Hubbs v. City of Charlotte

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-00069-KDB-DCK

ALAN HUBBS,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF CHARLOTTE,

JEFFREY WHEATON, JENNA

PARKER AND C. LAI,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 10).

The Court has carefully considered this motion and the parties’ briefs in support and in opposition.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

However, “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to

relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).

A. Rule 12(b)(2)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

proper process and proper service of process. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 59-60

(4th Cir. 1993). A summons must be issued and served in accordance with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Omni

Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). When process or service of process

is deficient, dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. See,

e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984).

B. Rules 12(b)(4) and (12)(b)(5)

Prior to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff must satisfy the procedural

requirement of service of a summons. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 104; see also ESAB

Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 620 (4th Cir. 1997) (“a federal court's exercise of

jurisdiction over a person is closely linked to effective service of process.”). “Thus, before a court

may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be more than notice to the

defendant and a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum. There

also must be a basis for the defendant's amenability to service of summons.” Id.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(4) challenges the sufficiency or form of the process

itself, while a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) challenges the sufficiency of the act of service

of process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4), (b)(5). In essence, a Rule 12(b)(4) motion to dismiss

objects to a defect in the content of the documents served, while a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss

objects to a defect in the act (or lack) of delivery. See, e.g., 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1353 (3d ed. 2004).

Once the sufficiency of process or service of process is challenged by a motion to dismiss,

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing process was sufficient and service of process was

effectuated in accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Scott v. Md. State

Dep't of Labor, 673 F. App'x 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (internal citation

omitted); Elkins v. Broome, 213 F.R.D. 273, 276 (M.D.N.C. 2003).

C. Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to expose deficient

allegations “at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the

court.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual

content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In evaluating whether a claim is

sufficiently stated, “[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but does not consider “legal conclusions, elements of a cause

of action, ... bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] ... unwarranted inferences,

unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,

591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (A claim will not survive a

motion to dismiss if it contains nothing more than “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of a cause of action's elements.”). That said, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed

even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery

is very remote and unlikely.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) determines only whether a claim is stated; “it does not

resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of

defenses.” Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).

Finally, a pro se complaint, as here, must be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Liberal

construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where ... there is a pro se complaint raising

civil rights issues.”). However, the liberal construction requirement does not permit a district court

to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in the complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable

under federal law. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Alan Hubbs alleges that he was driving on January 24, 2023, when an unmarked

police car forced him to swerve out of his lane. (Doc. 1, p 4, ¶ 14). Later that day, Mr. Hubbs called

internal affairs at the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (“CMPD”), but was unsuccessful

in learning who was driving the police car. (Doc. 1, p 4, ¶ 14). On April 19, 2023, Plaintiff traveled

to CMPD headquarters and began filming outside the building. (Id.). Plaintiff was then approached

by Defendant Officer Jeffrey Wheaton and another officer, who allegedly threatened to arrest

Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, p 4, ¶ 16). Plaintiff also learned Officer Wheaton was driving the unmarked

police car on January 24, 2023. (Id.). On April 23, 2023, Plaintiff traveled to CMPD headquarters

again, allegedly for the purpose of requesting bodycam video for the interaction that took place on

April 19. (Doc. 1, p 4, ¶ 17). At that time, Defendant Officer C. Lai and another officer arrested

Plaintiff for criminal stalking and confiscated Plaintiff’s phone. (Doc. 1, pp 4-6, ¶¶ 17-19).

The criminal case against Plaintiff was dismissed in November 2023, and Plaintiff’s phone

was returned to Plaintiff on or about December 6, 2023. (Doc. 1, p 6, ¶ 19). Plaintiff filed his pro

se Complaint on January 31, 2025 (Doc. 1), asserting four claims against Defendants, specifically

two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for alleged violations of civil rights (one for false arrest and another

for false imprisonment) (Doc. 1, pp 7-8); a claim for an alleged conspiracy to interfere with civil

rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Doc. 1, pp 8-9); and another false imprisonment claim in

which Plaintiff alleges Defendants acted “in their official capacities” (Doc. 1, pp 8-9). Plaintiff

states in the case caption that he is suing Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

(Doc. 1, p 1).

Summonses to the Defendants were issued when Plaintiff filed his Complaint. On February

25, 2025, the summons issued to Officer Wheaton was returned executed, showing a service date

of February 22, 2025 (Doc. 7). The summons issued to Defendant Officer Jenna Parker was

returned executed on March 4, 2025, showing a service date of March 3, 2025 (Doc. 8). The

summons issued to Defendant City was returned on March 24, 2025, showing that a private process

server served process on the City Manager, through an administrative employee who stated that

she was authorized to accept service. (Doc. 14). The Summons for Officer Lai was returned

unexecuted, and Plaintiff requests additional time to complete that service. (Doc. 17).

Defendants have moved the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), (4), (5), and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant City and Officer Lai should be dismissed pursuant to Rules

12(b)(2), (4), and (5) because they were not properly served.1 Defendants further seek dismissal

of all of Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for allegedly failing to

state a claim for which relief can be granted.

1 Defendants did not address service of process in their Reply brief (following return of the

Summons to the City on March 24, 2025) so it is unclear if they are still asserting that argument

as to the City.

III. DISCUSSION

While Defendants allege a number of reasons this action should be dismissed, including

lack of service as to one or more of the Defendants, there is (at least) one threshold merits issue

that supports dismissal of each of Plaintiff’s claims.2 As to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, both

his claim for false arrest and false imprisonment require a finding of constitutional error in the

individual Defendants’ conduct. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654 (4th Cir. 2012)

(constitutional claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “require a predicate constitutional violation

to proceed” because “supervisors and municipalities cannot be liable under § 1983 without some

predicate ‘constitutional injury at the hands of the individual [state] officer,’ at least in suits for

damages.”); Sigmon v. Brown, No. 5:23-CV-00155-KDB-DCK, 2024 WL 4508580, at *3

(W.D.N.C. Oct. 16, 2024).3

Here, the constitutional reasonableness of the arrest is established as a matter of law

because it was made pursuant to the execution of a facially valid warrant. See Messerschmidt v.

Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (“Where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a

search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is

the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or, as we have

sometimes put it, in ‘objective good faith.’”) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 - 923

(1984)). Further, the substance of the warrant application, which details multiple instances of

potential stalking behavior, makes clear that probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant.

2 Because it has determined that Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible claim on the merits, the

Court need not and does not reach Defendants’ arguments challenging service and personal

jurisdiction.

3 Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 solely on a respondeat superior

theory. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

See Doc. 1-1. Therefore, in the absence of a viable allegation of a constitutional violation,

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims cannot proceed.

Plaintiff also purports to sue all Defendants in their official capacities. Suits against an

officer in his official capacity are duplicative and “generally represent only another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n.55. For a municipality to be liable under

§ 1983, the constitutional deprivation must be caused “through an official policy or custom.” Lytle

v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.

Here, Plaintiff's “official capacity” and Monell claims are unsupported by evidence of any

unlawful official policy, custom or practice, or supervisory liability for an unspecified failure to

train in addition to the absence of an underlying constitutional wrong. Therefore, Plaintiff’s

“official capacity” claims similarly will be dismissed. See Lowe v. Cathey, No. 3:24-CV-00507-

KDB, 2024 WL 2981189, at *4 (W.D.N.C. June 13, 2024).

Finally, to successfully plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege

that the defendants were motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.

See Estate of Valentine by & through Grate v. South Carolina, 611 F.Supp.3d 99, 111 (D.S.C.

2019); A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011). However, all of

Plaintiff’s allegations relate to his own circumstances and fail to allege Defendants’ actions were

motivated by a discriminatory animus for a specific class of people (as distinguished from targeting

Plaintiff himself on “a discriminatory basis,” (Doc. 1, p 8, ¶ 31)). That is, Plaintiff fails to allege

that Plaintiff belongs to a specific class of people or that Defendants discriminated against him

because he belongs to a specific class of people. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and that claim will also be dismissed against all Defendants.

IV. ORDER

NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; and

3. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.

SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.

Signed: September 9, 2025

Kenneth D. Bell Vy,

United States District Judge □□ i