Jones v. City of North Las Vegas

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GENOA JONES; CORNELL No. 24-3374

TINSLEY,

D.C. No.

2:21-cv-00241-

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

CDS-DJA

v.

OPINION

CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS;

SCOTT SALKOFF; MICHAEL

ROSE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Cristina D. Silva, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 22, 2025

San Francisco, California

September 8, 2025

Before: Michelle T. Friedland and Salvador Mendoza, Jr.,

Circuit Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Mendoza

*

The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

2 JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

SUMMARY**

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the

district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of

North Las Vegas and two police officers in plaintiffs’ action

alleging that defendants violated their Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights when the officers physically intruded into

plaintiffs’ backyard without permission while searching for

a suspect, and one of the officers shot and killed two of

plaintiffs’ dogs after the dogs attacked the police K-9.

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of qualified

immunity and summary judgment to the individual police

officers with respect to their search of plaintiffs’

backyard. Defendants could not avail themselves of the “hot

pursuit” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement, which only applies when officers are in

“immediate” and “continuous” pursuit of a suspect from the

scene of the crime. Here, the continuity of the pursuit was

broken when defendants lost track of the suspect’s

whereabouts for eighteen minutes. Because defendants

lacked an exigent circumstance to search plaintiffs’ yard

under clearly established law at the time of the incident, they

were not entitled to qualified immunity.

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of

plaintiffs’ state law claim because the district court declined

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim solely

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 3

based on its grant of summary judgment to defendants on all

of plaintiffs’ federal claims.

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment for Lieutenant Salkoff, holding that he was entitled

to qualified immunity with respect to his use of force against

plaintiffs’ dogs because, given the spontaneous

confrontation, the panel could not say that he violated clearly

established law.

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment on plaintiffs’ Monell claims pertaining to both the

warrantless search and use-of-force claims. Plaintiffs

offered no evidence of a pattern of warrantless search

violations or other evidence establishing that the City was

deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment

rights or that its conduct had become a traditional method for

carrying out policy.

The panel remanded for further proceedings.

COUNSEL

Margaret A. McLetchie (argued) and Leo S. Wolpert,

McLetchie Law, Las Vegas, Nevada; Jennifer L. Braster,

Naylor & Braster, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Plaintiffs-

Appellants.

Rhiann J. Denman (argued) and Noel E. Eidsmore, Chief

Deputy City Attorneys; Micaela R. Moore, Former City

Attorney; Andrew D. Moore, City Attorney; North Las

Vegas Office of the City Attorney, North Las Vegas,

Nevada; for Defendants-Appellees.

4 JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

OPINION

MENDOZA, Circuit Judge:

When does a hot pursuit turn cold? Today we conclude

that a pursuit is at best lukewarm, and certainly no longer hot

pursuit, when officers lose a suspect’s trail in a residential

neighborhood for eighteen minutes.

A police officer saw a suspect flee from the back of a

house into a neighboring backyard. Instead of directly

following the suspect, the officer hurried to his car, called

for backup, and drove two blocks south to establish a

perimeter around the area. At least eighteen minutes passed

before a K-9 unit alerted in the direction of Plaintiffs’

backyard, several houses away from where the suspect had

disappeared. An officer with a K-9 searched the yard,

rousing Plaintiffs’ three dogs. Two of the dogs attacked the

police K-9 and were shot and killed by an officer.

Plaintiffs Genoa Jones and Cornell Tinsley sued under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the officers and the City of North

Las Vegas violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free

from unwarranted searches and seizures. The district court

granted summary judgment for the officers, reasoning that

the officers’ intrusion was permitted by the hot pursuit

exception to the warrant requirement and that the use of

force was reasonable under the circumstances. The district

court also granted summary judgment for the city, finding no

support for Plaintiffs’ failure-to-train theory.

We reverse, in part, holding that there is no hot pursuit

where officers lose track of a suspect for eighteen minutes.

We affirm with respect to the K-9 handler’s use of force and

JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 5

the claims against the city. We remand for further

proceedings.

I.

On February 15, 2019, at 3:47 p.m., North Las Vegas

Police Department (“NLVPD”) Officers Joseph Minelli

(“Officer Minelli”) and Michael Rose (“Officer Rose”)

responded to a possible domestic battery at a house on a

residential cul-de-sac. While Officer Minelli spoke with a

woman at the door, Officer Rose moved to the side of the

house, where he witnessed a person flee over the back wall

to the south into a neighboring yard. Officer Rose ran to his

patrol car to request assistance. He drove two streets south

hoping to cut off whomever had fled but did not catch sight

of the person again. Several units quickly responded and

helped Officer Rose establish a multiple-block perimeter

around the area.

Meanwhile, Officer Minelli stayed at the home to

investigate the domestic battery allegation. The woman who

answered the door denied that there was any domestic

violence, but Officer Minelli observed injuries on her face,

including several injuries around her eyes and a long cut

across her chin that had been stitched. The woman told

Officer Minelli that police were not welcome at her house

and that her boyfriend—whom officers suspected had

battered the woman and whom they believed to be the person

who fled—would be back that evening and police would

need a warrant to apprehend him at the home. Officer

Minelli remained at the address in case the suspect returned.

With a perimeter in place, officers believed nobody

could leave the area without crossing their line of sight. A

sergeant on scene decided to call for a K-9 unit to search for

the suspect. NLVPD Lieutenant Scott Salkoff (“Lieutenant

6 JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

Salkoff”) and his police K-9 Storm (“Storm”) responded to

the scene around 4:05 p.m., approximately eighteen minutes

after Officer Rose saw the suspect flee.

Lieutenant Salkoff used Storm—who is trained to detect

the odor of apocrine, a hormone some people release when

they are afraid—to search within the perimeter. Lieutenant

Salkoff informed residents of the searches using his patrol

car’s public address system. He also sent NLVPD Officer

Lee Young (“Officer Young”) ahead to seek consent from

residents to search their yards.

Lieutenant Salkoff was searching a backyard four houses

east and one house south of where the suspect vanished when

Storm alerted to an odor coming from a distant, elevated

position in the direction of Plaintiffs’ walled-in backyard.1

Lieutenant Salkoff decided to search Plaintiffs’

backyard. He had Officer Young check the gate, which was

locked and posted with a “Beware of Dog” sign. Officer

Young knocked on Plaintiffs’ door to request their consent

to search the yard but received no response because they

were not home. To gain a vantage, Lieutenant Salkoff

jumped onto the six-foot cinderblock wall that enclosed

Plaintiffs’ yard. He observed trash cans, where he thought

the suspect might be hiding, and a fenced-in kennel area with

1

We know Storm’s alert came at least eighteen minutes after officers

had last seen the person they were looking for—and, on the record before

us, it may have been much later. Officer Rose saw someone flee at

around 3:47 p.m. and Lieutenant Salkoff responded to the scene with

Storm at approximately 4:05 p.m. Lieutenant Salkoff does not recall

precisely when or where he started his search and says he may have

searched one yard or more than a dozen yards before Storm smelled fear

in the air. Officer Rose recalls that the search lasted for more than an

hour and possibly for two or three hours.

JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 7

an open gate and three dog houses and bowls but did not see

any dogs.

With neither a warrant nor Plaintiffs’ consent, Lieutenant

Salkoff hopped down from the wall into their backyard.

Officer Rose then passed Storm over the wall. Plaintiffs’

three dogs were stirred from their doghouses, emerging to

investigate the unwelcome strangers in their yard.

Lieutenant Salkoff attempted to keep the dogs at bay,

kicking them and placing trash cans between them and

Storm. His efforts deterred one dog, but the other two—

Shadow and Whitewall—attacked Storm. Lieutenant

Salkoff drew his service weapon and killed both Shadow and

Whitewall.

Despite officers scouring the neighborhood, they never

found the person they were looking for.

Plaintiffs sued Lieutenant Salkoff, Officer Rose, and the

City of North Las Vegas (“the City”), asserting several

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Lieutenant Salkoff violated

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when, without a

warrant, he entered Plaintiffs’ backyard, and Officer Rose

violated the same when he passed Storm into the yard;

Lieutenant Salkoff violated the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments when he unreasonably seized their dogs by

shooting them dead; and the City was deliberately indifferent

to the risk of these violations. Plaintiffs also brought a state

law claim that Lieutenant Salkoff and the City violated

Nevada Revised Statutes § 41.130.

The district court granted Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the constitutional claims, declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state

law claim, and entered judgment for Defendants. Plaintiffs

timely appeal.

8 JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

II.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, Spencer v. Pew, 117 F.4th 1130, 1137 (9th Cir.

2024), including officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity,

Sanderlin v. Dwyer, 116 F.4th 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2024). In

conducting this review, we take “the facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in

that party’s favor.” Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132

(9th Cir. 2019); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Qualified immunity protects government officials from

liability under § 1983 “unless (1) they violated a federal

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of

their conduct was clearly established at the time.” Waid v.

County of Lyon, 87 F.4th 383, 387 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018)).

“Either prong can be adjudicated on appeal by taking the

facts as most favorable to the plaintiffs and applying the

pertinent legal standards to those facts.” Isayeva v.

Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir.

2017). Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity where

we find “a negative answer at either step.” Sabbe v. Wash.

Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 84 F.4th 807, 819 (9th Cir. 2023).

III.

“When a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on

the curtilage” of a home, like a walled-in backyard, “a search

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.”

Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 593 (2018). “[A] small,

enclosed yard adjacent to a home in a residential

neighborhood . . . is ‘curtilage’ subject to Fourth

Amendment protection.” United States v. Struckman, 603

F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.

Romero-Bustamente, 337 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003)).

JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 9

Such searches are “presumptively unreasonable absent a

warrant.” Collins, 584 U.S. at 593.

But the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement “is

subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547

U.S. 398, 403 (2006). An “exigent circumstance” such as

“the hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect,” “the need to prevent

the imminent destruction of relevant evidence,” and “the

need to prevent the escape of a suspect” may constitute such

an exception. Struckman, 603 F.3d at 743. To rely on the

exigent circumstances exception, the government “must

satisfy two requirements: first, the government must prove

that the officer had probable cause to search,” and “second,

the government must prove that exigent circumstances

justified the warrantless intrusion.” United States v.

Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 905 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per

curiam). Probable cause exists where “the ‘facts and

circumstances’ before the officer are sufficient to warrant a

person of reasonable caution to believe” that a suspect would

be found in a place. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States,

338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)); see also Newman v. Underhill,

134 F.4th 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2025).

Lieutenant Salkoff and Officer Rose do not dispute that

they physically intruded into Plaintiffs’ walled-in

backyard—Lieutenant Salkoff by entering the yard and

Officer Rose by passing Storm over the wall. Such a

warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable. See

Collins, 584 U.S. at 593. The district court assumed, without

explanation, that Lieutenant Salkoff and Officer Rose

conducted this warrantless search while in hot pursuit of a

fleeing suspect. We disagree.

Hot pursuit fundamentally “means some sort of a chase.”

United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976). “The hot

10 JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

pursuit exception to the warrant requirement only applies

when officers are in ‘immediate’ and ‘continuous’ pursuit of

a suspect from the scene of the crime.” Johnson, 256 F.3d

at 907 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753

(1984)). To qualify as hot pursuit, a chase “need not be

reminiscent of the opening scene of a James Bond film,”

Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 329 (2021) (Roberts, C.J.,

concurring). Officers act with sufficient speed to qualify as

hot pursuit when they act immediately, making a “split-

second decision” to pursue a suspect. Stanton v. Sims, 571

U.S. 3, 10 (2013) (per curiam).

But there is no hot pursuit where “the continuity of the

chase was terminated permanently.” Johnson, 256 F.3d at

908. In Johnson, a suspect “ran into a wooded area where

he was free to run for over a half hour” rather than “into a

confined area where [the police] could monitor his

movements.” Id. On that basis, we determined that “the

continuity of the chase was clearly broken and a warrant was

required.” Id. We further noted that, “[a]lthough this

requirement may be inconvenient to law enforcement, any

other outcome renders the concept of ‘hot pursuit’

meaningless and allows the police to conduct warrantless

searches while investigating a suspect’s whereabouts.” Id.

We recently observed in Newman that whether a

pursuit’s continuity has been broken is a function of “two

interrelated considerations.” 134 F.4th at 1033. First,

“whether, and to what degree, the officer[] lost track of the

suspect’s whereabouts.” Id. Second, whether, after losing

sight of a suspect, the officer “continued to act with speed in

attempting to apprehend the suspect.” Id. Timing is relevant

to both considerations. As seconds and minutes tick by, the

officer’s once-clear knowledge of a suspect’s position fades

till they are no longer chasing a suspect but instead searching

JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 11

for him. “The more time passes without the officer’s

physically chasing after the suspect . . . the more likely the

continuity of the chase is to break.” Id.

In Newman, officers followed a suspect’s truck down a

dead-end street where the suspect exited his vehicle and ran

directly toward the back of the plaintiff’s house. Id. at 1028–

29. Officers lost sight of the suspect for nine minutes but

had probable cause to believe he was in the plaintiff’s house,

given that the suspect had been headed in that direction, he

was not in the backyard, the terrain and fences would have

hindered his flight to an adjacent property, the plaintiff’s

backdoor was unlocked, and the officer perceived someone

interacting with the backdoor at some point during the

pursuit. Id. at 1031. We held that the pursuit’s continuity

was unbroken because the officers “had a reasonably good

idea where [the suspect] was hiding” for the duration of the

nine minutes after they lost sight of him. Id. at 1033.

Comparatively, here, Officer Rose last saw the suspect

fleeing toward a different property—three houses west of

Plaintiffs’ home—rather than directly to the property that

was later searched. Officer Rose neither chased after the

person nor peered over the wall to monitor the person’s

movements, and instead unsuccessfully attempted to cut the

suspect off by patrol car. Officers had seen neither hide nor

hair of the suspect for at least eighteen minutes preceding

their search, in which time the suspect’s movements through

a suburban neighborhood were completely unknown.

Defendants suggest that they reasonably believed the

suspect was somewhere within the neighborhood, and

therefore, the continuity of their search was unbroken. If we

were to accept this argument, it would threaten to swallow

the warrant requirement whole. Officers may not riffle

12 JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

through private spaces in an entire neighborhood merely

because police have lost track of someone who earlier fled

from them in the general vicinity. Lieutenant Salkoff and

Officer Rose had no “reasonably good” basis for knowing

where the suspect was—beyond that he was likely still in the

neighborhood. Id. at 1033. Therefore, Defendants may not

avail themselves of the hot pursuit exception to the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Defendants urge that Storm’s alert salvaged the hot

pursuit and gave them probable cause to search Plaintiffs’

yard. Not so. Even if the dog sniff did give officers probable

cause to believe the suspect was in Plaintiffs’ yard, probable

cause alone is insufficient to obviate the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement—there must be both

probable cause and an exigent circumstance. Johnson, 256

F.3d at 905.

Our case law was clear when these unfortunate events

unfolded in February 2019 that a pursuit’s continuity is

broken when officers lose a suspect’s trail, as happened here.

We note that Newman, decided this year, is not only

distinguishable but also does not bear on what was clearly

established law in 2019. See Sanderlin, 116 F.4th at 916

(noting that “neither favorable nor damning subsequent legal

developments can be used to demonstrate what law was or

was not clearly established at the time of an officer’s

challenged conduct”). But Johnson, decided in 2001, made

it abundantly clear to officers in 2019 that they may not

sweep through an area and search the properties within it

simply because they believe a suspect is somewhere therein.

256 F.3d at 907–08. Allowing such searches would turn

back the clock to the age of English general warrants, which

our founders firmly rejected with the inclusion of the Fourth

JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 13

Amendment. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583

(1980).

Because Defendants lacked an exigent circumstance to

search Plaintiffs’ yard under clearly established law at the

time of the incident, they are not entitled to qualified

immunity and summary judgment was improper.

IV.

We turn now to the fate of Shadow and Whitewall.

“Reasonableness is the touchstone of any seizure under the

Fourth Amendment.” San Jose Charter of Hells Angels

Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 975 (9th

Cir. 2005). “To determine whether the shooting of the dogs

was reasonable, we balance ‘the nature and quality of the

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests

against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.’”

Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

We must judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force

“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490

U.S. at 396.

When we evaluate an officer’s use of force following a

warrantless intrusion into private space, we must not

conflate the unreasonable seizure claim with the

unreasonable search claim challenging the entry. County of

Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428 (2017) (“[T]he

objective reasonableness analysis must be conducted

separately for each search or seizure that is alleged to be

unconstitutional.”). Even where officers have violated

clearly established law with a warrantless search, we cannot

rely on that warrantless search to say that an officer’s

otherwise reasonable subsequent use of force was

excessive. See id. at 428–29.

14 JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

Plaintiffs argue that Lieutenant Salkoff violated rights

that were clearly established under Hells Angels when he

shot their dogs. In Hells Angels, recognizing “that dogs are

more than just a personal effect,” we found that killing dogs

is a “severe” intrusion on Fourth Amendment protections.

402 F.3d at 975. But, in that case, officers had a week to

plan the execution of the warrants, were aware guard dogs

resided at the premises to be searched, and devised only to

use a shotgun to handle any encounters with the dogs rather

than employing less-intrusive means. Id. at 976. We

emphasized in our decision that it was not a case “where the

officer was reacting to a sudden unexpected situation” or

needed to make a split-second judgment. Id. at 978.

By contrast, in this case, officers had minutes—not

days—to discover and plan for handling any dogs in

Plaintiffs’ backyard. Lieutenant Salkoff attempted to stir

any dogs that might have been home before he entered the

yard but saw no indications that dogs were present. Officers

were unaware that the resident dogs were pit bulls, as

opposed to a breed that may have been less sensitive to the

intrusion or more readily controllable by Lieutenant Salkoff.

For these reasons, the facts in this case are sufficiently

distinguishable from those in Hells Angels that we cannot

say Lieutenant Salkoff’s actions in this more spontaneous

confrontation violated clearly established law.

Because Plaintiffs do not offer, and we cannot find, any

cases clearly establishing that Lieutenant Salkoff’s actions

were unreasonable, he is entitled to qualified immunity and

summary judgment with respect to his use of force against

Plaintiffs’ dogs.

We note, however, that Lieutenant Salkoff and Officer

Rose may still be liable to Plaintiffs for the deaths of their

JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 15

dogs as a natural consequence of the warrantless search of

their yard. Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir.

2014) (“Under § 1983, ‘a person is responsible for the

natural consequences of his actions.’” (simplified)) (quoting

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled in part

on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658 (1978)); Mendez, 581 U.S. at 431 (stating that, even

where plaintiffs “cannot recover on their excessive force

claim, that will not foreclose recovery for injuries

proximately caused by the warrantless entry”).

V.

Cities may be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional

violations committed by their officers. See Monell, 436 U.S.

at 694. To establish such liability, Plaintiffs must prove

“(1) [they were] deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the

municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to

deliberate indifference to [their] constitutional right; and

(4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional

violation.” Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737,

741 (9th Cir. 2020). A municipal policy can be, among other

things, “a failure to train [or] supervise.” Horton by Horton

v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2019).

Plaintiffs contend that the City failed to provide officers

with adequate training and supervision regarding

warrantless searches and the lawful use of a service weapon

on pet dogs. To establish municipal liability under such a

theory, the failure to train must “amount to ‘deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the

[untrained employees] come into contact.’” Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (alteration in original)

(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388

(1989)). Because the municipality must have had “actual or

16 JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS

constructive notice [of] a particular omission in their training

program” to demonstrate deliberate indifference, a plaintiff

must typically provide evidence of “[a] pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Id. at 61–

62.

Plaintiffs’ Monell claim on warrantless searches fails

because Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence of a pattern

of warrantless search violations or other evidence of

constructive notice such that the City was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. As for

the use-of-force claim, Plaintiffs note that the City settled

three prior suits involving dog-shootings, each with different

facts than those presented here, during a five-year period.

Even if those settlements suggest that the police may have

acted wrongfully in those cases, evidence of “sporadic” or

“isolated” wrongdoing is generally insufficient to establish

“that the conduct has become a traditional method of

carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th

Cir. 1996); see also Connick, 563 U.S. at 62–63. Therefore,

the City is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

Monell claims.2

VI.

We reverse the district court’s grant of qualified

immunity and summary judgment to Lieutenant Salkoff and

Officer Rose with respect to their search of Plaintiffs’

backyard. Because the district court declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claim

solely based on its grant of summary judgment to

2

Plaintiffs also do not argue that the consequences of a failure to train

on warrantless searches are so “patently obvious” that the City could be

liable “without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Connick,

563 U.S. at 64.

JONES V. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS 17

Defendants on all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, its dismissal

of that claim is also reversed. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d

1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in all other respects. We remand

for further proceedings.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;

REMANDED.