Stapleton v. Prince Carpentry, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TAPLICE STAPLETON,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

– against – 22-cv-04044 (NCM) (JMW)

PRINCE CARPENTRY, INC., THOMAS

VOSS, & JOHN PUNIS,

Defendants.

NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Taplice Stapleton has filed suit against her former employer, Prince

Carpentry, Inc., and individual defendants Thomas Voss and John Punis. Plaintiff brings

claims for unequal pay in violation of the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) and the New

York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), disability discrimination and failure to

accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

the NYSHRL, and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), interference with

her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and retaliation in violation

of the FMLA. Defendants move for summary judgment on each of plaintiff’s claims

pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and move in limine for an

order striking the testimony of one of plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Balvindar S. Sareen. Plaintiff

moves for the establishment of certain facts pursuant to Rule 56(g) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.1 For the reasons discussed below, defendants’ motion for summary

1 Hereinafter, the Court refers to defendants’ memorandum of law in support of

their motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 66, as “Defs. Mot.”; plaintiff’s

judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; defendants’ motion in limine is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Prince Carpentry, Inc., (“Prince”), is a drywall and carpentry

subcontracting company owned by defendant Thomas Voss. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 1, 4, 11.2

Plaintiff was hired as a temporary receptionist at Prince in April 2003, and was promoted

to full-time receptionist in July 2003. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 4–5.

Between 2007 and 2009, two individuals, Michael Caruso and Syd McIntosh,

worked in Prince’s payroll department. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 17. Both Caruso and McIntosh

are male. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 18. Caruso was Prince’s payroll supervisor and was employed

by Prince from 1971 to 2009. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 21–25. Caruso was responsible for

supervising McIntosh and others and handled Prince’s taxes, neither of which plaintiff

was responsible for during her employment. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 29–32. At the time

Caruso separated from Prince in 2009, he was earning approximately $83,000 per year.

Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 25. In 2014, plaintiff was promoted from a receptionist to a payroll

specialist. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 11. As a payroll specialist, plaintiff earned $52,000 in 2014.

memorandum of law in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and in

support of plaintiff’s cross-motion for the establishment of certain facts, ECF No. 67, as

“Pl. Opp’n”; defendants’ memorandum in further support of their motion for summary

judgment and in opposition to plaintiff’s cross-motion for the establishment of certain

facts, ECF No. 68, as “Defs. Reply”; and plaintiff’s reply memorandum in further support

of her cross-motion for the establishment of certain facts, ECF No. 73, as “Pl. Reply.”

2 The facts contained herein are undisputed unless otherwise indicated, and are

taken from the parties’ statements pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, specifically

defendants’ 56.1 statement (“Defs. 56.1”), see ECF No. 66-1; plaintiff’s counter 56.1

statement (“Pl. Counter 56.1”), see ECF No. 67-1, plaintiff’s 56.1 statement (“Pl. 56.1”), see

ECF No. 71-1, and defendant’s counter 56.1 statement (“Defs. Counter 56.1”), see ECF No.

72-1.

Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 11–12. Plaintiff was employed as a payroll specialist until her

termination on June 14, 2019. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 13. At the time of plaintiff’s termination

she was earning an annual salary of $62,000. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 14.

Plaintiff’s duties as a payroll specialist included, among other things, preparing

unemployment and employment verification forms and documents, printing, stamping,

folding, sorting, and distributing weekly payroll checks, preparing employee union

benefit vouchers, collecting time entries, processing payroll, and processing benefit

applications. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 15. Plaintiff also performed some administrative tasks,

although plaintiff contends that certain administrative tasks, such as accepting deliveries

to the office, answering the office phone, and notarizing documents, were usually handled

by other employees. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 15. Plaintiff worked full-time, approximately 35

hours per week in Prince’s office. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 103.

In March 2018, plaintiff was injured in a car accident. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 36. In this

accident, plaintiff suffered permanent damage to her right knee. Counter 56.1 ¶ 37.

Plaintiff contacted Prince on the day of the accident, indicating that she would not be at

work. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 38. Plaintiff requested from Voss that she be allowed to take one

week of leave to recover from her injuries from the car accident, which Voss approved. Pl.

Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 39–40. Following her one-week absence, plaintiff returned to full-time

work as a payroll specialist with no accommodations for her knee injury. Pl. Counter 56.1

¶¶ 41–42.

On October 5, 2018, plaintiff had surgery in connection with her injuries from the

car accident. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 43. At this time, plaintiff took an approved medical leave

from Prince and applied for disability benefits with Voss’s assistance. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶

44. Plaintiff submitted to Prince a doctor’s note indicating that she would be unable to

work until January 3, 2019. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 45. Between the time of her surgery and

January 3, 2019, Prince paid plaintiff her accrued vacation leave, sick leave, and a

Christmas bonus. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 46. While plaintiff was on leave, plaintiff’s payroll

duties were performed by Catherine Pepe, another Prince office staff member. Pl. Counter

56.1 ¶ 109.

On or about January 3, 2019, plaintiff contacted Voss to inform him that she would

not be returning to work. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 49.3 Plaintiff thereafter submitted a second

doctor’s note that she would not be able to return to work for another month. Pl. Counter

56.1 ¶ 51. After that additional month, plaintiff still did not return to work. Counter 56.1

¶ 54. Voss reached out to plaintiff around this time to discuss plaintiff’s return. Counter

56.1 ¶ 55. Plaintiff thereafter submitted a third doctor’s note indicating that plaintiff

would not return to work for another two months, in April 2019. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 57.

Voss then emailed plaintiff an FMLA leave notice informing plaintiff that she was entitled

to 12 weeks of unpaid leave, which would begin from that point forward, and requested

plaintiff fill out certain forms. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 59–60.

On March 8, 2019, plaintiff submitted her FMLA certification documents to Voss.

Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 61. On May 17, 2019, plaintiff visited her doctor for an MRI on her

injured knee. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 66. Plaintiff’s doctor issued a note to her detailing her

capacity for work. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 68. This note included that plaintiff could “work part

time (3 days/week – 20 h[ours]/week).” Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 69. The doctor’s note indicated

that the restrictions would last for at least six months. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 87.

3 In plaintiff’s counter 56.1 statement, she notes that at this time she was simply

instructed by her doctor not to return to work rather than “not allow[ed] . . . to return to

work.” Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 49.

Shortly after the issuance of the May 2019 doctor’s note, plaintiff and Voss had a

phone conversation during which plaintiff requested to return to work in Prince’s office

part-time, around 20 hours per week. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 71–72. Plaintiff alternatively

requested to be allowed to work the remaining 15 hours per week at home, or to work in

the office more than 20 hours per week. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 73; see also Pl. Opp’n Ex. D

(“Voss Dep. Tr.”) 206:6–23, ECF No. 67-6. Voss told plaintiff that her requests would be

taken under consideration and that he would get back to her. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 76. As of

May 2019, no one in the Prince office worked part time. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 90. Plaintiff

did not return to her doctor to request any modification to his May 17, 2019 note

prescribing medical work restrictions. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 98. On or about May 24, 2019,

defendants began searching for candidates for an “administrative assistant,” which

plaintiff contends was an attempt to replace her. Defs. Counter 56.1 ¶ 10. On June 3, 2019,

plaintiff and Voss spoke again to discuss plaintiff’s return to work. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 88.

During this conversation, plaintiff told Voss that he did not need to tell anyone if she

worked more than the 20 hours per week recommended by her doctor. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶

94. Voss refused this arrangement. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 94. Prince terminated plaintiff on

June 14, 2019. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 108.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law.” Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 13

F.4th 247, 259 (2d Cir. 2021).4 Facts are in genuine dispute when “the jury could

reasonably find for” the non-moving party based on the evidence in the record. Borley v.

United States, 22 F.4th 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2021).

The movant “bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute

as to a material fact.” Jaffer v. Hirji, 887 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2018). Where the moving

party meets their burden, the non-moving party must provide sufficient evidence

establishing a genuine issue of material fact beyond “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence.” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 205 (2d Cir. 2012). The court need only

consider admissible evidence, and is not obligated to conduct an independent review of

the record to identify a factual dispute. Looney v. Macy’s Inc., 588 F. Supp. 3d 328, 340

(E.D.N.Y. 2021).

If “the court does not grant all the relief requested” by a summary judgment motion

made pursuant to Rule 56(a), the court “may enter an order stating any material

fact . . . that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as established in the case.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). Rule 56(g) “become[s] relevant only after the court has applied the

summary-judgment standard carried forward in Rule 56(a) to each claim, defense, or part

of a claim or defense, identified by the motion.” New Generation Produce Corp. v. N.Y.

Supermarket, Inc., No. 09-cv-05536, 2013 WL 2382970, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2013)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (Committee Note 2010)). Whether to treat certain facts as

established pursuant to Rule 56(g) is a matter of discretion. D’Iorio v. Winebow, Inc., 68

F. Supp. 3d 334, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Thus, “even if the court believes that a fact is not

4 Throughout this Order, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes,

and citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.

genuinely in dispute it may refrain from ordering that the fact be established.” Hasemann

v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 15-cv-02995, 2024 WL 1282368, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,

2024). Even if a fact is not genuinely in dispute, the court “may conclude that it is better

to leave open for trial facts and issues that may be better illuminated by the trial of related

facts that must be tried in any event.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants’ Motion in Limine

Defendants move to strike the expert report of Dr. Sareen, and to preclude Dr.

Sareen from testifying as an expert at trial. Defs. Mot. Lim. (“MIL”), ECF No. 60-8.5

Defendants argue that Dr. Sareen’s report and opinion contains legal conclusions that are

impermissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and those portions of his report that

do not contain legal conclusions otherwise constitute a narration of irrelevant facts.6

Plaintiff opposes defendants’ motion, arguing that Dr. Sareen’s report largely discusses

plaintiff’s medical condition and provides background information on standard patient

conduct. See Pl. Opp’n Defs. Mot. Lim. (“MIL Opp’n”), ECF No. 60-13. Plaintiff

alternatively argues that should any of Dr. Sareen’s conclusions be “deemed legal in

nature,” those conclusions are admissible as long as they are not questions to be

submitted to the jury. MIL Opp’n 4. The Court agrees with defendants that Dr. Sareen’s

report contains legal conclusions that are outside the scope of admissible expert opinion.

5 Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers

assigned in ECF filing headers.

6 Defendants make no arguments as to Dr. Sareen’s qualification as an expert; thus,

at this time, the Court makes no findings as to whether Dr. Sareen is qualified to give the

opinions which are consistent with this Court’s Order and are not impermissible legal

conclusions.

The Court’s determination of whether to admit expert testimony is guided by Rule

702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Gatto, 986 F.3d 104, 117 (2d

Cir. 2021). Pursuant to that rule, an expert may generally be permitted to testify “if he is

qualified, reliable, and helpful.” Id. The Court must also ensure that expert testimony is

reliable and relevant in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directives in Daubert v.

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). An expert “may not invade the province of the court to

determine the applicable law, nor may the expert usurp the role of the jury in applying

that law to the facts.” Goss v. Sealift Inc., No. 19-cv-05123, 2024 WL 670405, at *5

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2024).

Defendants argue that Dr. Sareen’s report concludes that plaintiff was “within her

rights” to insist on returning to work full-time, notwithstanding her doctor’s medical

advice to work only 20 hours per week, and that her request to do so was reasonable. MIL

12. Defendants argue that this conclusion is an impermissible attempt to instruct the jury

and the Court on the applicable legal standard for considering plaintiff’s failure to

accommodate claim. MIL 13. In opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff argues that

Dr. Sareen’s report concludes that medical professionals allow patients to decide what

medical evidence to heed. MIL Opp’n 7. However, this interpretation of the report is

belied by its contents. For example, Dr. Sareen’s report states that “[plaintiff’s] request to

work more than 20 hours per week was reasonable under these circumstances.” MIL Ex.

F (“Sareen Report”) 6, ECF No. 60-7. This determination, as to whether plaintiff’s request

to work more than 20 hours per week would be a reasonable accommodation, is a

conclusion to be reached by the jury in determining defendants’ liability on plaintiff’s

failure to accommodate claims. Dr. Sareen’s report also states: “[t]o conclude, the

common decision to override physician’s instructions, and make one’s own health-related

decision, was here one to be made entirely by [plaintiff].” Sareen Report 7. However,

whether defendants were reasonable in refusing to grant plaintiff an accommodation that

conflicted with medical guidance is also a determination to be made by the jury.

Thus, the Court agrees that Dr. Sareen’s report contains legal conclusions unfit for

expert evidence, and these conclusions must be stricken from his report. Nevertheless,

plaintiff notes that other aspects of Dr. Sareen’s report concern his “knowledge of patient

behavior and the reasons therefor, and as such is proper fodder for expert testimony.”

MIL Opp’n 7. The Court finds that Dr. Sareen’s testimony regarding the issue of patients

failing to comply with their doctor’s orders, and how commonplace that occurrence is,

may be admitted to provide helpful background information to the jury. Additionally, the

factual narration provided by Dr. Sareen in the report is limited and does not

impermissibly “invade the province of the jury by finding facts that are in contention in

this case.” S.E.C. v. Tourre, 950 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). It is common for

expert reports to contain some background information situating their expert opinion,

and the Court declines to strike Dr. Sareen’s report in its entirety on that basis. See

LoanCare, LLC v. Dimont & Assocs., LLC, No. 22-cv-09286, 2025 WL 951585, at *18

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025) (“It is commonplace, even standard or expected, for expert

reports to contain a section dedicated to a summary of the factual background relevant to

the ultimate opinions and conclusions detailed in the report.”).

The Court denies defendants’ request to preclude Dr. Sareen’s testimony at trial at

this time. However, should Dr. Sareen’s testimony at trial invade the jury’s province in

fact-finding, the Court will rule on specific objections to certain aspects of his testimony

at the appropriate time.

Plaintiff is directed to submit a proposed redacted version of Dr. Sareen’s report

that conforms with this order on or before September 22, 2025.

II. Plaintiff’s Unequal Pay Claims

Plaintiff brings unequal pay claims pursuant to the NYLL and the NYSHRL. See

generally Compl., ECF No. 1-2. Defendants move for summary judgment on both

claims. See Defs. Mot. 12–13.7 For the reasons stated below, summary judgment on

these claims is GRANTED.

A. NYLL Unequal Pay Claim

To establish a claim of unequal pay under the NYLL, the plaintiff must make a

prima facie case by offering evidence that “(1) the employer pays different wages to

employees outside the protected class; (2) the employees perform equal work on jobs

requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and (3) the jobs are performed under

similar working conditions.” Collison v. WANDRD, LLC, 737 F. Supp. 3d 231, 245

(S.D.N.Y. 2024). To show that a plaintiff and her comparators performed equal work, the

plaintiff may point to whether “[plaintiff] and her comparators had the same title or rank;

worked for the same division; shared supervisors; had analogous managerial

responsibilities; performed the same tasks; had the same skills or experience; and worked

on projects of a similar size or budget.” Moazzaz v. MetLife, Inc., No. 19-cv-10531, 2021

WL 827648, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2021). Where a plaintiff and a comparator have

7 Prior to October 8, 2019, New York Labor Law Section 194 only prohibited pay

differentials based on sex. This section has subsequently been amended to prohibit pay

differentials based on race. N.Y.L.L § 194. As the October 8, 2019 amendments are not

retroactive and plaintiff was terminated before October 8, 2019, the Court considers only

whether plaintiff has offered evidence in support of her claim that she was paid less

because of her gender. See Herrera v. Syracuse Univ., No. 24-cv-00245, 2025 WL

874734, at *19 n.17 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2025).

different levels of experience, this fact tends to show that the plaintiff and comparator did

not perform equal work. See Black v. Buffalo Meat Serv., Inc., No. 21-1468, 2022 WL

2902693, at *4 (2d Cir. July 22, 2022) (summary order) (noting comparator’s longer

tenure when determining that plaintiff and comparator did not perform equal work).

Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the “burden then shifts to the

defendant to provide an affirmative defense that the difference in pay was based on a bona

fide factor other than sex.” Manta v. Hofstra Univ., No. 157061/2021, 2024 WL 4650644,

at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 2024).

Here, even viewing the evidence in plaintiff’s favor, her unequal pay claim fails

because she has not offered evidence showing that she and her comparator performed

equal work. Plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion relies exclusively on the pay

differential between herself and Caruso, an employee who worked at defendant Prince

from 1971 to 2009. See Pl. Opp’n 11–14. Plaintiff has failed to show that she and Caruso

performed “equal work” for purposes of her prima facie claim during those years—it is

undisputed that Caruso had 38 years of experience by 2009, when plaintiff had at most 4

years of payroll experience by 2014. See Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 24 (Caruso worked for Prince

from 1971 to 2009); Defs. Counter 56.1 ¶ 5 (plaintiff states she took over payroll in 2010).

Additionally, the parties agree that Caruso performed managerial tasks, supervised other

employees, and was responsible for managing defendants’ taxes, which were job

responsibilities never assigned to plaintiff. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 29–32. Thus, plaintiff has

not provided facts by which a jury could find that plaintiff and Caruso performed equal

work.

Plaintiff attempts to cure this deficiency by enlisting an economic expert to

compare plaintiff’s pay and Caruso’s alleged salary at a time when they had the same level

of experience. Specifically, this expert calculated “inflation-adjusted, cost-of-living-

adjusted wages paid to [Caruso and plaintiff] at times when they possessed equal levels

of experience.” Pl. Opp’n 10. However, despite the benefit of discovery, plaintiff has no

information regarding how much Caruso was making when he began his payroll career

with Prince in the early 1970s, so plaintiff states that her economic expert uses Caruso’s

pay records from 2008 and 2009 to “extrapolate how much money Caruso would have

earned at those times earlier in his career when he had the same number of years of

experience” as the plaintiff. Pl. Opp’n 11. However, contrary to plaintiff’s characterization,

the economic expert does not include a calculation of how much money Caruso would

have earned earlier in his career. Instead, the report appears to use Caruso’s salary in

2008 to calculate how much money plaintiff should have made if she had been working

in 2008 with 31 fewer years of experience than Caruso, and then increases that amount

to determine how much plaintiff should have been making in 2016. See Pl. Opp’n Ex. A

(“Shapiro Rep.”) 4, ECF No. 67-3.8

8 Plaintiff’s expert treats Caruso’s 2008 compensation as a “benchmark” to

determine what plaintiff should have been paid as of 2016. See Shapiro Rep. 4. To do so,

plaintiff’s expert first took Caruso’s salary in 2008, which was $83,200, and decreased it

by .6 percent for each of 31 years, the difference in the amount of experience that plaintiff

had in 2016 and the amount of experience Caruso had in 2008. Shapiro Rep. 4. Dr.

Shapiro used the .6 figure as this was the average annual increase in median pay of payroll

clerks for each additional year of age for ages 35 to 39 and 55 to 59. Shapiro Rep. 4. n.5.

This calculation came out to $70,021. Shapiro Rep. 3. Next, plaintiff’s expert increased

that number by 13.8%, which is the difference in the Consumer Price Index from 2008 to

2016, to find that plaintiff should have been paid $79,718 in 2016 when she was actually

paid $56,420. Shapiro Rep. 4.

Dr. Shapiro’s report calculates plaintiff’s alleged “lost compensation resulting from

disparate pay treatment over the period from June 11, 2016 to October 15, 2018.” Shapiro

Rep. 4. As plaintiff claims damages for violation of the NYLL from January 2, 2014 to the

end of her employment, it is unclear why Dr. Shapiro only calculates plaintiff’s lost

compensation beginning in 2016. See Pl. Opp’n 11 (“[Plaintiff] is owed wages due to

Whether plaintiff is attempting to compare her pay with Caruso’s pay from the

early 1970s, or his pay from 2008, this method of comparison is unavailing. As articulated

in Hatzimihalis v. SMBC Nikko Sec. Am., Inc., No. 20-cv-08037, 2023 WL 3764823

(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2023), the “Second Circuit ordinarily evaluates [unequal pay] claims by

comparing the compensation paid to different employees in the same year . . . perhaps

because it seemed sufficiently obvious that comparisons should be made within the same

time period.” Id. at *7. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Hatzimihalis by correctly noting

that in that case, the plaintiff was attempting to compare her wages to comparators hired

and paid after her, where the plaintiff in the instant case attempts to compare her wages

to those paid before her. Pl. Opp’n 12. Additionally, plaintiff points to language in

Hatzimihalis that holds “plaintiff may rely on between-year comparisons to make out a

prima facie case” when “a reasonable jury could conclude that the time periods at issue

are similar[.]” Pl. Opp’n 12–13 (quoting Hatzimihalis, 2023 WL 3764823, at *9). Thus,

plaintiff correctly argues that a plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of unequal pay

by showing that she was paid less than a comparator in a different time period.

However, plaintiff fails to offer evidence to meet her “burden of establishing

similarity” between the time periods she seeks to compare. Id. As articulated by the court

in Hatzimihalis, “[r]equiring plaintiffs to prove the similarity of the relevant time periods

. . . [is] consistent with the overall burden-shifting scheme” of the NYLL. Id. at *8. Thus,

plaintiff is “required to show that the time period under examination was sufficiently

similar to presumptively require equal pay[.]” Id. However, plaintiff has offered no

evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the time periods at issue are

violations of NYLL § 194 from January 2, 2014, and due to violations of NYSHRL and

NYCHRL from January 2, 2017 through the end of her employment.)

sufficiently similar to presumptively require equal pay. In fact, the court in Hatzimihalis

concluded that the plaintiff could not compare the pay she received in 2016 to the pay her

comparators received in 2018, because the business grew and profitability fluctuated

during those few years. Id. at *9. Here, plaintiff has not presented any evidence

concerning Prince’s business or the industry between when Caruso had the same level of

experience as plaintiff in the 1970s, in 2008 when Caruso’s pay was used as a

“benchmark,” and the late 2010s when plaintiff was allegedly underpaid. Thus, plaintiff

has offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that payroll specialists in

these differing time periods should presumptively have received equal pay.

As plaintiff has failed to offer evidence by which a reasonable jury could find that

plaintiff performed equal work under similar conditions as her offered comparator, and

yet received unequal pay, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s NYLL

unequal pay claim is GRANTED.

B. NYSHRL Unequal Pay Claim

While a plaintiff bringing a NYLL unequal pay claim must show that she performed

equal work for unequal pay, the NYSHRL makes “actionable any form of sex-based

compensation discrimination” and is analyzed under the “well-known burden shifting

framework” adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Torre

v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 3d 276, 284–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (noting

different standards for disparate pay claims under the NYLL and the NYSHRL). Under

this framework, plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of compensation discrimination

by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her

position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse

employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

discrimination. Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015).9

Unlike her NYLL claim, plaintiff need not show that she performed “equal work” with her

offered comparator and may instead make a claim for sex-based wage discrimination if

she offers evidence that “the challenged wage rate is not based on seniority, merit,

quantity or quality of production, or any other factor other than sex.” Lenzi v. Systemax,

Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2019). However, the plaintiff carries “an additional

burden on her [] NYSHRL claim[]: she must also produce evidence of discriminatory

animus.” Zimpfer v. Hilbert Coll., ---F. Supp. 3d---, No. 21-cv-00231, 2025 WL 1758266,

at *16 (W.D.N.Y. June 25, 2025).

Here, plaintiff has not offered any evidence that her wage rate was based on her

sex, or any evidence of discriminatory intent, circumstantial or otherwise. Plaintiff’s

opposition states simply that plaintiff was paid less than Caruso when considering their

experience, and thus summary judgment on all her unequal pay claims should be denied.

See Pl. Opp’n 10–14. First, as discussed above, plaintiff’s calculations comparing plaintiff

and Caruso’s pay are insufficient to establish that plaintiff was paid less than Caruso

“when taking into account their experience” and responsibilities. Pl. Opp’n 10. Second,

even assuming plaintiff was able to establish that she was paid less than Caruso when

9 In 2019, the NYSHRL was amended to provide that its provisions “shall be

construed liberally . . . regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws

with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have been so

construed.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 300 (2023). However, the amendment does not have

retroactive effect. Wheeler v. Praxair Surface Techs., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 3d 432, 452

(S.D.N.Y. 2023). Therefore, the Court continues to analyze NYSHRL claims concerning

conduct that occurred prior to October 11, 2019 under the standard more akin to Title VII

claims. See Wellner v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 17-cv-03479, 2019 WL 4081898, at *5

n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2019) (The NYSHRL “amendments only apply to claims that accrue

on or after the effective date of October 11, 2019”). As plaintiff was terminated in

September 2019, the Court considers her NYSHRL claim pursuant to this higher

standard.

taking into account their respective experience, plaintiff has offered no evidence to show

that she was paid less because of her sex, or evidence that would allow a reasonable jury

to find that a disparity existed due to discriminatory animus. Cf. Miller v. Levi &

Korsinsky, LLP, 695 F. Supp. 3d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (denying summary judgment where

defendants refused to pay plaintiff a bonus and plaintiff presented evidence of sexist

remarks made by employers). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate. See Valerio v.

Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 24-1614, 2025 WL 686028, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2025)

(finding summary judgment on NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims appropriate where

plaintiff had “not produced any admissible evidence of direct unlawful discriminatory

intent or disparate treatment”).10

Having failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

plaintiff was paid less because of her sex, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s NYSHRL unequal pay claim is GRANTED.

III. Disability Discrimination Claims

A. Failure to Accommodate

The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified

individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions, and privileges

10 In her opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues

that she also brings an unequal pay claim pursuant to the NYCHRL, even though the claim

was not named in her complaint. Pl. Opp’n 14. Defendants correctly note that plaintiff

also did not raise a NYCHRL claim during discovery or in the parties’ pre-motion letters

in anticipation of the instant motions. See Defs. Reply 11; see also ECF Nos. 32, 37.

Nevertheless, plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim would fail for the same reason as her NYSHRL

claim: she has failed to offer evidence of discriminatory intent. Doe v. N.Y. Univ., No. 20-

cv-01343, 2023 WL 5293688, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-1246, 2024 WL

4834965 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2024) (“To plead a discrimination claim under the NYCHRL,

a plaintiff must allege [] that [she] was treated less well because of a discriminatory

intent.”).

of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination “for failure to accommodate under the ADA, a plaintiff must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that: (1) [her] employer is subject to the ADA; (2) [she]

was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) [she] was otherwise qualified to perform

the essential functions of [her] job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4)

[her] employer refused to make a reasonable accommodation.” Tudor v. Whitehall Cent.

Sch. Dist., 132 F.4th 242, 246 (2d Cir. 2025). “Plaintiff bears the burdens of both

production and persuasion as to the existence of some accommodation that would allow

[her] to meet the essential eligibility requirements of the position, after which defendant

bears the burden of proving that the requested accommodation is not reasonable.” Wenc

v. New London Bd. of Educ., 702 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). The

reasonableness of a proposed accommodation is “fact specific and must be evaluated on

a case-by-case basis.” Bielski v. Green, 674 F. Supp. 2d 414, 424 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). If

plaintiff establishes a prima facie failure to accommodate claim under the ADA and the

NYSHRL, she “also meets her less-demanding burden under the New York City Human

Rights Law.” Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co., 134 F.4th 39, 52 (2d Cir. 2025).

The parties do not dispute the first two elements of a prima facie case: that plaintiff

was a person with a disability under the ADA and that defendants are employers covered

by the statute. The parties do dispute, however, whether an accommodation existed that

would have allowed plaintiff to perform the essential functions of her position and

whether defendants refused to make a reasonable accommodation. Specifically,

defendants argue that working full time in person is an essential function of plaintiff’s job

duties, while plaintiff argues that she could perform her essential functions while working

part time, or working full time despite her doctor’s direction that she work part time.

The regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

define essential functions as the “fundamental job duties” of the position, but not “the

marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see also Stone v. City of

Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1112 (1998) (applying

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) to ADA claims). To determine a position’s essential functions, “a

court must conduct a fact-specific inquiry into both the employer’s description of a job

and how the job is actually performed in practice.” McMillan v. City of New York, 711

F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013). Although no factor is dispositive, relevant factors include an

“employer’s judgment,” “written job descriptions,” consequences of not performing the

function, and the work experience of employees in similar positions. Stone, 118 F.3d at 97

(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). An employer’s judgment as to which functions are

essential receives “considerable deference,” and a “reasonable accommodation can never

involve the elimination of an essential function of a job.” Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,

332 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2003). “Ultimately, however, the question whether a task

constitutes an essential function depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Tafolla v.

Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2023). Where the underlying material facts are

undisputed, a court may determine the essential functions of a position as a matter of law.

Hunt-Watts v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 43 F. Supp. 3d 119, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); see

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). However, when the underlying factors, taken together and

viewed in the non-movant’s favor, indicate a “reasonable dispute” as to whether a duty is

essential, that is a question for the trier of fact. McMillan, 711 F.3d at 126.

Here, plaintiff presented the following as reasonable accommodations that she

claims would allow her to perform the essential functions of her job, which defendants

rejected: returning to work in person part-time, returning to work full-time but working

partly from home, and returning to work full-time and in person with no accommodation.

i. Plaintiff’s Request to Work Part-Time.

Defendants argue that plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of her

position because her position required her to work full time. To support this claim,

defendants point to the following: defendants, as the employer, considered the position

to be full-time; plaintiff worked 35 hours per week before her accident; plaintiff’s

replacement while she was on leave, Catherine Pepe, spent more than 20 hours a week

completing plaintiff’s tasks; and two individuals who occupied a similar role had worked

full-time. Defs. Reply 13. Defendants note that Pepe testified that she could not complete

plaintiff’s payroll duties within 20 hours per week. Decl. of Adam Guttell Ex. 4 98:9–14,

ECF No. 72-6. Defendants also note that some of plaintiff’s secretarial duties were

essential because only a limited number of employees could perform them. Defs. Reply

14–15.

In response, plaintiff points to the following evidence: plaintiff filled out a detailed

list of each of her essential duties and how long it takes to complete each one, and

concluded that she could complete her essential duties in approximately 15 hours, 33

minutes per week. Pl. Opp’n 16. Additionally, during plaintiff’s leave, Catherine Pepe

covered all of plaintiff’s payroll duties on top of her existing duties. Pl. Opp’n 17. And

though Pepe testified that she could not complete those duties within 20 hours per week,

she also testified that her hours changed only slightly: she would work through lunch and

work from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM, which is approximately two hours per day longer than

her schedule before plaintiff went on leave. Decl. of David Zevin Ex. H 23:9–24:10, ECF

No. 67-10. Plaintiff also contends that some secretarial duties, such as accepting

deliveries, answering the phone, and notarizing documents, were usually handled by

other employees. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 15. Upon review of the totality of the circumstances,

the Court finds that each party has raised facts which put the essential nature of a full-

time position in genuine dispute.

First, defendants have failed to identify specific essential tasks which would be

eliminated were plaintiff to be placed on a part-time schedule. Defendants state, in a

relatively conclusory fashion, that plaintiff’s “essential duties required her to be at work

full-time, approximately 35 hours per week.” Defs. Reply 16. While defendants note that

plaintiff worked this amount of time in the past, and plaintiff’s employer considered the

job to be full-time, this does not establish that plaintiff could not perform her work in 20

hours per week. To the contrary, plaintiff presented evidence that she could complete her

duties in less than 20 hours, and Pepe only worked an additional two hours a day when

plaintiff’s duties were added to her responsibilities.

Further, defendants do not present evidence that plaintiff’s duties need to occur at

a specific time, which would require full time work, in contrast to those cases where a

plaintiff’s position “absolutely required their presence during specific business hours.”

See McMillan, 711 F.3d at 127. For example, in McMillan, the court found that the

plaintiff’s duties did not require him to be in the office at certain times in order to

complete his work in a timely manner, and thus the plaintiff’s requested accommodation

of a flexible start time would not eliminate an essential function of his position. Id. The

McMillan court compared the plaintiff’s position to that of a nurse who supervised other

employees during specific shifts, or an employee with a 4:00 p.m. daily deadline that

would be impaired by a flexible start time. See id. (citing Guice-Mill v. Derwinski, 772 F.

Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). In

McMillan, as here, the defendant employer was unable to identify a specific task that

needed to happen at a certain time of day and which the plaintiff could not accomplish if

they were not in the office at that particular time. Thus, the Court concluded that it was

not an essential function of the plaintiff’s position to be in the office at certain times.

While an employer is granted deference in determining what functions are

essential, where a reasonable juror could find that the plaintiff would be able to complete

all of her work in a timely fashion, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Rodal v.

Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that “a

modified work schedule may constitute a reasonable accommodation in certain

circumstances,” if it does not involve the elimination of an essential job function); Parker

v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 336 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that part-time

work can constitute a reasonable accommodation where the employee can demonstrate

that she can perform the essential functions of the job while working part-time). Here,

the Court finds that a reasonable juror could view the conflicting evidence presented by

each party and conclude that working full time was not an essential function of plaintiff’s

position. Thus, plaintiff has met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of failure to

accommodate.

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the

employer to offer evidence that the plaintiff’s proposed accommodation would constitute

an undue hardship for the defendant employer. Greenbaum v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No.

21-1777, 2022 WL 3347893, at *4 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2022). An undue hardship is defined

as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §

1211(10)(A). Thus, the burden shifts to defendants to show that allowing plaintiff to work

20 hours per week would have constituted an undue hardship. The Court finds that

defendants have not made this showing. In support of their argument that plaintiff’s

request to work part-time would have constituted an undue burden, defendants claim that

because plaintiff was “one of a handful of office staff,” and because another office member

was leaving defendants’ employment in May 2019, allowing plaintiff to work part time

would put “additional stress on Prince’s office operations.” Defs. Mot. 23. Defendants’

conclusory assertion of “additional stress” is insufficient to meet their burden to show

undue hardship as a matter of law. See e.g. Laguerre v. Nat’l Grid USA, No. 20-3901-CV,

2022 WL 728819, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2022) (finding employer had not satisfied burden

of showing undue hardship with “conclusory testimony” that it did not possess technology

to accommodate plaintiff’s disability, with no evidence that the technology was

unavailable or unreasonably expensive); Morse v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 941 F. Supp.

2d 274, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying summary judgment where defendant offered only

conclusory declaration that accommodating plaintiff’s request would result in additional

costs and scheduling issues).

In support of their undue hardship argument, defendants rely on Plourde v. Snow,

which found that the plaintiff’s request to work part-time would have placed an undue

burden on the defendant’s operations. See No. 02-cv-05532, 2006 WL 4510754 (E.D.N.Y.

June 14, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Plourde v. Paulson, 236 F. App’x 656 (2d Cir. 2007).

However, Plourde is distinguishable from this case. In Plourde, it was undisputed that

the plaintiff’s position involved supervising others and was time sensitive, and thus the

plaintiff could not genuinely dispute that the essential functions of her position would be

impaired if she worked part-time. Id. at *8. Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff did not

supervise others. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 29. Additionally, plaintiff has offered evidence that

most of her work was not time sensitive and could be completed throughout her week.

See Voss Dep. Tr. 179:11–180:4 (noting unemployment insurance could be sent out seven

days from the date for which it was applied). Further, for those job duties that were time

sensitive, for example, issuing layoff checks, defendant Voss testified that someone else

in the office can perform the job duty. See Voss Dep. Tr. 57:24–59:8.

Additionally, in Plourde, while the plaintiff was temporarily working part-time, the

defendant had to use another employee to perform the plaintiff’s duties and thus had to

pay two employees to perform the duties of one position. Plourde, 2006 WL 4510754 at

*10. This stands in contrast to the instant case: while plaintiff was out on medical leave,

her duties were managed completely by existing employees of Prince without bringing in

additional help. In Plourde, while defendants demonstrated that they would have been

required to pay two employees to perform the duties of plaintiff’s one position while

plaintiff was working part-time, defendants in the instant case have made no such

showing.

Thus, defendant have not established that they would face an undue hardship as a

matter of law if plaintiff was afforded the accommodation of working part-time.

ii. Plaintiff’s Request to Work Full-Time in Contravention of Medical

Advice

Defendants also claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because

plaintiff’s alternative requests, to work full time by spending 20 hours in the office and

finishing her work at home, or to work full time in person with no accommodations, each

conflicted with her medical restrictions. Defs. Mot. 15. Defendants alternatively argue that

allowing plaintiff to work part-time from home would constitute an undue hardship as

plaintiff handled sensitive payroll data and blank checks and allowing her to handle these

materials at home would constitute a security risk. Defs. Mot. 23–24. The Court finds

these arguments to be without merit.

a. Working in Contravention of Medical Advice

Defendants’ argument that, as a matter of law, Prince could not allow plaintiff to

return to work full-time in contravention of her doctor’s recommendation is misplaced.

Each case defendants rely on for this proposition is distinguishable and does not stand

for the broad holding defendants argue.

For example, defendants point to the Second Circuit’s decision in Wenc v. New

London Board of Education as supportive of their argument that when an employee’s

“request for an accommodation directly contradicts that employee’s doctor’s prescribed

medical restrictions, the employer is not obligated to provide the employee with their

preferred accommodation[.]” Defs. Mot. 15. (citing Wenc, 702 F. App’x at 30). However,

Wenc does not stand for the broad proposition that an accommodation that is against a

doctor’s recommendation is a per se unreasonable accommodation. Instead, Wenc stands

for the well-established proposition that an employee cannot insist on a particular

accommodation when the employer proposes a reasonable accommodation. Wenc, 702

F. App’x at 424.

In Wenc, the district court found that the defendant school district had reasonably

accommodated the plaintiff by granting him medical leave, as was his doctor’s

recommendation, even though the plaintiff would have preferred a transfer to a different

grade level. Id. at 30. The accommodation offered by the employer would have allowed

the plaintiff to remain employed and accommodated his medical restrictions. Here, the

issue is not plaintiff’s insistence on a particular accommodation. Instead, plaintiff was not

offered any accommodation for her medical restrictions whatsoever, and also not

permitted to return to work full-time.

Similarly, in Bielski, the defendant employer proposed an accommodation that

would have allowed the plaintiff to continue working and accommodated her medical

restrictions, even though it was not the accommodation that the plaintiff preferred. In

that case, the court held that once an “employer has proposed a reasonable

accommodation, the employee cannot insist on some other particular accommodation,

even if the employee’s proposed accommodation is also reasonable.” 674 F. Supp. 2d at

424. Here, defendants did not propose any accommodation to plaintiff that would have

allowed her to continue working and accommodated her medical restrictions. It is

undisputed that plaintiff requested to return to work for more than 20 hours per week,

notwithstanding her doctor’s recommendation, and defendants refused and did not

provide an alternative accommodation.

Additionally, Rodriguez v. Atria Sr. Living Group, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 503

(S.D.N.Y. 2012), does not command that, as a matter of law, any accommodation not

directed by an employee’s doctor is unreasonable. In Rodriguez, the court found that the

defendant did not “violate the ADA by relying on the opinion of a medical professional . . .

about what accommodation [the employee’s] injury required or by insisting that [the

employee] provide proof of the need for the requested accommodation” that was more

than the accommodation recommended by his doctor. Id. at 511–12. Here, rather than

requesting accommodations above those directed by her doctor, plaintiff requested to

return to work with less accommodation than required by her doctor. Whether such an

accommodation would be unreasonable is a question for the trier of fact.

Thus, defendants have not shown that, as a matter of law, an accommodation that

conflicts with a doctor’s recommendation is unreasonable.

b. Undue Hardship.

Defendants alternatively argue that allowing plaintiff to work part-time from home

would have presented an undue hardship in the form of a security risk, as plaintiff

handled sensitive payroll data. Defs. Mot. 23–24. In response, plaintiff points to evidence

that other Prince employees, including herself, worked from home sporadically. Pl. Opp’n

29. Defendants in reply rely largely on their argument that plaintiff’s medical restrictions

prevented her from working more than 20 hours per week, either from the office or from

home, and thus plaintiff cannot show that allowing plaintiff to work from home could

constitute a reasonable accommodation. Defs. Reply 28–30. As discussed above, the

Court has considered defendants’ argument that an accommodation which conflicts with

a doctor’s recommendation is unreasonable as a matter of law and rejected it. Thus, the

next question before the Court is whether defendants have shown that allowing plaintiff

to work from home would impose an undue hardship on defendants. As defendants have

not made this showing, summary judgment is not appropriate.

While defendants claim that allowing plaintiff to work from home would constitute

an undue security risk, plaintiff has pointed to evidence that she worked from home with

materials containing sensitive payroll data prior to her work-from-home request being

denied. Pl. Opp’n 29. Plaintiff testified that, prior to June 2019, she took documents home

from Prince Carpentry and informed Voss that she had done so. Pl. Opp’n Ex. J 128:7–

129:14 (“Pl. Dep. Tr.”), ECF No. 67-12. Plaintiff testified that certain documents she took

home contained information including employee names and the last four digits of their

Social Security numbers. Pl. Dep. Tr. 128:25–129:1. Plaintiff has also offered emails she

allegedly sent from home to Prince that contained attachments of payroll documents

containing sensitive information. Pl. Opp’n Ex. O, ECF Nos. 67-17, 67-18. Plaintiff has

therefore raised a genuine question of fact as to whether payroll employees were

permitted to work from home prior to her termination, and thus a genuine question as to

whether allowing plaintiff to work from home part time would create an undue hardship.

See Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 96.11

Therefore, the reasonableness of plaintiff’s requested accommodations—to return

to work part-time, or to return to work full-time either fully in the office or part-time from

home—is a question of fact for the jury and thus not appropriate for summary judgment.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claims

brought pursuant to the ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL is DENIED.

B. Disparate Treatment Claims

Defendants also seek summary judgment on plaintiff’s disability discrimination

claims brought under a disparate treatment theory. Defendants argue that plaintiff

cannot establish that the proffered reason for her termination—that she could not work

full-time according to her doctor—was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Defs. Mot.

25–26. Defendants also argue that plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case of disability

discrimination under the more lenient NYCHRL, as plaintiff cannot show that she was

treated “less well” than any other employee because of her disability. Defs. Mot. 27. In

opposition, plaintiff states that pursuant to the same analysis performed in support of her

11 As the Court finds that plaintiff has presented a question of fact as to whether

Prince allowed employees to work from home prior to her termination, the Court need

not reach the parties’ arguments regarding whether defendants’ work-from-home policy

during the COVID-19 pandemic after plaintiff’s termination should be considered in

evaluating whether allowing plaintiff to work from home in 2019 would have been an

undue hardship. See Pl. Opp’n 28–29; Defs. Reply 27.

failure to accommodate claim, her disability discrimination claim should also survive. Pl.

Opp’n 37–38.

Failure to accommodate claims and disparate treatment claims brought under the

ADA are different theories of discrimination that generally require distinct analyses. See

Geer v. Gates Chili Cent. Sch. Dist., 577 F. Supp. 3d 147, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (noting that

“[a]lthough related,” disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims “are

conceptually different claims”). A disparate treatment claim requires a showing that the

defendants treated the plaintiff less favorably than others because of the plaintiff’s

protected characteristic, in this case, plaintiff’s disability. To establish a prima facie case

of disability discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that “(1) [her] employer is subject

to the ADA; (2) [s]he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) [s]he was otherwise

qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] job, with or without reasonable

accommodation; and (4) [s]he suffered adverse employment action because of [her]

disability.” Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006). Once the

plaintiff has made a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a rebuttable presumption of

discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to set forth some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Anderson v. Nat’l Grid,

PLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 120, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Where the employer has articulated such a

reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered reason

is a pretext for discrimination. Geer, 577 F. Supp. 3d at 167.

However, as defendants do not claim that the plaintiff was terminated for some

reason unrelated to her disability, the burden-shifting framework established by

McDonnell-Douglas is less helpful. See McMillan, 711 F.3d at 129. The McDonnell-

Douglas burden-shifting framework is most useful for “weed[ing] out non-viable claims

of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence.” Id. “When the parties agree that the

employer” terminated the plaintiff for some reason directly connected with her disability,

“there is no need to evaluate whether the employer’s adverse employment action . . . is

pretextual.” Id. Accordingly, while disparate treatment and failure to accommodate

claims are conceptually distinct, where a plaintiff “asserts that an adverse employment

action is tied to an employer’s failure to accommodate,” the failure to accommodate the

plaintiff’s disability may constitute evidence of discriminatory intent. Piligian v. Ichan

Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai, No. 17-cv-01975, 2020 WL 6561663, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7,

2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Piligian v. Icahn Sch. of Med. at

Mount Sinai, 490 F. Supp. 3d 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Therefore, where a plaintiff claims that the employer failed to reasonably

accommodate her disability, and this failure led to the basis upon which the plaintiff was

terminated, there is no need to determine whether the proffered reason for discharge was

a pretext. Instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “with reasonable accommodations,

[s]he could have performed the essential functions of her job.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 129.

The plaintiff must also show the connection between the failure to accommodate, the

performance deficiencies, and the adverse employment action. Natofsky v. City of New

York, 921 F.3d 337, 352 (2d Cir. 2019). Where a plaintiff establishes a claim for disability

discrimination under the ADA and the NYSHRL, she has also necessarily established a

claim for disability discrimination under the NYCHRL. See Ragin v. Riverbay Corp., No.

20-2233-cv, 2021 WL 4057196, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2021) (“[W]e evaluate the state law

disability claim co-extensively with the federal claim because the scope of the disability

discrimination provisions of the NYSHRL are similar to those of the ADA.”); see also

Limauro v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., No. 20-cv-03558, 2021 WL 466952, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2021) (“Practically speaking, because the NYCHRL is more protective

than its state and federal counterparts, a claim is automatically stated under the NYCHRL

if it is stated under the federal and state statutes.”).

The parties do not dispute that plaintiff has satisfied the first two elements of a

disparate treatment claim, that defendants are subject to the ADA or that plaintiff is

disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Additionally, as discussed above, the Court has

found that plaintiff has offered evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

plaintiff would have been able to perform the essential functions of her job, with or

without a reasonable accommodation. Next, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff was

advised by her doctor that she should not work more than 20 hours per week, and that

defendants terminated her because she was directed not to work full-time. Thus, plaintiff

has satisfied the fourth element of a prima facie case of disparate treatment: she has

offered evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she suffered an adverse

employment action because of her disability. See Presumey v. Town of Greenwich Bd. of

Educ., No. 15-cv-00278, 2018 WL 740194, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 2018), aff’d sub nom.

Presumey v. Bd. of Educ., Town of Greenwich, 770 F. App’x 595 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding

in disparate treatment claim that plaintiff need only demonstrate that she could have

performed the essential functions of her job where it was undisputed that plaintiff was

unable to lift students due to her disability and was terminated as a result). As defendants

do not claim that they terminated the plaintiff for some reason unrelated to her disability,

there is no need to evaluate whether defendants’ proffered reason for plaintiff’s

termination is pretextual. See McMillan, 711 F.3d at 129.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s disparate

treatment claims brought pursuant to the ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL is

DENIED.

IV. Family and Medical Leave Act Claims

A. FMLA Interference

Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim,

arguing that plaintiff’s claim fails because she was provided twelve full weeks of FMLA

leave as required by statute. Defs. Mot. 29. In her opposition, plaintiff states that the

“evidence and arguments in opposition to [defendants’] motion for summary judgment

on [plaintiff’s] FMLA claims and in support of her motion for an Order establishing

violations of the FMLA’s notice requirements overlap and are intertwined, so they will be

combined in one section.” Pl. Opp’n 39. Plaintiff’s opposition then notes the instances

where defendants failed to provide plaintiff with the required notice of her FMLA rights,

and that defendants failed to provide adequate FMLA notice in the employee handbook.

Pl. Opp’n 40. As plaintiff has failed to present evidence that these failures interfered with

her rights secured by the FMLA, summary judgment is appropriate.

The FMLA entitles eligible employees to twelve workweeks of unpaid leave

“[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the

functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C § 2612(a)(1)(D). The FMLA also

prohibits an employer from interfering with an employee’s exercise of this entitlement.

Greenberg v. State Univ. Hosp. - Downstate Med. Ctr., 838 F. App’x 603, 605 (2d Cir.

2020) (summary order). To establish a prima facie case of FMLA interference, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that: “(1) she is an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the

defendant is an employer as defined by the FMLA; (3) she was entitled to take leave under

the FMLA; (4) she gave notice to the defendant of her intention to take leave; and (5) she

was denied benefits to which she was entitled under the FMLA.” Id.

The regulations promulgated under the FMLA require employers to provide

employees with certain notices regarding an employee’s eligibility for FMLA leave and

their rights under the FMLA. Where an employer fails to provide these notices in

compliance with their obligations, that failure may be compensable as FMLA interference

if the failure interfered with a plaintiff’s ability to structure her leave to preserve the job

protections afforded by the FMLA. Rengan v. FX Direct Dealer, LLC, No. 15-cv-04137,

2017 WL 3382074, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017). Where the requisite notices have not

been provided, the question for summary judgment is whether a reasonable juror could

find that the plaintiff was prejudiced and the notice failure caused the plaintiff to lose her

job. Id. at *7. Therefore, if plaintiff can offer evidence which creates a genuine dispute

regarding whether defendants’ FMLA notice failures interfered with her ability to return

to work and thus cost plaintiff her job, summary judgment on plaintiff’s FMLA

interference claim is inappropriate.

Plaintiff argues that her ability to return to work was interfered with because

defendants’ FMLA notices issued in February and March 2019 were ambiguous as to

when plaintiff’s FMLA leave ended. Pl. Opp’n 40–41. This argument is belied by the

record before the Court. Plaintiff was sent a letter on February 22, 2019, informing her

that her leave was designated as FMLA leave “from this point forward.” Defs. 56.1 ¶ 60;

Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 60. The interpretation of the plain text of this letter indicates that

plaintiff’s FMLA leave expired twelve weeks from February 22, 2019, which was May 17,

2019. Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that this was ambiguous because she originally went

on leave in October 2018 and was informed on March 13, 2019 that her FMLA leave was

approved. Pl. Opp’n 41. However, even if plaintiff was under the mistaken impression that

her leave expired twelve weeks from March 13, 2019, that would set June 5, 2019 as the

day her leave expired. Yet, plaintiff did not return to work on June 5. Indeed she met with

defendants on June 3, weeks after her leave actually ended to continue discussions

concerning plaintiff’s return. Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶ 88. It was not until more than a week after

June 5, when plaintiff believed her leave ended and she still failed to return to work, that

she was terminated. Thus, even if defendants’ delay in providing FMLA notice caused

plaintiff confusion as to her return to work date, she was not terminated until after the

date that she believed was correct.

Plaintiff does not state how any ambiguity in the FMLA notices impeded her ability

to return to work in mid-May, when her FMLA leave expired, or the beginning of June,

before she was terminated. Instead, she states that she “would have behaved very

differently had she known that [defendants] considered her leave to be over in mid-May,”

but does not state how she would have behaved differently or how this different behavior

would have allowed her to return to work. Pl. Opp’n 41.

It is undisputed that plaintiff was provided with twelve weeks of FMLA leave

beginning the date of the February FMLA notice. While defendants do not dispute that

they failed to provide plaintiff with the requisite FMLA notices until February and March

2019, plaintiff has not presented any evidence that this failure prejudiced her ability to

return to work following the expiration of her leave. Therefore, summary judgment is

appropriate.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim

is GRANTED.

B. FMLA Retaliation

FMLA retaliation claims are evaluated under the familiar burden shifting

framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To

establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1)

she exercised rights protected under the FMLA; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3)

she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action

occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of retaliatory intent.”

Greenberg, 838 F. App’x at 606.

Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of FMLA

retaliation because she was not qualified for her position at the time of her termination,

and because she cannot establish that defendants’ decision to terminate her for not

returning to work following the expiration of leave was in retaliation for taking FMLA

leave. Defs. Mot. 32–33. Plaintiff does not respond to defendants’ argument that her

FMLA retaliation claim should be dismissed. Pl. Opp’n 39. Nor does plaintiff’s subsequent

motion in further support of her cross-motion for the establishment of certain facts

address her FMLA retaliation claim. See Pl. Reply.

As noted by defendants, where a party fails to present arguments in opposition to

a motion for summary judgment on a particular claim, the Court may properly conclude

that the claim is abandoned. Malik v. City of New York, 841 F. App’x 281, 284 (2d Cir.

2021) (summary order) (“[W]hen a party fails adequately to present arguments in a brief,

a court may properly consider those arguments abandoned, especially in the case of a

counseled party where a court may infer from a party’s partial opposition that relevant

claims or defenses that are not defended have been abandoned.”). Even after defendants

noted plaintiff’s failure to respond to defendants’ arguments concerning plaintiff’s FMLA

retaliation claim, plaintiff had an opportunity to respond and present arguments as to

why her FMLA retaliation claim should survive. Plaintiff did not do so; thus, the Court

concludes that plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim has been abandoned.12

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s FMLA

retaliation claim is GRANTED.

V. Plaintiff’s Motion for the Establishment of Certain Facts

Plaintiff moves for the establishment of certain facts pursuant to Rule 56(g) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff requests that the Court treat as established that

defendants failed to provide plaintiff with certain required FMLA documents. Pl. Opp’n

41. Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to the establishment of those facts because they are

undisputed. Pl. Opp’n 40. The Court disagrees.

The decision “of the Court to enter an order . . . under Rule 56(g) is a matter of

discretion.” D’Iorio, 68 F. Supp. at 356. The purpose of Rule 56(g) is “to salvage some of

the judicial effort involved in the denial of a motion for summary judgment and to

streamline the litigation process by narrowing the triable issues.” Id. However, even if a

fact is not genuinely in dispute, the court “may conclude that it is better to leave open for

trial facts and issues that may be better illuminated by the trial of related facts that must

be tried in any event.” Hasemann, No. 15-cv-02995, 2024 WL 1282368, at *15.

Plaintiff has not moved for summary judgment on her FMLA claims, and instead

only seeks to establish the fact that defendants failed to provide plaintiff notice of her

12 The only discussion of the FMLA in plaintiff’s opposition concerns her FMLA

notices. This section does not discuss the elements of an FMLA retaliation claim, does not

argue that plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for exercising her rights under the

FMLA, and points to no evidence that would support a finding that she was terminated

because of a retaliatory intent.

rights under the FMLA within 5 days of plaintiff notifying them of a potentially FMLA

leave eligible event. While defendants do not dispute that they failed to provide plaintiff

notice of her FMLA rights within five days’ notice, defendants argue that this fact does

not give rise to liability. Defs. Mot. 30–31. As discussed supra, the Court agrees, and has

granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s FMLA claims. Therefore, these claims will not

be presented to the jury. Accordingly, the Court finds that establishing the fact that

defendants failed to comply with their FMLA notice obligations will not serve the

purposes of Rule 56(g), in that establishment of this fact will not significantly “streamline

the litigation process by narrowing the triable issues.” D’Iorio, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 356.

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion for the establishment of certain

facts is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, defendants’ motion in limine is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part, and plaintiff’s motion for the establishment of certain facts

is DENIED. In accordance with the Court’s Individual Practice Rule IV.A, the parties

shall file a proposed joint pretrial order by October 8, 2025.

Plaintiff is also ordered to file Dr. Balvindar Sareen’s report on the docket, with

redactions in line with this Order, on or before September 22, 2025.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Natasha C. Merle

NATASHA C. MERLE

United States District Judge

Dated: September 8, 2025

Brooklyn, New York