and operation of

red light cameras on the county’s Department of Public Works. (Id. ¶ 27.) According to the

plaintiff, neither VTL § 1111-b(a)(1) nor Title 72 explicitly or implicitly authorized the county

or the Department of Public Works to contract out the installation or operation to any other

agencies or third-party vendors. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) The plaintiff alleges that Nassau County

“intentionally ignored the limitations contained in the explicit statutory authorizations set forth in

VTL § 1111-b(a)(1) and Title 72,” because the Department of Public Works’ only involvement

with the program was to assist in selecting locations for the installation of these cameras. (Id.

¶¶ 28–29.) Instead, the plaintiff says, the NCTPVA “involved itself with the installation and

operation of the red light cameras in Nassau County” by contracting with the corporate

defendants to rent the red light cameras. (Id. ¶¶ 30–31.) The plaintiff maintains that the

contracts violated VTL § 1111-b(a)(1) and Title 72, because they provided that the corporate

defendants were responsible for installing, operating, and maintaining the red light cameras. (Id.

¶ 32.)

When a red light camera captures a driver violating red light laws, NCTPVA mails the

registered owner of the vehicle a notice of liability, which includes a fine. (Id. ¶ 33; see also

ECF No. 1-1 at 2.) The owner can pay the fine in four different ways: (1) in person at

NCTPVA’s office, (2) by mail with a check or money order made out to Nassau County and sent

to Nassau County (not NCTPVA), (3) calling a call center run by the corporate defendants, or (4)

paying the corporate defendants electronically through a commercial website. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 35.)

An owner who wants to contest the violation can request a hearing by completing a form

attached to the violation notice and mailing it to Nassau County, not NCTPVA. (Id. ¶ 36; see

also ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) A hearing is then scheduled before an officer employed by Nassau

County and NCTPVA. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 36.) If the officer upholds the violation, the driver pays

NCTPVA directly, at its office. (Id. ¶ 37.) If the officer dismisses the notice, the owner still has

to pay NCTPVA fees, which are imposed by Nassau County. (Id. ¶ 38.)

II. Factual Background

The plaintiff concedes that she violated the red light law. (Id. ¶ 39.) At about 12:20 p.m.

on June 15, 2022, she ran the red light at Old Country Road and South Oyster Bay Road. (Id.

¶¶ 41–42.) The red light camera, which was installed, operated and maintained by the corporate

defendants pursuant to contracts with Nassau County and NCTPVA (id. ¶ 43), captured the

violation in video and still images. (Id. ¶ 40.) 27 days later, the plaintiff received a notice of

liability dated July 1, 2022.4 (Id. ¶¶ 39, 44.) The notice stated that the plaintiff owed $150,

which included $50 in fines, a $45 “Driver Responsibility Fee” and a $55 “Public Safety Fee.”

(Id. ¶ 45.) According to the notice, the plaintiff could pay the $150, as described above, or

challenge the ticket and request a hearing by August 23, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 46–51.)

The plaintiff completed the hearing form and mailed it to Nassau County. (Id. ¶ 52.) She

received a response, dated August 9, 2022, advising her that the hearing would take place on

January 31, 2023. (Id. ¶ 53.) On that day, the plaintiff and her lawyer5 appeared for the hearing

at the NCTPVA offices; a Nassau County and NCTPVA attorney appeared for the county, and

an officer from Nassau County and NCTPVA presided. (Id. ¶ 54.) Nassau County and

4 The ticket number was 1692202357250. (Id. ¶ 39.)

5 Counsel in this action also represented the plaintiff at the hearing.

NCTPVA presented evidence, including the red light camera photographs and video recording,

and a certificate by an NCTPVA technician. (Id. ¶ 55.) The plaintiff now objects to the

admission of the photographs and video recording, because of the “unconstitutionality of the

enacting statutes.” (Id. ¶ 56.) Even if the statutes were constitutional, the plaintiff argues, the

red light camera was “unauthorized and illegal” because it “was not installed or operated in

compliance with the state and county statutes.” (Id. ¶ 57.) The plaintiff also alleges that the

camera’s certificate “failed to meet the statutory requirements for admission as it conflicts with

plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” (Id. ¶ 58.)6

The hearing officer ruled against the plaintiff and upheld the citation. (Id. ¶ 60.) The

plaintiff paid the entire $150 fine by credit card at the NCTPVA offices. (Id. ¶ 61.) She did not

appeal the officer’s decision. (See ECF No. 35-1 at 6.)

III. Procedural History

On April 15, 2024, the plaintiff brought this action on behalf of herself and similarly

situated drivers. She alleges the following causes of action:7

• VTL § 1111-b violates the federal and New York constitutions, because it

imposes liability only on motor vehicle drivers, not on bicyclists. (Id. ¶¶ 71–97.)

• Allowing a sworn affidavit as “evidence of the accusations made against Notice

recipients” “create[s] a new exception to the generally applicable rules on

hearsay.” (Id. ¶¶ 98–111.)

6 According to the plaintiff, Nassau County and NCTPVA “allowed their own inadmissible (and illegal

and unlawfully obtained) evidence” to be admitted, because their attorney offered the evidence and the

officer presiding over the hearing worked for them. (Id. ¶ 60.)

7 The complaint lists three proposed classes, two of which include sub-classes. (Id. ¶ 63.) The “Ticketed

Class” includes drivers who have received notices of liability, based on photographs and videos, since

2009. (Id.) The “Paying Class” includes people in the ticketed class who paid the fines. (Id.) This

class is divided into three subclasses: those who did not dispute the notice (the “Non-disputing

Subclass”), those who paid the fines after disputing the notice and appearing at a hearing (the

“Disputing Subclass”), and those who disputed the notice and prevailed, but had to pay fees (the “Fee

Only Subclass”). (Id.) The “RICO Class” includes people who suffered financial injuries and is divided

into two subclasses: those who were injured more than four years before this action (the “Older

Subclass”) and those were injured within four years of this action (the “Newer Subclass”). (Id.)

• Nassau County improperly gave the NCTPVA authority to issue notices of

liability, “exceed[ing] the authorization limitations” established in General

Municipal Law § 370-a(1), which provides that the “sole purpose of NCTPVA is

‘to administer and dispose of traffic and parking infractions.’” (Id. ¶¶ 112–24.)

• Title 72 “denies due process” because the NCTPVA prepares the notices of

liability and adjudicates the challenges to the notices, “eliminat[ing] any concept

of a fair tribunal.” (Id. ¶¶ 125–45.)

• The red light camera program fees are illegal taxes that violate the federal and

New York state constitutions; the “Driver Responsibility Fee” is the same

regardless of the actual administrative costs (id. ¶¶ 146–62), and the “Public

Safety Fee” is not applied in “all matters involving traffic safety” (id. ¶¶ 163–80).

• The “Public Safety Fee” exceeds the maximum penalty allowed by state law. (Id.

¶¶ 181–90.)

• Photographic and video evidence should not be admitted at NCTPVA hearings

(id. ¶¶ 320–56), and “live witnesses” should have to testify (id. ¶¶ 519–40).

• The defendants violated due process and denied equal protection under the state

and federal constitutions. (Id. ¶¶ 541–49.)

• The “red light camera Notices and red light camera hearings” are treated as

“quasi-civil and quasi-criminal hybrids;” thus, “due process requirements

pertaining to criminal proceedings” — including the Sixth Amendment right to

confront witnesses — “must apply.” (Id. ¶¶ 550–73.)

• The contracts between the Nassau defendants and the corporate defendants were

fraudulent, because only the Nassau County Department of Public Works was

legally authorized to install and operate the red light cameras. The defendants

committed “fraud” by issuing the notices of liability based on the evidence from

the cameras. (Id. ¶¶ 191–249.)

• The defendants invaded the plaintiff’s privacy, because the corporate defendants

did not have private investigator licenses, which were required because the

corporate defendants were “hired to obtain evidence of a crime committed against

the state.” (Id. ¶¶ 250–70.)

• The defendants used the license plate and registration information from the

photographs and video recordings to obtain confidential information about the

plaintiff in violation of the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721,

2722, and 2724. (Id. ¶¶ 273–97.)

In addition, the plaintiff claims:

• Unjust enrichment based on the payments from drivers who were issued notices

of liability (id. ¶¶ 298–319; 357–94);

• Abuse of process because Nassau County and NCTPVA “turn[ed] ‘a blind eye’”

to the supposedly illegal process (id. ¶¶ 395–431);

• Concert of action (id. ¶¶ 432–72);

• Fraud and abuse of process in connection Nassau County’s certifications about

the red light camera program to the New York state and federal governments (id.

¶¶ 473–518);

• Causes of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

18 U.S.C. § 1962 (id. ¶¶ 574–693).

The plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, an injunction prohibiting Nassau County and NCTPVA from

contracting with the corporate defendants, disgorgement of money collected by the red light

program, as well as compensatory, punitive and treble damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment

interest and attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 115–116.)8

The defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(c). They argue that the plaintiff does not have Article III

standing, did not exhaust administrative remedies and fails to state federal or state causes of

action. The Nassau defendants argue that NCTPVA is not a suable entity, and in any event, that

the law permits them to contract with the corporate defendants in connection with the red light

camera program.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)

when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v.

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “If plaintiffs lack Article III standing, a court

8 On May 20, 2024, Nassau County and NCTPVA answered the complaint and filed cross claims against

New York State, Verra Mobility Corporation and American Traffic Solutions for common law

contribution and indemnification, and against Verra Mobility Corporation and American Traffic

Solutions for contractual indemnification. (ECF No. 8.) On July 5, 2024, Nassau County and NCTPVA

voluntarily dismissed their cross claims against New York State. (ECF No. 24.) On July 31, 2024, the

plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against New York State. (ECF No. 31.) On August 29, 2024,

Nassau County and NCTPVA withdrew their cross claims against the corporate defendants. (ECF No.

34.)

has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claim.” Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health &

Welfare Fund v. Merck–Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005). “A

plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that it exists.” Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. However, “[b]ecause ‘standing is

challenged on the basis of the pleadings, [the court must] accept as true all material allegations of

the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.’” MacIssac v.

Town of Poughkeepsie, 770 F.Supp.2d 587, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Connecticut v.

Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2002)).

To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed

factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or a

‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555). Pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hayden v.

Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010).

The plaintiff argues that the Nassau defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion should be denied as

premature and not converted into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and that the Court should deny motion

in any event. (ECF No. 39 at 8–11.) “The standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for

judgment on the pleadings is identical to that for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to

state a claim.” Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 301 (2d Cir. 2021)

(quoting Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020)). Accordingly, the Court

construes the Nassau defendants’ motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Ezra v. Bristol-Myers

Squibb Co., 784 F. App’x 48, 49 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding that the district court property

considered the defendant’s untimely 12(c) motion); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1368 (3d ed.) (“Because of the similarity between the Rule 12(c) and Rule

12(b) standards, courts typically will construe a premature Rule 12(c) motions as if it were

brought under Rule 12(b) and a late Rule 12(b) motion . . . as if it were brought under Rule

12(c).”).

DISCUSSION

I. Article III Standing

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must “show that the conduct of which he

complains has caused him to suffer an ‘injury in fact’ that a favorable judgment will

redress.” Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, No. 01-CV-1399, 2006 WL 1155162, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.

Jan. 6, 2006), aff’d, 277 F. App’x. 72 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The defendants argue

that the plaintiff’s “interest in avoiding the consequences of running a red light does not confer

Article III standing.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 10; see also ECF No. 36-1 at 8–10.) The defendants rely

on Bell v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., in which the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs, who paid fines

after red light cameras caught them running red lights, did not have standing to bring a

negligence per se claim against American Traffic Solutions, which installed and operated the

cameras. 371 F. App’x 488, 492 (5th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff responds that Bell is different

because the plaintiffs sued for negligence under Texas law and claimed that they would not have

been caught if ATS had not installed and operated the cameras. (ECF No 39 at 11–12.)

a. Injury

The plaintiff cites the following as sources of her injuries: the allegedly unconstitutional

red light statutes, the allegedly invalid contracts between the Nassau and corporate defendants

and denial of due process in connection with her challenge to the citation. The Bell plaintiffs, on

the other hand, based their claims on a Texas statute prohibiting “investigations compan[ies]”

from operating without a license; they also claimed that “their violations would not have been

discovered were it not for [American Traffic Solutions].” Bell, 371 F. App’x at 490. Courts

have routinely found that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of state and

county statutes and regulations, including those related to fees. See, e.g., Kwong v. Bloomberg,

876 F. Supp. 2d 246, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding standing

where plaintiffs who paid a fee challenged the city statute establishing the fee as

unconstitutional); New York State Firearms Ass’n v. James, No. 23-CV-6524, 2024 WL

1932050, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2024) (finding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge fees

associated with background checks imposed by state statute). The plaintiff’s injury is therefore

more than simply an “interest in evading the law.” Bell, 371 F. App’x at 490.

The corporate defendants’ reliance on Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, (ECF No. 35-1 at

11), is also misplaced. Palmieri ignored a rental permit law and rented his property without the

necessary permit. Palmieri, 2006 WL 1155162, at *6. The Honorable Sterling Johnson held that

Palmieri did not have standing, and that his “failure to comply with the law by obtaining a permit

undermines any claim he has that the Rental Permit Law as enforced violated due process with

regard to his Property.” Id. Judge Johnson observed that Palmieri “could not have suffered the

alleged injury of being deprived due process . . . upon the statute’s enactment” because he did

not buy the property until years after the town enacted the statute. Id. at *5. Here, on the other

hand, the plaintiff does not base her due process claims on a statute that she ignored; rather, she

alleges that she was denied due process because the methods to challenge the hearing officer’s

finding were deficient.

Leder v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 211 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 630 F. App’x 61

(2d Cir. 2015) provides the appropriate analogy. In that case, Leder ran a red light, got a ticket

and sued the same defendants the plaintiff is suing in this case. Id. at 216. Leder did not contest

the ticket and paid the fine, but claimed the defendants violated due process because they

reduced the yellow light times, forcing drivers to run red lights, in order to generate revenue. Id.

at 217. The Honorable Arthur Spatt rejected the defendants’ standing claim, because Leder’s

“allegation that she paid a fine of $65.00 as a result of the Defendants’ actions, although for a

small amount, satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement.” Id. at 221. Like Leder, the plaintiff in

this case alleges “that she paid a fine . . . as a result of the Defendants’ actions . . . [which]

satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement.” Id.

a. Causation

The defendants also argue that the plaintiff’s “own allegations confirm that her alleged

‘harm’ is not ‘fairly traceable’ to” their conduct, because she “does not challenge that she

violated the law.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 11; see also ECF No. 36-1 at 10–11.) The corporate

defendants argue that, like in Palmieri, “it was Plaintiff’s traffic infraction — her failure to

comply with the VTL — that caused her alleged injury, not the red-light camera system that

recorded her unlawful act.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 11.) Judge Spatt rejected this argument when the

defendants made it in Leder. See Leder, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 221. “Article III causation does not

require that a plaintiff demonstrate that her injury was directly caused by the Defendant’s

actions; rather, she merely needs to show that her injury was ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s

conduct.” Id. (quoting Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 2013)). The plaintiff’s

claim — that the defendants caused her injuries by establishing and operating the red light

program — is sufficient at this stage of the litigation to show causation. Id.; see also Toretto v.

Donnelley Fin. Sols., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 3d 464, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[I]ndirectness is not

necessarily fatal to standing, because the fairly traceable standard is lower than that of proximate

cause.” (citation omitted)).

b. Redressability

The Court also considers the question of redressability, even though the defendants have

not raised it. See In re Univ. Urology Data Sec. Incident Litig., No. 23-CV-6484, 2025 WL

1002355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (“While Defendants advance no argument on

traceability or redressability, the Court considers these prongs sua sponte.”). The plaintiff seeks

declaratory relief, an injunction prohibiting the Nassau defendants from contracting with the

corporate defendants, disgorgement of profits from the red light camera program and damages.

(ECF No. 1 at 115–116.) “A plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of

relief sought.” MacIssac, 770 F.Supp.2d at 593 (citation omitted).

The plaintiff seeks damages for economic injuries she sustained because of the

defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Accordingly, awarding damages for the fines the

plaintiff paid will redress her injury. See Leder, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 222. However, as Judge Spatt

found in Leder, “the Plaintiff’s request for [injunctive] relief appears less plausible.” Id. “In

seeking prospective relief like an injunction, ‘a plaintiff must show that he can reasonably expect

to encounter the same injury again in the future — otherwise there is no remedial benefit that he

can derive from such judicial decree.’” Id. (quoting MacIssac, 770 F.Supp.2d at 593). The

plaintiff does not allege that she will be cited for running red lights if the Court does not grant

her injunctive relief. Even if she runs a red light and gets a ticket, that “chance is too

speculative to confer Article III standing on the Plaintiff’s claim for a permanent injunction.”

Id.; see also Worthy v. City of Phenix City, Alabama, 930 F.3d 1206, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2019)

(“Appellants lack standing to bring their claims for injunctive relief [related to a red-light-camera

ordinance] because they have not sufficiently alleged a threat of future harm.”). Accordingly,

the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are dismissed for lack of standing.

II. Failure to Exhaust and Preclusion

The defendants argue that the plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies.

According to the corporate defendants, the plaintiff’s “failure to raise the arguments contained in

her Complaint during her hearing before the NCTPVA bars her from now raising them here.”

(ECF No. 35-1 at 12.) They say that is so that even if the hearing was a judicial rather than

administrative proceeding, as the plaintiff claims. (ECF No. 40 at 8–9.) The Nassau defendants

argue that the plaintiff should be “estop[ped] . . . from now bringing the present action” because

she chose “to pay the fine instead of pursuing an appeal of her hearing.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 11.)

The plaintiff responds that exhaustion is not required, and that even if it is, she exhausted

administrative remedies by having a hearing. (ECF No. 38 at 14–17.)9

The plaintiff brings constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not require

exhaustion. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1982) (“[T]his

Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983.”);

see also Knutson v. Vill. of Lakemoor, No. 18-CV-1804, 2018 WL 10509387, at *8 n.12 (N.D.

Ill. Dec. 4, 2018), aff’d, 932 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2019) (exhaustion was not required where

plaintiff challenged red light camera ordinance); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell,

221 F.3d 376, 382 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000) (“For purposes of constitutional standing, there is no

requirement that a plaintiff challenging the facial validity of a state statute first raise its claim in

state court.”).

9 The plaintiff also challenges the defendants’ description of the hearing. (ECF No. 38 at 17–18.)

Nor does claim preclusion apply. In Section 1983 cases, “a federal court must give to a

state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of

the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Knutson, 2018 WL 10509387, at *7 (quoting

Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)).10 Under New York Law,

“[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, is invoked to prevent a party . . . from relitigating a

previously litigated action” and applies “to all issues and theories of recovery applicable to the

cause of action, whether or not they were actually litigated.” Hirschfeld v. Hogan, 18 Misc. 3d

531, 534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). Therefore, “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all

other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based

on different theories or even if seeking a different remedy.” Id.

While conceding that “a number of issues raised in the complaint were not put forth

before NCTPVA,” the plaintiff argues that “the presiding judicial hearing officer did not have

the authority to rule on those issues.” (ECF No. 38 at 18.) Claim preclusion “contemplates that

the parties had a ‘full and fair’ opportunity to litigate the initial determination.” People v. Evans,

94 N.Y.2d 499, 501 (2000). The plaintiff could not have litigated her claims at the hearing

because they are not defenses under VTL § 1111-b.11 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims are not

precluded. See also Knutson, 2018 WL 10509387, at *8 (preclusion was not available where the

10 The corporate defendants cite Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009), where plaintiffs

challenged the city’s red light camera program. (ECF No. 40 at 9.) The Seventh Circuit observed that

the city “might well have had a good argument that claim preclusion bars this litigation” but the city did

not advance “this affirmative defense.” Idris, 552 F.3d at 565. In Knutson, another challenge to a red

light camera program, the district court acknowledged that Idris “mention[s], in dicta, that claim

preclusion may be an available affirmative defense to claims against city ordinances,” but found that

the plaintiffs were not precluded from bringing suit even though they did not raise their arguments in

the administrative hearing. 2018 WL 10509387, at *7–8.

11 VTL § 1111-b has two defenses — that the car was reported stolen before the violation, VTL § 1111-

b(i), and that the red light camera was malfunctioning at the time of the alleged violations, VTL

§ 1111-b(o).

plaintiffs were “prevented from challenging allegedly unlawful notices or administrative hearing

procedures” and where “a hearing officer would not have been able to grant the relief [the

plaintiffs’ sought] under their limited powers”).

III. NCTPVA

The Nassau defendants argue that NCTPVA is a non-suable entity because it “is merely

an administrative arm of the municipality of Nassau County” and does not have its own legal

identity. (ECF No. 36-1 at 11–12 (quoting Davis v. Nassau Cnty., No. 06-CV-4762, 2011 WL

5401663, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2011).) According to the defendants, the “legal reality of

NCTPVA being legally identical to NASSAU has severe substantive ramifications” for the

plaintiff’s complaint, because she alleges that Nassau County improperly authorized or

empowered NCTPVA. (Id. at 12.) They argue that because NCTPVA is a non-suable entity,

“the many causes of action premised upon the mistaken argument that NASSAU improperly

enlarged NCTPVA’s authority and/or powers [are] null[].” (Id.) The plaintiff responds that

Davis, which Judge Spatt also decided, does not apply because the motion for summary

judgment was unopposed, and Judge Spatt did not consider NCTPVA’s history. (ECF No. 39 at

17–18.) The plaintiff asserts that the “statute and legislative history” show that NCTPVA is “not

an administrative arm of Nassau but a branch of the District Court,” and that NCTPVA’s website

includes disclaimers about Nassau County and NCTPVA that undermine the defendants’ claim

that NCTPVA cannot be sued. (Id. at 18–20.)

Judge Spatt observed that “under New York law, ‘departments that are merely

administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the

municipality, and therefore cannot … be sued.’” Davis, 2011 WL 5401663, at *3 (quoting

Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 99 n.3 (2d Cir. 2008)). Judge Spatt found that “[t]here is no

doubt that the Nassau County Traffic & Parking Violations Agency is merely an administrative

arm of the municipality of Nassau County,” and granted summary judgment for Nassau County.

Id. The Court agrees with that sound logic. See also Nassau County Administrative Code § 24-

1.1 (“[T]here shall be a department of the Nassau County government known as the Nassau

County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, which shall operate under the control and

direction of the County Executive.”). The plaintiff’s claims against NCTPVA are dismissed

because it does “not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore,

cannot be sued.” Davis, 2011 WL 5401663, at *3; see also Polite v. Town of Clarkstown, 60 F.

Supp. 2d 214, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[M]unicipal departments in this State . . . are not amenable

to suit, and no claims can lie directly against them.”).

IV. Failure to State a Claim

The defendants ask the Court to dismiss all of the plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a

claim. (ECF No. 35-1 at 13–21; ECF No. 36-1 at 14–22.) The Court addresses each claim in

turn.12

a. Due Process

Four of the plaintiff’s claims are federal due process claims against the Nassau

defendants. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 125–35 (Sixth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 320–41 (Nineteenth Cause of

Action); ¶¶ 541–44 (Thirty-Third Cause of Action); ¶¶ 550–73 (Thirty-Fifth Cause of Action).)13

The basis for her claims is that NCTPVA issues the notices of liability and adjudicates

challenges to the notices, and that evidence from the red light cameras — photographs and

videos — are admissible at NCTPVA hearings, as are sworn affidavits in lieu of witnesses.

12 The plaintiff did not bring federal claims against the corporate defendants. (ECF No. 38 at 19–24.)

13 As noted above, the plaintiff withdrew her claims against New York state, including the third and

fourth causes of action challenging the constitutionality of the statute. (ECF No. 31.)

The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause states that no person shall “be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law;” the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Clause “mirrors this language.” Marvin v. Peldunas, No. 21-1824-CV, 2022 WL 2125851, at *1

(2d Cir. June 14, 2022). “Due process protection has two components, a substantive due process

component and a procedural due process component.” Avramenkov v. I.N.S., 99 F. Supp. 2d 210,

215 (D. Conn. 2000). “The substantive due process component precludes the government from

engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept

of ordered liberty.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “The

procedural due process component precludes the government from depriving a person of life,

liberty, or property in an unfair manner.” Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

(1976)).

i. Substantive Due Process

A plaintiff making a substantive due process claim must sufficiently allege “(1) a ‘valid

property interest’ or ‘fundamental right’; and (2) that the defendant infringed on that right by

conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ or suggests a ‘gross abuse of governmental authority.’”

Leder, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 223 (quoting Sloup v. Loeffler, No. 5–CV–1766, 2008 WL 3978208, at

*10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008)). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must show that the

government decision it challenges ‘was arbitrary or irrational or motivated by bad faith.’” Dubin

v. Cnty. of Nassau, 277 F. Supp. 3d 366, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889

F.2d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1989)). Notably, “the scope of rights afforded by the Due Process clause

is extremely limited.” Leder, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 223.

“Not all property rights are entitled to the protections of substantive due process,” which

protects only “those interests that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, i.e., those rights

that are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”

Id. at 223–24 (citations omitted); see also Venghaus v. City of Hartford, No. 06–CV-1452, 2012

WL 1050014, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) (“The protections of substantive due process have

for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right

to bodily integrity.”). The property interest that the plaintiff alleges is her “financial liability” for

the red light violation — a $150 fee. (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 45.) But “courts have repeatedly found

that the substantive Due Process clause does not protect plaintiffs from modest fines.” Leder, 81

F. Supp. 3d at 224. Nor does the challenged conduct — issuing and adjudicating notices of

liability and permitting certain evidence at an NCTPVA hearing — “shock[] the conscience” or

constitute a “gross abuse of governmental authority.” Id. at 223.

ii. Procedural Due Process

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 procedural due process claim “must allege both the

existence of a protected liberty or property interest, and that he or she was deprived of that

interest without being afforded sufficient process.” Foskey v. Corp. State of New York, No. 22-

CV-2546, 2022 WL 3228271, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022). Procedural due process requires,

at a minimum, that the state afford people “some kind of hearing” before depriving them of a

liberty or property interest. Id. (quoting DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003)).

In “evaluating the adequacy of a challenged procedure,” courts balance the following factors:

“(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the

function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedural requirement would entail.” Dubin, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 388–89 (quoting Nat’l Org. for

Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2001)).

New York courts have determined that VTL § 1111-b’s red light camera program is civil,

not criminal. See Krieger v. City of Rochester, 978 N.Y.S.2d 588, 598–99 (Sup. Ct. 2013)

(“[T]he statutory scheme demonstrates an unequivocal intent to create a civil enforcement

mechanism, not a criminal one.”); id. at 599 (collecting cases).14 Accordingly, the adjudication

procedure “require[s] a lower level of due process protections.” Id. at 600. As explained above,

the $150 fee that the plaintiff paid for violating the red light law is not a protected property

interest. On the other hand, the government has an interest in enforcing traffic laws, and “the

Legislature went to great lengths to design the red light program to be a minimal invasion into

privacy by prohibiting photographs of the ‘driver, the passengers, or the contents of the

vehicle.’” Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (quoting VTL § 1111–b(a)(2)). In any case, “adequate

procedures exist[] to safeguard plaintiffs’ property rights.” Dubin, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 389. The

notice of liability “provides sufficient detail of the allegations . . . as amplified by an opportunity

to view the video of the alleged infraction via the internet, and the matter is set for a hearing at

which time the owner is given a chance to contest the alleged infraction.” Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d

at 601 (quoting VTL § 1111-b(g)). The plaintiff took advantage of this procedure and contested

her notice of liability at a hearing. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 52–54.) A vehicle owner can also “appeal any

guilt adjudication to an Examiner Panel at the Bureau,” Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 602; the

plaintiff did not avail herself of this opportunity. “The fact that a [NCTPVA] technician inspects

the red light camera footage and issues a sworn or affirmed certificate, and another [NCTPVA]

14 The plaintiff alleges that the “red light camera Notices and red light camera hearings [are] quasi-civil

and quasi-criminal hybrids” because the notices of liability provide that failure to respond will result in

a “default conviction.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 557–60.) But the statute “expressly states that a finding of

liability ‘shall not be deemed a conviction.’” Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (quoting VTL § 1111-b(f)).

Moreover, VTL § 1111-b “does not allow for a conviction exposing the offender to potential jail time,”

and “the alleged infraction is heard by an administrative body and not a criminal court.” Id.

employee conducts the hearings, does not condemn the red light camera program.” 15 Id.

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s due process claims are dismissed.

b. Equal Protection

Two of the plaintiff’s claims are for federal equal protection violations. (See ECF No. 1

¶¶ 163–72 (Tenth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 545–49 (Thirty-Fourth Cause of Action)).16 According

to the plaintiff, VTL § 1111-b treats motor vehicle owners differently than bicycle owners, the

Public Safety Fee treats red light camera violations differently than parking infractions, and

people who are caught by red light cameras are denied the “right to confront their accuser.”

“In order to establish an equal protection claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) [s]he

was selectively treated compared with others similarly situated; and (2) the selective treatment

was based on impermissible considerations, such as membership in a suspect class, intent to

inhibit or punish the exercise of a constitutional right, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure.”

Margiotta v. Kaye, 283 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). As for the first requirement,

“[e]qual protection challenges to government classifications generally are concerned with

distinctions based on an ‘identifiable group.’” Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-CV-1289, 2009 WL

3055322, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). In Akbar, also a challenge to red light cameras, the

court found that a plaintiff’s equal protection classifications — drivers in the downtown area

versus drivers in other areas — were “problematic,” because “the constituent members of the

two groups constantly are in flux.” Id. The same is true in this case. The groups of people who

15 The Krieger court identified additional safeguards for vehicle owners. “At the hearing, the owner can

have the assistance of an attorney if desired, can subpoena witnesses and records, and is not restrained

by the traditional rules of evidence . . . . The hearing also provides the owner with the ability to pursue

the defense that the red light camera was malfunctioning . . . . The owner’s guilt must be shown by

‘substantial evidence.’” 978 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (quoting VTL § 1111-b(n), VTL § 240(2)(b), (c) & (d)).

16 The plaintiff argues that the Nassau defendants cannot defend equal protection challenges to a New

York statute’s constitutionality (ECF No. 39 at 24), but that argument is moot because she withdrew

her constitutional claims about the statute, which includes the first and second causes of action.

own cars, ride bikes, commit parking violations and run red lights are constantly changing. Nor

has the plaintiff alleged that these classifications are “based on impermissible considerations,

such as membership in a suspect class, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of a constitutional

right, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure.” Margiotta, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 864.

Because “the alleged unequal treatment implicates neither a ‘fundamental right’ nor is

based on a suspect or quasi-suspect distinction such as race, religion, or alienage, the Court must

apply a ‘rational basis review’ to the statutory distinction.” Id. (quoting Lamson v. Blumenthal,

75 F. App’x. 811, 812 (2d Cir. 2003)). A legislative classification subject to rational basis

review “must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable

state of facts that could provide a rational basis for classification;” “[t]he actual motivations of

the enacting governmental body are irrelevant.” Id. (citations omitted). The burden is on the

plaintiff to negate “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis

for the classification.” Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)

(citation omitted). The plaintiff has not come close to meeting this burden, nor does she attempt

to do so. The plaintiff claims only that the red light camera program “constitutes an

impermissible selective treatment,” without addressing whether the program serves a legitimate

governmental purpose. (See, e.g., ECF No. 39 at 25–26.) In any event, there is a rational basis

for the red light camera program. For example, it is rational to conclude that car drivers who run

red lights pose a greater danger to public safety than bicycle riders who run red lights or than

drivers who violate parking regulations. The equal protection claims are dismissed.

c. Takings Clause

The plaintiff brings a federal Takings Clause claim. She alleges that the “Driver

Responsibility Fee” is an illegally imposed tax, not an administrative fee, because the defendants

impose it regardless of whether the driver has a hearing. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 146–54 (Eighth

Cause of Action).) The defendants argue that courts have upheld the fee, citing Dubin, 277 F.

Supp. 3d at 393, and Guthart v. Nassau Cnty., No. 604271-2016, 2022 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 42415

(Sup Ct. Nassau County 2022). (ECF No. 35-1 at 17; ECF No. 36-1 at 17–18.) The plaintiff

responds that the claims in those cases are different. (ECF No. 39 at 26.)17

“To plead a taking under the Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment, a plaintiff must allege

that (1) plaintiff possessed a valid property interest; (2) there was a taking of that property

interest under color of state law; and (3) the taking was without just compensation.” Dubin, 277

F. Supp. 3d at 394. In McCarthy v. City of Cleveland, 626 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 2010), the court

distinguished between takings of “a sum of money from a specific fund” — which is an improper

taking — and a taking that “merely impose an obligation on a party to pay money on the

happening of a contingency” — which is not an improper taking. Id. at 284. Because the Driver

Responsibility Fee is not a seizure of funds from the plaintiff’s bank account, but a fee that a

driver must pay for violating the red light laws, the fee is not an improper taking.

d. The Drivers Privacy Protection Act

The plaintiff brings two causes of action for invasion of privacy under the Drivers

Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721, 2724. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 250–82 (Fifteenth

Cause of Action); ¶¶ 283–97 (Sixteenth Cause of Action).) First, she maintains that the Nassau

defendants did not ensure that the corporate defendants were qualified; she claims that the

corporate defendants did not have a private investigative license, which New York law requires

for “any person or entity hired to obtain evidence of a crime committed against the state.” Her

second claim is that the Nassau and the corporate defendants invaded her privacy by getting

vehicle owner information from the Department of Motor Vehicles. As support for this

17 Dubin may no longer be good law after Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 588 U.S. 180 (2019).

proposition, the plaintiff cites the supposed “illegality” of the contracts between the Nassau and

corporate defendants, as well as the “illegal” photographs and recordings that showed the

plaintiff running the red light; the plaintiff says that the Nassau defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §

2722(a) when they used this evidence to get confidential information about vehicle owners.

These conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. The plaintiff claims that

New York requires a private investigator license in this context, but does not identify the law that

establishes this requirement, other than to cite “New York State law.” (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 262–

63.) Nor does the plaintiff explain how the photographs and videos from the red light cameras

are “evidence of a crime.” As explained above, the red light camera program is civil in nature.

See Krieger, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 598–99 (“[T]he statutory scheme demonstrates an unequivocal

intent to create a civil enforcement mechanism, not a criminal one.”).

The plaintiff claims that the defendants violated the DPPA by getting vehicle owner

information from the Department of Motor Vehicles. The plaintiff cites the supposed “illegality”

of the contracts between the Nassau and corporate defendants, as well as the “illegal”

photographs and recordings that showed the plaintiff running the red light; the plaintiff says that

the Nassau defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a) when they used this evidence to get

confidential information about vehicle owners. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 274–78.)18

The DPPA provides a cause of action against “[a] person who knowingly obtains,

discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted

under this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). “Permissible use” includes (1) “use by any

government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its

functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State, or local agency in

18 The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants are liable for damages pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(1),

reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 2724(b)(3) and equitable relief pursuant to § 2724(b)(4).

carrying out its functions,” § 2721(b)(1); (2) “use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or

driver safety,” § 2721(b)(2); and (3) “use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative,

or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court or agency,” § 2721(b)(4). The plaintiff

does not address the permissible purposes in § 2721 or the caselaw that discusses permissible use

under the DPPA. See, e.g., King v. Creed, No. 14-CV-0165, 2017 WL 11712225, at *9

(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2017) (under the DPPA, “disclosure of such information is permitted for use

‘by any governmental agency’ or by ‘any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal,

State or local agency in carrying out its functions’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1))); id. (“The

DPPA also allows states to divulge drivers’ personal information . . . in connection with court,

agency, or self-regulatory body proceedings.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4))). The invasion

of privacy claims based on the DPPA are dismissed.

e. Racketeering

Finally, the plaintiff brings claims for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (See id. ¶¶ 574–670 (Thirty-Sixth Cause of

Action); ¶¶ 671–93 (Thirty-Seventh Cause of Action).) “To state a plausible RICO claim, a

plaintiff must allege: (1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3)

constituting a ‘pattern’ (4) of ‘racketeering activity’ (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or

maintains an interest in, or participates in (6) an ‘enterprise’ (7) the activities of which affect

interstate or foreign commerce.” Foskey, 2022 WL 3228271, at *6 (quoting Williams v. Affinion

Grp., LLC, 889 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2018)). Because “the core of a RICO civil conspiracy

is an agreement to commit predicate [RICO] acts, such a complaint, at the very least, must allege

specifically such an agreement.” Id. (quoting Wolhendler v. Goldberg, No. 19-CV-457, 2020

WL 5658790, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2020) (cleaned up)). A RICO conspiracy claim will

therefore “be dismissed where the plaintiff alleges no facts to show specifically that the

defendants had any meeting of the minds in the alleged violations.” Wolhendler, 2020 WL

5658790, at *2 (citation omitted).

Foskey involved a similar RICO claim about Nassau County’s red light camera program.

The court rejected the claim because “[u]nder no possible interpretation of the facts has Plaintiff

plausibly alleged any predicate acts, much less a pattern of RICO activity, nor does he

sufficiently allege the existence of a RICO enterprise that affects interstate or foreign

commerce.” 2022 WL 3228271, at *6. That is true here, as well. The only agreement the

plaintiff alleges is the contract between the Nassau and corporate defendants to operate and

install the red light cameras. A contract to perform services is not a “meeting of the minds” to

“commit RICO predicate acts.” Wolhendler, 2020 WL 5658790, at *2. The racketeering claims

are dismissed.

V. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Remaining State Law Claims

“[A] district court ‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455

F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). The Court dismisses all the

federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction, and it declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state law claims alleging violations of the New York

State constitution (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 112–24 (Fifth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 136–45 (Seventh Cause of

Action); ¶¶ 155–62 (Ninth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 173–80 (Eleventh Cause of Action); ¶¶ 181–90

(Twelfth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 342–56 (Twentieth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 519–32 (Thirty-First

Cause of Action); ¶¶ 533–40 (Thirty-Second Cause of Action)), fraud (id. ¶¶ 191–213

(Thirteenth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 214–49 (Fourteenth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 473–89 (Twenty-

Eighth Cause of Action)), unjust enrichment (id. ¶¶ 298–309 (Seventeenth Cause of Action); ¶¶

310–319 (Eighteenth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 357–70 (Twenty-First Cause of Action); ¶¶ 371–81

(Twenty-Second Cause of Action); ¶¶ 382–94 (Twenty-Third Cause of Action)), abuse of

process (id. ¶¶ 395–415 (Twenty-Fourth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 416–31 (Twenty-Fifth Cause of

Action); ¶¶ 490–503 (Twenty-Ninth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 504–18 (Thirtieth Cause of Action)),

and concert of action (id. ¶¶ 432–50 (Twenty-Sixth Cause of Action); ¶¶ 451–72 (Twenty-

Seventh Cause of Action)).19 See Kolari, 455 F.3d at 123 (“Plaintiffs’ federal-law claims were

eliminated on a motion to dismiss, prior to the investment of significant judicial resources, and

we can discern no extraordinary inconvenience or inequity occasioned by permitting the claims

to be refiled in state court where they will be afforded a surer-footed reading of applicable law.”

(citation omitted)).

CONCLUSION

The defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. The Clerk of Court is respectfully

directed to enter judgment and close this action.

SO ORDERED.

_ _ s_/_A_n_n__ M__. _D_o_n__n_e_ll_y_________

ANN M. DONNELLY

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

September 9, 2025

19 The plaintiff’s Thirty-Eighth Cause of Action is a claim for attorneys’ fees, but a “claim for attorney’s

fees and costs is not actually a separate cause of action” but a potential form of relief. Reliance

Commc’ns LLC v. Retail Stores Ventures, Inc., No. 12-CV-2067, 2013 WL 4039378, at *1 n.3

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013); see also Jaffe v. Capital One Bank, No. 09-CV-4106, 2010 WL 691639, at

*10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (dismissing claim for attorneys’ fees because it is “not [a] claim[] upon

which relief may be granted” but a “potential form[] of relief,” and therefore “cannot stand as [a]

separate cause[] of action”).