The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
ERIC NARAMORE, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 6:23-cv-531-AMM
)
CITY OF JASPER, ALABAMA, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the court on a motion for summary judgment by defendant
City of Jasper, Alabama (“the City”). Doc. 29. For the reasons stated below, the
motion, Doc. 29, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART AS MOOT.
Count III is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs are a group of former and current firefighters employed by the
City. See, e.g., Doc. 27-15 at 4; Doc. 27-16 at 2; Doc. 27-19 at 3. In this lawsuit,
they assert claims under the overtime compensation provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) applicable to firemen. See generally Doc. 24. Because
those claims center on the City’s use of a nineteen-day and a twenty-eight-day work
period for purposes of compensating firefighters for overtime, the court describes
the facts of this case in the light of the work period used by the City at the time of
the events.
A. The Nineteen-Day Work Period
1. The Firefighters’ Compensation for Hours Worked
From approximately 1985 until 2022, firefighters for the City worked on a
nineteen-day work period, meaning they worked 144 hours over a Nineteen-day
period. Doc. 27-33 at 1; Doc. 27-27 at 14, 19; see Doc. 27-15 at 7. The City divided
the firefighters into three groups, and each group rotated working a twenty-four hour
shift before having forty-eight hours off. See, e.g., Doc. 27-15 at 6. Each of the
plaintiffs worked on this twenty-four/forty-eight-hour rotation, see, e.g., Doc. 27-1
at 5; Doc. 27-13 at 4; Doc. 27-16 at 4, which resulted in them generally working
either ninety-six or 120 hours in a work period, see, e.g., Doc. 27-5 at 5.
This schedule inevitably resulted in one shift of firefighters working more
than 144 hours, which entitled them to overtime compensation under the FLSA. See,
e.g., Doc. 27-22 at 3–4; Doc. 27-25 at 4; Doc. 27-23 at 3; see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(k);
29 C.F.R. § 553.230. To prevent those firefighters from working in excess of 144
hours, the City gave them a “Kelly Day.” See Doc. 27-27 at 27. A “Kelly Day” is an
additional day off “to reduce the total number of work hours down.” Id. If a
firefighter worked in excess of 144 hours, the City paid him or her overtime. See
Doc. 27-22 at 4; Doc. 27-23 at 3.
The firefighters were salaried employees for the City. See, e.g., Doc. 27-26 at
5. Although the City used a nineteen-day work period, it used a fourteen-day pay
period. See id. The City calculated the firefighters’ biweekly payment by dividing
their salaries by twenty-six pay periods. Doc. 27-27 at 10; Doc. 27-26 at 5.
When a firefighter worked overtime, the City paid him or her overtime
compensation. See, e.g., Doc. 27-15 at 8; Doc. 27-20 at 5. The City calculated a
firefighter’s overtime rate by dividing the firefighters biweekly salary by 106, which
is the average number of hours that a firefighter worked in the biweekly pay period
(or a fifty-three hour weekly average), and then multiplied that number by 1.5. See
Doc. 27-26 at 5; Doc. 27-1 at 12.
This case hinges in part on a discrepancy included on the firefighters’ checks
under the nineteen-day work period. Because of the payroll software used by the
City, the firefighters’ checks listed “80.00” under the heading “HOURS” and
included a “PAY RATE” calculated by dividing the firefighter’s biweekly salary by
eighty hours. See Doc. 27-26 at 6; see, e.g., Doc. 36-17 at 1–2; Doc. 36-18 at 1. It is
undisputed that, absent inapplicable exceptions like beginner training programs, the
plaintiffs always worked more than eighty-hours in a two-week span and averaged
106 hours. See, e.g., Doc. 27-16 at 6–7; Doc. 27-9 at 7.
Nevertheless, the pay rate listed on the checks caused confusion for the
firefighters, who believed that their overtime compensation rate should have been
calculated by using that number (which is derived by dividing their salary by eighty
hours) instead of the calculation used by the City (dividing their salary by the 106
average hours). Dante Fields, the Fire Chief for the City’s Fire Department, Doc. 27-
26 at 3, received complaints about the City’s pay system—mainly “seeing one figure
on the check and being paid at a different rate” even though he says that all of the
firefighters “knew that the rate on the check was incorrect” and that “it was common
knowledge.” /d. at 6-8.
2. The Firefighters’ Compensation for Paid Leave
In June 2014, the City’s Civil Service Board adopted a rule (“Rule 9”)
addressing how firefighters were compensated for leave. See Doc. 27-31 at 85, 94—
97. For vacation, Rule 9 stated that employees would “be paid his or her regular
salary during the period of time he or she is on vacation,” and set forth the following
chart delineating the number of vacation hours an employee accrued based on his or
her tenure:
D. Vacation Time
Length of Employment Minimum Number of vacation.
hours per year
a. from6monthstooneyear 48 hours
b. from 1 year to 5 years 96 hours
c. from 5 years to 10 years 112 hours
d. from 10 years to 15 years 128 hours
e. over 15 years 144 hours
Id. at 94–95. Rule 9 also stated, “There is no limit on the amount of sick leave that
can be accumulated and used for legitimate purposes during an employee’s
employment with the City” and that employees would be paid “at the[ir] regular rate
of pay” for their sick and vacation leave when he or she leaves employment with the
City, although there may be a cap on the number of hours for which he or she may
be compensated. Id. at 94–96.
The vacation policy in the City’s employee handbook was consistent with
Rule 9 and stated that employees earned vacation hours based on their tenure with
the City. See Doc. 38-1 at 67 (2016 employee handbook); id. at 16 (2021 employee
handbook). The employee handbook also specified that City employees received
holiday and sick leave time in eight-hour increments based on the monthly tenure of
the employee. See id. at 69–70 (2016 employee handbook); id. at 18 (2021 employee
handbook). At this time, the City gave the firefighters a number of holiday days,
which the fire department permitted them to use at any time—that is, the firefighters
could “bank” those days for use at a later date. Doc. 27-27 at 22–23. Although the
City’s employee handbook “specifie[d] an eight-hour day” for holidays, id. at 23;
see Doc. 38-1 at 17 (2021 employee handbook), the firefighters “used them as 24
hour[]” days, Doc. 27-27 at 23.
In September or October 2021, all City employees “were told that the City
would no longer [bank] holidays” and that employees would no longer “be able to
take th[ose days] off at a later date.” Doc. 27-27 at 23. Instead, they would receive
compensation for eight hours for that holiday. Id. at 23–24.
In November 2021, the plaintiffs complained to the Jasper Civil Service Board
about their inability to bank holidays and payment for eight hours instead of twenty-
four for those days. Doc. 36-1 at 1. They “ask[ed] th[e] Board to correct” the
decision. Id. The Civil Service Board held a hearing on the complaint, but ultimately
dismissed the case, at plaintiffs’ counsel’s request, for lack of jurisdiction. See Doc.
36-2 at 2–3. In June 2022, the plaintiffs sent the City notices of their claims. See
Doc. 36-3 at 1–6.
In August 2022, the City passed a new pay plan for its employees, which
“provide[d] additional pay benefits to every job description” for the City. Doc. 27-
34 at 1. The firefighters received a pay raise under this new pay plan. See, e.g., Doc.
27-11 at 5–6. See generally Doc. 27-34; Doc. 27-35.
B. The Twenty-Eight-Day Work Period
1. The Firefighters’ Compensation for Hours Worked and
Overtime
Because of confusion caused by the incorrect pay rate listed on the
firefighters’ paychecks under the nineteen-day work period, Chief Fields asked the
City to switch to a twenty-eight-day work period so it would be “more applicable
for the fire department.” Doc. 27-26 at 6; see Doc. 27-27 at 15. In September of
2022, the City passed a resolution in which it adopted a twenty-eight-day work
period, meaning the firefighters worked 212 hours in a twenty-eight-day period. See
Doc. 27-33 at 2; Doc. 27-36 at 1; Doc. 27-27 at 14; Doc. 27-26 at 6, 8; Doc. 27-14
at 6. The City was “trying to get the pay periods to . . . better . . . match [the
firefighters’] work period,” and to “make it more simple” for the firefighters and
payroll personnel to understand. Doc. 27-27 at 15–16; see Doc. 27-33 at 1.
Under the twenty-eight-day work period, the City calculated a firefighter’s
hourly rate by dividing that firefighter’s annual salary by 2,756 hours, which is the
number of hours firefighters work annually, and then multiplying that rate by the
actual number of hours they worked. See Doc. 27-33 at 2; Doc. 27-27 at 10, 14.
Because of this change, the firefighters were “paid for every hour that they worked
based on that regular hourly rate,” and the City no longer had to “convert to an hourly
rate” for its overtime calculation like it did under the nineteen-day work period. Doc.
27-27 at 14. It is undisputed that the firefighters worked the same schedule under the
twenty-eight-day work period—twenty-four hours on, forty-eight hours off.
See, e.g., Doc. 27-13 at 9.
The firefighters’ checks under the twenty-day work period reflected the actual
number of hours he or she worked that week. See, e.g., Doc. 27-37 at 71; Doc. 36-
18 at 2; see also Doc. 27-26 at 8–9. Because the checks reflected the firefighters’
actual hours worked (rather than eighty-hours), the “PAY RATE” included on these
checks reflected the firefighters’ biweekly salary divided by the actual number of
hours worked by the firefighter. See Doc. 36-18 at 2. Therefore, the pay rate listed
on these checks was lower than the pay rate on the checks given under the nineteen-
day work period (which were incorrect and not used by the City). See Doc. 27-26 at
8-9. Compare Doc. 36-18 at 1 (pay rate of $22.99 for nineteen-day pay period), with
Doc. 36-18 at 2 (pay rate of $20.60 for twenty-eight day pay period).
To illustrate the difference, consider one example. Under the nineteen-day
work period, plaintiff Kenneth Miller received $1,839.14 biweekly salary. Doc. 27-
37 at 70; see Doc. 27-13 at 7. Although the check reflected that Mr. Miller received
a salary, it also stated “80.00” underneath the heading “HOURS” and listed a “PAY
RATE” of $22.99—$1,839.14 divided by eighty-hours. See Doc. 27-37 at 70; Doc.
27-13 at 7.
City of Jasper
EMPLOYEE NAME MPLOY 15 NOTIFICATION Nu
DEPT; 3510
LEAVE BALANCE AS OF 10/12/2022
eal ’ 85.00 1,839.14 38,017.38 RETIRG 111.45 2,578.00 VAC 112.00
o_o! aes 39.64 BCBSFT22 101.03 1,919.57 SICK 766.00
eee 24,69 = soe. PRIN INS 40.30 7403.00 BIRTHDAY 0.00
LONGOT vee aoe gy Kansas T 0.37 7.03
CALL OUT 27,105.91 □ .
24.05 0.00 1,594.86
GROSS WAGE 1,857.56 57,433.57
ote FEDERAL EXEMPTIONS □
sia “36.98 3430.21 MARTA STATUS | □
DEDUCTION ee ADD HED ws 0.00
NET Pay Sei ee dee ee ADOL STATE WH 0.00
Peeol. G2 45,€70.76
PAY RATE 2959
Doc. 27-37 at 70. Mr. Miller testified that he “never just worked the 80 hours salary”
and “always worked 106 [hours] on average.” Doc. 27-13 at 13; see id. at 7. Because
Mr. Miller always worked more than eighty-hours, the City did not use this pay rate
in its overtime compensation calculation. See Doc. 27-26 at 5-6.
After the City’s change to the twenty-eight-day pay period, Mr. Miller’s check
reflected that he worked 122.25 hours, was paid hourly, and received a biweekly
salary of $2,518.35. Doc. 27-37 at 71. Accordingly, the “PAY RATE” listed is
20.60—$2,518.25 divided by 122.25 (Mr. Miller’s actual hours). Jd.
City of Jasper
_—_ Snore [eNPLOvEE1S [PAY PERIOD [__ GHEEKDATE__ NETRCATONNONT
KENNETH A MILLER | 3480 | sivoa/2022 [| a1/ii/2022 | 62508 _|
- DEPT: 3516
LEAVE BALANCE AS OF 11
HOURLY 33.50 1,514.10 4,032.45 RETIRE 3 ee maana
ee 99.84 acnsrT22 ct 2121.63 srck 174.00
Loxcor. 18.92 PRIN INS 40.30 443,30 BIRTHDAY 0.00
HOL 24,00 494.40 659.20 0.37
CALL OUT 2.00 62.50 17,168.41
KOLPD 9.00 53.56 1,648.36 ,
eaRe ar oo a 12 FEDERAL EXEMPTIONS
FEDERAL TAX 165.92 ’ at 7 STATE EXEMPTICNS
STATE TAX □□□ □□□ soo4 a MARITAL STATUS
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 273.28 $441.37 ADOLFED WH 0.00
NET PAY 1,453.23 34,012.08 ~~ oe
PAY RATE 29.60
Td. On the next pay period, Mr. Miller was paid $1,514.10 for 73.50 hours, and the
pay rate listed was $20.60—$1,514.10 divided by 73.50. /d. at 72.
City of Jasper
EWPLOVEE nae STEEREATE
[reine a eruies asians Ls Pe
DEPT: 3510
([nenuetion [eunnent[ □□□ LEAVE BALANCE As OF 10/25/2022
HOURLY 122.25 2,518.35 2,518.35 RETIRG 162.09 2,740.09 VAC * 112.00
or 99.84 scearT22 101.03 2,020.60 SICK 774.00
oe 18.42 Kansas T 0.37 7.40 BIRTHDAY 0.00
HOL 8.00 164.80 164.80 Baan ENS 403.00 ‘
CALL OUT 17,105.91 :
HOLBD 0,00 0.00 1,594.80
GROSS WAGE 2,701.57 60,135.14
FICA/MEDICARE 206 67 4,600.36 FEDERAL EXEMPTIONS a
STATE TAR lidsac | 2,58361 MARITAL STATUS.
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 263.49 5,171.09 ADDLFED WH 0.00
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 263.49 5,171.09 ADDL STATE WH 0.00
NET PAY 1,988.09 42,558.94 □ ,
PAY RATE 20,60
Id. The differing pay is consistent with Mr. Miller’s testimony that the firefighters
worked twenty-four hours and then received forty-eight hours off—which is the
equivalent of working on a rotation of either ninety-six hours or 120 hours. Doc. 27-
13 at 4, 7.
2. The Firefighters’ Compensation for Paid Leave
The City’s 2022 resolution maintained that firefighters cannot “bank” holiday
days “for use at a later date”’ and stated that the firefighters would receive eight hours
of holiday pay. Doc. 27-33 at 1-2. It stated that the pay rate for a firefighter’s holiday
and sick hours would “be calculated by dividing his or her annual salary by 2,080
hours, which is not the exact number of hours worked by an employee of the fire
department in a year, but is the approximate number of hours, exclusive of overtime,
worked by other employees of the City.” /d. at 2.
The resolution increased the firefighters’ accrual of vacation hours:
“Employees of the Jasper Fire Department who work 24-hour shifts shall earn
10
vacation at the rate of 1.5 times the rate specified in the . . . Employee Handbook for
employees who regularly work a 40-hour weekly schedule.” Id.; see Doc. 27-27 at
24–25.
C. The Present Lawsuit
The plaintiffs sued the City and asserted their claims in three counts. See Doc.
24. In Count I, they asserted claims for unpaid overtime under the FLSA based on
use of an incorrect hourly rate to calculate overtime pay. Id. ¶¶ 109–21. In Count II,
they asserted claims of retaliation under the FLSA because they alleged their hourly
pay rate decreased under the twenty-eight-day work period, which was adopted after
the City received their complaints. Id. ¶¶ 122–28. And in Count III, they asserted a
claim for breach of contract under the Jasper Civil Service Law for the City’s
changes in compensation for paid leave. Id. ¶¶ 129–37.
The City moved for summary judgment. See Doc. 29. The motion is fully
briefed. See Docs. 30, 37, 38.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A party moving for summary judgment must establish “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it could “affect the
outcome” of the case. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th
Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). A material fact is in “genuine” dispute “if the evidence is
such that” the trier of fact “could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
(cleaned up). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not
“to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986). “[T]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650,
651 (2014) (cleaned up).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Violation of the FLSA Overtime Compensation Requirements
(Count I)
The City argues that even though the plaintiffs’ checks under the nineteen-
day work period listed that they worked eighty hours and showed an incorrect pay
rate based on that hourly figure, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that it paid
the plaintiffs overtime as contemplated under the FLSA—by dividing their salary by
the number of hours they worked and multiplying it by 1.5. Doc. 30 at 13–18.
The plaintiffs respond that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether they were paid appropriate overtime because (1) prior to the City’s adoption
of the twenty-eight-day work period, the firefighters’ checks included an “hourly
rate” that was “higher” than what the City used to calculate the plaintiffs’ overtime,
and (2) “the City used differing pay rates” to calculate paid leave and overtime. Doc.
37 at 11.
The FLSA requires an employer to compensate an employee who works more
than forty hours in a workweek “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he [or she] is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). A municipality
like the City is an “employer” subject to the requirements of the FLSA. See Knight
v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579, 583 (11th Cir. 1994).
The FLSA provides special overtime rules for an “employee in fire protection
activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(k); see Huff v. DeKalb Cnty., 516 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th
Cir. 2008). An employee in fire protection activities is entitled to “one and one-half
times the regular rate at which he is employed” when he works a certain ratio of
hours to days. 29 U.S.C. § 207(k). Specifically, a firefighter can work 212 hours
within a twenty-eight-day work period or 144 hours within a nineteen-day work
period before being entitled to overtime. 29 C.F.R. § 553.230; see 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(k).
The amount of overtime that a firefighter is owed depends on his or her
“regular rate.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (calculating overtime at “one and one-half times
the regular rate at which he [or she] is employed”). The Department of Labor defines
an employee’s “regular rate” as his or her “rate per hour.” 29 C.F.R. § 778.109.
Where an employee is paid a salary, his or her rate per hour is computed “by dividing
[the employee’s] total remuneration for employment . . . in any workweek by the
total number of hours actually worked by him.” Id. § 778.109; see id. § 778.108.
Compensation for “occasional periods when no work is performed due to
vacation, holiday, illness, . . . or other similar cause” is not included in an employee’s
“regular rate.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2); see 29 C.F.R. § 778.200(a)(2); 29 C.F.R. §
778.219(a) (“[C]ertain payments made to an employee for periods during which he
performs no work because of a holiday, vacation, or illness are not required to be
included in the regular rate because they are not regarded as compensation for
working.”).
The plaintiffs do not argue that they do not qualify for the overtime
compensation exception applicable to those in fire protection activities, nor do they
argue that the City failed to pay them overtime compensation. See generally Doc.
37.1 Instead, they claim that the City failed to pay them overtime at the appropriate
rate. See id. at 11.
The plaintiffs argue that their “paychecks reflected an hourly rate which was
not used to calculate time-and-a-half overtime” under the nineteen-day work period.
1 To the extent that the plaintiffs attempt to present an argument of this nature in footnote 2 of their
brief, Doc. 37 at 8 n.2, the court declines to consider it. The Eleventh Circuit and numerous district
courts have declined to consider substantive arguments made only in footnotes. See Tallahassee
Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1435, 1446 n.16 (11th Cir. 1987); Pinson v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 942 F.3d 1200, 1209 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019); Burks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 2:23-CV-01045-JHE, 2024 WL 4228616, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 18, 2024); Club Madonna,
Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, No. 16-25378-CIV, 2023 WL 3534077, at *8 (S.D. Fla. May 18,
2023); Landrum v. City of Coll. Park, No. 1:21-CV-716-AT-CCB, 2022 WL 22361949, at *10
n.10 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-716-AT, 2022
WL 22361947 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2022). This court too declines to consider the plaintiffs’
substantive arguments made only in footnotes. And in any event, the plaintiffs later state in their
brief that “[t]his is not a case where the Plaintiffs are arguing that the City should not have treated
them as exempt under the 7(k) exemption.” Doc. 37 at 17.
Doc. 37 at 15. But the plaintiffs have presented no evidence indicating that they
worked a forty-hour workweek such that the pay rate listed on the check should have
been used to calculate their overtime. Indeed, each of the plaintiffs testified that they
worked more than that. See, e.g., Doc. 27-16 at 6–7; Doc. 27-9 at 7.
The evidence demonstrates that the City calculated the plaintiffs’ “regular
rate” by dividing the individual plaintiff’s salary by the number of hours worked—
not the undisputedly incorrect eighty-hour figure listed on the checks. See, e.g., Doc.
27-26 at 5–6, 8. The City’s method of calculating overtime is consistent with FLSA
overtime requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(k); 29 C.F.R. § 778.109.
The plaintiffs’ arguments about differing pay rates for holidays, vacation, and
sick leave are also unavailing. The FLSA specifically excludes compensation for
such time from calculating an employee’s overtime compensation. See 29 U.S.C. §
207(e)(2). And the FLSA mandates appropriate compensation for hours worked, not
for paid leave. See Wince v. CBRE, Inc., No. 19-cv-01546, 2020 WL 6273479, at *9
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2020) (“[T]he FLSA does not require payment for time not
worked.”); Okonkwo v. Callins L. Firm, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-02263-ELR, 2015 WL
12880529, at *4 n.2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2015), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 875, 876 (11th
Cir. 2016) (“The FLSA does not require . . . vacation pay. . . .” (cleaned up)).
Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to
Count I.
B. Retaliation (Count II)
The City argues that the plaintiffs cannot establish that they suffered an
adverse employment action. Doc. 30 at 19–24. It argues that, if anything, it increased
the plaintiffs’ salaries after receiving their complaints when it passed the new 2022
pay plan. Id. at 20–24. And it argues that even if the plaintiffs could establish that
some of them received lower pay, several plaintiffs “were not even employed by [the
City] during the period of time covered by this claim,” and therefore the City could
not have retaliated against those plaintiffs. Id. at 24–25.
The plaintiffs concede that the plaintiffs who were not employed at the time
of the allegedly retaliatory activities cannot pursue a retaliation claim and do not
oppose summary judgment in the City’s favor for those plaintiffs on Count II. Doc.
37 at 19 n.4. For the plaintiffs who were employed at the relevant time, they argue
“that after they complained to the City” about their pay, “the City changed the way
it calculated its pay periods to reduce the Plaintiffs’ hourly rate used for overtime
compensation to punish” them. Id. at 19. They argue that by changing from a
nineteen-day work period to a twenty-eight-day work period, the City decreased the
hourly rate it used to calculate the plaintiffs’ overtime, holiday pay, and other leave.
Id. at 19–20.
An employer may not “discharge or in any other manner discriminate against
any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted . . . any
proceeding under or related to” the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). “To prove
retaliation, a plaintiff must ultimately show: (1) she engaged in activity protected
under the act; (2) she subsequently suffered adverse action by the employer; and (3)
a causal connection existed between [the employee’s] activity and the adverse
action.” Smith v. Haynes & Haynes P.C., 940 F.3d 635, 648 (11th Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up).
The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they “suffered adverse action” by
the City. Smith, 940 F.3d at 648. The evidence—including some of the plaintiffs’
own testimony—reveals that the City gave the firefighters a raise and did not
decrease their salaries. See, e.g., Doc. 27-11 at 5–6; Doc. 27-2 at 10. As one example,
plaintiff Eric Naramore stated that his biweekly salary under the nineteen-day work
period was $1,839.13, which is $47,817.38 annually. See Doc. 27-15 at 23; Doc. 36-
18 at 1. After the twenty-eight-day work period was adopted, Mr. Naramore’s salary
increased to $56,777.42. Doc. 27-34 at 1–2; see Doc. 36-18 at 2.
The plaintiffs’ argument that the City lowered their hourly rate is based on the
pay rate that was included on their paychecks under the nineteen-day work period.
Doc. 37 at 11–16. But as explained above, the pay rate listed on those checks was
the result of the computer software used by the City, was incorrect, and was
(appropriately) not relied upon by the City to calculate the plaintiffs’ overtime in the
first place. See supra Part III.A. There is no evidence that the City decreased the
plaintiffs’ pay when it enacted the twenty-eight-day work period.
Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to
Count II.
C. Breach of Contract (Count III)
The City argues that the plaintiffs’ claim that the changes in paid leave
policies breached the Jasper Civil Service Law and employee handbook is “plainly
inaccurate.” Doc. 30 at 26. It also argues that if the court dismisses the FLSA claims
but disagrees with its breach of contract arguments, the court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim. Doc. 30 at 30–
32.
The plaintiffs argue that the City breached a contract with them and breached
Jasper Civil Service law by compensating them for eight hours of holiday and
vacation pay instead of twenty-four hours. Doc. 37 at 27–32.
Because the court grants summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ federal law
claims, see supra Part III.A–B, there is no longer an independent basis for subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law breach of contract claims. The court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Accordingly, Count III is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and
the City’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED AS MOOT as to Count III.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the City’s motion for summary judgment, Doc.
29, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART AS MOOT. Counts I and II
will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Count III will be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. A final judgment will be entered consistent with this
opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of September, 2025.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19