Xi v. The Trustees of Purdue University

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE

BOWEI XI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:23-CV-88-PPS

)

THE TRUSTEES OF PURDUE UNVIERSITY, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Bowei Xi is a tenured Associate Professor of Statistics at Purdue University who

alleges Purdue denied her application for promotion from associate to full professor

because of her sex, race, and national origin. Xi also alleges Purdue retaliated against

her when she protested the University’s denial of her request for promotion. Purdue

argues Xi’s research record did not justify her promotion to full professor and moves for

summary judgment on Xi’s claims. Based on the record before the Court, Xi has failed to

provide sufficient evidence to support her claims of discrimination or retaliation, and

summary judgment will therefore be granted to Purdue.

Factual Background

Xi failed to comply with Local Rule 56-1(b)(2) in her response to Purdue’s

statement of material facts. Local Rule 56-1(b)(2) requires the party opposing summary

judgment to file a response to the moving party’s statement of material facts that

includes, among other things, “a verbatim restatement of [the moving party’s]

Statement of Material Facts.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(2). Xi’s response to Purdue’s

statement of material facts does not include a verbatim restatement of those facts.

Instead, in her response to Purdue’s statement of material facts, Xi said she “focuse[d]

only on disputed facts that are ‘material’” and “reserves the right to dispute any and all

facts . . . including those facts not specifically disputed herein.” [DE 40 at 1 n.1.] That’s

not how Local Rule 56-1(b)(2) works. In fact, a failure to dispute facts in the manner

dictated by the local rules renders the facts presented by the moving party as

undisputed. See Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218–19 (7th Cir. 2015). That

said, I’ll use Xi’s response to identify any disputed material facts for purposes of

summary judgment.

Purdue has three general categories of faculty: assistant professor (tenure-track),

associate professor (tenured), and full professor (tenured). [DE 44 at ¶5.] Tenured

faculty have a home academic department. [Id. at ¶6.] To seek promotion, a faculty

member must navigate an elaborate and exhaustive multi-level review process. [Id. at

¶7.] Here’s how it works: The first level of review occurs at the department level. [Id. at

¶8.] A Primary Committee chaired by the department head and generally consisting of

all the department’s tenured faculty review the candidate’s promotion packet. [Id.] The

voting members of the Primary Committee, which is usually everyone except the

department head, then vote “yes” or “no” for each candidate. [Id.] From there, the

department head decides whether to accept the recommendation of the Primary

Committee. [Id.]

Candidates who advance to the second level are reviewed by the college-level

Area Committee, which is chaired by the relevant college dean. [Id. at ¶9.] Other

members of the Area Committee include department heads and tenured full professors.

[Id.] The Area Committee votes on each candidate, and the Dean reviews the Area

Committee’s recommendations. [Id.]

Candidates who advance to the third level are reviewed by a university-wide

committee called the Campus Promotions Committee. [Id. at ¶10.] The Provost chairs

the Campus Promotions Committee, and the remaining members are deans, one

tenured full professor from each college, and additional at-large tenured faculty. [Id.] If

the Campus Promotions Committee approves an applicant’s promotion, they are

forwarded to the Provost, who makes a recommendation to the President. [Id. at ¶11.]

Lastly, the President then makes a recommendation to the Board of Trustees for a final

decision. [Id.]

Voting at each level of the promotion process is confidential, and Purdue does

not record individual committee members’ votes. [Id. at ¶7.] If a candidate receives a

negative decision at any level of review, they may submit a request for reconsideration

to the Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs. [Id. at ¶12.] Grounds for reconsideration are

limited to evidence of grossly inadequate consideration of professional competence or

judgments based on erroneous or misinterpreted information. [Id.] The Vice Provost for

Faculty Affair’s decision on reconsideration is final. [Id.]

The Office of the Provost sends a memorandum to faculty at the beginning of

each promotion cycle that includes guidance on Purdue’s procedures for promotion. [Id.

at ¶14.] The Office of the Provost sent the relevant memorandum for the promotion

cycle at issue here on April 29, 2022. [Id.; DE 32-3 at 8–23.]

Candidates for promotion must meet minimum thresholds in three “mission

areas”: discovery, learning, and engagement. [DE 44 at ¶19; DE 32-2 at 59.] Under

Purdue’s system, “discovery” means “a record of scholarly achievement and evidence

of national/international visibility.” [Id. at 60; DE 44 at ¶22.] This includes “a

substantial record of published original research or its equivalent” and “external

funding (where it can be said to reflect the positive, rigorous assessment of peers and

the scholarly promise of the topic), national and/or international reputation (if

appropriate).” [Id.] In addition to these general criteria, colleges and academic

departments may establish more specific criteria that is consistent with Purdue’s

guidelines. [Id. at ¶25; DE 32-2 at 59.] The College of Science and Department of

Statistics both established additional guidelines and instructions for promotion and

tenure. [DE 44 at ¶26; DE 32-2 at 79–101.]

Plaintiff Bowei Xi was born in China. [DE 44 at ¶30.] She began working at

Purdue in 2004 as an Assistant Professor of Statistics. [Id. at ¶31.] Xi applied for but was

denied a promotion to Associate Professor in 2009, but Purdue later promoted her as a

tenured Associate Professor of Statistics in 2011. [Id. at ¶¶32–33.] Xi applied for

promotion to Full Professor of Statistics in 2018 but was denied. [Id. at ¶35.] She again

applied for promotion to Full Professor of Statistics in 2020 but withdrew her

application after the Primary Committee vote. [Id. at ¶36.]

According to the Dean of the College of Science, Purdue previously offered the

Research Refresh Award program to aid faculty who could benefit from dedicated time

to reinvigorate stalled research. [Id. at ¶40; DE 32-2 at 6.] Purdue offered the award for

faculty whose research had not been active or had recently slowed. [Id.] The award

provided grant money and dedicated time away from teaching to focus on research.

[Id.]

Xi applied for the Research Refresh Award in April 2022. [DE 44 at ¶41.] In her

application, she noted difficulties with the pregnancy and premature birth of her son in

July 2020. [DE 32-1 at 166.] Xi took maternity leave for the Fall 2020 semester. [Id.]

According to Xi, “[h]er research progress slowed down due to the unexpected

pregnancy complication and the challenge to find childcare during the [COVID-19]

pandemic.” [Id.] She noted the program “would give a much-needed boost to help her

regain momentum.” [Id.] Purdue awarded Xi the Research Refresh Award for the 2022-

2023 academic year. [DE 44 at ¶43; DE 32-1 at 179.] In his May 19, 2022, email that

informed Xi of her award, Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs Peter J. Hollenbeck wrote Xi

could “benefit from intense focus to advance [her] scholarship and reinvigorate [her]

career.” [Id.]

Xi says she applied for promotion to Full Professor of Statistics in November

2022. [DE 44 at ¶45.] Her application included her background information, details

concerning her work applicable to the three “mission areas” of discovery, learning, and

engagement, as well as letters of recommendation. [Id.; DE 32-1 at 97–163.] At the first

level of review, the Primary Committee consisting of tenured professors within her

department, Xi received a unanimous twelve to zero vote in favor of promotion. [DE 44

at ¶50; DE 32-1 at 164.]

At the second level of review, the Area Committee voted eleven to ten against

Xi’s promotion. [DE 44 at ¶52; DE 32-1 at 164.] The Area Committee wrote that their

“decision focused on the quality of journals and conference proceeding in which [Xi]

was publishing.” [Id.] The Area Committee also cited Xi’s recent selection for the

Research Refresh Award and that she “had no active funding and thus not evident that

her research program was in an upward trajectory.” [Id.] Purdue claims the Area

Committee did not receive or review Xi’s Research Refresh Award application as part of

its decision on Xi’s promotion so did not know the reasons why Xi applied for the

award. [DE 44 at ¶56.] Patrick Wolfe, then the Dean of the College of Science,

participated in the Area Committee’s discussion on Xi’s application but did not vote.

[Id. at ¶¶65–66.] Wolfe then reviewed and approved the Area Committee’s decision to

deny Xi’s promotion. [Id. at ¶65.] In a January 3, 2023, letter the now Interim Dean of the

College of Science Jean Chmielewski memorialized the reasons for the Area

Committee’s denial of her application. [DE 32-3 at 62.] Chmielewski noted that many of

Xi’s publications “were not in tier 1 journals” and pointed to Xi’s “end of research

funding in the coming year necessitating the Research Refresh award” as the bases for

the Area Committee’s decision. [Id.]

At the time of her application for promotion, Xi had funding from the Army

Research Lab that ended in academic year 2024. [DE 44 at ¶¶57, 59.] According to

Purdue, the Area Committee determined the Army Research Lab funding was not

awarded through a competitive grant process. [Id. at ¶58.] Purdue says the Army

Research Lab was Xi’s only active external research funding source when she applied

for promotion in November 2022. [Id. at ¶57.] Xi’s application lists the Army Research

Lab grant as ending on May 14, 2024, and a second source of then active external

funding from the Army Research Office that expired on January 6, 2023. [DE 32-1 at

115.] Xi says her Army Research Lab grant was later extended to 2027, but she does not

contest that her November 2022 application listed the grant as expiring in 2024. [DE 44

at ¶60.]

On January 18, 2023, Xi met with Lucy Flesch, the then-Senior Associate Dean of

the College of Science, and Hao Zhang, a Professor of Statistics, for feedback on the

Area Committee’s review of her application for promotion. [Id. at ¶67.] Flesch told Xi

the Area Committee interpreted Xi’s receipt of the Research Refresh Award as an

indication Xi’s research had slowed. [Id. at ¶69–70.] Zhang told Xi that applying for the

Research Refresh Award may be interpreted as an admission that an individual has

fallen behind on their research. [Id. at ¶71.] Flesch told Xi the Area Committee had

concerns Xi did not have competitive federal grant funding at the time of her

application for promotion and did not know whether her Army Research Lab funding

was awarded through a competitive process. [Id. at ¶72.] Flesch encouraged Xi to solicit

new letters of recommendation, submit grant applications to appropriate federal

agencies, and encouraged Xi to wait to reapply until 2024. [Id. at ¶76.]

On January 25, 2023, Xi submitted a request for reconsideration of the denial of

her promotion to Hollenbeck (then Purdue’s Vice Provost for Academic Affairs). [Id. at

¶77; DE 32-1 at 200.] Xi said the grounds for her appeal were (1) grossly inadequate

consideration of professional competence, and (2) judgments based on erroneous or

misinterpreted information. [DE 44 at ¶78; DE 32-3 at 25.] In her appeal, Xi listed two

faculty who had received the Research Refresh Award and a subsequent promotion, but

these individuals were not from the Department of Statistics or the College of Science

and did not apply in 2022. [DE 44 at ¶83; DE 32-3 at 28.] Three individuals from the

College of Science, including Xi as a member of the Department of Statistics, received

the Research Refresh Award from 2018 to 2022. [DE 44 at ¶85.] But Xi does not dispute

the two other award recipients from the College of Science either had not gone through

the promotion process since receiving the award or were already a Full Professor. [Id.]

On January 28, 2023, Dennis Lin, who presented Xi’s case to the Area Committee

in his role as head of the Department of Statistics, emailed Hollenbeck. [DE 32-3 at 71–

72.] Lin described the Primary Committee and Area Committee meetings on Xi’s

application, including the Committees’ points of concern and his responses (in defense

of Xi) to those concerns. [Id.] Lin wrote he “personally strongly supported [Xi’s]

promotion case” and “was so disappointed that the Area Committee did not [promote

Xi that he] decided to step down” as head of the Department of Statistics. [Id.]

Purdue says Hollenbeck spoke with Flesch and Chmielewski about the Area

Committee’s deliberations on Xi’s application. [DE 44 at ¶99.] According to Purdue,

Hollenbeck determined the Area Committee had concerns with the lack of

competitiveness for Xi’s funding, her external funding ending soon, her receipt of the

Research Refresh Award, and the lack of clarity of Xi’s role in some of her listed

publications. [Id.] Hollenbeck appears to have taken notes of this conversation on

February 1, 2023. [DE 32-3 at 67.]

Hollenbeck emailed Xi on February 3, 2023, to inform her he was denying her

appeal. [Id. at 74.] Hollenbeck said he assessed three issues: whether the Area

Committee (1) ignored the unanimous vote of the Primary Committee; (2)

misunderstood her publication record; and (3) misunderstood her research funding and

awards. [Id.] Hollenbeck concluded the Area Committee “spent considerable time

reviewing” Xi’s application, and he found no evidence of misunderstood or grossly

inadequate consideration. [Id.] Hollenbeck added “I do think that a few things could

have been presented more clearly [in Xi’s application], including the nature and

duration of your research awards and your exact role in them.” [Id.]

Xi emailed Interim Head of the Department of Statistics Daniel Cziczo on March

8, 2023, to indicate her intention to “re-apply for promotion to full professor in Spring

2023.” [DE 32-6 at 6.] In his response on March 9, Cziczo said he would first like to meet

with Xi during their one-on-one meeting scheduled for April 5. [Id.] Cziczo explained

there were “issues” with reapplying in two consecutive years such as Purdue’s policy

that it does not replace letters of recommendation solicited in the prior year. [Id.] Cziczo

said it would therefore be “extremely difficult” for Xi to re-apply in 2023, but he added

“I would of course be open to discussing what the implications are regarding 2023.”

[Id.]

That same day, Cziczo emailed Xi’s faculty mentors and reiterated “we are likely

not able to run a case two consecutive years due to the shelf life of letters from last

year.” [Id. at 11.] Cziczo added: “this is a University rule so not one we can change.”

[Id.] Mark Daniel Ward, Professor of Statistics, responded he told Xi “we would be

willing to work with her to re-apply in two years if she wanted to try” and that it was

“not possible to apply for two years.” [Id. at 10.] Cziczo responded: “it is good to know

we’re giving her a consistent message, especially since it is a sensitive case . . . . we

should assume the case can not move forward in 2023 but will in 2024.” [Id. at 9.]

Purdue says Cziczo met with Xi on April 5, 2023, for her annual review and

reiterated the risk of re-applying with the same letters of recommendation in 2023 due

to the 24-month lifecycle of those letters. [DE 44 at ¶115.] Xi testified Cziczo told her he

would “give up” if he was in her position, but Cziczo and Purdue dispute this

allegation. [Id. at ¶120.] Cziczo said he told Xi they would discuss her case at the next

Statistics Primary Committee meeting to solicit their recommendation on whether she

should re-apply in 2023 or 2024. [Id. at ¶121.] Purdue says the Primary Committee

recommended Xi wait to re-apply until 2024. [Id.] Xi testified she next asked to be

considered for promotion to full professor in the spring of 2024. [Id. at ¶130.]

Xi filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission on April 17, 2023. [DE 32-1 at 94–95.] Xi alleged discrimination based on

her race, sex, national origin, and age. [Id.] But Xi did not check the box for retaliation.

[Id.] Xi brought this lawsuit on October 19, 2023. [DE 1.] During a telephonic hearing on

February 4, 2025, Xi moved for dismissal of her age discrimination claim and a separate

race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. [DE 28.]

Standard of Review

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a

party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its

version of the events.” Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). On a motion for summary judgment, all facts and reasonable inferences are

construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Waukegan Potawatomi

Casino, LLC v. City of Waukegan, 128 F.4th 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2025).

Discussion

Xi alleges Purdue discriminated against her on the basis or her race, national

origin, and sex. She also claims to have been retaliated against for lodging complaints of

discrimination. I’ll take up the discrimination claims first before turning to the

retaliation claim.

I. Race, National Origin, and Sex Discrimination Claims (Counts II, III, & IV)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or to otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of that

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Barbera v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 906

F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 2018); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). To survive summary judgment on

her Title VII discrimination claims, Xi must present evidence that “would permit a

reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or

other proscribed factor caused the adverse employment action.” Barbera, 906 F.3d at 628

(quoting Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 710 (7th Cir. 2017)).

Evaluating discrimination claims using the framework established in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) remains an efficient way to organize, present,

and assess evidence related to claims of discrimination. But it’s not the only way to

analyze a discrimination case. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Ortiz v. Werner

Enters., Inc., courts may take a holistic approach and simply view all the evidence, direct

and circumstantial, place it into a pile, and ask whether a reasonable juror could

conclude based on all the evidence that discrimination was afoot. 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th

Cir. 2016). In a recent concurrence, Justice Thomas suggested the same thing. Ames v.

Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 313–19 (2025) (Thomas, J., concurring).

Nevertheless, the Parties in this case have hewed closely to the McDonnell Douglas

framework, so I will do so as well.

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must make a prima facie case by showing

(1) they are members of a protected class; (2) performed reasonably on the job in accord

with their employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) were subjected to an adverse

employment action despite their reasonable performance; and (4) similarly situated

employees outside of the protected class were treated more favorably by the employer.

David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 225 (7th Cir. 2017). If the

plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, at which point the burden shifts back

to the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual. Id.

As alluded to in Ortiz and by Justice Thomas in his Ames concurrence, there is no

magic to this test; it is merely one way of culling the relevant evidence needed to

demonstrate whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that an employer engaged

in an adverse employment action based on the plaintiff’s protected status. Johnson v.

Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2018). Just as the Parties have

in their briefing, I will consider Xi’s race, national origin, and sex discrimination claims

jointly given the same framework and similar analysis for these claims.

Purdue concedes that Xi satisfies the first, third, and fourth elements of the

McDonnell Douglas test. [DE 30 at 10.] Purdue argues Xi has not met the second element

of this test because she cannot establish that she was qualified for promotion to full

professor. Xi argues Purdue’s proffered reasons for denying her promotion are a pretext

for unlawful discrimination. This is the opposite side of the same coin. Indeed, the

Seventh Circuit recognizes that analysis of the second element in the McDonnell Douglas

framework—satisfactory job performance—and pretext are “inextricably intertwined.”

Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 814 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Denisi v.

Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 99 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). So, courts may

“proceed directly to the issue of pretext” given the second element of the McDonnell

Douglas framework and considerations of pretext focus on essentially the same inquiry

and evidence. See Vanasco v. Nat’l-Louis Univ., 137 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1998); Vichio v.

US Foods, Inc., 88 F.4th 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2023). Because the bulk of the Parties’

arguments focus on Xi’s allegation of pretext, that is where I will focus as well.

Before diving into consideration of Purdue’s proffered reasons for denying Xi’s

promotion, I must establish a few more ground rules. The first concerns the definition

of pretext: it is “a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action” and “not just faulty

reasoning or mistaken judgment.” Barnes v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 946 F.3d 384, 389–90

(7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “Thus, when an institution proffers as reasons for [the

adverse employment action] deficiencies in a plaintiff’s scholarship, teaching, or service,

the court is not concerned with whether plaintiff’s scholarship, teaching, or service were

in fact deficient; only with whether the defendant institution honestly believed they

were deficient[.]” Schneider v. Northwestern Univ., 925 F.Supp. 1347, 1369 (N.D. Ill. 1996).

Second, as alluded to above, I am mindful of the unique context of Title VII

employment discrimination cases in the context of university decisions concerning

tenure and promotion. In that regard, the Seventh Circuit has long recognized “the

nuanced nature of tenure decisions and our corresponding reticence to second-guess

the expert decisions of faculty committees.” Haynes v. Ind. Univ., 902 F.3d 724, 734 (7th

Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted). And “although the legal standard is the same

whether the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case is a salesman or a scientist,

practical considerations make a challenge to the denial of tenure . . . an uphill fight—

notably the absence of fixed, objective criteria for tenure at that level.” Blasdel v.

Northwestern Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2012).

Xi is quick to point out that she is already tenured. From this, she implies that the

cases just cited are somehow less relevant to her situation because this is not a denial of

tenure case. True enough. But the decision to grant tenure and the decision to promote a

tenured professor from associate to full professor are surely close cousins to one

another, at the very least. This is because the same subjective factors used to decide who

will get a promotion from associate professor to full professor at Purdue apply to the

considerations used to grant or deny tenure. So, cases like Blasdel remain highly

instructive.

With this background, let’s dive into whether Purdue’s stated reasons for

denying Xi’ promotion were phony excuses to mask its actual discriminatory motive.

Purdue says the Area Committee declined to promote Xi because, at the time she

applied, she lacked competitive federal grant funding, her only active external funding

expired the following year, she had recently been awarded the Research Refresh

Award, and they had concerns with the quality of her publications and the conferences

she attended. Xi argues these stated reasons fly in the face of her unanimous

departmental support, strong external reviews, active federal funding, and she argues

Purdue’s reliance on her receipt of the Research Refresh Award is contradictory and

unsupported by the record.

The Research Refresh Award lies at the heart of this dispute. Before we get there,

though, I will analyze Xi’s other alleged evidence of pretext. Xi argues the Area

Committee’s comments on her research are not credible and ignore her strong

institutional and external support. [DE 36 at 9.] As evidence, Xi points to the unanimous

Primary Committee vote to advance her promotion application and selectively quotes

her letters of support, including a comment that “Purdue would be foolish not to grant

this promotion.” [DE 32-1 at 164, 136.] Xi argues these factors demonstrate Purdue’s

proffered concern with her research is so incredible that it is “unworthy of credence.”

Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

Xi’s argument is self-defeating. This is because even if I were to assume that

Purdue was substantively wrong in its decision making (as Xi contends), that wouldn’t

be proof of pretext. At most, all that Xi has provided is circumstantial evidence that

Purdue’s evaluation of her research may have been inaccurate or unfair, but she

provides no evidence that Purdue did not honestly believe she lacked the research

prowess to merit promotion. As has been stated many times by the Seventh Circuit, “[i]t

is not the court’s concern that an employer may be wrong about its employee’s

performance, or may be too hard on its employee. Rather, the only question is whether

the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, meaning that it was a lie.” Id. (citation

omitted).

There is simply no evidence in the record that Purdue’s stated reason for denying

Xi’s promotion was a lie. The Area Committee noted that “discussion focused on the

quality of journals and conference proceedings in which she was publishing” and

determined Xi “had no active funding.” [DE 32-1 at 164.] Indeed, Xi’s application listed

her Army Research Lab grant as ending on May 14, 2024, and a second grant from the

Army Research Office that expired on January 6, 2023. [Id. at 115.] In her deposition, Xi

acknowledged that she considered “only one, [the] Army Research Lab” grant to be

active at the time of her application. [Id. at 26–27.]

Xi indeed submitted documentation in her January 23, 2023, appeal that showed

her Army Research Lab grant had been extended to October 6, 2027, but she did not

submit this information with her initial application. [DE 37-2 at 71.] It is undisputed that

the extension to 2027 of Xi’s sole source of external funding was not before the Area

Committee, and she provides no evidence that Purdue’s concerns with the criteria and

competitiveness for her receipt of money from that source was insincere. The mere fact

that Xi received a unanimous vote from the Primary Committee of her peers in the

Department of Statistics does not somehow make the Area Committee’s decision

dishonest nor does it insulate her from the remaining levels in Purdue’s promotion

process.

The Parties’ discussion of Xi’s research credentials focuses on her receipt of the

Research Refresh Award and the Area Committee’s analysis of the same. There are

several components to Xi’s allegations concerning the Area Committee’s treatment of

this Award. Xi says she applied for the Research Refresh Award because of a high-risk

pregnancy at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. [DE 36 at 12.] It follows, according

to Xi, that viewing her receipt of this Award negatively is evidence of sex

discrimination. Xi also makes much of her allegation that Purdue never told her that the

Award could be treated negatively in the promotion process. [Id. at 13.] Finally, Xi

alludes to inconsistent treatment of recipients of the Research Refresh Award.

There is no question the Area Committee heavily relied on Xi’s receipt of the

Research Refresh Award to deny her promotion. Xi’s application for the Award

includes several references that her “research progress slowed down due to the

unexpected pregnancy complication and the challenge to find childcare during the

pandemic.” [DE 32-1 at 166.] She added the Award “would give her a much-needed

boost to help her regain momentum.” [Id.] But Xi acknowledged in her deposition that

she had no knowledge whether the Area Committee ever reviewed her application for

the Award when considering her request for promotion. [Id. at 24–25.] The evidence

suggests the Area Committee did not. Xi’s application for promotion noted her receipt

of the Research Refresh Award, [id. at 99], but she did not elaborate on why she applied

for (or may have received) the Award. Purdue also points to the testimony of Lucy

Flesch and Peter Wolfe, both of whom attended but did not vote in the Area Committee

meeting on Xi’s promotion. Flesch and Wolfe both claim the Area Committee did not

receive or review Xi’s application for the Research Refresh Award. [DE 32-2 at 8, ¶33;

DE 32-5 at 2, ¶6.] Xi has put forth no evidence that the Area Committee was even aware

of her pregnancy nor the reasons she applied for the Award, much less that they relied

on those reasons to make their decision.

Xi’s claim of selective interpretation of the Award is similarly unsupported by

the record. Xi admitted that in her January 18, 2023, meeting with Flesch and Hao

Zhang concerning the Area Committee’s review of her application for promotion, both

Flesch and Zhang told her receipt of the Research Refresh Award may be interpreted as

falling behind on one’s research funding. [DE 32-1 at 54–55.] Though Xi says she was

not aware of this possibility when she applied for the Award, she points to no evidence

of inconsistent treatment of the Award by Purdue in the promotion process. Xi does not

dispute Purdue’s statement that the other two individuals from the College of Science

who received the Research Refresh Award from 2018 to 2022 did not subsequently go

through the promotion process to full professor. [DE 44 at ¶85.] Xi provides no evidence

of inconsistent treatment through this comparison of dissimilar situations.

The Research Refresh Program policy for 2022 – 2023 that Xi includes in her

response describes the program as geared towards professors “who would benefit from

intense focus to advance their scholarship and reinvigorate their careers.” [DE 37-2 at

16.] In fact, Xi herself admitted on her application for the Award that she needed

assistance to “reinvigorate” her research. [DE 32-1 at 165.] Xi’s claim that Purdue has

identified no formal guidance that instructs reviewers to view the Award as indicative

of problems securing research funding does nothing to suggest Purdue’s reliance on her

receipt of the Award was a lie or insincere. In short, Xi’s disagreement with Purdue’s

treatment of her receipt of the Research Refresh Award does not prove pretext.

Lin’s December 1, 2022, email announcing his resignation as Department Head

for the Department of Statistics likewise does not provide a whiff of pretext evidence. In

his email to Wolfe, Lin said he “failed” Xi and wrote “I am shame [sic] to be a

department Head who is not able to promote our faculty.” [DE 39-1 at 1.] Of note, he

voices his opinion that “a similar (or even worse) case from another department went

through.” [Id.] This all sounds to me like nothing more than a sincere disagreement, not

pretext.

Xi also argues Purdue’s promotion of Anindya Bhadra provides evidence of

pretext because he is a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably.1

Recall that Purdue concedes Bhadra is similarly situated for purposes of Xi’s prima facie

1 Xi also points to Raghu Pasupathy as a comparator, but I quickly dispense of this argument. Purdue promoted

Pasupathy during a different promotion cycle that included different reviewers. See Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,

219 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz, 834 F.3d 760 (noting that when “different

decision-makers are involved, two decisions are rarely similarly situated in all relevant respects.”) (citation omitted).

case. [DE 30 at 10.] But whether there is a similarly situated comparator is also relevant

to the pretext analysis. See Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 892 (7th Cir.

2001) (“A showing that similarly situated employees belonging to a different racial

group received more favorable treatment can also serve as evidence that the employer’s

proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse job action was a pretext

for racial discrimination.”) (citation omitted). Purdue has, of course, not conceded

anything with respect to Bhadra’s status as similarly situated to Xi for pretext purposes.

Plaintiffs may demonstrate discrimination by pointing to differential treatment

of a “similarly-situated employee who was not in the protected class.” Little v. Ill. Dep’t

of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has cautioned against

too rigid an application of this analysis. It is a “flexible” analysis that considers “all

relevant factors, the number of which depends on the context of the case.” Humphries v.

CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Common factors

include whether the individuals had the same supervisor, were subject to the same

standards, engaged in similar conduct, and lacked differentiating or mitigating

circumstances that distinguished their conduct. Id. But at bottom, the analysis focuses

on “eliminat[ing] confounding variables” and deciding whether “there are enough

common features between the individuals to allow a meaningful comparison[.]” Id.

Let’s first consider whether Bhadra is in fact similarly situated to Xi. Xi says

Purdue promoted Bhadra to full professor in December 2022. [DE 37-2 at 73.] Xi claims

Bhadra had fewer publications, less external research funding, and supervised fewer

graduate mentees than herself. [DE 36 at 13.] For example, Bhadra received five total

grants since 2018 while Xi received eleven total grants since 2011. [DE 37-2 at 73–74.]

Bhadra has supervised four students since his prior promotion while Xi has supervised

twelve. [Id. at 75–76.] There are two key problems with Xi’s one to one comparison of

credentials. First, as noted above, courts reviewing Title VII claims are not tasked with

subjective analysis of professors’ credentials, scholarship, and mentorship. We are ill

equipped for that task. See Hatcher v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 829 F.3d 531, 541 (7th Cir.

2016) (“[S]cholars are in the best position to make the highly subjective judgments

reviewing scholarship and tenure”), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz, 834 F.3d 760 (7th

Cir. 2016).

Moreover, “differences in qualifications between job candidates, on their own,

cannot be evidence of discrimination unless those differences are so favorable to the

plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment

that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at issue.” Id. Xi has not

presented evidence to meet this bar. For example, part of the difference in Xi’s and

Bhadra’s total number of grants, supervisees, and publications can be explained by the

fact that Xi has been an associate professor seven years longer than Bhadra. [DE 37-2 at

73.] And the Seventh Circuit has specifically cautioned against strict comparison of the

quality versus quantity of academics’ publications and other achievements. See Blasdel,

687 F.3d at 816 (“If A publishes an excellent academic paper every five years on

average, is she better or worse than B, who publishes a good but not excellent paper on

average every six months, so that at the end of five years he has published 10 papers

and she only 1?.”)

Purdue points out important differences in Bhadra’s promotion process that

suggest he is not, in fact, a proper comparator. Above all else, Bhadra did not receive

the Research Refresh Award. [DE 36 at 13.] Bhadra’s Nomination for Promotion Form

36 reflects the Area Committee weighed his funding from NSF and NIH and “strong

publication record in tier 1 journals.” [DE 32-2 at 105.] More importantly, another key

differentiator was Bhadra’s receipt of an offer from North Carolina State University to

enter as a full professor. Bhadra used this offer as leverage to get a full professorship

from Purdue. Indeed, there are emails in the record where Bhadra requests a formal

counteroffer at the “full professor level” in light of his offer for a full professorship from

NC State. [DE 39-2 at 8.] In response, Purdue said it would put Bhadra’s promotion “on

an appropriately aggressive track.” [Id. at 7.] Xi believes this email thread raises

suspicion that Purdue may have sped up its consideration of Bhadra’s promotion.

Perhaps it did. But I’m at a loss to see how that shows discrimination against Xi

especially because Xi did not have a similar offer from a rival university.

In sum, Xi has not presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue on

whether Purdue’s promotion of Bhadra suggests its decision to not promote Xi was

pretextual. For that reason and the others discussed above, summary judgment must

therefore be granted on the Xi’s discrimination claims.

II. Retaliation Claim (Count V)

Xi also alleges Purdue retaliated against her by refusing to permit her to re-apply

for promotion to full professor “within a reasonable time.” [DE 1 at ¶49.] Under Title

VII, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee because he or she

opposes an employment practice proscribed by Title VII or because he or she

participates in an investigation or proceeding under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);

Jokich v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 42 F.4th 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2022). To survive summary

judgment on her retaliation claim, Xi must provide evidence that (1) she engaged in

activity protected by Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3)

there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Id.

Purdue argues Xi fails to prove each element of her Title VII retaliation claim, but

it also argues the Court need not reach the issue because Xi failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies. Generally, “a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a

lawsuit that were not included in her EEOC charge.” Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31

F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994); Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1099–1100 (7th Cir.

2013) (“[P]laintiffs may pursue only those claims that could reasonably be expected to

grow out of the administrative charges.”). But a plaintiff may bring claims in a lawsuit

if they are “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of

such allegations.” Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500 (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has

clarified that the claim and the administrative charge must “at minimum, describe the

same conduct and implicate the same individuals.” Reynolds, 737 F.3d at 1100 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

It is a close call whether Xi exhausted her administrative remedies. On the one

hand, Xi explicitly chose not to check the retaliation box in her Charge of Discrimination

form. [DE 32-1 at 94.] But on the other hand, reasonable minds could conclude that her

retaliation claim is inter-woven with her claims of discrimination. Because Xi’s

retaliation claim fails on the merits, I will simply note that Purdue has preserved the

exhaustion argument and proceed to the substance of the retaliation claim.

Xi’s theory of her case fails to create a triable issue on whether she engaged in

Title VII protected activity. Xi must demonstrate she took “some step in opposition to a

form of discrimination that [Title VII] prohibits.” O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657

F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2011). Xi need not show that the practice she opposed in fact

violated Title VII, but her opposition to the practice at issue “must be based on a good-

faith and reasonable belief that [she] is opposing unlawful conduct.” Id. Xi argues her

submission of a written internal appeal challenging the denial of her promotion to Full

Professor was protected activity. But while “filing an official complaint with an

employer may constitute statutorily protected conduct under Title VII, the complaint

must indicate the discrimination occurred because of sex, race, national origin, or some

other protected class.” Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006).

For starters, Xi’s appeal of her application for promotion contains no mention of

discrimination based on race or national origin. Xi has therefore presented no evidence

that she filed her appeal on a belief she was opposing unlawful conduct based on these

protected characteristics. Xi’s appeal does, contrary to Purdue’s insistence otherwise,

make several references to her sex. For example, she notes she applied for the Research

Refresh Award because of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on her “as a female

faculty member with two young children.” [DE 32-1 at 185.] She also argued the Area

Committee provided inadequate consideration of her qualifications as compared to a

male faculty member “who lacked the same family obligations during the pandemic.”

[Id.]

Xi’s argument that her appeal was protected activity fails to support an inference

that she opposed discrimination on the basis of her sex. Xi did not have to “use the

magic words sex or gender discrimination . . . [but] she has to at least say something to

indicate her gender is at issue.” Sitar v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.

2003) (internal quotation makrs and citation omitted). Xi’s first reference to being a

“female faculty member with two young children”, [DE 32-1 at 185], describes why she

applied for the Research Refresh Award. It does not indicate that she believes Purdue

discriminated against her because of her sex. Moreover, the substance of her

comparison to her two male colleagues focused not on their sex but on the number of

students supervised, publications, and research grants. [See id. at 186–97.]

It is true that Xi’s appeal noted that her colleagues were male and “lacked the

same family obligations during the pandemic.” [Id. at 185.] But these allegations are tied

to caregiver status, which is not on its own a protected characteristic. See Boyd v.

Advanced Physicians, Case No. 22-CV-7012, 2024 WL 1363421, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,

2024) (noting “the plain language of Title VII does not prohibit discrimination solely

based upon caregiving responsibility or family responsibilities.”). Even to allege

retaliation under a so called “plus” claim, which Xi does not allege, Xi still “must allege

discrimination, harassment, or retaliation based on a protected characteristic plus

familial status and not familial status alone.” Id. Xi has failed to present such evidence.

In fact, after thoroughly reviewing Xi’s briefing, I cannot find any substantive response

to Purdue’s claim that she did not engage in protected activity.

Even if we assume Xi engaged in protected activity, there is no evidence that she

suffered a materially adverse action. The standard for a materially adverse action in the

context of a Title VII retaliation claim is “easier to satisfy than the comparable standard

for Title VII discrimination claims[.]” Lesiv v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 912 (7th Cir.

2022); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (“Title VII’s

substantive provision and its antiretaliation provision are not coterminous.”). To be

“materially adverse”, Xi must show that Purdue’s action “might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68

(internal citation omitted). The adverse action element of a retaliation claim is

frequently described in terms of an adverse employment action, but the Supreme Court

has been clear that the adverse action need not affect the plaintiff’s “terms and

conditions of employment.” Id. at 64.

Xi advances no facts to create a triable issue on whether Purdue subject her to an

adverse action. Xi alleges Purdue retaliated against her by prohibiting her from re-

applying for promotion to Full Professor until 2024 instead of 2023. They did no such

thing. The only evidence advanced by Xi are her deposition comments that Cziczo told

her to “give up” on re-applying for Full Professor. [DE 32-1 at 58.] Xi says she

clandestinely recorded Cziczo as he made these comments during her annual review on

April 5, 2023, [id. 55–56], but she did not provide the Court with a copy of this recording

during briefing on Purdue’s motion for summary judgment. Cziczo denies having

made that comment. [DE 32-6 at 2, ¶8.]

While a disputed issue of fact, this alleged exchange does not rise to the level of

an adverse action that could have dissuaded a reasonable person from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination. In Barker v. YMCA of Racine, the Seventh Circuit

rejected the plaintiff’s claim that her supervisors’ emails and comments requesting the

plaintiff to withdraw her state discrimination claim against them constituted an adverse

action. 18 Fed.Appx. 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit noted that the

supervisors’ comments may have made plaintiff “uncomfortable”, but they were not

evidence of threats or efforts to prevent the plaintiff from pursuing her claims. Id. Even

assuming Xi is correct that Cziczo told her he would “give up” if he were in Xi’s

position, this discouragement is too thin, certainly thinner than in Barker, to be

considered an adverse action.

Xi has presented no other evidence of adverse action by Purdue. To the contrary,

Xi’s allegations that Cziczo prohibited her from re-applying in 2023 are clearly refuted

by the documentary evidence presented. The evidence suggests Purdue merely

cautioned Xi that it would be an uphill battle to re-apply in 2023 because she would

have to re-use her letters of recommendation. Cziczo emailed Xi that there were “issues

. . . with running a case in two consecutive years . . . due to the 24-month ‘life’ [cycle] of

a letter of reference.” [DE 32-1 at 218.] Cziczo wrote “it is typically not possible” to

apply in back-to-back years, but he said he was “of course be open to discussing what

the implications are regarding [Xi reapplying in] 2023.” Id. The full context of these

emails paints a different picture of this exchange. Cziczo’s email suggests he had

concerns with Xi applying in back-to-back years with the same letters of

recommendation, but he indicated an openness to discussing that possibility. No

reasonable jury could find that Cziczo’s words of caution and Purdue’s application of a

broadly applicable policy concerning letters of recommendation for the College of

Science constituted an adverse action. See Kinsella v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., LLC., No. 18 C 7803,

2021 WL 3737731, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2021) (finding plaintiff’s allegations

“stem[med] from a company policy that affected every employee”, including plaintiff,

so did not rise to the level of adverse action). The evidence suggests Purdue

recommended Xi wait another year to re-apply so she could strengthen her application

with new letters of recommendation. No reasonable juror could conclude that Purdue’s

response would deter others from filing charges of discrimination.

Finally, Xi presents no triable issues concerning causation. The standard for

causation in a Title VII retaliation case is traditional but-for causation. See Cung Hnin v.

TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014). Flesch met with Xi on January 18,

2023, and suggested Xi wait to re-apply until 2024 to acquire new letters of

recommendation. [DE 32-2 at 9, ¶38; 10, ¶42.] Importantly, this meeting occurred before

Xi submitted her January 25, 2023, application for reconsideration, which she says

initiated Purdue’s retaliation. The fact that Purdue had already recommended Xi wait

another year to re-apply before the event she says instigated that response weakens the

already loose connection between these events.

Additionally, Purdue’s Operating Procedures for Granting Academic Tenure

forbade Xi from nominating herself for promotion because she had been considered for

promotion within the previous three years. [DE 32-2 at 68.] Thus, Xi was dependent on

the Statistics Primary Committee to nominate her for promotion in the 2023 cycle. The

Primary Committee declined to nominate Xi, but Xi presented no evidence that this was

because of her January 2023 request to reconsider her 2022 application for promotion. Xi

claims that Cziczo’s decision to check with the College of Science concerning her

eligibility for re-applying in 2023 is murky and similarly unsupported. In her

deposition, Xi suggested Cziczo should not have consulted with the College of Science

concerning her re-applying in 2023. [DE 32-1 at 77–79.] But there is again no evidence

that the College of Science directed Cziczo or the Department of Statistics to forbid Xi

from re-applying because of her appeal of her 2022 application. Rather, the evidence

suggests Cziczo, as interim dean from a different department, was not familiar with the

application process for the Department of Statistics.

Xi also vaguely claims without evidence that Purdue in April 2023 changed its

university-wide policy concerning letters of recommendation in retaliation for her

January 2023 request for reconsideration. Xi points to an undated College of Science

Promotion Outline from 2023 that references an April 2023 memo which announced a

new policy that “deans will explicitly review and sign off on all letter-writers in

advance of the letters being solicited.” [DE 32-1 at 212–13; 82–85.] Xi suggests Lin’s

resignation as head of the Department of Statistics triggered this policy change and that

Cziczo somehow had a hand in securing this change. [Id. at 85–86.] But by Xi’s own

admission she “do[es] not know” how or why Cziczo purportedly changed this policy.

[Id. at 86.] There is simply nothing in the factual record presented by Xi to support this

bare-bones allegation of a university-wide conspiracy to change broadly applicable

rules concerning letters of recommendation in response to her January 2023 request for

reconsideration. Because Xi has presented no facts to create a triable issue of a prima

facie case of retaliation, summary judgment is warranted for Purdue on this claim too.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendant The Trustees of Purdue University’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [DE 29] is GRANTED. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor

of The Trustees of Purdue University. The Clerk is instructed to CLOSE this case.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: September 8, 2025.

/s/ Philip P. Simon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE