The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
TY’YELL M HALL,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 3:22-CV-1043-SJF
ORNELAS, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
On December 19, 2022, Plaintiff Ty’Yell M. Hall, a prisoner proceeding without a
lawyer1, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the above-captioned case. The
Court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to determine whether his case
was frivolous or malicious, failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
sought monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. On
February 6, 2023, Mr. Hall was granted “leave to proceed against Officer Heinaman and
Sergeant Ornelas (first names unknown) in their personal capacity for monetary
damages for allegedly using excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth
Amendment on September 25, 2021, by repeatedly shocking him with a tazer and
causing their dog to bite him in the genitals while he was lying on the ground.” [DE 5 at
1 As discussed below, Mr. Hall retained counsel shortly after Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Mr. Hall thus responded to Defendants’ summary judgment motion through his counsel. Mr. Hall is
again proceeding pro se because his counsel withdrew from the case after the motion was fully briefed
and ripe for consideration.
1]. On April 20, 2023, the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). [DE 19].
On January 5, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 44],
and a Motion to File and Maintain Under Seal Exhibit D-2 of the Summary Judgment
Motion [DE 48]. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hall retained counsel. [DE 51]. Mr. Hall, through
counsel, requested two extensions of time to respond to Defendants’ summary
judgment motion, which the Court granted. [DEs 53, 55]. Mr. Hall then responded to
Defendants’ motion on March 22, 2024, and Defendants filed their reply in support of
their motion on April 3, 2024. After Defendants’ motions were fully briefed and ripe for
ruling, Mr. Hall--again through his counsel—filed a Motion to Supplement Response to
Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 59] on June 27, 2024. This motion became ripe on
July 12, 2024, after Defendants did not respond.
The case was then reassigned to the undersigned magistrate judge on August 14,
2024, and the parties did not object to the continued exercise of jurisdiction by the
undersigned. [See DE 60]. Mr. Hall’s counsel then withdrew from this case on May 22,
2025. [DE 64, DE 68]. Around that same time, Mr. Hall filed a pro se Motion for
Settlement Conference, which Defendants have opposed while their Motion for
Summary Judgment remains pending. [DE 67].
With the parties’ continued consent to the undersigned magistrate judge, the
Court now enters the following opinion and order addressing all pending motions. For
the reasons explained below, the Court: (1) grants Defendants’ Motion to Seal [DE 48];
(2) denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement [DE 59]; (3) grants Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [DE 44]; and therefore (4) denies as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for
Settlement Conference [DE 67].
I. Factual Background
The following facts are undisputed.2 Plaintiff Ty’Yell Hall is an offender in the
custody of the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”). Mr. Hall is currently
incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional Facility, but during the incident at issue
here, Mr. Hall was incarcerated at the Miami Correctional Facility (“MCF”) in Bunker
Hill, Indiana. [DE 46 ¶1; DE 56-1 at 1, ¶3].
Defendant Casey Hindman3 was employed at the MCF as a Correctional Officer
during the incident at issue. As a correctional officer, Officer Hindman oversaw
incarcerated individuals on his assigned unit. [DE 46 ¶2]. Defendant Sonney Ornelas
was employed as a sergeant at MCF at this time and worked as a K9 handler. [Id. ¶3].
Sgt. Ornelas had more than three years of experience working with the K9s. [Id.] K9s are
trained to protect their handler if another person comes within ten feet of them. [Id. ¶5].
Thus, inmates are “advised to stay at least ten feet away from the K9s” and they “are
further advised that taunting or lunging at the K9 units will not be tolerated.” [Id.]
Relevant here, Sgt. Ornelas worked with a K9 partner named Odin, a Belgian Malinois,
who weighs between 60 and 70 pounds. [Id. ¶4].
2 As explained in Section III.A. infra, Plaintiff’s response brief appears to disregard the Court’s local rules,
particularly, N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(2). The Court has thus considered Defendants’ Statement of Material
Facts [DE 46] as undisputed, as permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
3 Defendant Hindman was incorrectly named as Officer Heinaman in Mr. Hall’s complaint.
On September 25, 2021, Officer Hindman was working in the Phase 2 Yard by the
KHU dorm at MCF. [Id. ¶6]. Mr. Hall was out in the Phase 2 Yard and was complaining
“profanely that he did not have the appropriate clothing for chow.” [Id. ¶7]. Officer
Hindman allowed Mr. Hall to return to his dorm so that he could get proper clothes for
chow. [Id.]. Mr. Hall went to his dorm and obtained a blue shirt, the proper attire for
chow. [Id. ¶8]. But Mr. Hall did not fully put the shirt sleeves on. [Id.]. Officer Hindman
ordered Mr. Hall to put on his shirt properly, but Mr. Hall refused and instead kept
walking toward the chow hall. [Id. ¶¶9-10]. Sgt. Ornelas also instructed Mr. Hall to put
his on shirt properly, and Mr. Hall then “became disorderly and refused to comply with
orders.” [Id. ¶11]. Sgt. Ornelas thus further advised Mr. Hall that he needed to put on
his shirt properly and to cease “making aggressive stances toward staff.” [Id.]. Sgt.
Ornelas explained to Mr. Hall that if he failed to do so, he would need to return to his
dorm and would not be able to go to chow. [Id.]
Both Sergeant Ornelas and Officer Hindman ordered Mr. Hall to stop walking.
Mr. Hall responded to these orders profanely and with vulgarities. [Id. at 2, ¶¶12-13].
Sgt. Ornelas then gave Mr. Hall a clear order to stop walking and to turn around, but
Mr. Hall refused. [Id. ¶14]. Mr. Hall continued to walk toward chow. [Id.] Sgt. Ornelas
blocked the sidewalk with his K9. Officer Hindman ordered Mr. Hall to either return to
his dorm or to stop and get on the ground. [Id. ¶15]. Sgt. Ornelas also stepped on the
sidewalk so that Mr. Hall would stop walking toward chow. [Id. ¶16]. Sgt. Ornelas
ordered Mr. Hall to stop walking and further warned him that he would release the K9
if Mr. Hall did not stop walking toward him. [Id. ¶18]. But Mr. Hall kept walking,
ultimately closing the 10-foot gap that he was supposed to keep between himself and
the K9. [Id. ¶¶17, 20]. Mr. Hall does not deny he refused to follow orders, and he knew
that he needed to stay at least 10 feet away from a K9. [Id. ¶¶19, 22].
When Mr. Hall came within 10 feet of the K9 and Sergeant Ornelas, Sgt. Ornelas
deployed the K9. [Id. ¶23]. The K9 jumped at Mr. Hall but missed initially. [Id. ¶25].
After that, Officer Hindman deployed his taser, a lesser level of force than a K9. [Id.
¶¶26-27]. Officer Hindman disengaged his taser before a full cycle occurred, as the K9
then reengaged, this time latching on to Mr. Hall’s clothes in the inner thigh area. [Id.
¶28]. Mr. Hall then went to the ground, and Sgt. Ornelas disengaged the K9. [Id. ¶29].
Approximately eight seconds elapsed between the K9’s deployment and
disengagement. [Id. ¶31].
Another correctional officer, non-party Lieutenant Morgan, then placed Mr. Hall
in mechanical restraints and escorted him to medical. [Id. ¶32]. Mr. Hall was then
assessed by Nurse Ashley Wilson. [Id. ¶34; DE 44-10]. Nurse Wilson found that Mr. Hall
“had a small puncture wound in his arm from the taser” but medical staff “could not
locate any marks in the groin area.” [DE 46 ¶34, 35;]. Medical records document that
“all skin [was] intact to scrotum and penis, [and] no redness, bruising, or edema noted
in the area.” [Id. ¶35; DE 44-10 at 17].
Mr. Hall did request an acetaminophen refill on October 13, 2021, because of pain
with arousal, stating that he needed acetaminophen because his was bitten in the “penis
and testicals [sic]” and because he had a hernia. [DE 46 ¶42; DE 44-10 at 8]. Eight days
later, on October 21, 2021, Mr. Hall requested another acetaminophen refill reporting
pain in other areas. [DE 46 ¶43; DE 44-10 at 9]. Mr. Hall was then assessed by a doctor
on October 26, 2021. During the examination, Mr. Hall reported a bite on his penis and
testicle area. Mr. Hall also reported that “with arousal he develops throbbing pain but
that has been gradually decreasing.” [DE 46 ¶44; DE 44-10 at 34]. After that date,
however, Mr. Hall did not report any other pain in his penis. [DE 46 ¶45]. Mr. Hall
described himself as “fully recovered” from this incident. [Id. ¶48].
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact
exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. To determine whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must review the record, construing all
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003).
The Court’s role “is not to sift through the evidence, pondering the nuances and
inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe. The court has one task and one task only:
to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is a material dispute that
requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Indeed,
the court is not “obligated to research and construct legal arguments for parties,
especially when they are represented by counsel.” Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590
(7th Cir. 2011).
Thus, to overcome a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party
cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings. The
nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each
element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23;
Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013) Where a factual record taken as
a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is
no genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In other words, “[s]ummary judgment is not a dress
rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party
must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version
of the events.” Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)
(quotations omitted); see also Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th
Cir. 2010).
Mr. Hall alleges that Defendants used excessive force against him on September
25, 2021, when Defendants deployed a taser and K9 as Mr. Hall walked on the sidewalk
between his dorm and the chow hall. Defendants have moved for summary judgment
contending that the undisputed material facts show that the force involved in the
incident was justified and minimal. Defendants also maintain that they are entitled to
qualified immunity. [See DE 45 at 10-12].
III. Discussion
Before the Court addresses the merits of Defendants’ summary judgment
motion, the Court must take up several preliminary matters and ancillary procedural
motions. The Court begins by addressing the numerous procedural deficiencies
contained in Mr. Hall’s response brief.
A. Procedural Deficiencies with Plaintiff’s Response
As stated, Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 5, 2024. Under
this Court’s local rules4, a party moving for summary judgment must separately file: (1)
a motion; (2) a supporting brief; and (3) a statement of material facts with numbered
paragraphs for each material fact the moving party contends is undisputed which
includes (A) a short statement of each fact; and (B) a citation to evidence supporting
each fact. See N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a). Defendants’ summary judgment filings comport
with these rules, thus meeting their obligation as the moving party. [See DE 44 (motion);
DE 45 (supporting brief); and DE 46 (statement of material facts)].
Plaintiff then responded on March 22, 2024, after requesting and receiving two
extensions. [DE 56]. Under this Court’s local rules, a party opposing summary
judgment must separately file: (1) a response brief and (2) a Response to Statement of
Material Facts that (A) restates verbatim the Statement of Facts, (B) includes a
correspondingly numbered response immediately following each paragraph of the
Statement of Facts, (C) a cites to evidence supporting each dispute of fact, and (D)
4 The applicable rules became effective on February 25, 2022, about two years before the instant motion
was filed.
includes additional facts in a section titled Additional Material Facts with numbered
paragraphs continuing the sequential numbering of the Statement of Material Facts for
each additional material fact the opposing party contends is undisputed which includes
both (i) a short statement of each fact, and (ii) a citation to evidence supporting each
fact. See N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)5.
Plaintiff does include a “Brief in Opposition” as contemplated by N.D. Ind. L.R.
56-1(b)(1). [See DE 57]. But Plaintiff’s response ignores the requirements listed in N.D.
Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(2). Instead of including a separately filed Response to Statement of
Material Facts as required by N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(2), Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition
merely includes a paragraph stating that he “adopts and incorporates Plaintiff’s
affidavit set forth in his statement of material facts[.]”6 [DE 57 at 2]. Plaintiff’s Affidavit,
however, does not “restate[] verbatim the [Defendants’] Statement of Facts” nor does it
include “a correspondingly numbered response immediately following each paragraph
of the Statement of Facts” or a citation to evidence supporting each dispute of fact. Id.
Plaintiff’s Affidavit thus also fails to include a list of additional facts in a section titled
Additional Material Facts as required. Thus, Plaintiff has not met his obligations as the
nonmoving party under the local rules.7
5 The rule applies when an opposing party is represented by counsel—and Mr. Hall had counsel at the
time the response brief was filed. See N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(3) (exempting pro se parties from this
requirement).
6 To support this adoption, Plaintiff cites N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a)(3). But this rule provides for the moving
party’s obligations at summary judgment, not those of the opposing party.
7 The Court notes that the substance of Plaintiff’s response brief is deficient on numerous fronts as well.
First, it is filled with typographical errors. See, e.g., DE 57 at 6 (“Mr. Hall considers himself ‘fully
recovered’ from the incident he describes in his complot.”) Some of these errors result in statements
contrary to Plaintiff’s position on summary judgment. See id. at 8 (“They are entitled to qualified
immunity from suit. Accordingly, summary judgment should be entered for Sgt. Ornelas and Officer
Defendants raise these procedural deficiencies in their reply brief and request
that the Court treat all facts in their Statement of Material Facts [DE 46] as undisputed
due to these deficiencies. As Defendants suggest, “[t]he district court is entitled to
require strict enforcement with its local rules.” McCormick v. Goebel, 655 F. Supp. 3d 748,
756 (N.D. Ind. 2023)(citing Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218-19 (7th Cir.
2015). The Court included these requirements in the local rules because they facilitate
the Court’s ability to efficiently and justly resolve motions for summary judgment.
Thus, parties’ “[c]ompliance with these rules demonstrates respect for the process.”
Robertson v. Marthakis, No. 3:22CV887 DRL-AZ, 2025 WL 1784690, at *5 (N.D. Ind. June
25, 2025). When a party fails to comply with the local rules, the Court must then wade
through a long record to find disputes of fact. But “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting
for truffles buried in briefs.” United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991); see
also Litsinger v. Forest River, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 3d 334, 353 (N.D. Ind. 2021) (stating that “it
isn't the court's job to find the needle in the haystack, the truffle in the field, or the
Waldo on the page”). Accordingly, a non-moving party's failure to admit or deny facts
as presented in the moving party's statement of facts “render[s] the facts presented by
the moving party as undisputed.” Curtis, 807 F.3d at 218-19; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)
(“If a party ... fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by
Hindman, and against Plaintiff’s pending Eighth Amendment claim.”) Other parts of the response
include incomplete or nonsensical sentences. See id. at 3 (“The [evidence] does not entitle Sgt. Ornelas and
Officer Hindman to summary * The Plaintiff moves the court to take judicial notice of his information,
pursuant to FRE 201(b)(c)(d) in that source of the information is attached and are from Nation Journals
and/or Law school publication.”). Other portions use improper rhetorical questions as a form of
advocacy. See id. at 5: “How would you like [to be] tased and bitten for that time period for not having
your shirt tucked in?” and id. at 6: “Who would do this if not in bad faith[?]”
Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion
....”).
Thus, the Court must determine whether to treat Defendants’ Statement of
Material Facts as undisputed here. The Court first notes that Plaintiff’s counsel
appeared on January 15, 2024, ten days after Defendants moved for summary judgment.
This circumstance would generally counsel the Court to relax its requirements. But
Plaintiff was then afforded two extensions of time before ultimately responding in
opposition to summary judgment on March 22, 2024. [DE 53, DE 55]. This suggests that
the deficiency did not stem from a lack of time. Rather, it suggests a lack of awareness
of the court’s rules at the time the response was filed. Even so, Defendants’ reply brief
filed fourteen days later raised the deficiencies with Plaintiff’s Response, and Plaintiff
did not seek leave to address the deficiencies. What’s more, Plaintiff later filed a Motion
to Supplement his Response to Defendants’ motion, but this motion does not
acknowledge the deficiencies or seek to supplement his response to correct the
problems. Based on these circumstances, as well as Plaintiff’s total failure to comply
with the rules, the Court can only consider the facts listed by Defendants in their
Statement of Material Facts [DE 46, ¶1-¶48] as undisputed, consistent with other courts
in this district. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Szczepanski v. Dana, Inc., No. 1:22-CV-00318-GSL,
2024 WL 3594693, at *1 fn. 1 (N.D. Ind. July 31, 2024)(accepting the moving party’s
Statement of Facts as true where the non-moving party—represented by Plaintiff’s same
counsel here—“ma[d]e no attempt to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or N.D. Ind. L.R.
56-1(b)”); Buckley v. S.W.O.R.N. Prot. LLC, No. 20-CV-357, 2022 WL 4598577, at *1 (N.D.
Ind. Sept. 30, 2022) (same); but see Downey v. Hyatte, No. 3:21-CV-131-SJF, 2025 WL
901559, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2025)(granting other counsel leave to amend his
response to a motion for summary judgment when counsel’s original response did not
comply with N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)).
B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement Response to Summary Judgment
As noted above, on June 27, 2024, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Supplement Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. Through this motion, Plaintiff
moved to supplement his response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion to
include documents showing that ultimately, Plaintiff was not disciplined for disorderly
conduct from the incident at issue. Plaintiff contends that, if he “was [t]hreatening
[c]onduct resulting in him being bitten in the groin/penis why was it thrown out?” [DE
59 at 2, ¶5].
An adverse party shall have fourteen days after service of a motion in which to
serve and respond. N.D. Ind. L.R. 7-1(d)(3)(A). Failure to file a response within the time
prescribed may subject the motion to summary ruling. N.D. Ind. L.R. 7-1(d)(5). As of
this date, Defendants have neither responded to Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement, nor
have Defendants explained the inaction. Consequently, this Court can only treat
Plaintiff’s Motion as unopposed.
The Court generally considers a motion for supplemental briefing based on “how
helpful the new information will be in making a decision on the underlying motion.”
Sajda v. Brewton, 265 F.R.D. 334, 338 (N.D. Ind. 2009). But, as discussed above, the Court
has deemed Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts as undisputed. Accordingly, the
Court cannot fairly find that this new information will help determine whether
summary judgment is appropriate. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion to supplement must be
denied.
C. Defendants’ Motion to Seal Exhibit D-2
Contemporaneous with their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants filed a
Motion to File and Maintain Under Seal Exhibit D-2 to their summary judgment motion.
Thus, the Court next considers whether this exhibit should remain under seal.
Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 5-3 provides that “[t]he clerk may not
maintain a filing under seal unless authorized to do so by statute, court rule, or court
order.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 5-3(a). In the instant motion, Defendants present no statute or
court rule that authorizes sealing the documents at issue. Therefore, the Court must
determine whether good cause exists to maintain them under seal as requested. See
Citizens First Nat’l Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1999). Judicial
records are presumed public unless “the property and privacy interests of the litigants .
. . predominate in the particular case.” Id. Establishing such predominance is often
difficult as “[a]ny step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public
view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat and requires rigorous justification”
by the Court. Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006). The decision
of whether good cause exists to file a document under seal rests solely with the Court.
Id.
In support of the instant motion, Defendants explain that there is good cause to
keep the exhibit under seal because it consists of photographs of Mr. Hall’s genitalia
that were taken shortly after the incident at issue here. The Court agrees that Mr. Hall’s
privacy concerns provide the requisite good cause to maintain the images under seal
even though they are cited as part of the record of the instant decision. Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion to seal will be granted. K. C. v. Individual Members of Med. Licensing
Bd. of Ind., No. 1:23-CV-00595-JPH-KMB, 2023 WL 3978425, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 13,
2023)(“Good cause to seal confidential information may exist . . .where documents
contain . . . other categories of sensitive information.”) See also Williams v. Illinois, No.
3:19-CV-739-MAB, 2022 WL 4598880, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2022)(sealing a prison’s
investigation report filed as part of briefing on a motion for summary judgment because
it contained “sensitive and graphic information” including photographs of an inmate’s
deceased body).
D. Merits Analysis
The Court now turns to the merits of Defendants’ summary judgment motion. As
stated, Mr. Hall was granted “leave to proceed against Officer [Hindman] and Sergeant
Ornelas . . . in their personal capacity for monetary damages for allegedly using
excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment on September 25,
2021, by repeatedly shocking him with a tazer and causing their dog to bite him in the
genitals while he was lying on the ground.” [DE 5 at 1]. Defendants have moved for
summary judgment contending that the force involved was justified and minimal and
that Mr. Hall suffered only a de minimis injury. Defendants also contend that they have
qualified immunity.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability
for civil damages when their conduct does not violate a “clearly established”
constitutional or statutory right. McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010).
Once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff carries the burden of
defeating it. Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346, 359 (7th Cir. 2005). Evaluating this
defense requires the Court to make two inquiries: (1) whether the facts—which the
Court views in the light most favorable to Plaintiff—show a violation of a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of
the alleged violation. Williams v. Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 758 (7th Cir. 2013). “If either
inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant official is entitled to summary
judgment.” Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original).
The Court need not address the prongs in this order; instead, the Court may
address the prongs in the order “best suited to the circumstances of the particular case
at hand.” McAllister, 615 F.3d at 881. Here, it makes sense to address the prongs in
order, as Defendants’ primary argument is that no constitutional violation occurred.
Accordingly, the Court begins by considering whether the facts, viewed in the light
most favorable to Mr. Hall, show a violation of his constitutional rights.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
prohibits “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on inmates. Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Force must be “of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2010) (per curiam) (cleaned up). Force against an
inmate is considered excessive when such force is used “not in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, a plaintiff must put
forth evidence that “support[s] a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of
pain.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. As direct evidence of intent is rare, the Court considers
several factors to distinguish between good faith and malicious uses of force, including:
(1) how much force was needed versus how much was applied; (2) whether the force
was needed because of a risk to safety; (3) the effort made to limit the severity of force
applied; and (4) the extent of injury inflicted. McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 663 (7th
Cir. 2019); Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). In the end, “correctional
officers receive special deference in their approach to restoring or maintaining order
and discipline.” Smith v. Kind, 140 F.4th 359, 368 (7th Cir. 2025)(internal citations
omitted).
The undisputed material facts show that Defendants did not use force until after
Mr. Hall refused to comply with multiple verbal orders regarding his attire and his
continued walk to chow. [See DE 46 at ¶¶ 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18]. Moreover, the
undisputed evidence shows that as Mr. Hall kept walking, he crossed the 10-foot gap
between himself and the K9, even though he knew that he needed to maintain that
distance. [Id. ¶¶20, 22]. These facts, when considered under factors 1 and 2, show force
used in good faith to maintain order. Defendants have also presented evidence that they
tried to limit the force applied, first by disengaging the taser after less than a full cycle,
and second, by disengaging the K9 shortly after Mr. Hall was on the ground. [Id. ¶¶28-
29]. These facts, when considered under factor 3 above, also show a good faith use of
force. Defendants also presented undisputed evidence that Mr. Hall did not have visible
injuries in the groin area after the incident and that he now considers himself fully
recovered. [Id. ¶¶35, 38]. These facts also suggest force inflicted in good faith under
factor 4 above. Thus, the undisputed facts, when considered under these factors, show
that Defendants used force as part of a good faith effort to discipline and maintain
order. Hendrickson, 589 F.3d at 890.
In response, Mr. Hall does not dispute that he failed to obey orders. But Mr. Hall
maintains that other inmates were improperly dressed that day, and that because the
incident arose based on a failure to “tuck[] in a shirt,” Defendants were never “in fear of
their safety or lives.” [DE 57 at 4]. Generally, however, “inmates may not pick and
choose which orders to obey.” Smith, 140 F.4th at 368. “When an inmate refuse[s] to
obey a proper order, he is attempting to assert his authority over a portion of the
institution and its officials. Such refusal and denial of authority places the staff and
other inmates in danger.” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 476 (7th Cir. 2009)(internal
quotation omitted). Still, the court must “consider an inmate's disobedience, along with
the surrounding ‘facts and circumstances,’ to determine whether a particular use of
force was necessary.” Smith, 140 F.4th at 358 (internal citation omitted). Here, even if
Mr. Hall was not acting as profanely as Defendants have contended, it remains
undisputed that he refused to obey orders, and his refusal included actions that brought
him within ten feet of Sgt. Ornelas’ K9—a rule that Mr. Hall was aware of. [DE 46 at
¶¶25, 26]. Thus, the undisputed materials facts show that Defendants “used force . . . in
a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline . . . .” Hendrickson, 589 F.3d at 890
(internal citation omitted).
Mr. Hall also contends that “[t]he officers could have detained [him] or
sanction[ed him] in some other fashion”—such as simply allowing him to miss chow—
citing to Siers v. McGuire, No. 314-CV-2031PS, 2015 WL 3739221 (N.D. Ind. June 15,
2015) in support. At the outset, the Court notes that Siers is a review order under 28
U.S.C. §1915A. Indeed, while the Court in Siers held that the plaintiff alleged a plausible
claim, the Court also noted that “further factual development may show that [the
defendant’s] actions [deploying a K-9] were reasonable under the circumstances . . ..” Id.
at *1. Therefore, without more, the Court cannot find Siers dispositive here. In any
event, the Court cannot find that the availability of other alternatives for discipline
results in a genuine dispute of material fact affecting the outcome of the case. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248. Indeed, the Court “must determine whether the evidence goes beyond a
mere dispute over the reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of
arguably superior alternatives.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. Finally, Mr. Hall’s reliance on
Siers fails to address Defendants’ evidence that Mr. Hall refused to obey orders not to
approach within 10 feet of the K9. [DE 46 ¶¶22-23; 5].
Mr. Hall does dispute Defendants’ characterization of events on one critical fact,
which the Court must address. Mr. Hall contends that he “could not comply with the
commands” when he was “being bitten by the dog and being tased.” [DE 57 at 8]. In
support, Mr. Hall cites to his own Affidavit. [DE 56-1]. As explained above, the Court
has accepted Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts as undisputed due to deficiencies
with Mr. Hall response brief. [See Section III.A.]. Moreover, Mr. Hall’s Affidavit
contradicts Mr. Hall’s own deposition testimony admitting that he did not follow
commands before the K9 was deployed. [See, e.g., DE 44-6 at 6, 14]. Thus, the Court may
disregard this inconsistent statement in Mr. Hall’s affidavit. See James v. Hale, 959 F.3d
307, 315 (7th Cir. 2020)(“[E]very federal court of appeals permits a judge to disregard a
‘sham’ affidavit—typically an affidavit that contradicts prior deposition
testimony.”)(collecting cases)).
Finally, Mr. Hall disputes Defendant’s characterization of events by contending
that the force used was plainly extreme and caused him severe injury. Plaintiff seeks to
dispute Defendants’ evidence on this issue by asking the Court to take judicial notice of
information about dog bites from unspecified law journals and from information about
the Belgian Malinois dog breed obtained from wwww.quora.com. [DE 57 at 2-3, 6]. But
the Court may only take judicial notice of facts if it “is supplied with the necessary
information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). Here, Mr. Hall has failed to provide necessary
information allowing the Court to do so.
In sum, the Court cannot find that Mr. Hall has put forth sufficient evidence that
“support[s] a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Whitley, 475 at
322. Accordingly, the Court can only find that summary judgment for Defendants is
appropriate. As Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment resolves this case,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Settlement Conference will be denied as moot.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court now:
• GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to File and Maintain Under Seal [DE 48];
• DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement Response to Motion for
Summary Judgment [DE 59];
• GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 44]; and
• DENIES as MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Settlement Conference. [DE 67].
SO ORDERED this 8th day of September 2025.
s/Scott J. Frankel
Scott J. Frankel
United States Magistrate Judge