(PS) Meckfessel-Poletti v. Workday, Inc.

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JULIE A. MECKFESSEL-POLETTI, Case No. 2:25-cv-01315-DJC-CSK PS

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER GRANTING IFP REQUEST,

DISMISSING COMPLAINT, AND

14 WORKDAY, INC., GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

15 Defendant. (ECF Nos. 1, 2)

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17 Plaintiff Julie A. Meckfessel-Poletti is representing herself in this action and seeks

18 leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 2.)

19 Plaintiff’s application in support of the IFP request makes the required financial showing.

20 Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP request. The Complaint, however, fails to

21 state a claim and therefore, the Court dismisses the Complaint with leave to amend.

22 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

23 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

24 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to

25 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a

26 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith,

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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R.

28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c).

1 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an

2 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In

3 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual

4 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and

5 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490

6 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960

7 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).

8 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

9 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal).

10 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

11 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d

12 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does

13 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007);

14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

15 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough

16 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A

17 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

18 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

19 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the

20 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be

21 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

22 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

23 II. THE COMPLAINT

24 Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant Workday, Inc., alleging violations of

25 (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17; (2) Age Discrimination

26 in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621-634; (3) Americans with

27 Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112-12117; (4) Genetic Information

28 Nondiscriminatory Act (“GINA”); and (5) California Fair Employment and Housing Act

1 (“FEHA”), Cal. Government Code 12940. Compl. at 2, 4 (ECF No. 1).

2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is the “contracted Human Resources for Sprouts

3 Farmers Market Inc.” Id. at 13, 14. Plaintiff applied to Sprouts Farmers Market in

4 November 2019 for a legal assistant position but was instead hired and placed in a deli

5 position. Id.at 14. Plaintiff states she had almost seven years of experience as a legal

6 assistant and was thus qualified for the position. Id.

7 Plaintiff alleges that she is an individual with a qualified disability related to her left

8 arm that “substantially limits one or more of [her] daily and major life activities. Id. at 5,

9 13-14, 22. Plaintiff alleges that the deli was a physically demanding job where she tried

10 “to hold food with [her] left hand and use knives up to safety standards,” and had to

11 wash dishes “at least half the time.” Id. at 22. Plaintiff alleges she informed a store

12 manager about her disability and requested reasonable accommodations, such as a

13 “table position for free movement,” help lifting boxes, help lifting rotisserie chicken racks,

14 and help lifting “huge pots of soup.” Id. at 23. Plaintiff requested to move to the produce

15 department or any other open position. Id. Plaintiff alleges her requests were “met with

16 arrogance and laughter” and the store manager made “numerous inferences that

17 [Plaintiff] had a mental disability.” Id.

18 In 2020, Plaintiff went on a two week leave of absence, which was extended by

19 eight or nine months by Sprouts corporate management. Id. at 21. Plaintiff alleges she

20 tried to return to work in May 2021, but when she logged on to the employee portal, her

21 employee number was gone with no notice. Id. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated

22 during the second week of July in 2021. Id. at 22.

23 Plaintiff also states that Lisa Meckfessel McFall, Plaintiff’s “first cousin on [her]

24 adoptive father’s side” works at Workday. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. McFall used

25 her position at Workday to further a “smear campaign” against Plaintiff including

26 harassment and “reduc[tion] of [Plaintiff’s] job title.” Id.at 15, 19. Plaintiff alleges this

27 “smear campaign in family court was to keep custody out of [Plaintiff’s] hands and not

28 pay child support or a divorce settlement.” Id. at 17. Plaintiff makes other statements

1 about Ms. McFall, including that Ms. McFall “used her position against [Plaintiff]

2 personally through Sprouts Farmers Market over a family will and other criminal

3 conduct.” Id. at 15.

4 Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

5 and received a notice of her right to sue in February 2025. See Compl. 8-12.

6 III. DISCUSSION

7 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

8 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as

9 required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims

10 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of

11 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v.

12 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals it

13 consists of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements” of her causes of action and fails to

14 state a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

15 The only Defendant named in the Complaint is Workday, Inc. See Compl. at 2.

16 However, the majority of the allegations in the Complaint are against Sprouts and

17 Sprouts employees. Accordingly, given the requirement to construe pro se pleading

18 liberally, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as being brought against both

19 Workday and Sprouts and will address each of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant

20 Workday and Defendant Sprouts. See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342 & n.7.

21 Plaintiff’s five causes of action against Defendant Workday and Sprouts allege

22 violations of: (1) Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17; (2) ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634;

23 (3) ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112-12117; (4) GINA; and (5) FEHA, Cal. Government Code

24 12940. The Court addresses each of the claim’s deficiencies as it relates to Defendant

25 Workday and Sprouts.

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1 1. Title VII Claim

2 a. Legal Standards

3 Title VII protects individuals from discrimination based on race, color, gender,

4 religion, or natural origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To state a claim for retaliation

5 under Title VII, an employee must show (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the

6 employer subjected her to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists

7 between the protected activity and the adverse action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d

8 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). The last element requires that the protected activity be the

9 but-for cause of the alleged adverse action. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570

10 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). An employee has engaged in a protected activity if she has either

11 (1) “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII” or

12 (2) “made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation,

13 proceeding or hearing” under Title VII. E.E.O.C. v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, Inc. 644

14 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1279 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Additionally, “making complaints to an officer

15 of a company about discriminatory practices is a protected activity.” Id.

16 b. Workday

17 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title VII claim against Defendant

18 Workday. First, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant is her employer. She

19 states she is suing Workday because it is Sprouts’ Human Resources company. Compl.

20 at 14. Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Sprouts, and does not make any

21 allegations that she was also employed by Workday. See id. Second, the Complaint

22 alleges no facts demonstrating Plaintiff participated in a protected activity or suffered any

23 adverse action due to participation in a protected activity. See Ray v, 217 F.3d at 1240;

24 Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged

25 that any discrimination occurred due to Plaintiff’s race, color, gender, religion, or national

26 origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). As discussed below, Plaintiff’s discrimination

27 claims are related to her disability or age. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

28 under Title VII against Defendant Workday, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against Defendant

1 Workday is dismissed with leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

2 c. Sprouts

3 Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim under Title VII against Defendant Sprouts.

4 Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Sprouts (Compl. at 14), however she has not

5 sufficiently alleged that she participated in a protected activity or suffered any adverse

6 action due to participation in a protected activity. See Ray v, 217 F.3d at 1240; Cal.

7 Psychiatric Transitions, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. Plaintiff also has not alleged that any

8 discrimination occurred due to Plaintiff’s race, color, gender, religion or national origin.

9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Sprouts

10 are dismissed with leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

11 2. ADEA Claim

12 a. Legal Standards

13 Under the ADEA, it is unlawful to discharge any individual because of his or her

14 age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To state a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show:

15 (1) she was at least 40 years old, (2) she was performing her job satisfactorily, (3) she

16 was discharged, and (4) either replaced by substantially younger employees with equal

17 or inferior qualifications or discharged under other circumstances that gave rise to an

18 inference of age discrimination. Diaz v. Eagle Produce, Ltd., 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th

19 Cir. 2008).

20 b. Workday

21 Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead an ADEA claim against Defendant Workday.

22 The Complaint alleges Plaintiff was discharged by a Sprouts manager, not a Workday

23 employee, and Plaintiff has not alleged that Workday was her employer. Compl. at 22.

24 Also, although Plaintiff was 53 years old when she was discharged, the Complaint does

25 not allege that she was performing her job satisfactorily or that she was replaced by a

26 person substantially younger than her with equal or inferior qualifications. See Compl. at

27 5, 22; see also Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207. Because Plaintiff fails to state an ADEA claim

28 against Workday, the ADEA claim against Workday is dismissed with leave to amend.

1 See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

2 c. Sprouts

3 Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead an ADEA claim against Defendant Sprouts. As

4 stated above, although Plaintiff was 53 years old when she was discharged, there are no

5 facts alleged that she was performing her job satisfactorily or that she was replaced by a

6 person substantially younger than her with equal or inferior qualifications. See Compl. at

7 5, 22; see also Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207. Because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts

8 to state a claim against Sprouts under the ADEA, this claim is dismissed with leave to

9 amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31

10 3. ADA Claim

11 a. Legal Standards

12 Pursuant to the ADA, a “disability” is defined as: a physical or mental impairment

13 that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record

14 of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C.

15 § 12102(2). A failure to accommodate claim under the ADA requires that the plaintiff

16 establish (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is a qualified

17 individual able to perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable

18 accommodation; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her

19 disability. Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir.

20 2012) (citing Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003)); see 42 U.S.C.

21 § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). A “qualified individual” is an individual with a disability who, either

22 with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

23 employment position. Samper, 675 F.3d at 1237. The individual must satisfy the

24 requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the

25 employment position. Id.

26 b. Workday

27 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Workday. Here, for purposes

28 of screening, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she is disabled within the meaning of

1 the ADA. See Compl. at 13-14. But Plaintiff does not allege that she was employed by

2 Defendant. Further, the Complaint alleges no facts to suggest Workday was aware of

3 Plaintiff’s disability or facts showing any accommodation requests Plaintiff made. See

4 Samper, 675 F.3d at 1237. Accordingly, the ADA claim against Workday is dismissed

5 with leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

6 c. Sprouts

7 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Sprouts under the ADA because

8 Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged she suffered an adverse employment action due to

9 her disability. See Samper, 675 F.3d at 1237. As described above, Plaintiff has

10 sufficiently alleged that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See Compl. at

11 13-14. Plaintiff has also has not sufficiently alleged she is a qualified individual who can

12 perform the essential functions of the job. See Samper, 675 F.3d at 1237. Plaintiff states

13 she “was always well qualified to perform the duties of the legal assistant position” and

14 that she “was at all times well qualified and able to perform the deli duties.” Compl. at 22.

15 However, these conclusory statements are insufficient to allege she is a qualified

16 individual. Western Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624. Plaintiff alleges despite having

17 close to seven years’ experience as a legal assistant, she was ultimately placed to work

18 in Sprouts’ deli, not as a legal assistant. Compl. at 14, 22. Additionally, Plaintiff asked for

19 disability accommodations on numerous occasions to no avail. Compl. at 23. The

20 Complaint alleges that in January 2020, Plaintiff informed the store manager of her

21 disability and requested reasonable accommodations but, her “conversations or requests

22 were met with arrogance and laughter by Manager Tonia Tong. Ms. Tong made

23 repeated inferences that I had a mental disability.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that she suggested

24 accommodations of her disability such as moving her to the produce department, helping

25 Plaintiff with lifting boxes, and/or changing table positioning for free movement. Id. The

26 Complaint does not, however, allege that she was terminated because of her disability.

27 See Samper, 675 F.3d at 1237. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s ADA claim

28 against Sprouts with leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

1 4. GINA Claim

2 a. Legal Standards

3 “Genetic information” refers to information about an individual’s genetic tests, the

4 genetic tests of family members of such individual, and/or the manifestation of a disease

5 or disorder in family members of such individual. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A); see Tulipat v.

6 Lombardo, 2020 WL 6566846, at * 3 (D. Nev. Nov. 9, 2020). Under GINA, an employer

7 is “prohibited from using individual or family genetic information when making

8 employment decisions or otherwise discriminating on the basis of an employee's genetic

9 information.” Biruk v. Boeing Co., 2025 WL 1866182, at *5 (W.D. Wash. July 7, 2025)

10 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)).

11 b. Workday

12 Plaintiff has failed to state a GINA claim against Defendant Workday. Plaintiff

13 appears to bring this claim because she is related to a Workday employee, Ms. McFall,

14 and has not alleged that Workday was her employer. Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest

15 that Workday discharged Plaintiff, or that Plaintiff was discharged due to any genetic

16 information. See Biruk, 2025 WL 1866182, at *5. Therefore, the GINA claim against

17 Workday is dismissed with leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

18 c. Sprouts

19 Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a GINA claim against Sprouts. Although Plaintiff

20 claims her discharge from Sprouts occurred after disclosing that her cousin, an

21 employee of Workday, is leading an intentional smear campaign against Plaintiff, Plaintiff

22 has not alleged that she was discharged due to her genetic information. See Biruk, 2025

23 WL 1866182, at *5. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Sprouts is dismissed with leave

24 to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

25 5. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim

26 As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under federal law.

27 Accordingly, at this time, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

28 Plaintiff’s state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Campos v. Fresno Deputy

1 Sheriff’s Ass’n, 535 F. Supp. 3d 913, 930 (E.D. Cal. 2021); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.

2 Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1992). Because Plaintiff has failed to state a

3 claim under any federal statue, she has not established this Court’s jurisdiction.

4 Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

5 law claim.

6 B. Leave to Amend

7 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se

8 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and

9 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). If the

10 court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, it has

11 discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-30. Leave

12 to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could

13 be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato v. United

14 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to

15 amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely

16 clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (citation

17 omitted). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a complaint cannot be

18 cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at

19 1105-06.

20 In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and because it is conceivable that Plaintiff could

21 allege additional facts to state an employment claim against her former employer, the

22 Court finds it appropriate to grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the Complaint to

23 allege an employment claim. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (indicating that prior to

24 dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and provide an

25 opportunity to cure – if it appears at all possible the defects can be corrected).

26 Plaintiff should amend her Complaint only if she is able to allege sufficient facts

27 for her claims, as outlined above. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, this new

28 pleading should allege facts establishing the existence of federal subject matter

1 jurisdiction and must contain a short and plain statement of each claim. In an abundance

2 of caution given Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend but the Court

3 notes that amendment may be futile as to Defendant Workday, who was not Plaintiff’s

4 employer. If Plaintiff amends and continues to allege employment claims against

5 Workday, the amended complaint must make clear how such claims can be brought

6 against Workday. The Court further notes that amendment may be futile as to any GINA

7 claim as there are no allegations that Plaintiff was discharged due to her genetic

8 information or her family’s genetic information. See Biruk, 2025 WL 1866182, at *5.

9 Any amended complaint should be titled “Amended Complaint.” The allegations of

10 the amended complaint must be set forth in sequentially numbered paragraphs, with

11 each paragraph number being one greater than the one before, each paragraph having

12 its own number, and no paragraph number being repeated anywhere in the complaint.

13 Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of circumstances” where possible. See

14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Forms are available to help plaintiffs organize their complaint in the

15 proper way. They are available at the Clerk's Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200),

16 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms.

17 The amended complaint must not require the court and the defendant(s) to guess

18 at what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th

19 Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally

20 guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain

21 defendants”). The amended complaint must not require the court to spend its time

22 “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id.

23 at 1180. The amended complaint must not require the court and defendants to prepare

24 lengthy outlines “to determine who is being sued for what.” Id. at 1179.

25 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in

26 order to make the amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an

27 amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a

28 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior complaint(s), and once the

1 | amended complaint is filed and served, any previous complaint no longer serves any

2 | function in the case. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012).

3 If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she must clearly identify each

4 | defendant. If Plaintiff wishes to bring claims against Sprouts, she must clearly identify

5 || Sprouts as a defendant and make clear which allegations and claims are brought

6 || against it so that Sprouts is given proper notice of the allegations and claims against it.

7 Plaintiff shall have 21 days from the date of this order to file an amended

8 || complaint. If Plaintiff fails to timely file an amended complaint, the Court may

9 | recommend that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

10 | IV. CONCLUSION

11 In accordance with the above, IT |S ORDERED that:

12 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;

13 2. Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend; and

14 3. Plaintiff shall have 21 days from the date of this order to file an amended

15 complaint. If Plaintiff fails to timely file an amended complaint, the

16 undersigned may recommend that this action be dismissed.

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18 | Dated: August 25, 2025 Cc (i s □□

19 CHI SOO KIM

50 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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