The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
TYRELL WRIGHT #567066, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) NO. 3:24-cv-00726
v. )
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
FAST ACCESS CORRECTIONAL ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HEALTH CARE, ) FRENSLEY
)
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights case filed by Tyrell Wright, an inmate of the Northeast
Correctional Complex in Mountain City, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1).
Plaintiff has submitted an Application for Leave for Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”). (Doc. No. 2). The Court must resolve the filing fee before moving to the required
screening of the prisoner complaint.
I. FILING FEE
Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a). From a review of Plaintiff’s IFP Application and supporting documentation
(Doc. Nos. 2, 8), it appears that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the
full filing fee in advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.
Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.
The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-
plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder
in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby assessed the full civil filing fee of $350, to be paid
as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly
balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from
Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all
deposits credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in
the account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the
account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case
number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States
District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex to ensure that the custodian of
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the
payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the
custodian of his inmate trust fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff
to his new place of confinement for continued compliance.
II. PLRA SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
A. Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which creates a cause of action against
any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state
law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of
Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Facts Alleged in the Complaint
The allegations of the complaint are assumed true for purposes of the required PLRA
screening.
On June 2, 2023, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Sumner County Jail.
After an attack by unidentified individuals, a member of Defendant’s nursing staff made an
incision on the back of Plaintiff’s head “but was not authorized to do so.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5). The
nurse put a “bandaid” on the incision, but the incision started to “bleed out” later. (Id.) An officer
took Plaintiff back to the medical area where an unidentified person “stitch[ed] the open cut
close[d].” (Id.)
The complaint alleges that Defendant was negligent and requests $150,000 for Plaintiff’s
scar and “uncontrollable” headache. (Id.)
C. Analysis
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute of limitations for a
Section 1983 action is the “state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under
the law of the state in which the § 1983 claims arise.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs.,
510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). The limitations period for Section 1983 actions arising in
Tennessee is the one-year limitations provisions found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-
104(a). Porter v. Brown, 289 F. App’x 114, 116 (6th Cir. 2008). “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983
cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Claims accrue and the statute of limitations period begins to
run when the plaintiff knows or has reason “to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.”
Roberson v. Tenn., 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005). This inquiry is objective, and courts look
“to what event should have alerted the typical layperson to protect his or her rights.” Hughes v.
Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000). It is the Court’s responsibility to “determine
whether the alleged precipitating event or events occurred more than a year before [the plaintiff]
filed the complaint.” Standridge v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. 3:08-CV-133, 2009 WL
348782, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2009).
Here, Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 5, 2024.1 (See Doc. No. 1 at 11). Because the
alleged precipitating event (the incision) occurred over one year before Plaintiff filed his complaint
(on June 2, 2024), and because Plaintiff was aware of his claimed injuries at the time of the event,
Plaintiff’s claims concerning the event are barred by the governing statute of limitations for
Section 1983 claims.
Even if Plaintiff had filed this lawsuit within the governing statute of limitations, the case
would still be subject to dismissal, however. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant committed “medical
1 Under the “prison mailbox rule” of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988), and the Sixth
Circuit’s subsequent extension of that rule in Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 2002)
and Scott v. Evans, 116 F. App’x 699, 701 (6th Cir. 2004), a prisoner’s legal mail is considered
“filed” when he deposits his mail in the prison mail system to be forwarded to the Clerk of Court.
Pursuant to this authority, the Court finds that Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 5, 2024, the
date he signed the petition, even though the Clerk of Court received and docketed the petition on
June 13, 2024.
negligence.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment requires prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, which includes
appropriate medical care to inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (citations
omitted). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates these protections
for pretrial detainees such as Plaintiff. Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 890 (6th Cir.
2018). An Eighth Amendment claim is composed of two parts: an objective prong, which requires
plaintiff to show a “sufficiently serious” deprivation, and a subjective prong, which requires a
showing of a sufficiently culpable state of mind—one of deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S.
825, 834, 837. Deliberate indifference is “a high standard of culpability, ‘equivalent to criminal
recklessness.’” Greene v. Crawford Cnty., Mich., 22 F.4th 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., Kentucky, 975 F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Until recently, the Sixth Circuit “analyzed Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainee claims
and Eighth Amendment prisoner claims ‘under the same rubric.’” Greene, 22 F.4th 593 at 605 (6th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Brawner v. Scott Cnty., Tenn., 14 F.4th 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted). But in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), the Supreme Court held that the
standard for excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment differs from the standard for excessive force claims brought by
convicted prisoners under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 391-92. The Court held that, to prove the second prong of an excessive force claim, a pretrial
detainee must show that “the officers were subjectively aware that their use of force was
unreasonable, or only that the officers’ use of that force was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 391-
92 (italics in original).
Kingsley left open the question of “whether an objective standard applies in other
Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainment context[s].” Brawner, 14 F.4th at 592. Finding that it
was “no longer tenable” after Kingsley to apply the same analysis to the “constitutionally different
groups” of convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, the Sixth Circuit in “Brawner modified the
second prong of the deliberate indifference test applied to pretrial detainees to require only
recklessness[.]” Id. at 592, 596. Thus, under Brawner, to prove a deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, “‘[a] pretrial detainee must prove more
than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.’” Brawner,
14 F.4th at 597 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)). He or she must prove that the defendant acted “deliberately (not
accidentally), [and] also recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either
known or so obvious that it should be known.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit decided Trozzi v. Lake Cnty., 29 F.4th 745 (6th Cir. 2022), which
articulated the modified standard as follows:
[A] plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) the plaintiff had an objectively serious
medical need; (2) a reasonable officer at the scene (knowing what the particular jail
official knew at the time of the incident) would have understood that the detainee’s
medical needs subjected the detainee to an excessive risk of harm; and (3) the prison
official knew that his failure to respond would pose a serious risk to the pretrial
detainee and ignored that risk.
Id. at 757. The Court pointed out that this standard still “ensur[es] that there is a sufficiently
culpable mental state to satisfy the [ ]high bar[ ] for constitutional torts grounded in a substantive
due process violation.” Id. at 758. A showing of “mere negligence is insufficient.” Id. at 753 (citing
Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596).
Here, the complaint alleges that a member of Defendant’s medical staff acted negligently.
The allegations do not meet the standard set forth in Brawner and Trozzi.’ Thus, the complaint,
even if it had been timely filed, does not state a Section 1983 claim upon which relief can be
granted.
IH. CONCLUSION
Having conducted the screening required by the PRLA, the Court finds that Plaintiff's
Section 1983 claim was filed outside the governing statute of limitations and therefore must be
dismissed. Alternatively, the allegations of the complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted via Section 1983. Accordingly, this action is therefore DISMISSED.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
It is so ORDERED. Ve
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JI&
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
> Moreover, the complaint only names Fast Access Correctional Health Care, the entity presumably
responsible for providing medical care to Sumner County Jail inmates. The complaint does not
name the Fast Access Correctional Health Care Nurse who allegedly made the incision about
which Plaintiff complains. Because Defendant Fast Access Correctional Health Care performs a
traditional state function in providing medical care to inmates, it acts under color of state law and
may be sued under Section 1983. Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993). For
Defendant to be liable under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege that there is a direct causal link
between a policy or custom of Defendant and an alleged constitutional violation. See Monell, 436
U.S. 658, 691. In other words, Defendant may be liable under Section 1983 “if its official policies
or customs resulted in injury to the plaintiff.” O’Brien v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 592 F. App’x 338,
341 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Mason v. Doe, No. 3:12CV-P794-H, 2013 WL 4500107, at *1 (W.D.
Ky. Aug. 21, 2013) (collecting cases) (“a private corporation may be liable under § 1983 when an
official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of a federal right”). The
complaint here does not allege the existence of any relevant official policies or customs.