The opinion
[Cite as Snider Crossing L.L.C. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Rev., 2025-Ohio-3189.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
SNIDER CROSSING LLC, :
CASE NO. CA2025-01-005
Appellant, :
OPINION AND
: JUDGMENT ENTRY
- vs - 9/8/2025
:
WARREN COUNTY BOARD :
OF REVISION, et al.
:
Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
Case No. 2023-1195
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, and Nicholas M. J. Ray and Lindsay D. Spillman,
for appellant.
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kathryn Horvath, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees, Warren County Board of Revision and Warren
County Auditor.
David C. DiMuzio, Inc., and Matthew C. DiMuzio and David C. DiMuzio, for appellee,
Mason City Schools Board of Education.
David A. Yost, Ohio Attorney, General, for Appellee, Ohio Tax Commissioner.
____________
OPINION
Warren CA2025-01-005
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Snider Crossing LLC appeals from the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA")
decision increasing the 2022 tax-year valuation of real property that it owns. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} This case arises from a property tax valuation dispute that concerns the
2022 statutory amendments to Ohio's school district complaint filing requirements in R.C.
5715.19(A)(6). The case focuses on whether appellee Mason City School District, Board
of Education ("BOE") properly established jurisdiction to challenge the assessed value of
real property it neither owns nor leases and whether an entity transfer can satisfy the
statutory prerequisites for such challenges.
{¶ 3} The subject property consists of four separate parcels located in Mason,
Ohio, in Warren County. The property operates as a strip shopping center housing several
commercial tenants. For tax year 2022, appellee Warren County Auditor ("Auditor")
initially assessed the property's true total value at $2,878,020.
The March 2021 Transaction
{¶ 4} On March 2, 2021, approximately ten months before the relevant tax-lien
date, the subject property was transferred through what the parties characterize as an
entity sale or LLC transfer. The transaction was structured as a transfer of ownership
interests in Snider Crossing rather than a direct conveyance of real estate. The purchase
price was $3,742,500. No deed reflecting a change of ownership was recorded in public
records. The Auditor's records continued to show Snider Crossing LLC as the titleholder
from 2017 through the relevant tax period, with no indication of a transfer occurring on
March 2, 2021. This absence from the public record reflects the nature of the entity
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transfer structure, which accomplishes the equivalent of a real estate sale without
requiring a traditional deed recordation.
{¶ 5} The transaction followed conventional real estate marketing practices. The
property was marketed before the sale was completed. Both a listing broker and a buying
broker participated in the transaction, and the parties were unrelated entities. The
purchase contract, dated October 1, 2020, was specifically captioned as an agreement
for the sale of real estate and identified the specific real property as the subject matter of
the transaction. The final settlement statement, dated February 23, 2021, confirmed that
only real estate was transferred, with no personal property or other business assets
included in the deal.
The 2022 Statutory Amendments
{¶ 6} In 2022, the General Assembly made fundamental changes to Ohio's
property tax complaint system. Through H.B. 126, effective July 21, 2022, the legislature
made school district valuation challenges more difficult. Before these amendments,
boards of education enjoyed virtually unrestricted authority to file complaints challenging
property valuations for any reason, assuming they followed basic procedural
requirements.
{¶ 7} The amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) changed this, establishing what
courts have described as severe restrictions on school district participation in property tax
proceedings. The new provision begins with an express prohibition: "The legislative
authority of a subdivision, the mayor of a municipal corporation, or a third party
complainant shall not file an original complaint with respect to property the subdivision or
complainant does not own or lease unless both of the following conditions are met." For
complaints based on recent sales, these conditions require that the property was "(i) sold
in an arm's length transaction, as described in section 5713.03 of the Revised Code,
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before, but not after, the tax lien date for the tax year for which the complaint is to be
filed," and that "(ii) the sale price exceeds the true value of the property appearing on the
tax list for that tax year by both ten per cent and the amount of the filing threshold
determined under division (J) of this section." R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). For tax year 2022,
that threshold was $500,000.
The Board of Education's Complaint and Snider Crossing's Jurisdictional Challenge
{¶ 8} Against this statutory backdrop, the BOE filed an original complaint with
appellee Warren County Board of Revision ("BOR") on March 15, 2023, seeking to
increase the property's assessed value from $2,878,020 to $3,750,000 for tax year 2022.
The complaint explicitly premised this requested increase on the March 2, 2021 sale of
the subject property. The BOE attached a printout from CoStar, a subscription-based but
publicly available database of real estate transactions, to the complaint that documented
the transaction details, including confirmation that the sale occurred in March 2021, that
both listing and buying brokers were involved, and that the "true buyer" and "true seller"
were different individuals.
{¶ 9} The BOE's complaint allegations, if true, would clearly satisfy amended R.C.
5715.19(A)(6)'s requirements. The alleged sale price of $3,750,000 exceeded the
Auditor's assessment of $2,878,020 by $871,980, representing both more than ten
percent of the assessed value and more than the required $500,000 filing threshold.
{¶ 10} Snider Crossing filed a motion to dismiss the BOE's complaint on
jurisdictional grounds, asserting that the BOE had failed to establish the statutory
requirements and that entity transfers do not qualify as sales under the amended statute.
This motion established the central legal questions that would dominate the subsequent
proceedings: whether the BOE must conclusively prove jurisdictional compliance at the
outset of BOR proceedings, what quantum of evidence suffices for such proof, and
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whether entity transfers can constitute qualifying sales under the cross-referenced R.C.
5713.03.
The Board of Revision Proceedings
{¶ 11} The BOR conducted a hearing on July 13, 2023, to address both the
jurisdictional motion and the substantive valuation issues. At the hearing, Snider Crossing
presented no witnesses or other evidence, relying solely on legal arguments regarding
jurisdiction. The BOE, by contrast, presented evidence supporting both the existence of
the qualifying sale and its impact on property valuation.
{¶ 12} The BOE's evidence included professional real estate appraiser James
Burt's testimony and written appraisal report. Burt opined that the subject property's true
value was $3,800,000 as of January 1, 2022. His written report stated that the March
2021 transfer "appears to be an arms-length sale." Burt testified that he had researched
the transaction through multiple sources, including CoStar records and public mortgage
filings, and that another appraiser in his office had independently verified the sale through
conversations with one of the involved brokers. Burt verified the sale in September 2021
and began using it as a comparable in appraisals of other properties shortly thereafter.
Burt noted that amount was reported in CoStar records as $3,750,000, instead of the
$3,742,500 purchase price, which he explained was a nominal variance typical in such
databases.
{¶ 13} As to the valuation of the property, Burt testified that his appraisal
methodology followed conventional practices for commercial property valuation. He first
used a sales-comparison analysis, which yielded a total rounded value of $3,750,000.
Burt then used an income analysis to reach a value of $3,810,000. He ultimately
reconciled to a final valuation of $3,800,000.
{¶ 14} The BOR denied Snider Crossing's motion to dismiss and issued a decision
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on July 17, 2023, increasing the property's value to $3,750,000. The BOR made no
specific findings in its recorded or written decision regarding whether the BOE had
established compliance with the jurisdictional standing requirements of R.C.
5715.19(A)(6).
The Board of Tax Appeals Proceedings
{¶ 15} Snider Crossing appealed the BOR's decision to the BTA and renewed its
jurisdictional challenge by filing a motion to remand. The motion argued that the BOE had
failed to meet jurisdictional standing requirements and that the case should be remanded
to the BOR with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
{¶ 16} In December 2023, the BTA issued an order denying the motion to remand,
relying on established case law regarding jurisdictional proof in tax proceedings. The BTA
determined that complainants are not required to establish jurisdictional facts at the time
of filing but rather may prove compliance with statutory prerequisites through the ordinary
course of administrative proceedings. This decision forced Snider Crossing to proceed
with discovery and document production.
{¶ 17} The case proceeded to a merit hearing before the BTA on June 5, 2024.
The evidentiary record developed during these proceedings provided definitive resolution
of the factual questions that had dominated the earlier stages. The BOE submitted the
actual purchase contract dated October 1, 2020, and the settlement statement dated
February 23, 2021, establishing conclusively that the entity transfer occurred for
$3,742,500. Both documents were produced by Snider Crossing during discovery.
{¶ 18} Burt provided updated testimony based on his revised appraisal report
dated March 15, 2024. Having reviewed the purchase contract and settlement statement,
Burt confirmed that these documents showed a sale of the subject property through an
entity transfer. He again testified that he had personally verified the sale in September
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2021 and that another individual in his office had also verified the transaction
independently. Burt's revised appraisal reached the same value conclusion as his original
report. While the appraisals contained some differences in detail and analysis, both
supported the conclusion that the March 2021 transaction provided reliable evidence of
the property's market value.
{¶ 19} Snider Crossing offered no evidence of valuation at the BTA hearing,
continuing to focus its arguments solely on jurisdictional issues. Snider Crossing objected
to the introduction of the purchase contract and settlement statement on grounds that
Burt had no personal involvement in the transaction, but these objections were overruled.
The Board of Tax Appeal's Decision
{¶ 20} On December 17, 2024, the BTA issued a decision rejecting Snider
Crossing's jurisdictional arguments and addressing the substantive valuation issues. The
BTA concluded that the BOE had properly established jurisdiction under R.C.
5715.19(A)(6) and that the March 2021 entity transfer constituted a qualifying sale under
the statute's cross-referenced R.C. 5713.03. On the merits, the BTA determined that the
sale provided the best evidence of the property's true value and set the assessed value
at $3,742,500, the actual transaction price.
{¶ 21} The decision synthesized the evidentiary record developed through both
BOR and BTA proceedings, finding that the purchase contract and settlement statement
provided conclusive proof of the transaction's terms and that Burt's verification efforts
demonstrated the sale's arm's length character. The BTA rejected Snider Crossing's
arguments that entity transfers categorically cannot qualify as sales under the amended
statute and that the BOE's preliminary evidence at the BOR level was insufficient to
establish jurisdiction.
{¶ 22} Snider Crossing appealed.
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II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 23} Snider Crossing presents five assignments of error challenging various
aspects of the BTA's jurisdictional and substantive determinations. These assignments of
error challenge the framework for establishing jurisdiction under amended R.C.
5715.19(A)(6), the sufficiency of evidence presented at different procedural stages, the
qualification of entity transfers as sales, and the propriety of the BTA's case-management
decisions.
A. When and How Jurisdiction May Be Established
{¶ 24} Snider Crossing's first assignment of error alleges:
THE BTA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE BOE WAS NOT
REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THAT IT MET THE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTORY PROHIBITION ON
FILING A COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO R.C. 5715.19(A)(6),
EITHER AT THE TIME OF FILING OR AT THE HEARING
BEFORE THE WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION.
{¶ 25} This assignment of error challenges the framework for how jurisdictional
prerequisites operate under amended R.C. 5715.19(A)(6). The question is whether a
complainant must conclusively prove compliance with R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)'s conditions at
the outset of proceedings, or whether it may establish jurisdiction through the ordinary
course of administrative review.
{¶ 26} "We must affirm a BTA decision that is reasonable and lawful." Rover
Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Harris, 2025-Ohio-2806, ¶ 27, citing R.C. 5717.04. We review the
BTA's legal conclusions de novo. Id. "[B]ut issues relating to the credibility of witnesses
and the weighing of the evidence are subject to abuse-of-discretion review." Id.
{¶ 27} "The BOR is a creature of statute," possessing only the jurisdiction the
General Assembly has conferred. Kohl's Illinois, Inc. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2014-
Ohio-4353, ¶ 23. "A county board of revision's jurisdiction to hear and rule on complaints
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is defined by statute." (Citation omitted.) Groveport Madison Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v.
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2013-Ohio-4627, ¶ 9. Our task is to determine what that
statutory definition requires. "This is a question of statutory interpretation. As with any
question of statutory interpretation, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to
the legislature's intent." (Citation omitted.) Marysville Exempted Village School Bd. of
Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2024-Ohio-3323, ¶ 13.
1. The 2022 Amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)
{¶ 28} The amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) significantly restrict the authority of
school districts to challenge property valuations, establishing what one court described
as "severe restrictions on the participation of boards of education in seeking ad valorem
real property tax proceedings." Olentangy Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty.
Bd. of Revision, 2024-Ohio-1564, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.).
{¶ 29} Amended R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) begins with a prohibition: "The legislative
authority of a subdivision, the mayor of a municipal corporation, or a third party
complainant shall not file an original complaint with respect to property the subdivision or
complainant does not own or lease unless both of the following conditions are met." For
complaints based on recent sales, the property must have been "(i) sold in an arm's length
transaction, as described in section 5713.03 of the Revised Code, before, but not after,
the tax lien date for the tax year for which the complaint is to be filed," and "(ii) the sale
price exceeds the true value of the property appearing on the tax list for that tax year by
both ten per cent and the amount of the filing threshold determined under division (J) of
this section." For tax year 2022, that threshold was $500,000.
{¶ 30} These are substantive restrictions defining when a school board may file a
complaint. But the statute does not prescribe how or when compliance with these
restrictions must be demonstrated. The General Assembly changed the substantive
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standards for filing while leaving the procedural machinery intact. It included no
requirement for immediate proof of jurisdictional facts, no provision limiting when
supporting evidence may be presented, and no restriction on the BTA's authority to
consider jurisdictional questions de novo. Had the legislature intended to change
established precedent on how jurisdictional prerequisites operate in tax proceedings, we
think it would have said so explicitly. See Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, 2001-
Ohio-39 ("It is presumed that the General Assembly is fully aware of any prior judicial
interpretation of an existing statute when enacting an amendment.").
2. Snider Crossing's Bifurcated Theory
{¶ 31} Snider Crossing advances a novel theory of jurisdictional administration.
Under this view, the amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) created a rigid two-stage
process: first, the BOR must make threshold jurisdictional determinations based solely on
evidence presented at that level; second, only if jurisdiction is conclusively established
may the case proceed to substantive review. Any evidentiary inadequacy at the BOR
level, Snider Crossing contends, creates an incurable jurisdictional defect mandating
dismissal.
{¶ 32} But this theory finds no support in the statutory text. R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)
contains no language requiring immediate proof of jurisdictional facts or limiting the
venues for establishing compliance. The statute uses the language of prohibition and
exception, not the language of procedure and proof. It states what facts must exist for
jurisdiction, not when or how those facts must be demonstrated.
3. What Existing Law Requires
{¶ 33} The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between the
existence of jurisdictional facts and the timing of their proof. In Worthington City Schools
Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2009-Ohio-5932, the Court confronted similar
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jurisdictional prerequisites under the second-filing prohibition in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2),
which prohibits filing a second valuation complaint unless at least one of four statutory
exceptions applies. The Court noted that "the school board complied with the language
of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) by indicating on the complaint that the first of the four exceptions
applied." Worthington at ¶ 19. The Court did not require contemporaneous proof but
rather proper allegation followed by opportunity to produce evidentiary support.
{¶ 34} The Court's subsequent decision in Glyptis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of
Revision, 2018-Ohio-1437, reinforces this understanding. There, the Court affirmed the
BTA's finding that complainants "'properly alleged one of the four circumstances set forth
in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) on the face of the complaint and offered sufficient evidence to show
that [the complaint] qualified for the exception.'" Glyptis at ¶ 7 (quoting the BTA decision).
Importantly, the Court approved the BTA's reliance on evidence presented at both the
BOR hearing and the BTA hearing to establish the exception. See id. at ¶ 4, ¶ 5. Thus
evidence presented to the BTA, not just the BOR, established jurisdiction.
{¶ 35} Snider Crossing attempts to distinguish these precedents as pre-
amendment decisions, but this misses the point. The statutory structure remains the
same: a general prohibition with specific exceptions that must be satisfied for jurisdiction
to exist. The 2022 amendments changed which exceptions apply to school districts, not
how compliance with those exceptions may be demonstrated.
{¶ 36} Snider Crossing places great weight on Soyko Kulchystsky, L.L.C. v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2014-Ohio-4511, arguing it mandates contemporaneous
proof of jurisdiction. But Soyko addresses a different question entirely. The Ohio Supreme
Court said that "compliance [with R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)] should be determined as of the time
of filing," meaning the circumstances at the time of filing were dispositive as to that
statutory prohibition. Id. at ¶ 31. This addresses a temporal question: whether
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jurisdictional facts must exist when the complaint is filed. It does not address an
evidentiary question: when those facts must be proven.
{¶ 37} The distinction matters. A sale that occurred before the tax lien date either
happened or it did not; the sale price either exceeded the statutory thresholds or it did
not. These are objective facts that existed, or did not exist, at the moment of filing.
Whether a complainant can immediately prove these facts through admissible evidence
is an entirely different question. Soyko answered the first question, not the second.
{¶ 38} As the BTA correctly explained in its decision, this principle means "the
Board must consider whether, at the time the complaint was filed, the property had been
the subject of an arm's-length sale before the tax lien date and the sale price was at least
$500,000 and 10% above the Auditor's value." The inquiry focuses on historical fact, not
contemporaneous proof.
{¶ 39} The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Diley Ridge Med. Ctr. v. Fairfield Cty.
Bd. of Revision, 2014-Ohio-5030, provides guidance on how jurisdictional requirements
interact with procedural fairness. In that case, when the BTA dismissed a complaint for
lack of standing without allowing the complainant to present evidence, the Court reversed.
The complainant, the Court held, "ought to have been accorded the opportunity both to
assert and to prove the basis for its standing to maintain the complaint." (Emphasis sic.)
Diley at ¶ 24.
{¶ 40} This principle applies with equal force here. The filing restrictions in R.C.
5715.19(A)(6) operate as standing requirements that must be satisfied for jurisdiction to
exist. And, as Diley teaches, complainants must have meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate their right to relief.
{¶ 41} Snider Crossing's proposed framework would create an anomalous
procedural framework. Under its theory, any evidentiary deficiency at the BOR level would
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constitute an incurable jurisdictional defect. This approach would transform every
procedural inadequacy into a substantive barrier to relief, creating an unnecessarily harsh
standard inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the tax appeal system. The BOR, an
informal body designed for accessible dispute resolution, would become a court of first
and last resort on complex jurisdictional questions.
{¶ 42} Moreover, Snider Crossing's framework would create significant practical
difficulties. Different BOR panels might apply varying evidentiary standards to
jurisdictional questions, creating inconsistent results for similarly situated complainants.
The existing framework, by contrast, provides uniform review through the BTA's de novo
jurisdiction and ensures consistent application of legal standards.
4. Application to the Present Case
{¶ 43} Here, the BOE's complaint alleged that the subject property was sold on
March 2, 2021, for $3,750,000, which exceeded the Auditor's valuation by more than the
statutorily required percentages and dollar amounts. These allegations, if true, would
satisfy R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). The subsequent proceedings established their truth
through the purchase contract, settlement statement, and appraisal testimony.
{¶ 44} The BOE properly invoked jurisdiction by alleging facts that, if proven, would
satisfy the statutory requirements. The administrative process then tested those
allegations through discovery and hearings. The evidence ultimately confirmed them.
Jurisdiction existed because the facts existed, not because they were proven at any
particular moment.
{¶ 45} Snider Crossing complains that this approach gives school districts a "free
pass" on jurisdictional requirements. But school districts must still prove the jurisdictional
facts; they simply need not do so at the earliest possible moment or in the least convenient
forum. The requirements remain stringent. Only the timeline for proof maintains
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appropriate flexibility.
5. Conclusion
{¶ 46} The BTA correctly interpreted R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) as creating substantive
filing restrictions while preserving procedural flexibility for proving compliance. This
interpretation accords with the statutory text and follows established precedent. The
General Assembly changed substantive requirements but chose not to upend established
procedural practice. We will not read into the statute restrictions the legislature chose not
to include.
{¶ 47} The first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Sufficiency of Evidence Establishing a Sale
{¶ 48} The second assignment of error alleges:
THE BTA ERRED BY NOT ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF
THE BOE'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE BOE FAILED TO
PRESENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE
SALE AT THE BOR HEARING.
{¶ 49} This assignment of error challenges the evidentiary sufficiency of the BOE's
jurisdictional showing specifically at the BOR level. While Snider Crossing's argument
here shares common ground with the first assignment of error's jurisdictional-framework
argument, it presents a distinct question about the evidence that must be presented to
establish compliance with R.C. 5715.19(A)(6).
{¶ 50} Our analysis of the first assignment of error established the controlling legal
framework: R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) creates substantive restrictions on when school districts
may file valuation complaints while preserving the established procedural mechanisms
for proving compliance with those restrictions. The statute requires that jurisdictional facts
exist at the time of filing, but it does not mandate that those facts be conclusively proven
at that time or at any particular stage of the administrative process. Under this framework,
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the BOE bore the burden of properly alleging jurisdictional facts in its complaint and
ultimately establishing those facts through the administrative process. The timing and
venue for that proof, however, remained subject to the ordinary operation of
administrative procedure rather than the rigid bifurcated approach Snider Crossing
advocates.
{¶ 51} Snider Crossing's argument here directly contradicts our framework by
insisting that evidentiary inadequacies at the BOR level mandate dismissal regardless of
subsequent proof. This approach would effectively require immediate and conclusive
jurisdictional determinations at the informal BOR level, precisely the result we already
rejected.
{¶ 52} Snider Crossing's argument also misconceives the role and function of BOR
proceedings within the administrative tax system. The BOR operates as an informal
administrative body designed to provide accessible dispute resolution for property tax
matters. As the BOE correctly observed, "proceedings before a board of revision 'are not
governed by the Rules of Evidence.'" Remington Clean Fill LLC v. Milford Exempted
Village Schools Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-3779, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.), quoting Dayton Supply &
Tool Co. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2006-Ohio-5852, ¶ 24.
{¶ 53} The administrative structure contemplates that more complex evidentiary
questions will receive attention at the appellate level, where the BTA exercises de novo
jurisdiction. See Key Serv. Corp. v. Zaino, 2002-Ohio-1488. The BTA has statutory
authority to conduct comprehensive administrative appeals. Id. During these appeals,
parties may present additional evidence beyond what the BOR originally reviewed. Id.
The BTA can also conduct its own investigation to gather more facts and reach
conclusions that are independent of the BOR's findings. Id. See R.C. 5717.02(E). Under
R.C. 5717.03, the BTA has the power to modify existing orders based on these
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independent determinations. R.C. 5717.02(E) gives the BTA authority to hear appeals
based solely on the existing record and evidence but, if any interested party requests it,
the BTA must allow additional evidence to be presented.
{¶ 54} Snider Crossing's characterization of the BOR evidence as wholly
inadequate does not withstand scrutiny. The record establishes that the BOE presented
multiple forms of evidence supporting its jurisdictional allegations. The BOE's evidence
included appraiser James Burt's written report stating that the March 2021 transfer
"appears to be an arms-length sale," Burt's testimony that he had knowledge of the sale
and that "another appraiser in his office had confirmed its validity through conversations
with one of the brokers involved in the transaction," and a CoStar printout documenting
the transaction details.
{¶ 55} While Snider Crossing focuses on the tentative language in Burt's written
report, this critique misses the broader evidentiary picture. Burt testified that he had
researched the transaction through multiple sources and that the sale had been
independently verified by another professional in his office. The CoStar documentation
provided additional corroboration of the transaction's basic parameters, including the
involvement of both listing and buying brokers and the arms-length character of the deal.
{¶ 56} More fundamentally, Snider Crossing's critique conflates the preliminary
showing required for jurisdictional purposes with the ultimate burden of proof on the
merits. The proper inquiry is not whether the BOR evidence would satisfy formal
evidentiary standards for ultimate resolution of the merits, but whether it provided
adequate foundation for the BOE's jurisdictional allegations, pending further development
through the administrative process. Under our analysis of the first assignment of error,
complainants who properly allege jurisdictional facts may proceed if those facts are
ultimately substantiated, regardless of the initial quality of proof.
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{¶ 57} The evidence before the BOR clearly supported the BOE's jurisdictional
allegations, that the property was sold on March 2, 2021, for a price exceeding the
statutory thresholds. Burt's professional verification of the transaction, combined with the
CoStar documentation, provided a reasonable foundation for these allegations even if it
would not constitute definitive proof for ultimate resolution of the case.
{¶ 58} The administrative process ultimately vindicated the BOE's jurisdictional
allegations through the presentation of definitive documentary evidence. The purchase
contract and settlement statement obtained through discovery provided conclusive proof
of the March 2021 transaction and its terms. This evidence confirmed that the
jurisdictional prerequisites existed at the time of filing and that the BOE's original
allegations were factually accurate. Under our framework from the first assignment of
error, this proof established jurisdiction regardless of any preliminary evidentiary
limitations. Because the key question was whether the jurisdictional facts existed when
the complaint was filed, not whether those facts were immediately provable through
admissible evidence at the BOR level.
{¶ 59} Snider Crossing argues that Burt's appraisal testimony constituted
inadmissible hearsay that could not support jurisdictional findings. This argument
mischaracterizes both the nature of Burt's testimony and the standards governing
preliminary jurisdictional determinations. When Burt testified about his investigation and
verification of the March 2021 transaction, he was providing factual testimony about his
professional activities rather than offering inadmissible hearsay about third-party
statements.
{¶ 60} Moreover, even accepting Snider Crossing's evidentiary characterizations,
the BOR was not required to adhere to the hearsay rule under the rules of evidence. See
HealthSouth Corp. v. Testa, 2012-Ohio-1871, ¶ 13 (stating that "[t]he rules of evidence,
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including the hearsay rule, do not control administrative hearings"). The BOR's role is to
make preliminary determinations based on available information, with the understanding
that more formal evidentiary development will occur if the case proceeds to the BTA level.
We note too the Ohio Supreme Court's observation that "an expert appraiser must at
times rely on hearsay evidence to perform his or her job. 'Some hearsay evidence
necessarily is always involved with expert testimony. To become an expert, one must
read and learn from sources which are necessarily outside the evidence at trial. It is this
knowledge obtained from outside sources which qualifies a witness as an expert.'" Hilliard
City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2018-Ohio-2046, ¶ 37, quoting
Worthington City Schools v. ABCO Insulation, 84 Ohio App.3d 144, 152 (10th Dist. 1992).
{¶ 61} Snider Crossing's citation to BTA decisions rejecting CoStar printouts in
other contexts does not support its position here. Those decisions addressed ultimate
burdens of proof on the merits in cases where complainants relied exclusively on
unauthenticated database printouts. Here, by contrast, the CoStar information was
authenticated by expert testimony and supplemented by additional evidence of the
appraiser's independent verification efforts.
{¶ 62} The BTA reasonably and lawfully determined that the BOE had presented
adequate evidence to survive preliminary jurisdictional challenge. The decision to deny
Snider Crossing's motion to dismiss and permit the case to proceed to discovery and
hearings was entirely consistent with established principles of administrative law that
favor resolution on the merits rather than dismissal on technical procedural grounds.
{¶ 63} Having established in our analysis of the first assignment that jurisdictional
compliance may be demonstrated through the entirety of the administrative process, the
adequacy of evidence presented specifically at the BOR level becomes legally irrelevant
to the ultimate jurisdictional determination. The BTA's access to comprehensive evidence
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establishing the March 2021 transaction provides the appropriate foundation for its
jurisdictional conclusion, regardless of any preliminary evidentiary limitations.
{¶ 64} The second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Evidence of Sale Price Thresholds
{¶ 65} The third assignment of error alleges:
THE BTA ERRED BY NOT ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF
THE BOE'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE IT FAILED TO
ESTABLISH WITH ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
BOR THAT THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION HAD A SALE
PRICE THAT MET THE $500,000 AND 10% THRESHOLDS
REQUIRED BY R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(A)(ii).
{¶ 66} Snider Crossing's third assignment of error advances a challenge to the
sufficiency of evidence establishing the price threshold requirements of R.C.
5715.19(A)(6)(a)(ii). Unlike the broader jurisdictional framework questions addressed in
the first two assignments of error, this assignment of error focuses specifically on whether
appraisal testimony can establish sale prices for jurisdictional purposes.
{¶ 67} The framework established in our review of the first assignment of error
governs the third assignment of error's price-threshold challenge. R.C.
5715.19(A)(6)(a)(ii) requires that "the sale price exceeds the true value of the property
appearing on the tax list for that tax year by both ten per cent and the amount of the filing
threshold determined under division (J) of this section," which for tax year 2022 was
$500,000. The critical inquiry is whether the BTA had sufficient evidence to determine
that these requirements were satisfied at the time of filing, not whether that evidence was
conclusively presented at any particular procedural stage.
{¶ 68} Snider Crossing argues that "an opinion of value in an appraisal report is
not evidence of a sale price, and it is a sale price that must be established." This
distinction draws an artificial line between appraisal testimony about transaction details
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and documentary evidence of those same details. The argument fails because it
mischaracterizes both the nature of Burt's testimony and the ultimate evidentiary
foundation for the BTA's price threshold determination.
{¶ 69} When appraiser James Burt testified about the March 2021 transaction, he
was not offering subjective opinions about property value but reporting factual information
about a documented real estate sale. As Burt testified at the BTA hearing, he had
"personally verified the sale in September 2021" and had obtained specific transaction
details including the purchase price of $3,742,500. This testimony constituted factual
reporting about historical events, not the type of opinion evidence Snider Crossing
describes. Moreover, Snider Crossing's characterization ignores the distinction between
preliminary proof and ultimate evidence. Even accepting that Burt's BOR testimony alone
might have been insufficient for final jurisdictional determination, the BTA proceedings
produced definitive documentary evidence that mooted any preliminary evidentiary
concerns.
{¶ 70} The record establishes beyond dispute that the price threshold
requirements were satisfied. The property's assessed value for tax year 2022 was
$2,878,020. The purchase contract and settlement statement, authenticated and
admitted into evidence at the BTA hearing, demonstrate that the property sold for
$3,742,500 in March 2021. This sale price exceeded the assessed value by $864,480,
representing both more than ten percent of the assessed value and more than the
required $500,000 filing threshold. These documents provide conclusive evidence that
the jurisdictional prerequisites existed at the time the BOE filed its complaint in March
2023. The sale occurred well before the relevant tax lien date and exceeded the statutory
thresholds by substantial margins. This documentary evidence establishes jurisdiction
regardless of any preliminary evidentiary limitations at the BOR level.
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{¶ 71} The subsequent presentation of primary documentary evidence through
discovery validated the BOE's original allegations and demonstrated that its complaint
was not speculative but was grounded in verifiable facts about a documented real estate
transaction. This ultimate confirmation of the jurisdictional facts establishes the propriety
of the BTA's decision to proceed with substantive review.
{¶ 72} The BTA possessed adequate evidence to determine that the price
threshold requirements of R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a)(ii) were satisfied at the time of filing.
{¶ 73} The third assignment of error is overruled.
D. Entity Transfer as "Sale"
{¶ 74} The fourth assignment of error alleges:
THE BTA ERRED IN FINDING THAT ANY FORM OF
TRANSFER IS A SALE THAT WOULD ESTABLISH
JURISDICTION UNDER R.C. 5715.19(A)(6). THE ALLEGED
TRANSFER THE BOE RELIES UPON DOES NOT MEET
THE REQUIREMENTS IN R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(A)(i) AND R.C.
5713.03.
{¶ 75} This assignment of error presents a question of statutory interpretation:
whether the March 2021 entity transfer constitutes a qualifying "sale" under the
jurisdictional requirements of R.C. 5715.19(A)(6). The question requires us to construe
the meaning of "sold in an arm's length transaction, as described in section 5713.03 of
the Revised Code" and to determine whether entity transfers can satisfy this requirement.
{¶ 76} R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a)(i) requires that property was "sold in an arm's length
transaction, as described in section 5713.03 of the Revised Code, before, but not after,
the tax lien date for the tax year for which the complaint is to be filed." This explicit cross-
reference to R.C. 5713.03 indicates that the General Assembly intended to incorporate
the established framework that governs valuation determinations throughout the property
tax system. Had the legislature intended to exclude entity transfers from the scope of
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qualifying sales, it could have done so explicitly. By incorporating the R.C. 5713.03
framework, the legislature showed an intent to maintain the established understanding.
{¶ 77} The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn.
v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2020-Ohio-353, ("Palmer House") provides definitive
guidance on the central question here. In Palmer House, the Court addressed whether
the sale of corporate ownership interests constituted a sale of real estate for purposes of
applying the sale-price presumption under R.C. 5713.03. The Court's analysis began with
the identical statutory language that governs here: the requirement for "'an arm's length
sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer within a reasonable length of time.'" Id.
at ¶ 28, quoting R.C. 5713.03.
{¶ 78} The Court rejected the categorical approach that Snider Crossing
advocates in this case. Specifically, the Court rejected "an iron rule that the sale of an
entity may never, for purposes of invoking the sale-price presumption, be viewed as
equivalent to a sale of the entity's real-estate asset." Id. at ¶ 36. Instead, the Court
adopted a functional approach that examines the substance of each transaction to
determine whether it constitutes an arm's length sale of real estate. Id. at ¶ 38-39. This
determination represented a finding that the jurisdictional prerequisites for treating the
transaction as a sale under R.C. 5713.03 had been satisfied.
{¶ 79} Snider Crossing attempts to characterize Palmer House as merely holding
that entity transfers are "like" sales for valuation purposes, rather than constituting actual
sales under R.C. 5713.03. This reading misreads the Court's holding and analysis. The
Court did not create a separate category of "sale-like" transactions with different legal
effects. Instead, the Court determined that the specific entity transfer at issue satisfied
the statutory definition of a qualifying sale because the evidence demonstrated that the
parties intended to effectuate a real estate transaction.
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{¶ 80} The Court's analysis focused on several key factors that distinguished the
Palmer House transaction from earlier cases where entity transfers had been found
insufficient. The purchase agreement was "labeled by the parties as 'Sale of Palmer
House'" and "Purchase and Sale Agreement." Palmer House, 2020-Ohio-353, at ¶ 38.
More importantly, "the contract takes the classic form of a purchase agreement for
commercial real estate by identifying as the subject matter of the transaction the specific
real property along with categories of personal property appurtenant to the commercial
operation of the real estate." Id. The contract also "includes an explicit provision setting
forth an optional method for consummating the deal as a transfer of corporate ownership
rather than a conveyance of real estate from the seller to the buyer." Id.
{¶ 81} Based on this evidence, the Court concluded that "the documentation in this
case made it reasonable for the BTA to find that this sale . . . reflected the parties' intent
to sell and purchase income-producing real estate and supported the BTA's finding that
the parties' transfer of corporate ownership constituted a contrivance for accomplishing
the sale of commercial real estate." Id. at ¶ 39.
{¶ 82} Snider Crossing relies heavily on earlier Supreme Court decisions in Salem
Med. Arts & Dev. Corp. v. Columbiana Cty. Bd. of Revision, 82 Ohio St.3d 193 (1998),
and Gahanna-Jefferson Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 89
Ohio St.3d 450 (2000), to support its position that entity transfers categorically cannot
constitute sales under R.C. 5713.03. This reliance is misplaced.
{¶ 83} In Palmer House, the Court specifically addressed and distinguished these
earlier decisions. The Court explained that in Salem Med. Arts and Gahanna-Jefferson,
"the purchase contracts provided for sales of corporate shares or partnership interests
without explicit reference to an intent to sell and buy the real estate itself." Palmer House,
2020-Ohio-353, at ¶ 37. Those cases involved pure business acquisitions where the
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purchasers acquired entity interests without any indication that they intended to acquire
the underlying real estate. The Court emphasized that the factual distinction was
dispositive: "In stark contrast, the BTA in this case confronted a document labeled by the
parties as 'Sale of Palmer House . . .' and 'Purchase and Sale Agreement.'" Id. at ¶ 38.
The Court's analysis makes clear that the legal standard focuses on the parties' intent
and the substance of their transaction, not on the formal structure they choose to
accomplish their objectives.
{¶ 84} Snider Crossing's argument that the General Assembly intended to exclude
entity transfers from the scope of qualifying sales lacks support in the statutory text. The
BTA correctly noted that the General Assembly was fully aware of the Palmer House
decision when it enacted the 2022 amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A)(6). Despite this
knowledge, the legislature chose not to exclude entity transfers from the definition of
qualifying sales.
{¶ 85} When the legislature enacts amendments against the backdrop of existing
judicial interpretations and chooses not to override those interpretations, it demonstrates
approval of the judicial approach. See Clark, 91 Ohio St.3d at 278 ("It is presumed that
the General Assembly is fully aware of any prior judicial interpretation of an existing
statute when enacting an amendment."). The General Assembly's decision to reference
R.C. 5713.03 without limitation, combined with its failure to exclude entity transfers
despite clear opportunities to do so, confirms that such transactions remain within the
scope of qualifying sales.
{¶ 86} The record here establishes that the March 2021 transaction possesses all
the characteristics that the Supreme Court identified as supporting a finding of a qualifying
sale in Palmer House. The purchase contract was specifically captioned as an agreement
for the sale of real estate and identified "the specific real property" as the subject matter
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of the transaction. The contract contained "an explicit provision setting forth an optional
method for consummating the transaction as a transfer of corporate ownership rather
than a direct conveyance of real estate."
{¶ 87} The evidence supports the BTA's finding that this was an arm's length
transaction between unrelated parties who were represented by real estate brokers. The
property was marketed for sale before the transaction was completed. The settlement
statement confirmed that only real estate was transferred, with no personal property or
other business assets included in the transaction.
{¶ 88} This evidence supports the conclusion that the entity transfer constituted
what the Palmer House Court described as "a contrivance for accomplishing the sale of
commercial real estate" rather than a business acquisition. Palmer House, 2020-Ohio-
353, at ¶ 39. Snider Crossing's approach focuses on form over substance. The arm's
length transaction requirement in R.C. 5713.03 is designed to identify transactions that
reflect true market conditions and genuine negotiations between unrelated parties. When
an entity transfer accomplishes the economic equivalent of a real estate sale under arm's
length conditions, the statutory purposes are fully served regardless of the formal
structure employed.
{¶ 89} The BTA reasonably and lawfully determined that the March 2021 entity
transfer constituted a qualifying sale under R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a)(i) and R.C. 5713.03.
This determination follows established precedent, applies well-settled principles of
statutory construction, and rests on adequate factual findings supported by the record.
{¶ 90} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
E. Case-Management Decisions
{¶ 91} The fifth assignment of error alleges:
THE BTA ERRED BY NOT DISMISSING THE APPEAL FOR
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A LACK OF JURISDICTION. BY PERMITTING THE CASE
TO PROCEED FORWARD WITH DISCOVERY AND TO A
MERIT HEARING WHEN THE BOR AND THE BTA'S
JURISDICTION IS IN ISSUE, THE BTA'S ORDER
IRREPARABLY HARMED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS BY
DISCLOSURE OF NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION.
{¶ 92} Snider Crossing's final assignment of error presents a two-pronged attack
on the BTA's procedural management of this case. First, it contends that the BTA should
have dismissed the entire proceeding for lack of jurisdiction rather than allowing
development through discovery and hearings. Second, Snider Crossing alleges that
permitting the case to proceed while jurisdictional questions remained unresolved caused
irreparable harm through compelled disclosure of confidential business information.
{¶ 93} Snider Crossing's argument for jurisdictional dismissal has been rendered
entirely moot by our resolution of the first four assignments of error, determining that the
BTA correctly interpreted R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) as permitting jurisdictional development
through ordinary administrative procedures and concluding that the BOE ultimately
established all requisite jurisdictional facts.
{¶ 94} Snider Crossing's assertion of procedural harm through compelled
disclosure lacks both factual foundation and legal merit. The record demonstrates that
the BOE discovered the March 2021 transaction through its own investigation rather than
through formal discovery processes directed at Snider Crossing. As the Auditor and BOR
observe in their brief, "it did not take a formal discovery order or the filing of a formal
complaint for the BOE to discover the sale of the property. The BOE located that
information on its own, forming the basis of its complaint against valuation and the basis
of jurisdiction for the BOE to file such a complaint."
{¶ 95} This factual reality undermines Snider Crossing's entire harm theory. The
BOE based its jurisdictional allegations on information it had already obtained through
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public sources and professional channels, not on confidential data extracted through
compulsory process. The appraiser James Burt testified that he verified the sale "in
September 2021" and began using it as a comparable in other appraisals thereafter,
indicating that transaction details were available through professional networks well
before any formal discovery commenced.
{¶ 96} More fundamentally, Snider Crossing fails to identify any specific procedural
harm or to demonstrate that it was denied adequate protective mechanisms during the
administrative proceedings. The BOE correctly notes in its brief that "during the discovery
phase, Appellant could have filed a motion for a protective order seeking to limit the
discovery given to the School District. Appellant filed no such motion." This failure to
pursue available procedural safeguards constitutes a clear waiver of any objection to the
scope or burden of discovery.
{¶ 97} Even accepting Snider Crossing's characterization of the discovery
process, its harm claim fails because it identifies no cognizable legal injury flowing from
the BTA's procedural decisions. The information ultimately disclosed through discovery
consisted primarily of standard commercial real estate transaction documents that
evidenced a sale Snider Crossing does not seriously dispute occurred. The purchase
contract and settlement statement represent the type of business records that property
owners routinely produce in tax valuation proceedings.
{¶ 98} Moreover, the record suggests that much of the relevant information was
already available through public or semi-public sources. The transaction was documented
in CoStar records, mortgage filings were made in public records, and professional
appraisers had verified the sale details well before any formal discovery commenced.
Snider Crossing's claim of harm through disclosure of "non-public information" does not
rest on concrete injury from inappropriate revelation of sensitive data.
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{¶ 99} We see no error in the BTA's management of this case.
{¶ 100} The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 101} We have overruled each of the assignments of error presented. Therefore
the BTA's decision is affirmed.
BYRNE, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is
the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same
hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals for
execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry
shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
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