The opinion
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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11783
____________________
AMMON RA SUMRALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
WARDEN WILCOX STATE PRISON,
DEPUTY WARDEN TONYA ASHLEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00187-MTT-MSH
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and GRANT and KIDD, Circuit
Judges.
GRANT, Circuit Judge:
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Ammon Ra Sumrall, an inmate at Wilcox State Prison in
Abbeville, Georgia, says he practices veganism as part of his
religious commitment to the Egyptian sun god—“Ammon Ra”—
whose name he also adopted. When Sumrall became a vegan in
2007, he enrolled in the Alternative Entrée Program, an opt-in
vegan meal plan. But prison officials removed him after they
discovered that he had purchased large quantities of non-vegan
food from the prison store—Cheetos, chili, chicken soup, and the
like. Although he was soon reenrolled, he sued for alleged
violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as
well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants on his constitutional claims and three of his RLUIPA
claims, and dismissed the remaining RLUIPA claim as moot.
Seeing no error, we affirm.
I.
Sumrall, a black male, has been incarcerated in Georgia’s
prison system since the early 1990s, serving a life sentence for
felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
impersonating a peace officer, and possession of a firearm during a
crime. Sumrall worships the Egyptian sun god and believes it is
“inherently wrong to kill animals for clothing and to satisfy human
appetite.” He observes a vegan diet because of “his overall belief
that God made humans to protect the earth and all animals.”
Sumrall first became a vegetarian in the late 1990s. Because
the Georgia Department of Corrections did not offer vegan or
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vegetarian meals at that time, Sumrall gave away the non-
vegetarian food on his tray or traded it for “fruit, vegetables or
bread.” In 2007, Sumrall “heard the word vegan” for the first time
and elevated his diet to veganism. Around the same time, the
Department implemented an “Alternative Entrée Program” (AEP)
to accommodate inmates’ religious diets, and Sumrall enrolled
after converting to veganism.
For the next twelve years, all went smoothly. But in August
2019, while housed at Wilcox State Prison, Sumrall filed a
grievance “about Food Service workers not giving vegans food that
they should have received.” The grievance did not lead to
Sumrall’s desired result—in fact, quite the opposite. After Warden
Artis Singleton investigated, he removed Sumrall from the AEP
because he had “violated the vegan meal requirements” by
purchasing non-vegan food from the prison store. But at that time,
purchases of non-vegan items were not formal grounds for
removal from the AEP, so Sumrall was placed back on the list a few
days later.
Almost a year later, in July 2020, Sumrall and several other
prisoners were again removed from the AEP for purchasing non-
vegan food from the prison store. These removals followed
complaints from “a few prisoners” that the vegan meals they were
offered were “inadequate.” Sumrall’s purchase records between
May 2020 and July 2020 confirm that a large portion of his weekly
purchases were for non-vegan foods like chicken soup, chili,
Cheetos, cheese crackers, cinnamon rolls, iced honey buns, and
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chocolate covered candy bars. Sumrall claims that he bought these
items to sell to other prisoners. And he testified that, had he known
he would be removed from the AEP for buying (and selling) non-
vegan food, he would have stopped. Still, the Department’s official
policy did not yet include non-vegan purchases as a basis for
dismissal from the AEP. The Department did not revise the policy
to include that until October 2020—more than two months after
Sumrall was removed from the AEP for the second time.
Sumrall also alleged that only black inmates were removed
from the AEP in July 2020. His white roommate, Michael Cwikla,
testified that he remained enrolled despite having purchased non-
vegan food from the prison store, and provided an August 19, 2020,
receipt showing non-vegan purchases to back up his claim.
Another inmate, James America, said that he and other black
prisoners were removed from the list for buying non-vegan food,
while white prisoners were not. But America provided no
evidence beyond his own statements, which prison officials
dispute. Deputy Warden Ashley, for instance, testified that the
inmates removed from the AEP in July 2020 belonged “to a
number of racial groups, including White, Black, and Hispanic.”
Sumrall added that his removal from the AEP led to various
medical difficulties. In the fall of 2020, he made two medical
complaints: one for fatigue and another for “pain in his back,
stomach, and other parts of his body.” The first yielded a
prescription for Vitamin D pills. And the second led to a diagnosis
of arthritis and bone weakness; the prescribed treatment was
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Ibuprofen. Sumrall does not dispute that he contracted Covid-19
in August 2020—“before the onset of any of those symptoms that
he attributes to malnutrition.” But he argues that even if his
symptoms stemmed from Covid, his removal from the AEP
“hampered his ability to fight” the virus.
Less than two months after Sumrall’s second removal from
the AEP, he submitted a “Special Religious Request,” asking for
(1) vegan meals, (2) permission to order vegan athletic shoes,
(3) permission to receive an ankh (a pendant in the shape of a
religious symbol), and (4) the sale of vegan food at the prison store.
Although these requests were denied, he was placed back on the
AEP on October 19, 2020, less than three months after he was
removed. He has remained on the program since.
In 2021, Sumrall sued Singleton and Ashley under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming that his removal from the AEP violated his First
and Eighth Amendment rights by denying him the vegan meals
that were consistent with his religious beliefs and depriving him of
nutritionally adequate vegan meals. He also alleged that the
removal violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of
equal protection and due process. Finally, he sued the Georgia
Department of Corrections under RLUIPA for denying his “Special
Religious Request.”1
1 Sumrall also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress under
Georgia state law, but he does not challenge the district court’s ruling on this
claim.
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The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted summary judgment to Singleton and Ashley
on the § 1983 claims for various reasons. Two were decided on
qualified immunity grounds: the court determined that existing
law did not clearly establish that Sumrall’s removal from the AEP
violated either his First Amendment or due process rights. As for
the equal protection claim, the court found no violation because
Sumrall did not show “that he was treated differently than any
similarly situated prisoner, nor that Singleton and Ashley possessed
discriminatory intent when they removed him from the AEP.”
And the Eighth Amendment claim failed because the non-vegan
food Sumrall was given was “nutritionally adequate.”
The district court also disposed of the RLUIPA claims. It
granted summary judgment on the allegations stemming from the
denial of Sumrall’s request for vegan athletic shoes, an ankh, and
the sale of vegan food products at the prison store because none of
those denials substantially burdened his religious rights. In a later
order, the court dismissed the remaining RLUIPA claim—the
denial of vegan meals—as moot because Sumrall had been
reenrolled in the AEP since October 2020. This is Sumrall’s appeal.
II.
We review the district court’s grants of qualified immunity
and summary judgment de novo. Stryker v. City of Homewood, 978
F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020); Nehme v. Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs.,
121 F.4th 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 2024). Mootness determinations are
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also reviewed de novo. Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir.
2017).
III.
Sumrall raises several issues on appeal. He challenges the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to Singleton and Ashley
on his free exercise, due process, equal protection, and Eighth
Amendment claims. He also argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to the Georgia Department of
Corrections on two of his RLUIPA claims and dismissing the
remaining claim as moot.
A.
We begin with the free exercise and due process claims. The
district court granted Singleton and Ashley qualified immunity on
both because Sumrall could not show that his constitutional rights
were clearly established. That was not error.
Qualified immunity “shields public officials from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Stryker, 978 F.3d at 773 (quotation
omitted). To receive qualified immunity, an official must first
prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary
authority when the allegedly unlawful conduct took place. Mobley
v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015).
The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
official violated a clearly established constitutional right. See id. at
1352–53. We can consider the two prongs in any order, and the
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plaintiff must win on both to succeed. Piazza v. Jefferson County, 923
F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2019).
1.
We first consider whether Singleton and Ashley acted within
their discretionary authority when they removed Sumrall from the
AEP. Sumrall argues that they did not because (at least at that
time) the Department’s policies did not authorize removal for non-
vegan food purchases. But that’s not the test. The correct inquiry
is whether managing a prison’s food program fell within Singleton
and Ashley’s “arsenal of powers” as prison officials. See Carruth v.
Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1055 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). It
did. That Singleton and Ashley removed Sumrall for a reason that
was not then authorized by Department policies does not mean
they were acting outside their discretionary authority; managing
the AEP list was a “legitimate job-related function” that was within
their “power to utilize.” See id. at 1054 (quotation omitted).
2.
Because Singleton and Ashley were acting within their
discretionary authority, the burden shifts to Sumrall to show that
the officials violated a clearly established constitutional right. See
Mobley, 783 F.3d at 1352–53. He did not.
Start with the free exercise claim. Sumrall tries to show that
the right he asserts was clearly established based on the “general
principle that prisons must accommodate incarcerated persons’
religious dietary restrictions when their beliefs are truly held,
subject only to legitimate penological limitations.” But for a
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general principle to clearly establish the law, it must be “so clear
that, even without specific guidance from a decision involving
materially similar facts, the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is
apparent.” Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920 (11th Cir. 2022). The
“salient question” is whether the law at the time of the incident
gave the official “fair warning that his conduct was unlawful.” Id.
at 921 (quotation omitted).
A free exercise claim requires a showing that the
government has impermissibly burdened a “sincerely held
religious belief[].” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). And authorities are not required to
rubber stamp every religious claim: “prison officials may
appropriately question whether a prisoner’s religiosity, asserted as
the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic.” Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005). Same goes for the courts.
See Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 942
F.3d 1215, 1246–47 (11th Cir. 2019). Even so, neither inquiry is
“probing.” See id. at 1247.
Sumrall alleged that his removal from the AEP
impermissibly burdened his religious beliefs by forcing him to
choose between “malnourishment and religious adherence.” And
because there was no “legitimate penological reason” for his
removal, he argues, Singleton and Ashley violated the First
Amendment.
While existing law may have been clear that prison officials
needed to accommodate “truly held” religious beliefs, it did not
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give Singleton and Ashley “fair warning” that they could not
question the sincerity of Sumrall’s beliefs based on his non-vegan
purchases. See Powell, 25 F.4th at 921 (quotation omitted). In fact,
neither published case Sumrall cites involved an inmate’s actions
contradicting his professed religious beliefs. See generally United
States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2016);
Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1987). The district
court did not err in granting Singleton and Ashley qualified
immunity on Sumrall’s free exercise claim.
The same is true for the due process claim. To succeed
there, Sumrall needs to show “(1) a deprivation of a
constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state
action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Resnick v.
KrunchCash, LLC, 34 F.4th 1028, 1035 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation
omitted). A prisoner has a protected liberty interest “when the
state has consistently bestowed a certain benefit to prisoners,” and
denying that benefit “imposes atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Kirby
v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation
omitted).
Sumrall says that the “AEP created a liberty interest by
providing religiously compliant meals” and that his removal from
the program “imposed an atypical and significant hardship” by
forcing him to either abandon his religion or starve. But once
again, he has not shown that the right he claims was clearly
established—he identifies no authority establishing a protected
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liberty interest in remaining on a religious meal plan when an
inmate’s actions contradict a genuine commitment to the dietary
restrictions he claims.
Once more, Sumrall tries to use “[b]road statements of law”
to defeat qualified immunity. But neither case he cites gets him
where he needs to go. Bass v. Perrin established that prisoners in
solitary confinement have a constitutionally protected interest in
outside yard time, but we do not see how this translates to
temporary removal from the AEP. 170 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir.
1999). And the principle Sumrall pulls from Sandin v. Conner—that
“hardship is evaluated by comparing it to the ‘ordinary incidents of
prison life’”—is just a restatement of the protected-liberty-interest
standard articulated in that case. See 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). This
was not enough to put the officials on notice that removing
Sumrall from the AEP was a due process violation. Put differently,
it was not obvious that removing an inmate who bought all kinds
of non-vegan goods from a vegan meal plan violates due process.
The district court did not err in determining that Singleton and
Ashley were entitled to qualified immunity on Sumrall’s due
process claim.
B.
We next turn to Sumrall’s equal protection claim, which is
based on his allegation that only black, non-Jewish prisoners were
removed from the AEP in July 2020. To prevail, Sumrall must
show that “(1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who
received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in
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invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion,
national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis.”
Sweet v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2006).
He cannot make either showing.
A similarly situated prisoner must be “prima facie identical
in all relevant respects.” Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1264
(11th Cir. 2010) (italics deleted and quotation omitted). Sumrall’s
principal comparator is a white and Jewish prisoner, Michael
Cwikla, who testified that he was not removed from the AEP
despite having purchased non-vegan food from the prison store. So
far, so good. But the receipt attached to his affidavit shows
purchases from August 19, 2020, which was nearly a year after
Sumrall was removed from the AEP the first time, and three weeks
after he was removed the second time. Without more information
from the record, those dates may seem inconsequential. But here
we know that both times prison officials removed Sumrall from the
AEP it stemmed from reviews of store purchases. And those
reviews were triggered by complaints from Sumrall and other
prisoners that they had not received adequate vegan food.
That sequence means Cwikla did not engage in the same
conduct as Sumrall: purchasing non-vegan food from the store
before prison officials ran their July 2020 purchase check. After all,
the officials could not have removed Cwikla from the AEP in July
for non-vegan purchases that he did not make until August. The
answer may well be different if the purchase checks had occurred
more regularly.
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Sumrall contends, however, that Cwikla made purchases
before Sumrall’s removal, and that the receipt in the record is “just
one example.” He points to Cwikla’s statement that he was not
removed even though he “also bought” and continued to “buy”
non-vegan items from the store. (emphasis added). Because
Cwikla spoke in the past and present tense, Sumrall contends,
Cwikla made purchases “before and during the period” of Sumrall’s
removal
We see it differently. Cwikla’s affidavit is dated September
14, 2020. To support his statement that he “also bought” non-
vegan food, Cwikla referenced his August 19, 2020, receipt. But
the affidavit does not state that Cwikla made purchases before
Sumrall’s July 29 removal—when prison authorities ran checks for
non-vegan store purchases by prisoners receiving vegan meals.
Absent this assertion, Cwikla and Sumrall are not “prima facie
identical in all relevant respects.” Id. (italics deleted and quotation
omitted).
Sumrall insists that there were other similarly situated
prisoners, too, but the evidence he cites does not move the needle.
First, he points to Cwikla’s statement that prison officials “did not
remove [him] nor any other Jewish/Caucasian prisoner from the
AEP even though [they] also bought (and buy) non-vegan store
items.” Second, he notes that another inmate, James America,
testified that “White and Jewish prisoners in [Sumrall’s dorm] had
also previously bought non-vegan store goods,” but were not
culled from the AEP.
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The problem is that none of the referenced comparators
testified, and neither Cwikla nor America provided any details—
like the prisoners’ names or the date ranges of their non-vegan
purchases—that would allow us to assess whether they were
similarly situated. And without “specific supporting facts,”
Cwikla’s and America’s “conclusory allegations” are not enough to
create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Evers v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985).
Plus, even if Sumrall did identify a similarly situated inmate,
he has not presented evidence that Singleton and Ashley acted with
a discriminatory purpose. After all, to “make out an equal
protection claim, a plaintiff must prove purposeful, intentional
discrimination.” Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1271 (11th
Cir. 2017). And that requires proving that “the governmental
decisionmaker acted as it did because of, and not merely in spite of,
its effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. (quotation omitted). In
Harris v. Ostrout, for example, “evidence of an illegal motive”—that
the prison official “used racist language” when referring to the
inmate—created a genuine issue of fact and precluded summary
judgment on the inmate’s equal protection claim. See 65 F.3d 912,
917 (11th Cir. 1995).
No such evidence exists here. It is undisputed that Sumrall
regularly bought non-vegan food from the prison store, and that
he was removed from the AEP only after prison officials discovered
these purchases. What’s more, Sumrall does not refute Ashley’s
testimony that white prisoners were removed from the AEP in July
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2020. He argues instead that Ashley did not state why they were
removed. But that is not true. Ashley said that she “reviewed the
list of Wilcox State Prison inmates removed from the Alternative
Entrée Meal Program (‘AEP’) in July 2020 because they had purchased
non-vegan items from the prison store.” (emphasis added). Next
sentence: “The Wilcox State Prison inmates removed from the
AEP in July 2020 belong to a number of racial groups, including
White, Black, and Hispanic.” 2 Because there is no evidence of
“purposeful, intentional discrimination,” the defendants were
entitled to summary judgment on Sumrall’s equal protection
claim. See Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1271.
C.
We now move to Sumrall’s Eighth Amendment claim. The
Eighth Amendment requires prisons to provide inmates with basic
life necessities such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and
medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Only
“extreme deprivations”—those posing an “unreasonable risk of
serious damage to [the inmate’s] future health or safety”—qualify
as a violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992); Swain v.
Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1088 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Inmates are entitled to “reasonably adequate food,” but what that
means is a “well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional
value to preserve health.” See Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d
2 And although Ashley did not state that any Jewish prisoners were removed,
she testified that the removed prisoners belonged to several religions,
including “Baptist,” “Christian,” and “Islam.”
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1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotations omitted). The Eighth
Amendment does not mandate meals that match inmates’ dietary
preferences—even when those preferences are dictated by
religious beliefs. See McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 199–201
(2d Cir. 2004); LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 1991).
Sumrall argues that his three-month removal from the AEP
violated the Eighth Amendment because it “caused him to starve.”
We are not persuaded. To begin, Sumrall did not dispute that the
non-vegan meal offerings were nutritionally adequate. He argues
only that “his diet was inadequate because he was unable to eat the
non-vegan food trays.” But the test is whether the meals were
nutritionally adequate—and they were. Indeed, under Sumrall’s
test, any prisoner could manufacture an Eighth Amendment
violation by refusing to eat his food. In any event, the record
contradicts Sumrall’s assertion that his diet on the regular non-
vegan meal plan was inadequate. Sumrall was on that plan before
the creation of the AEP, and he testified that he ate the vegan
portions of the meals while giving away or trading the meat.
We also note that the “medical complications and pain” that
Sumrall allegedly suffered after being removed from the AEP find
no support in the record. Though he asserts that two “test
result[s]” support his allegations, neither establishes that he
suffered “serious damage to his future health or safety.” Swain, 958
F.3d at 1088 (quotation omitted). Rather, the lab results and x-rays
reveal that Sumrall sought treatment for “pain,” and that there was
“[n]o evidence” of “significant degenerative disease.” Coupled
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with his “prolonged” contraction of Covid-19—which, as he
concedes, could have contributed to his symptoms—Sumrall has
not raised a genuine issue of material fact.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
Eighth Amendment claim was proper.
D.
Finally, we address the RLUIPA claims. Sumrall says the
Department violated RLUIPA when it denied his 2020 “Special
Religious Request,” in which he sought three things: permission to
order vegan athletic shoes, a requirement that the Department sell
him vegan food, and a requirement that the Department offer him
vegan meals in the cafeteria. 3 Again, we disagree.
An RLUIPA plaintiff must demonstrate that “his
engagement in religious exercise was substantially burdened by the
law, regulation, or practice he challenges.” Owens, 848 F.3d at 979.
And a substantial burden places “more than an inconvenience on
religious exercise.” Thai Meditation Ass’n of Ala. v. City of Mobile, 980
F.3d 821, 830 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). Pressure that
“tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts” or
“mandates religious conduct” can meet the mark. Id. (quotation
omitted).
Citing the “centrality of veganism” to his “religious
worldview,” Sumrall argues that the Department “substantially
3 He also alleged an RLUIPA violation for the denial of his request for an ankh,
but he does not appeal the district court’s ruling on this claim.
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burdens his religious exercise under RLUIPA by refusing him
access to athletic shoes that are not made from animal products.”
He says that because “the only religiously compliant alternative to
leather sneakers is rubber slides—which are not gym shoes—[he]
cannot exercise without violating his religious beliefs.” And this,
Sumrall asserts, amounts to “a substantial burden” on his religion.
Not so. That rubber shoes do not fulfill Sumrall’s physical-
exercise preferences does not mean his religious exercise is
substantially burdened. He cannot show that the denial of vegan
athletic shoes does anything more than “inconvenience” his
religious exercise. Cf. id. at 829–30 (quotation omitted).
Sumrall next contends that the Department’s refusal to
“make vegan food available for purchase” substantially burdens his
religious exercise. Because the prison store “does not designate
items as vegan or non-vegan,” he argues, he “cannot know” which
type they are. And because the Department has since “added the
non-vegan-purchase prohibition” to its standard operating
procedures, Sumrall says he “risk[s] removal from the AEP” each
time he shops at the commissary.
The district court correctly rejected this claim, too. The
Department offers vegan meals through the AEP, and Sumrall
remains an enrolled participant. Because he can obtain vegan
meals that way, he cannot show that the Department’s refusal to
separately sell other vegan food is more than an inconvenience.
Sumrall cannot use RLUIPA to compel the prison to sell vegan
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meals when he already has access to those meals through a
program created to “accommodate as many religions as possible.”
Last, Sumrall’s request for access to vegan meals is moot. A
case becomes moot “[w]hen events subsequent to the
commencement of a lawsuit create a situation in which the court
can no longer give the plaintiff meaningful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of
Rehab. Facilities v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208,
1217 (11th Cir. 2000). Because mootness is jurisdictional, a moot
case requires dismissal. Sierra Club v. EPA, 315 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th
Cir. 2002).
The district court correctly determined that this claim was
moot because the only relief Sumrall sought in connection with his
request for vegan meals was to be placed back on the AEP—which
happened nearly five years ago. Even so, Sumrall says his claim is
live because he was placed on the “restricted” vegan meal plan,
which he says provides “largely inedible” meals. He argues that
“he has not received the relief he requested—edible vegan meals.”
We cannot agree. Sumrall requested only that he “be put back on
the vegan AEP meals.” And the restricted vegan meal plan offers—
you guessed it—vegan meals. The primary difference between the
restricted vegan plan and the regular vegan plan is that the former
serves “cold foods” after “sunset on Friday until one (1) hour past
sunset on Saturday.”
Sumrall’s complaints about the quality of the restricted plan
do not save his claim. Again, he sued “based on his removal from
the AEP, not the nutritional adequacy of the vegan meals.” At his
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20 Opinion of the Court 23-11783
deposition, for example, Sumrall acknowledged that he was “not
making a complaint about the vegan food itself,” but only about
“whether [he] got the vegan or not the vegan food.”
Sumrall’s final defense to mootness is the voluntary-
cessation exception, which provides that a defendant’s “voluntary
cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case.” 4
Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir.
2020) (quotation omitted). But this exception does not apply when
“there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be
repeated.” United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)
(quotation omitted). And where, as here, the defendant is a
government actor, we apply a rebuttable presumption that the
objectionable behavior will not recur. See Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc.
v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2004).
Voluntary cessation does not save the day for Sumrall. He
has remained on the AEP for over four years since his
4 Sumrall also suggests that “[d]amages claims against” the prison officials in
their individual capacities “provide an additional reason” why this claim is not
moot. He concedes that our precedent forecloses money damages against
government officials for RLUIPA violations, but asks this Court to stay the
issuance of this opinion because the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on
this issue. See Landor v. La. Dep’t of Corr. & Pub. Safety, No. 23-1197, 2025 WL
1727386, at *1 (U.S. June 23, 2025) (mem.). Sumrall, however, did not raise
this issue before the district court, which means it was forfeited. See Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). Because we
see no “exceptional” reason to address the issue for the first time on appeal,
his motion to stay is denied. See id. at 1332.
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23-11783 Opinion of the Court 21
reenrollment, and he has presented no evidence that he is likely to
be removed again. Still, he argues that because the government
has provided no assurance that it will not “arbitrarily remove” him
from the AEP again, it is not entitled to a presumption that its
objectionable behavior will not recur. But the basis for his prior
removals was not arbitrary: both times it was for the purchase of
non-vegan food (which is now a formal justification for removal
from the AEP). Whether Sumrall is removed again, then, is
entirely in his control. And he appears to have stopped purchasing
non-vegan items. Given that, the record offers no reason to think
the government will remove him from the program—and certainly
not that it will do so arbitrarily.
* * *
Because the district court correctly disposed of Sumrall’s
claims, we AFFIRM.