Campbell v. Butler County Jail

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

LE-LON CAMPBELL, : Case No. 1:23-cv-763

:

Plaintiff, : District Judge Michael R. Barrett

: Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

vs. :

:

BUTLER COUNTY JAIL, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Plaintiff, a prisoner currently housed at the Manchester Federal Correctional Institution, in

Manchester, Kentucky, has filed a pro se civil rights action, alleging that his constitutional rights

were violated when he was housed as a federal pretrial detainee at the Butler County Jail (Jail).

The operative pleading in this case is Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 17), which supersedes

his initial Complaint (Doc. 1-1) for all purposes. See Scuba v. Wilkinson, No. 1:06-cv-160, 2006

WL 2794939, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2006) (citing Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236

F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2000)). By separate Order, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in

forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Doc. 16).

Observing that it was unclear from Plaintiff’s initial filings whether he had sufficient funds

to prepay the filing fee in this matter, the Court entered two Show Cause Orders concerning his in

forma pauperis application. (Docs. 3; 11). When Plaintiff failed to respond to the Second Show

Cause Order, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation to dismiss the case for want

of prosecution. (Doc. 12). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed motions clarifying that he lacked sufficient

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendation.

funds to prepay the full filing fee. (Docs. 13; 14). For good cause shown, the undersigned vacated

the Report and Recommendation to dismiss the case for want of prosecution and permitted Plaintiff

to proceed in forma pauperis in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). (Doc. 16).

This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Amended Complaint to

determine whether the Amended Complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary

relief from a Defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) &

1915A(b). Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarity and Next Steps. (Doc. 18).

Screening of Complaint

A. Legal Standard

In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant

whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an

economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To

prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when

the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 328-29; see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has

no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation

of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable

factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly

incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true

factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness.

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). A

complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however,

the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal

standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§

1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does

a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id.

at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

B. The Amended Complaint

The Amended Complaint arises out of Plaintiff’s allegations that pretrial detainees at the

Jail are not allowed any outdoor recreation. (Doc. 17, PageID 77). Plaintiff names three

Defendants—the Jail, Sheriff Richard K. Jones, and the “U.S. Marshals,” by which the Court

understands Plaintiff to mean the United States Marshals Service (USMS). Because the

Defendants are both county and federal officials, the Court understands the Amended Complaint

to arise under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the federal equivalent to § 1983. See Hodge v. Abbott, No. 1:08-

cv-230, 2008 WL 4682786, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 21, 2008).

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of outdoor recreation for

over 50 months while housed at the Jail. (Doc. 17, PageID 74). According to Plaintiff, he was

prohibited from going outside “for recreation or simply just to receive … natural sunlight and …

vitamin d and fresh air.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that the denial of outdoor recreation was especially

harmful because during this same time period he was confined to his cell for 19 to 23 hours a day.

Id. He alleges that as a result of being confined to his cell without outdoor recreation he suffered

from depression, anxiety, fatigue, skin discoloration, hair loss, joint pain, and eye and teeth

sensitivity. Id. at 77.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief in the form of policy changes at the

Jail. Id. at 75.

C. Analysis

Based on the above allegations, the Court understands Plaintiff to bring a Fourteenth

Amendment2 cruel-and-unusual punishment claim against Defendants regarding outdoor

recreation at the Jail. At this stage in the proceedings, and without the benefit of briefing by the

parties, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff may proceed at this juncture for further

development on the above claim against Defendant Sheriff Jones in his official capacity for

damages. Liberally construed, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, the Amended Complaint alleges a

policy or practice at the Jail regarding outdoor recreation that purportedly posed a serious threat to

Plaintiff’s health and safety. See Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 927 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[T]here

might be [a constitutional] violation in a case where an inmate is isolated and is deprived of ‘nearly

all fresh air and light.’”) (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254–55 (9th Cir. 1982),

abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). The Court advises

Plaintiff that this is only a preliminary determination. The Court has not made a determination as

to the merits of the claim or potential defenses thereto, nor is Defendant Jones precluded from

filing a motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, or other appropriate motion under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley v. Austin, No. 8:20-cv-220, 2020 WL

6204382, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020). However, for the reasons below, the remainder of the

Amended Complaint should be dismissed.

2Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged events, his claim is governed by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Culberson v. Franklin Cty. Correction,

No. 2:22-cv-3671, 2022 WL 17600955, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub

nom. Culberson v. Franklin Cty. Corr. Ctr., II, 2023 WL 3180755 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2023).

Individual Capacity Claim against Sheriff Jones Should Be Dismissed

First, although the undersigned has allowed Plaintiff to proceed for further development at

this juncture on his Fourteenth Amendment cruel-and-unusual punishment claim against Sheriff

Jones based on an allegedly unconstitutional policy or practice at the Jail concerning outdoor

recreation, that claim is an official-capacity claim and is treated as a claim against Butler County,

Ohio, the entity of which Sheriff Jones appears to be an agent. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t.

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A municipality qualifies as a “person” subject to

liability under § 1983. Id.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Sheriff Jones in an individual capacity, however,

because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that Sheriff Jones was personally involved in

the alleged denial of outdoor recreation to Plaintiff. “A supervisory employee cannot be held liable

under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of those he supervises unless it is shown ‘that the

supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly

participated in it.’” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 287 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Bellamy

v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)). See also Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th

Cir. 1999) (“A supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual

is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in

some way directly participated in it.”).

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Jones knew or should have known about the

denial of outdoor recreation to pretrial detainees at the Jail (Doc. 17, PageID 77), such allegations

are insufficient to establish Sheriff Jones’ personal involvement. See, e.g., Jae Jeong Lyu v.

McDonnell, No. 5:19-cv-00637, 2020 WL 7872962, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2020), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Lyu v. McDonnell, 2021 WL 107199 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2021)

(“Rather, following his attempts at amendment, plaintiff's [second amended complaint] continues

to make sweeping and conclusory allegations such as that Sheriff McDonnell knew of plaintiff’s

‘need [for] special protection.’ … Such allegations, when plaintiff fails to set forth any supporting

factual allegations, are not entitled to a presumption of truth in deciding the sufficiency of

plaintiff’s claim.”); O’Keefe v. Clarke, No. 14-cv-834, 2014 WL 5849209, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Nov.

12, 2014) (“The claim alleges merely that [the defendant sheriff] ‘knew or had a duty to know’

that Plaintiff’s cell was infested with bugs, but such a conclusory assertion of personal involvement

does not suffice.”) (citing, inter alia, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); Houghton v. Cardone, 295 F.

Supp. 2d 268, 276 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the

defendant sheriff “(1) failed to adequately train or supervise the officers; (2) knew about and

tolerated the officers’ allegedly unlawful behavior; and (3) ‘failed to institute a proper system of

review and reprimand’ of his deputies so as to prevent the types of unlawful acts alleged here”

were insufficient to establish the sheriff’s personal involvement).

Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that Sheriff

Jones was personally involved in the allegedly unconstitutional denial of outdoor recreation to

Plaintiff at the Jail, Plaintiff’s cruel-and-unusual punishment claim against Sheriff Jones in an

individual capacity is subject to dismissal.

Claim against the Jail Should Be Dismissed

Next, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against the Jail. To state a claim under

§ 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts showing the deprivation of a “right secured by the United States

Constitution or a federal statute by a person who was acting under color of state law.” Mincy v.

Hamilton Cty. Justice Ctr., No. 1:20-cv-822, 2021 WL 6427516, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2021)

(internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). The Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal

against the Jail because the Jail is not a person or legal entity capable of being sued under § 1983.

See id.

Claim against the USMS Should Be Dismissed

It appears that Plaintiff named the USMS as a Defendant because it allegedly allowed him

to be housed at a jail where outdoor recreation was prohibited. (See Doc. 17, PageID 77). Plaintiff,

however, cannot state a Bivens claim against the USMS (a federal law enforcement agency)

because “the United States Marshals Service is entitled to sovereign immunity from suit.” Gary

v. Gardner, 445 F. App’x 465, 466-67 (3rd Cir. 2011). See also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,

475 (1994) (“[S]overeign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”).

Thus, the Court should dismiss the USMS from this action for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.

Claim for Injunctive Relief Should Be Dismissed

Additionally, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed because his transfer

from the Jail to his current facility has rendered such a claim moot. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d

172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (“However, to the extent [the plaintiff] seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief his claims are now moot as he is no longer confined to the institution that [allegedly violated

his rights]”). “Underlying th[is] rule is the premise that injunctive relief is appropriate only where

plaintiff can show a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability that he is in immediate

danger of sustaining direct future injury as the result of the challenged official conduct.” McMurry

v. Brown, No. 2:20-CV-58, 2020 WL 3118567, at *3 (W.D. Mich. June 12, 2020) (citing Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). Because Plaintiff is no longer confined at the Jail, he

cannot show a reasonable expectation that he is in immediate danger of sustaining direct future

injury from alleged policies at the Jail. Id.; see also Lowe v. Oppy, No. 2:14-cv-535, 2015 WL

1439345, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL

1439325 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2015) (“Accordingly, the Court’s entry of equitable relief on behalf

of Plaintiff would have no effect on Defendants’ actions towards him because Defendants perform

their duties at an institution where Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated.”). Because Plaintiff’s claim

for injunctive relief is moot, it should be dismissed without prejudice.

Additional Allegations

Finally, the undersigned notes that the Amended Complaint contains allegations that

Plaintiff raised concerns about the lack of outdoor recreation to several individuals who are not

named as defendants, including, it appears, a grievance officer at the Jail, and counsel and the

judge in his underlying criminal case. (Doc. 17, PageID 72, 74). While such allegations would

likely fail to state a claim for relief under Bivens or Section 1983, see, e.g., Shehee v. Luttrell, 199

F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding no liability for prison officials whose only roles “involve

their denial of . . . administrative grievances and their failure to remedy the alleged

[unconstitutional] behavior”); Welch v. Dobias, No. 2:17-cv-38, 2017 WL 1905869, at *2-3 (W.D.

Mich. May 10, 2017) (“Federal courts have uniformly held that a criminal defense attorney is not

acting under color of law in either state or federal court, whether appointed or retained.”), or would

be barred as a matter of law due to judicial immunity, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (“It

is a well-entrenched principle in our system of jurisprudence that judges are generally absolutely

immune from civil suits for money damages.”), the undersigned does not address them as they are

not properly before the Court. See Arnold v. Montgomery Cty. Jail, No. 3:22-cv-34, 2022 WL

1046775, at *3 n.2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL

1045604 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2022). Accordingly, any claims against non-defendants should be

dismissed without prejudice.

D. Conclusion

Plaintiff may proceed at this juncture with his Fourteenth Amendment cruel-and-unusual

punishment claim regarding outdoor recreation at the Jail against Sheriff Jones in his official

capacity for money damages. The remainder of the Amended Complaint should be dismissed. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

However, Plaintiff has failed to provide a U.S. Marshal or summons form for Sheriff Jones.

Plaintiff is therefore ORDERED to submit, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, a

completed summons and U.S. Marshal form for Defendant Sheriff Jones. Once the Court receives

the requested summons and United States Marshal form, the Court will order service of process

by the United States Marshal. Plaintiff is advised that failure to comply with this Order may

result in the dismissal of this action for want of prosecution.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Jones in an individual capacity, the Jail,

and the USMS be DISMISSED with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1);

2. Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief be DISMISSED without prejudice as

moot, see Whitfield v. Gustave, No. 3:23-cv-023, 2023 WL 6141665, at *1

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2023);

3. Plaintiff’s claims against individuals who are not named as Defendants be

DISMISSED without prejudice, see Redman v. Jefferson Cty. Jail, No.

2:23-cv-168, 2023 WL 8436081, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2023), report

and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8018515 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20,

2023); and

4. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing

reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation

would not be taken in good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d

601 (6th Cir. 1997).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order and Report and

Recommendation, submit to the Court a completed summons and U.S.

Marshal form for Defendant Sheriff Richard K. Jones. Once the Court

receives the requested summons and U.S. Marshal form, the Court will

order service of process by the United States Marshal. The CLERK OF

COURT is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff a blank summons and U.S.

Marshal form for this purpose.

2. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant or, if an appearance has been entered

by counsel, upon counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other

document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include

with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating

the date a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to Defendant

or Defendant’s counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or

magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to

include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.

3. Plaintiff is REMINDED to keep the Court apprised of any changes to his

address during the pendency of this lawsuit.

4. In light of the instant Order and Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff’s

Motion for Clarity and Next Steps (Doc. 18) is DENIED as moot.

September 9, 2025 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and

Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).